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ABSTRACT 
The original contribution of this study is to demonstrate how North Korea 
survives by using smart power.  The existing literature has offered partial 
explanations, but many have lost their explanatory power over time and there 
seems to be no definitive answer to explain how North Korea survives.  This 
multi-case study was designed to explore how the North uses smart power by 
examining its provocations from the Korean War to August 2015.  The rationale 
for this study is to increase understanding of Pyongyang’s behavior and offer 
recommendations to bring long-term stability to the Korean Peninsula.  This 
study purposefully began with the Korean War because it was assumed that, 
without understanding the origin of North Korean provocations, it would be 
difficult to provide the proper temporal context for other provocations.   
This study reveals that Kim Il-sung and his guerrillas consolidated power 
and established totalitarian rule dominated by his Juche ideology (self-reliance).  
Subsequently, they waged a long war of reunification from 1948 to the 1980s.  
Although Kim’s smart power attempts failed to achieve his principal aim of 
reunification, when Beijing and Moscow abandoned him in the early 1990s he 
focused on regime survival.  He bolstered his weak hand by playing the nuclear 
card to buy more time to ensure the hereditary succession by his son Kim Jong-
il, who defied predictions he would not survive and proclaimed Songun (military-
first) to deal with the changing international environment.  He demonstrated his 
own skill by exploiting Seoul’s Sunshine Policy and successfully negotiating 
three nuclear agreements with the U.S.  After his death, Kim Jong-un waged a 
reign of terror to consolidate power and manufactured crises to bolster his 
legitimacy and demonstrate his leadership.  He also invoked his grandfather’s 
anti-Japanese legacy and the Byungjin policy (simultaneous development of 
nuclear weapons and the economy) to legitimize his rule.  The evidence shows 
he is rational and that offers opportunities to resolve the North Korea issue.       
Keywords:  
North Korea, Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Un, Juche, Songun, Byungjin, 
Smart Power, Sunshine Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Provocations, Reunification. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Smart 
Power 
 
Joseph Nye argued that smart power is the “ability to combine the 
hard power of coercion or payment with the soft power of 
attraction into a successful strategy.”i  The essence of Nye’s 
concept is resolving the challenge of power conversion.  This 
means actors involved must understand the power resources 
available and appreciate “the problems of combining them 
effectively in various contexts.”ii  The attainment of favorable 
outcomes also requires “contextual intelligence” to understand the 
evolving domestic and international situation to identify the right 
mix of hard and soft power to achieve desired outcomes.iii   
      
 
Provocation 
 
Hannah Fischer defined provocation as an “armed invasion; 
border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; 
hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and 
bombing); threat/intimidation against political leaders, media 
personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of 
the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede 
progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons.”iv  On the other hand, the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies focused only on provocations that 
resulted in casualties which included “major armed conflicts, 
military/espionage incursions, border infractions, [and] acts of 
terrorism.”  As a result, it omitted North Korean verbal rhetoric, 
kidnappings, missile launches, and nuclear tests.v  This study’s 
definition of provocations will be more inclusive and include all of 
these activities identified in both studies.  Moreover, many believe 
the regime has successfully employed a strategy based on a 
cycle of nuclear provocations.  North Korea would begin by 
manufacturing a crisis; then it would be open to negotiations, only 
to backtrack to get a better deal.  If that failed, it would escalate 
the crisis and be willing to re-negotiate to continue the cycle.vi   
 
                                            
i
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The War on Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the_war_on_soft_power (accessed June 12, 
2014).   
ii
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 23. 
iii
 Nye, The Future of Power, p. 212. 
iv
 Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007,” Congressional Research 
Service, April 20, 2007, p. CRS-1. 
v 
Office of the Korea Chair, “Record of North Korea’s Major Conventional Provocations since 
1960s,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 25, 2010, p. 1. 
vi
 Gregory J. Moore, ed., North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Regional Security & 
Nonproliferation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. x. 
xxii 
 
Totalitarian 
Dictatorship 
 
Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed there are six traits 
of totalitarian dictatorships and they are dominant ideology, single 
party led by a dictator, secret police control over society, 
monopoly control of information, regime control of the army, and 
central command of the economy.  I accept these six traits of 
totalitarianism as I proceed to examine the three Kims. 
 
 
Juche 
 
While many scholars have simply used “self-reliance” to define 
Juche, Suh Jae-jung argued it is “best understood as subjecthood 
or being a master of one’s own fate.”vii  According to Michael 
Robinson, Juche symbolizes “one’s independence and autonomy 
from any external control or manipulation.”viii  Bruce Cumings 
went on to say that Juche “means self-reliance and independence 
in politics, economics, defense, and ideology.”ix  The concept is 
best understood as an antonym for sadaejuui, which means 
“serving and relying upon foreign power.”  In the end, Cumings 
noted that the meaning of Juche “might best be translated as 
putting Korean things first, always: it suggests a type of 
nationalism.”x  Kim Il-sung’s claimed Juche meant “doing 
everything in conformity with the actual conditions of our country, 
creatively applying the general principles of Marxism-Leninism 
plus the experiences of other countries to our own country in 
accordance with our actual conditions.”   He also stressed 
Koreans had to solve their own problems and not depend on 
others to achieve the goals of the revolution.xi  Hence, I will 
accept “self-reliance,” an expression of Korean nationalism, and 
“being a master of one’s own fate” as the core principles of Juche. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
vii
 Jae-Jung Suh, ed., Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War and Development 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 2. 
viii
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University of Hawaii Press, 2007), p. 159. 
ix
 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997), pp. 402-404. 
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xxiii 
 
Suryong (or 
Supreme 
Leader) 
 
Suh Dae-sook noted that in the late 1960s North Korea began to 
use the term Suryong, which means the “Supreme Leader,” to 
describe Kim Il-sung.xii  According to Cumings, the term Suryong 
comes from an old Koguryoxiii term that means “maximum 
leader.”xiv  This study will accept the term Suryong to mean the 
member of the Kim family who is the official ruler of North Korea.   
 
 
Songun (or 
Military-
First Policy) 
 
Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh argued the origin of Songun is 
Kim Il-sung’s Four Military Guidelines policy to deal with a 
complex international environment that was increasingly 
unfavorable to North Korea by the early 1960s.xv  I agree there is 
a linkage between Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s responses to 
the changing international environment in the early 1960s and the 
mid-1990s.  Kim Il-sung’s equal emphasis policy or simultaneous 
development of the economy and defense was really meant to 
prioritize the development of the military over the economy.xvi        
 
 
  
                                            
xii
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1988), p. 197. 
xiii
 Lim Jae-Cheon, in his work titled Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, argues that in the 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the most part, North Korean policy has been mysterious.  The 
only patterns that seem tolerably clear are that North Korea will do 
something provocative when it feels ignored or under serious 
economic strain, and that it will make commitments and keep 
them only as long as it takes to bilk the international community 
out of valuable resources.1  
 
    - Joseph Nye, Jr., and David Welch 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This study seeks to explore the phenomenon of how North Korea 
continues to defy predictions that its end is near and survives despite the fall of 
the Soviet Union, death of its founder Kim Il-sung, and tightening of U.S.-led 
international sanctions.  The purpose of this multiple-case study2 is to examine 
the reigns of the three Kims (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un) and 
determine how they have managed to survive over time.  What the study 
reveals is that in most cases the Kims made rational choices and this revelation 
is important because as Joseph Nye, Jr., and David Welch noted, “It is 
impossible to know how best to deal with North Korea without having a sense of 
what North Korea wants and why it does what it does.”3  I will use Nye’s smart 
power theory as an analytical tool4 to divine the “erratic, unpredictable, and 
mysterious” behavior of the North Koreans5 to reveal new insights about their 
decision-making, and ultimately offer an alternative explanation for how the 
regime persists.  Whether Kim Jong-un succeeds in prolonging his regime or 
not has profound security and economic implications for Northeast Asia and 
                                            
1 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An 
Introduction to Theory and History, 8
th
 ed. (Boston, MA: Longman, 2011), p. 234. 
2
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3
rd
 ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2003), p. 46. 
3 
Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, p. 234. 
4
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 210.  Nye argued 
that his smart power theory could be used as an analytical tool and is not only for examining 
how the U.S. wields power. 
5 
Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, p. 234. 
2 
beyond.  This chapter begins with an overview of the context and background to 
frame the research before focusing on the problem statement, the statement of 
purpose, and the related research questions.  This chapter next explains my 
research approach and personal views regarding North Korea, as well as my 
assumptions for the study.  It concludes with the rationale and significance of 
the research and defines key terminology used in the study.6    
     
1.2  Background and Context 
Arguably, since the end of the Korean War, the survivability of North 
Korea had not been in question until near the end of Kim Il-sung’s rule.  In fact, 
North Korea has claimed, “Since the first days of the country’s division by 
foreign forces, the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Government of the Republic 
have put forward the Juche-oriented policies for national reunification, reflecting 
the unanimous will and desire of the entire Korean people and exerted every 
sincere effort for their realization.”7  The result of the multi-case study supports 
North Korea’s claim that Kim Il-sung did all he could to achieve reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula.  However, since his death in July 1994, North Korea has 
often been characterized by some as a failing state8 teetering on the verge of 
collapse.9  Over 20 years ago, Ahn Byung-joon noted that, as Kim Jong-il was 
beginning to consolidate his power after the death of Kim Il-sung, his reign 
would be “short-lived.”10  Ahn reasoned that unless Kim Jong-il instituted 
political and economic reforms he would not survive.  The country was almost in 
total isolation and its economy was on the brink of collapse.  According to this 
                                            
6
 Linda Dale Bloomberg and Marie Volpe, Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Road 
Map From Beginning to End, 2
nd
 ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012), p. 68.  
This thesis follows many of the organizational concepts recommended in this reference for 
chapters 1 to 3. 
7
 Reunification Program of the DPRK (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1982), p. 1. 
8 Hong Yung Lee, “North Korea in 2012: Kim Jong Un’s Succession,” Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 
1 (January/February 2013), p. 177., and Nicholas Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: 
Between Crisis & Catastrophe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), pp. 11-13. 
9 
Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger, eds., The Survival of North Korea: 
Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 2011), p. 1, and Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1999), p. 4. 
10 Ahn Byung-joon, “The Man Who Would Be Kim,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November-
December 1994), pp. 94-108.  
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view, unless Kim was willing to pursue economic liberalization and give up 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, he would be doomed to fail.11  
However, Kim chose not to reform during his reign and somehow managed to 
survive until he suffered a heart attack at the age of 69.12   
Kim Jong-il survived despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the death of Kim 
Il-sung,13 tightening of U.S.-led international sanctions,14 and penetration of 
information from the outside.15  The prevailing explanations of how North Korea 
survived under Kim Jong-il arguably ranged from his father’s guerrilla legacy,16 
foreign aid,17 the China factor,18 illicit activities,19 nuclear deterrence,20 and 
ideology21 to the staying power of North Korea’s totalitarian system.22  In spite 
of these explanations, one poll of North Korea experts in 2014 indicated that 
about 70 percent of them believed Kim Jong-un’s regime would collapse within 
10 to 20 years.23  Therefore, the fate of the Kim regime has gone back to the 
                                            
11 Ahn, “The Man Who Would Be Kim,” pp. 94-108.  
12 Lee, “North Korea in 2012,” pp. 176-77. 
13
 CIA Intelligence Report, “Exploring the Implications of Alternative North Korean End Games: 
Results from a Discussion Panel on Continuing Coexistence Between North and South Korea,” 
January 21, 1998 (released March 2004), pp. 1-4. 
14
 U.S. efforts to pressure Pyongyang are found in Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The 
Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). 
15 
A useful discussion on how penetration of outside information could end North Korea is found 
in Melanie Kirkpatrick, Escape from North Korea (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), pp. 275-
294. 
16 
Han Hong-koo, “Wounded Nationalism: The Minsaengdan Incident and Kim Il Sung in Eastern 
Manchuria” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1999), pp. 19 and 354. 
17
 Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, June 2000), p. 10.   
18 
Jinhwan Oh and Jiyong Ryu, “The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions on North Korea, 
China’s Vital Role,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 
120-123. 
19
 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Why Hasn’t North Korea Collapsed? Understanding the Recent Past, 
Thinking About the Future,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The 
Politics of Survival (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 273-277.   
20 
Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security 
(London, UK: Routledge, 2011), pp. 159-160.   
21
 Charles K. Armstrong, “Ideological Introversion and Regime Survival, North Korea’s ‘Our-
Style Socialism,’” in Martin K. Dimtrov, ed., Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding 
Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), p. 99.   
22
 Patrick McEachern, “North Korea’s Policy Process: Assessing Institutional Policy Preference,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 3, p. 528. 
23
 Kim Sung-han, Korea Chair Platform, Center for Strategic and International Studies, The 
Future of North Korea, November 4, 2014, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/141031_The_Future_of_north_korea.pdf (accessed November 17, 
2014).  
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future.  Another heir of the Kim Dynasty was doomed to fail because the experts 
still assume he must reform to survive.  While that remains to be seen, Kim 
Jong-un continues to expand his nuclear weapons capabilities24 as Presidents 
Barack Obama25 and Park Geun-hye wait for North Korea to show its 
commitment to denuclearization.26  Perhaps Kim’s most shocking move since 
his assumption of power was the purge and execution of his uncle, Jang Song-
thaek.  The unusually transparent process of the purge that was visible to both 
North Koreans and the outside world seemed to signal Kim was ready to take 
charge in Pyongyang.27  However, due to his youth and lack of leadership 
experience, it begs the question how will he survive?  To address this question, 
this study examines how the Kim family has managed to survive in spite of the 
apparent weaknesses of the regime and U.S.-led international pressure.   
 
1.3  Problem Statement 
The research reveals that for over 20 years many experts have predicted 
the end of North Korea, yet these predictions have not come to fruition.  This 
has led to the development of several theories to explain how North Korea 
continues to survive.  However, there is no consensus in the existing literature 
as to why North Korea continues to survive and many of these theories have 
lost their explanatory power while others remain speculative.   
 
1.4 Statement of Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this multiple-case study is to examine the rule of the 
three Kims to determine what tools were available to each of them to deal with 
domestic and external challenges, and to maintain control and ultimately to 
survive.  To conduct the multi-case study, the following enabling (or supporting) 
                                            
24
 Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Turning in the Wrong Direction,” Foreign Affairs, April 10, 
2013, http://38north.org/2013/04/amansourov041013/ (accessed May 13, 2013). 
25 
James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American 
Power (New York: Penguin Group, 2012), pp. 196-198. 
26 
Lee Sangsoo with Bernt Berger, “Park’s ‘Trustpolitik’ Challenge,” Institute for Security & 
Development Policy, Policy Brief No. 185, October 12, 2015, 
http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2015-lee-berger-parks-trustpolitik-challenge.pdf 
(accessed October 14, 2015).  
27 
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, 
and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2014, p. 1. 
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research questions are derived from existing explanations of North Korean 
survival to direct attention to the issues that will be examined within the scope of 
this study:28 
 
1. How relevant is Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla experience to North Korea’s 
survival? 
 
2. Was Kim Jong-il capable of maintaining totalitarianism despite relative 
weakness? 
 
3. What did the Kims learn from North Korea’s economic failure following 
the Soviet collapse? 
 
4. How critical is ideology to overcoming the regime’s weakness and 
promoting unity? 
 
5. Will nuclear weapons strengthen the regime or make it more vulnerable 
to external pressure? 
 
6. Is North Korea exploiting China to strengthen its economy or is it 
dependent on China for survival? 
 
7. Can North Korea under Kim Jong-un counter calls for a “North Korean 
spring” with its own ideas? 
 
 
The propositions offered by these seven questions will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) and help to validate the research question 
regarding the alternative explanation presented by this study.29  Moreover, the 
questions are not meant to conflate the Kims’ leadership with the North Korean 
state.  In this study, they are viewed as interchangeable since the key 
institutions of the state are controlled by the Kims as the study demonstrates in 
Chapters 4 to 7.  As Bruce Cumings noted, “Kim Il Sung was not just the ‘iron-
willed, ever-victorious commander,’ the ‘respected and beloved Leader’; he was 
also the ‘head and heart’ of the body politic, even ‘the supreme brain of the 
nation – a mantle now held by his son, Kim Jong Il.”30  Having said that, the 
primary research question is, given that there is no consensus on how North 
                                            
28
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., p. 22. 
29
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., p. 22. 
30
 Bruce Cumings, “Divided Korea: United Future?” Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, 
No. 306 (Spring 1995), p. 54. 
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Korea survives and why it conducts provocations; does the concept of smart 
power offer an alternative explanation for North Korea’s resilience? 
 
1.5 Research Approach 
With respect to academic disciplines, this study is a hybrid of historical 
study and international relations theory.  In order to understand the Kims’ 
thought process, one must first explore the past because it “is not a dead past, 
but a past which in some sense is still living in the present.”  As Edward Carr 
suggested, reconstituting the past by judiciously selecting and interpreting the 
empirical evidence will lead to understanding the thought that lay behind it.31  
Han Hong-koo agrees with Carr by saying, “In north Korea, history, in a sense, 
does not belong to the past, but governs the present.”  He went on to state, 
“History cannot explain everything, but at least in north Korea’s case, unless we 
consider the history of the guerrilla movement in Manchuria, we can explain 
nothing.”32  Although this study is not a complete history of North Korea, it aims 
to understand its past and present by conducting the multi-case study from 
1945 to 2015, and briefly examining what occurred from one case to the next.   
The study also deals with the field of international relations (IR) as it 
attempts to understand the “inescapable link between the abstract world of 
theory and the real world of policy” with the application of smart power theory.  
According to Stephen Walt, realism accepts the fact that states are prone to 
conflict by using primarily economic and military instruments of power to protect 
their interests (e.g., the Cold War), while liberalism hopes for alternative 
solutions to resolve differences between states (e.g., economic 
interdependence, promotion of democracy, and use of international and 
multilateral organizations).  On the other hand, idealism challenges realism and 
liberalism by suggesting that power of ideas can transform state relations.  It 
focuses on the society’s evolving “beliefs and interests,” and “norms of behavior” 
to explain state behavior (e.g., Mikhail Gorbachev’s embrace of new ideas to 
change Soviet foreign policy).  In the end, Walt claims realism is the most 
                                            
31
 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered at 
the University of Cambridge January-March 1961 (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 23-24. 
32 
Han Hongkoo, “Wounded Nationalism,” p. 23. 
7 
compelling one to understand state behavior but “a wise leader would also keep 
insights from the rival paradigms in mind.”33   
While identifying which IR theory the Kims preferred is beyond the scope 
of this research, Walt may be correct to suggest that most states prefer realism 
(e.g., mentality of the Cold War still shapes North Korea’s world view) and 
sometimes acquiesce to other paradigms such as liberalism when necessary 
(e.g., Six-Party Talks (6PT) to address the nuclear issue).  However, there is 
little evidence the Kims were prepared to embrace idealism beyond the primacy 
of nuclear deterrence and other “ideas” that they promoted (e.g., Juche, Songun, 
and Byungjin).  What is also important is to recognize the fact that political 
leaders rely on strategies to guide their behavior in the international system.34            
The aims of my research are to increase the level of understanding about 
how the Kims have managed to survive despite growing international pressure, 
to offer North Korea’s use of smart power strategy as an alternative explanation 
for its survival, and to offer policy recommendations to address the North Korea 
problem.  My enabling objectives to achieve the aims are as follows:      
 
 Clarify the role of Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla experience for the regime’s 
legitimacy 
 
 Determine how Kim Il-sung established totalitarian control and whether it 
was sustainable 
 
 Determine how North Korea survived the “arduous march” after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and how it impacted its subsequent 
economic policies 
 
 Examine Juche as an ideology and whether it remains a unifying 
ideology for the regime 
 
 Examine whether North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons capability is a 
survival tool or a potential cause for U.S. intervention 
 
 Determine whether China is the key to North Korea’s survival 
 
                                            
33 
Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 
110 (Spring 1998), pp. 29-44. 
34 
Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21
st
 Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, 
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006, p. 2. 
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 Examine whether Kim Jong-un can successfully lead North Korea to 
counter the invasion of information from the outside and the expansion of 
markets 
 
 Conduct a multi-case study to determine whether North Korea’s use of 
smart power can help explain North Korea’s survival   
 
In order to offer an alternative explanation of how North Korea continues to 
survive (smart power), I have applied Robert Yin’s approach to case studies.  
He confirmed that the case study is “most likely to be appropriate for ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions,” which meets the first requirement for this study.  Furthermore, 
the primary and the seven enabling research questions will help guide the 
research toward the relevant information for this work.   
Next, the unit of analysis is the three Kims and I have collected the 
relevant information for each of the Kims to form a multiple-case study.  As 
discussed further in Chapter 3 (Methodology Chapter), to minimize case 
selection bias, I have selected more than a dozen cases of North Korean 
provocations (hard power), with the rationale that if the smart power theory is 
valid then the study can safely assume that, even in cases where North Korea 
appears to use only variations of force, closer examination is likely to reveal the 
Kims simultaneously employed other power resources to achieve their aims.   
That said, the three Kims as a unit of analysis are defined separately in Chapter 
3, and data from subsequent chapters demonstrate that the examination of the 
collected information provided sufficient data for a multi-case study.35   
In effect, the review of the literature provides an opportunity to conduct 
“pilot case studies"36 of several issues to clarify the line of research questions 
and to help refine my data collection plan.  Finally, the review revealed that the 
Kims (some better than others) are capable of successfully crafting and 
exercising smart power strategies to overcome their relative weaknesses in 
national power.  However, it was also evident that what may be considered 
relative strengths today could quickly become weaknesses if the North Korean 
leadership is unable to correctly discern the critical factors for regime survival as 
                                            
35
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., p. 22. 
36
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., pp. 78-79. 
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the domestic and international security environment continues to evolve.  In 
short, Kim Jong-un must recognize that the same old tactics and lessons 
learned may not always work and be capable of developing new and successful 
strategies if his family is going to survive beyond the second dynastic transition.   
Finally, the criteria for interpreting the issues resulting from the study’s 
findings are those of Joseph Nye’s smart power concept, which raises the 
following five questions to determine evidence of a smart power strategy:37           
 
1. “What goals or outcomes are preferred?” 
2. “Which forms of power behavior are most likely to succeed?”   
3. “What resources are available and in which contexts?” 
4. “What is the probability of success?” 
5. “What are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence 
attempts?”38   
 
Having said this, some skeptics are not convinced of the utility of “soft power” to 
achieve “specific policy objectives,” especially when compared to traditional use 
of “hard power.”  According to Christopher Ford, the U.S. has prematurely 
embraced “soft power” after the George W. Bush administration with the belief 
that it “would complement residual ‘hard power’ capabilities and produce a 
hybrid, smugly termed ‘smart power’ that would transform American foreign 
policy and give the United States new clout and stature on the world stage.”  
Ford criticized Nye for minimizing the role of hard power and overselling the 
impact of soft power in international affairs.  He seemed to disparage the 
concept of soft power which some described as “movies, books, and songs; 
ideals, diplomacy, and moral authority – all about hearts and minds.”  
Nevertheless, Ford admitted “soft power” had potential but argued it was harder 
for democracies to harness it since it lacked the ability to control it.  In other 
words, authoritarian regimes like Beijing could wield soft power more effectively 
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than countries with “genuine political and economic freedoms.”  There is 
evidence China has invested in the development of its soft power. 
According to David Shambaugh, China has enhanced its economic and 
military power, but lacks soft power.  Xi Jinping is apparently aware and 
declared, “We should increase China’s soft power; give a good Chinese 
narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to the world.”  In order to 
enhance its soft power, China has invested over $150 billion in its “soft-power 
ventures” and “pledged to invest $1.25 trillion worldwide by 2025.”  However, 
Shambaugh concluded that China has a long way to go before its global image 
improves largely due to its authoritarian political system.39  Perhaps the most 
important claim by Ford is the statement, “If there is anything to the idea of a 
genuinely ‘smart’ approach to wielding power, it surely involves emphasizing 
areas in which one possesses a relative advantage and de-emphasizing 
others.”40  This idea is essentially what Nye attempts to examine with his 
second smart power question.  
Nye agrees with Ford that the Obama administration has embraced his 
concept of smart power since it assumed power in 2009.  According to Nye, 
Obama seemed to embrace his theory when he stated, “Our power grows 
through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, 
the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”  
Obama’s former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was even more clear about 
the utility of Nye’s theory.  She argued, “America cannot solve the most 
pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without 
America.  We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of 
tools at our disposal.”41  She even proposed her own definition that “smart 
power meant choosing the right combination of tools – diplomatic, economic, 
military, political, legal, and cultural – for each situation.”42  Moreover, former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for a significant increase in the State 
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Department’s budget to promote diplomacy, economic aid, and strategic 
communications.  Gates argued that the U.S. must increase its soft power 
capacity by highlighting the fact that the Defense Department’s budget 
overshadowed that of the State Department by a factor of fourteen, $500 billion 
vs. $36 billion respectively.  He was cautioning that to effectively wield smart 
power there needs to be a proper balance of soft and hard power resources.43   
In short, even if one is a skeptic, smart power theory needs to be 
acknowledged as something more than a “catch-all phrase.”44  On the contrary, 
this discussion indicates that smart power theory has begun to move beyond 
“the abstract world of theory” and entered “the real world of policy.”  In fact, 
Juan Zarate argued that the U.S. has been exercising “smart financial power” 
since September 11, 2001.  Instead of relying on government sanctions, this 
new paradigm persuades global financial networks to protect their own interests 
by denying access to “targeted actors” such as rogue regimes, criminal 
organizations, and terrorist groups.  Zarate highlighted the Department of the 
Treasury’s actions against Banco Delta Asia (BDA) to increase pressure on 
North Korea as one of the cases of smart financial power.45   
As Nye cautioned, it is wrong to depict soft power “as ‘non-traditional 
forces such as cultural and commercial goods’,” and simply ignore it because it 
is “soft.”  Most importantly, Nye argued “smart power is available to all states 
(and non-state actors), not just [powerful states like] the United States.”46  He 
argued that rising states (e.g., Meiji Japan, Communist China under Deng 
Xiaoping, etc.) and smaller ones (e.g., Singapore, Qatar, Switzerland, etc.) were 
also effective in employing smart power strategies.47  This begs the question 
whether the Kim regime of North Korea is capable of wielding smart power.  
More importantly, do the Kims possess the power of attraction and persuasion?  
How does Nye define them?  
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 According to Nye, “benignity, competence, and beauty (charisma)” 
produce “positive attraction.”  Benignity is about how a state or an agent relates 
to others.  When they are benign, it generates “sympathy, trust, credibility, and 
acquiescence.”  When a state or agent is perceived as competent, it engenders 
“admiration, respect, and emulation.”  Finally, charisma is related to how the 
agent is associated with “ideals, values, and vision, and it tends to produce 
inspiration and adherence.”  The concept of charisma is discussed further in 
subsequent chapters as the study examines the Kims’ leadership capabilities 
and styles.  These “clusters of qualities” are essential to producing attractive 
power behaviors.  Ultimately, outcome depends on the qualities of the agent 
and how the targets of influence perceive the agent.48  
 With respect to the power of persuasion, Nye argued it “is closely related 
to attraction.”  It is being able to influence “the beliefs and actions” of one’s 
target audience by the “use of argument” without the use of coercion.  He also 
emphasized that persuasion “almost always involves some degree of 
manipulation.”  This means one often highlights some points while 
deemphasizing others.  In the end, the more rational the appeal, the more likely 
the argument is going to be persuasive, and the concept of attraction and 
persuasion are “closely related” with trust.49  The evidence suggests the first 
two Kims demonstrated their ability to exercise at least few clusters of attractive 
and persuasive power; however, it remains to be seen whether Kim Jong-un 
can follow their lead in due course.  For example, Kim Il-sung’s was able to 
attract huge amount of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc from the end 
of the Korean War to 1962,50 and Kim Jong-il established “trust” with the Clinton 
administration during the late 1990s to elicit aid to survive.51  Thus, this study 
suggests even a relatively weak rogue state like North Korea is capable of 
achieving its aims by using the key tenets of Nye’s smart power principles.   
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As a result, using Nye’s smart power theory, I identified the outcomes of 
the cases (Question 1) and hard and soft power actions by North Korea 
(Question 2), examined the resources available (Question 3), attempted to 
assess the probability of success of its actions (Question 4), and determined the 
policy preferences of key actors (Question 5).  Collecting the data for four of the 
questions was not very difficult, but Question 4 was more challenging in many 
cases due to the opaque nature of the North Korean leadership’s decision-
making process.  Nevertheless, while observers may not always be able to 
assess Pyongyang’s “probability of success,” focusing on whether North 
Koreans “recognized their limits and rarely went beyond them” can help mitigate 
the problem.52  Moreover, outcomes of different situations could also be used to 
assess the probability of success of subsequent events.  In other words, North 
Korea may learn (and sometimes the wrong lessons) how to use smart power 
more effectively over time and gain more confidence of its positive outcome.     
 
1.6  Assumptions 
Upon review of the literature, the following assumptions were made for 
this study.  These statements were what I held to be true as I initiated the study 
and they were validated through the course of the study, and led to one of the 
study’s more important conclusions: The regime continues to highlight Kim Il-
sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy to wage its war of legitimacy against 
South Korea and to legitimize Kim family rule. 
 
Assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Kim Il-sung was born as Kim Song-ju but he was the man 
he claimed to be – an effective leader of a band of Korean guerrillas in 
Manchuria. 
 
Assumption 2: Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
when he was in Manchuria and fought with the Chinese Communists, but 
he remained a pragmatic Korean nationalist. 
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Assumption 3: Kim Il-sung was not chosen as a Soviet puppet leader 
prior to Korean liberation from the Japanese, but he eventually benefited 
from Soviet support to become the “Supreme Leader” of North Korea. 
 
Assumption 4: Kim Il-sung created a totalitarian state based on his cult of 
personality, but that alone cannot be the answer to why North Korea 
survives. 
 
Assumption 5: There is some correlation between explanatory variables 
(i.e., survival tools) regarding North Korea’s survival and the regime’s 
use of smart power. 
 
Assumption 6: The Kims and the North Korean state are considered the 
same since they exercise near complete control over North Korea’s core 
institutions. 
 
Assumption 7: While the concept of abductive strategy used in this 
research cannot be proven scientifically, it can be applied as a 
hypothesis by using smart power theory to better understand North 
Korea’s behavior. 
 
1.7 The Researcher’s Background and Bias 
As a U.S. Army officer, I served several tours dealing with Korea issues 
from 1987 to 2011.  While serving with the United Nations Command Military 
Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in the late 1990s, I had an opportunity to 
work with a select group of Korean People’s Army (KPA) officers at Panmunjom.  
It was during this tour that I first realized they were often rational, highly skilled 
at negotiations, and even persuasive in achieving their outcomes.  For example, 
one of the armistice maintenance incidents with which I had to deal with the 
KPA was the so-called “acorn incident.”  KPA soldiers had kidnapped two 
farmers from Taesong-dong village near Panmunjom on October 16, 1997.  It 
was later discovered that the two South Koreans were collecting acorns to 
make a gelatin-like side dish (muk) popular in South Korea.  The evidence 
indicated that the two farmers had crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) 
inadvertently and the KPA captured them to make a point.  The KPA then 
proposed to conduct a joint investigation to resolve the issue, and the first joint 
investigation since 1976 took place within a short distance from Panmunjom.  
This development was a surprise since the KPA had been denouncing the 
legitimacy of the Armistice and the UNCMAC since the early 1990s.  In the end, 
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the United Nations Command (UNC) agreed to the proposed farmers’ 
declaration: “We accidentally crossed the Military Demarcation Line in an area 
that is not clearly marked.”53  It taught me that when the North Koreans believe 
they were “in the right,” they are more than willing to defend their position and 
use the opportunity to make a point.  In hindsight, this case made me realize my 
potential bias in believing that the North Koreans were capable of using smart 
power.  I have sought to mitigate my bias through the use of a multi-case study 
approach, focusing on a series of provocations over time, which could prove the 
Kims have used a purely coercive strategy.  
 
1.8 Research Rationale and Significance 
This study seeks to understand better the Kim regime and its domestic 
and external challenges.  As Kim Jong-un solidifies control of the regime, 
whether he succeeds in further consolidating his power or eventually fails to 
overcome the “constellation of forces” against him will have profound security 
and economic implications for the Korean Peninsula and beyond.  Not only 
does the study examine the nuclear and missile issues, it also demonstrates 
North Korea’s seemingly erratic and unpredictable behavior is in fact a carefully 
crafted smart power strategy.  In fact, this is the first study that applies Nye’s 
smart power strategy holistically to demonstrate its utility as an analytical tool.  
Moreover, it validates Nye’s theory can be used to examine other cases such as 
Iran and Russia (further discussed in Chapter 2).  With respect to North Korea, 
the higher level of understanding of the Kim regimes’ decision-making process 
revealed by the application of a smart power framework also assists in the 
formulation of policy options to resolve the North Korea issue (discussed in 
Chapter 8).   
 
1.9 Definitions of Key Terminology 
As noted in Linda Dale Bloomberg and Marie Volpe’s work, “This section 
provides the definitions of terminology used in the study that do not have a 
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common meaning or those terms that have the possibility of being 
misunderstood.”54  I will clarify how they will be used in this study.     
 
Smart Power: Nye argues that smart power is the “ability to combine the 
hard power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a 
successful strategy.”55  The essence of Nye’s concept is resolving the challenge 
of power conversion.  This means actors involved must understand their “full 
range of power resources” and appreciate “the problems of combining them 
effectively in various contexts.”56  The attainment of favorable outcomes also 
requires “contextual intelligence” to understand the evolving domestic and 
international situation to identify the right mix of hard and soft power to achieve 
desired outcomes.57  The challenge for this study will be assessing the 
probability of success and demonstrating how the actors involved in the cases 
exerted their power to affect preferred outcomes, especially the soft power of 
attraction.   
One could argue an actor like North Korea may not have “attractive” 
cultural or political values, but it is plausible that Pyongyang can periodically 
exercise effective foreign policies to exercise soft power.58  While observers 
may not always be able to determine each of the actor’s calculus for the 
“probability of success,” one may be able to deduce it by identifying whether the 
actors “recognized their limits and rarely went beyond them.”59  Moreover, their 
expression of power can be revealed by focusing on how they attempted to get 
the other side to abandon “their initial preferences and strategies,” or by framing 
and setting the agenda in such a way to shape the other side’s preferences.  
That said, one must not ignore the possibility that even North Korea may have 
attempted to shape the other’s “ideas and beliefs” so they aligned with its own 
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preferences.60  For instance, Kim Jong-il reportedly believed the U.S. could be 
easily persuaded as long as North Korea presented its policy positions 
“logically.”61  However, this works only if North Korea follows through with its 
commitments, at least some of the time.  The final step is to shift the focus to 
measuring their power by trying to determine the strength of the other’s “initial 
preferences,” and how much the actors managed to change them through their 
efforts.62   
 
Juche (or Chuche):  While many scholars have simply used “self-
reliance” to define Juche, Suh Jae-jung argues it is “best understood as 
subjecthood or being a master of one’s own fate.”63  According to Michael 
Robinson, Juche derives its meaning from two Chinese characters that mean 
“subject” and “body.”  When they are combined, they suggest the ideas of 
“autonomy” or “self-reliance.”  Robinson argues that “in its most straightforward 
use, Chuche [or Juche] can denote one’s independence and autonomy from 
any external control or manipulation.”  As a result, North Koreans generally 
operationalize the term to perceive their country as an “autonomous, 
independent, and self-reliant” nation.  What this means is that, as a matter of 
honor, North Koreans will seek to defend it when they feel their honor has been 
“besmirched or denigrated.”64  Bruce Cumings goes on to say that Juche 
“means self-reliance and independence in politics, economics, defense, and 
ideology.”  However, he argued Kim Il-sung also used similar language such as 
“chajusong (self-reliance), minjok tongnip (national or ethnic independence), 
[and] charip kyongjae (independent economy).”65   
According to Cumings, the antonym for all these terms is the concept of 
sadaejuui, “which means serving and relying upon foreign power.”  When these 
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terms are synthesized one realizes that what Kim Il-sung sought for the Korean 
people, who had been colonized by the Japanese for so long, was “basic dignity 
as human beings.”  In the end, Cumings noted that the meaning of Juche “might 
best be translated as putting Korean things first, always: it suggests a type of 
nationalism.”66  Kim Il-sung’s own biography claimed, Juche meant “doing 
everything in conformity with the actual conditions of our country, creatively 
applying the general principles of Marxism-Leninism plus the experiences of 
other countries to our own country in accordance with our actual conditions.”   
He also stressed while Marxist-Leninist principles were a guide, the Koreans 
had to solve their own problems and not depend on others to achieve the goals 
of the revolution.67  Hence, I will accept “self-reliance,” an expression of Korean 
nationalism, and “being a master of one’s own fate” as the core principles of 
Juche. 
 
Suryong (or Supreme Leader): Suh Dae-sook noted that in the late 
1960s North Korea began to use the term Suryong, which means the Supreme 
Leader, to describe Kim Il-sung.  Until then, North Korea had apparently 
reserved the term for “such notables as Lenin and Stalin.”  This elevation of Kim 
Il-sung’s status signaled the coming of his personality cult and North Korea’s 
adulation of Kim.68  According to Bruce Cumings, the term Suryong comes from 
an old Koguryo69 term that means “maximum leader.”70  Lim Jae-cheon agreed 
with Suh that North Korea began to use the term consistently in the late 1960s 
but clarified that this occurred after Kim Il-sung purged the Kapsan group that 
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attempted to challenge his son’s succession.71  After the succession was 
completed between the two Kims, Kim Jong-il continued to be referred to as 
Yongdoja (a lower-grade term for leader), rather than Suryong.72  This study will 
accept the term Suryong to mean the member of the Kim family that is the 
official ruler of North Korea.   
 
Military-First Policy (or Songun): Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh 
argued that military-first policy replaced Juche as a core ideology in North 
Korea.  They noted that “in the past, everything was supposed to be done in the 
Juche style… Now everything is to be done in the military way.”73  They also 
claimed that the origin of Songun is Kim Il-sung’s Four Military Guidelines policy 
to deal with a “complex” international environment that was increasingly 
unfavorable to North Korea by the early 1960s.  The new environment included 
the Soviet Union’s more accommodating approach to the West after the death 
of Stalin, the Soviet-China dispute, and U.S. assertiveness in Southeast Asia.  
According to this view, Kim Jong-il may have sensed a similar period of 
“complexity” for North Korea as the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia and China 
both abandoned his regime for the South in the early 1990s, and the U.S. 
became the lone superpower in the world.74   
I agree Kim Jong-il’s Songun policy is similar to his father’s ideas 
regarding military power.  However, the idea’s origin appears to be Park Chung-
hee’s military coup in May 1960.  Kim Il-sung had argued that due to the 
growing threat from Park, he had to adopt the “equal emphasis policy,” to 
develop the North’s heavy industries as well as its defense capabilities (i.e., 
Byungjin line).  This policy resulted in the declaration of Four Military Guidelines 
consisting of arming the entire population, fortifying the whole nation, creating a 
“cadre army,” and modernizing all aspects of the military to achieve “self-
                                            
71
 Lim Jae-cheon, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 
39-40. 
72
 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 486. 
73
 Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the 
Hermit Kingdom (Lanham, MD: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), p. 180. 
74
 Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, pp. 178-179. 
20 
reliance in national defense.”75  Therefore, Kim Il-sung’s “equal emphasis policy” 
or simultaneous development of the economy and defense was really meant to 
prioritize development of the military over the economy.  This is the true 
meaning of Kim Jong-il’s Songun policy and why Kim Jong-un revealed on 
March 31, 2013, that he is attempting to revive his grandfather’s Byungjin 
policy.76        
 
Totalitarian Dictatorship:  The six traits of totalitarian dictatorships that 
are “universally acknowledged” were identified by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  First, they argued there is an official ideology that must be adhered 
to by all members of society, and it contained a belief in the creation of a 
utopian society and global domination.77  They defined totalitarian ideology as 
“a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how totally 
to change and reconstruct a society by force, or violence, based upon an all-
inclusive or total criticism of what is wrong with an existing or antecedent 
society.”  When fully achieved at some point in the future, totalitarian ideologies 
become a “weapon” for action to fulfill a promise to deliver “utopia,” and thus 
were more radical-style of development that were absent in old-style 
conventional societies.78   
Second, there is a single mass party consisting of a “hard core” elite that 
is completely dedicated to the ideology, and led by the dictatorial leader.  They 
also emphasized that the party is both “hierarchically” and “oligarchically” 
organized and is normally superior to or completely integrated with the state 
bureaucracy.79  This party organization is the “mainstay” of the totalitarian 
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system and the leader could not survive without its support.  Its members were 
fanatically devoted to the leader like lemmings but were determined to impose 
their will on the masses on behalf of the leader “to shape the society in its 
image.”80  One problem that persisted in solidifying the totalitarian leadership 
was the issue of succession as the paramount leader eventually succumbed to 
“the way of all flesh.”81  The process of succession likely resulted in a five 
phased struggle.  It begins with the designated successor assuming the mantle 
but he would soon be challenged by others in the inner circle to accept a 
“collective leadership” arrangement.  This arrangement would not last long 
before a power struggle occurs amongst the core leadership and some of the 
members will be eventually be “removed” and reshuffling would also occur 
before two dominant figures will vie for power.  Ultimately, the one that controls 
the key personnel and institutions of power will become the successor.82            
Third, there was “terroristic police control” that simultaneously supported 
and supervised the party, and terrorized both the opposition and the entire 
population at random.83  The opposition is targeted by the secret police because 
the vestiges of the old regime still threatened the masses and the totalitarian 
system.  This struggle with the opposition was permanent and intensified even 
after regime consolidation of power.  While totalitarians claimed some of the 
“enemies of the people” can be “re-educated,” but in reality, they were viewed 
as hopeless and exterminated in mass.84  This terror originated from the 
totalitarian movement’s aim to achieve “total change” of society.  As old 
enemies were eliminated, others were discovered and the terror permeated 
through all elements of society.  The terror became the “vital nerve” of the 
system, and they justified it by demanding “unanimity” from the masses to 
deceive themselves into thinking there was collective support for their actions.85   
In short, complete loyalty was expected from the masses and those that were 
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regarded as disloyal were either exterminated or isolated.86  If the disloyal were 
not executed, they were condemned to rot at the concentration camps, which is 
another unique characteristic of totalitarianism.  These camps varied from the 
“mildest” labor camps to the worst “bone-mills.”87  Moreover, even the party 
elites were vulnerable to regular purges by the secret police to strengthen the 
party and eliminate any potential alternatives to the leader.88  Similar to regime’s 
desire for “unanimity,” confessions were used along with the purges to educate 
the masses and train the secret police.89      
Fourth and fifth, the party and its key members had near monopoly 
control of “mass communication,” and “all means of effective armed combat.”90  
The total control of mass communication is another prominent feature of 
totalitarian dictatorship, which set it apart from traditional forms of despotic rule.  
However, the control over the content of communications (e.g., propaganda) 
was not unique to totalitarian dictatorships.  While many assume propaganda is 
essentially about lies, “no propagandist worth his mettle will prefer an untruth to 
a truth if the truth will do the job.”91  The job for totalitarian propaganda was to 
persuade the masses to act a certain way to achieve the regime’s goals,92 
which was to seize power and extend it over all aspects of society.93  
Nevertheless, totalitarian propaganda resulted in “rumor-mongering” because 
the masses sooner or later lost faith in all information promulgated by the 
regime.94  What is surprising is that the regime knew of this “vacuum” created 
by the separation of the masses from the leader, and there is some indication 
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that accurate reporting of public sentiment by the secret police may even have 
resulted in policy changes.95   
On the other hand, constant repetition of propaganda with its targeted 
word usage unconsciously inculcated the masses to adopt the value judgments 
promoted by the regime.  In other words, without access to reliable information, 
it dehumanized “the subjects of the regime by depriving them of a chance for 
independent thought and judgment.”96  Perhaps the one segment of the 
population that the regime could ill afford to “dehumanize” was the army, 
especially if the prospects of war were real.  Properly trained military officers 
were essential to national defense but they were not trusted by the regime, and 
a tripartite system of military political commissars, secret police, and party cells 
within the army ensured the Army remained a loyal part of the system.97   
Finally, totalitarian regimes pursued “central control” of the whole 
economy.98  The intent was to regain control of the means of production from 
capitalist exploiters,99 and not surprisingly, one of their rallying cries was 
“expropriation of the exploiters.”100  However, the management of the whole 
economy required a huge number of public officials, both from the state and 
party bureaucracies.  The initial problem was recruitment of qualified 
bureaucrats and some compromise with the old system’s bureaucrats was 
tolerated until the new regime was able to replace them with their own “trusted” 
state officials.  What they ended up with is a parallel structure of party and state 
bureaucracies which some described as “total bureaucratization” of almost all 
organizations within the totalitarian system.  This resulted in rising tensions 
between the state and party officials as the party attempted to control the 
economy.  As the totalitarian movement matured, the party bureaucrats and 
sympathizers successfully penetrated the state organizations and party loyalty 
replaced “professional qualification for office.”  The totalitarian leader was still 
not satisfied.  The system of “cross-espionage and the institutionalization of 
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mutual suspicion” kept constant observation and surveillance using the secret 
police and other party organs to ensure political reliability of state 
bureaucrats.101  In sum, I accept these six traits of totalitarianism as I proceed to 
examine in greater detail the political systems of the three Kims in Chapters 4 to 
7. 
 
Provocation:  As the study will examine many cases to determine 
whether or not the Kims employed smart power to survive, and many of them 
will be characterized as provocations, it also needs to be defined.  Hannah 
Fischer defined provocation as an “armed invasion; border violations; infiltration 
of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including 
assassination and bombing); threat/intimidation against political leaders, media 
personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South 
Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major 
negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.”  However, 
she did not include North Korean illicit activities and “political and other 
extrajudicial killing.”102  On the other hand, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies only focused on provocations that resulted in casualties 
which included “major armed conflicts, military/espionage incursions, border 
infractions, [and] acts of terrorism.”  As a result, it omitted North Korean verbal 
rhetoric, kidnappings, and missile launches and nuclear tests.103  Since the 
concept of smart power includes the application of soft and hard power, this 
study’s definition will be more inclusive and include all of these activities 
identified in both of these studies. 
 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
 The study consists of a total of eight chapters, including Chapter 1, 
“Introduction.”  Chapter 2, “Literature Review and the Conceptual Framework,” 
examines the existing literature to identify the research problem and questions, 
                                            
101
 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 177-182. 
102
 Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007,” Congressional Research 
Service, April 20, 2007, p. CRS-1. 
103 
Office of the Korea Chair, “Record of North Korea’s Major Conventional Provocations since 
1960s,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 25, 2010, p. 1. 
25 
considers the plausibility of North Korea’s use of smart power, and describes 
the conceptual framework.  Chapter 3 explains the “multi-case study” 
methodology, research design, limitations, and the analytical framework for 
testing the hypotheses.  Chapter 4 examines the rise of Kim Il-sung as a Korean 
leader in Manchuria, how he consolidated his power in North Korea, set the 
conditions for forced reunification, and laid the foundation for regime survival.  
Chapter 5 initiates the first multi-case study of North Korean provocations that 
begins with the Korean War.  It examines whether Kim Il-sung successfully 
used smart power strategies to achieve reunification before and during the 
Korean War, and provides the historical context for the provocations that came 
after the war.  Chapter 6 examines how Kim Jong-il applied what he learned 
over two decades as his father’s successor and used effective smart power 
strategies to survive, and Chapter 7 considers if an inexperienced Kim Jong-un 
is capable of using smart power strategies despite a truncated grooming period.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the study’s findings, overall analysis, policy 
recommendations, and questions for additional research to apply Nye’s smart 
power theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The DPRK continues to function as a state…Yet at the same time, 
one can also say that the North Korean project, in some profound 
and meaningful senses, has already come to an end.104 
      - Nicholas Eberstadt 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I aim to identify, examine and critique the existing 
literature regarding the discourse over North Korea’s possible collapse.  The 
intent is to provide a clear and balanced view of the various arguments 
regarding the prospects for the Kim regime’s survival.  This review should 
underscore the rationale for North Korea’s use of smart power, which forms the 
foundation of this work.  Next, based on the review of the literature regarding 
the various explanations of North Korea’s survival, section 2.3 presents the 
research problem and question.  I will then provide the rationale for 
Pyongyang’s instinctive use of Smart power and the conceptual framework that 
will be used in this study in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.   
         
2.2 The Literature Review: Identifying the Research Problem 
The review indicates that there is wide variance in the literature 
concerning the prospects for North Korean collapse and why it continues to defy 
all predictions that the end of the Kim regime is near.  However, none of the 
arguments thus far has attempted to examine this issue from a smart power 
perspective.  This needs to be explored since there is no definitive explanation 
for North Korea’s survival, or how a relatively weak and isolated power like it not 
only survives but has not given up on its own style of socialism.105  Moreover, it 
has become a de facto nuclear weapons state, despite proliferating nuclear 
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weapons technology to Syria.106  This is a significant accomplishment for North 
Korea since proliferation of nuclear weapons technology has long been a 
declared U.S. “redline.”107  The question is can North Korea still keep the U.S. 
and the international community at bay while it continues to expand its nuclear 
weapons programs?  This section will explore this question and also synthesize 
the existing literature on North Korea’s collapse, identify the important issues 
that may not have been sufficiently addressed and, most importantly, validate 
the research question.   
I will begin by examining the origin of the collapsist argument that rests 
on the presumed correlation between North Korea’s economic failure and 
regime collapse.  I will then consider the role of Pyongyang’s illicit activities, 
growth of foreign aid, and potential of economic reform in its survival.  Next, I 
will examine the China factor in North Korea’s survival as well as its reliance on 
nuclear weapons.  This is followed by examining the totalitarian explanation of 
how the regime survives.  Once the review of totalitarianism is completed, I will 
consider the role of Pyongyang’s Juche ideology108 in sustaining the regime as 
more information penetrates its borders.  After examining the diverse 
explanations for North Korea’s survival, I will review several explanations for 
why Pyongyang conducts provocations or hostile foreign policy activities.  
Finally, I offer the rationale for North Korea’s use of smart power.   
 
2.2.1 Origins of Scholarship Regarding the End of North Korea 
In June 1990, Nicholas Eberstadt published an essay titled, “The Coming 
Collapse of North Korea,” and began to focus his work on the sustainability of 
North Korea’s political and economic systems.109  General Gary Luck, then-
Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, forecasted in 1997 that “North Korea 
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would ‘disintegrate.’”110  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was also 
interested in the future prospects of North Korea.  The Agency sponsored a 
conference in January 1998 to discuss alternative futures for North Korea.  
While the participants of the conference recognized that several factors could 
prolong North Korea’s survival, there was consensus that Kim Jong-il’s regime 
would not survive more than five years.111  Finally, as a visiting scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, Eberstadt boldly predicted the end of North Korea 
in 1999 with his aptly titled book, The End of North Korea.  Eberstadt argued 
that North Korea had lost its raison d'être since it was no longer capable of 
reunifying the peninsula or provide for its people.  Some Chinese observers 
also began to spread the word in May 1994, just before the death of Kim Il-sung, 
that North Korea was suffering “the worst food crisis in history.”112  
Subsequently, more stories surfaced about people migrating to Pyongyang from 
the periphery to scrounge for food, with hundreds of people dying due to the 
spread of deadly disease.  Some observers estimated the eventual death toll 
from this period of economic suffering at about three million.113  To make 
matters worse, North Korea’s major ally, the Soviet Union, suddenly collapsed 
in 1991, and that seemed to put North Korea on notice that its very survival was 
at stake.114   
After carefully citing speeches by Kim Jong-il in the 1990s, Eberstadt 
concluded that the serious economic reforms required to rejuvenate the 
economy were unlikely since it would mean the loss of Kim’s control over the 
economy.115  More importantly, Kim was afraid it would contaminate North 
Korean society and threaten his regime.116  Therefore, Eberstadt argued there 
was good reason for Kim to forgo economic reform and accept the risk of further 
economic decline.  In short, Kim was rational and probably knew how to fix the 
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economy, but he chose not to risk domestic instability by opening up the 
economy.117  In January 2011, Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-il’s oldest son, 
observed that “there is a fear that economic reforms and openness will lead to 
the collapse of the present system.”118  There seemed to be little doubt that 
North Korean leaders understood that their own lives would be at risk if they 
implemented reforms.119  As a result, viewed from this elite perspective, the 
current strategy of economic isolation has been a great success as they live a 
relatively privileged life, while most of their counterparts in other communist 
countries were ousted long ago.120      
How then did North Korea survive without economic reform?  What did 
the Kims learn from economic failure following the collapse of the Soviet Union?  
Eberstadt speculated that North Korea continued to survive, during and after the 
Cold War, by extracting favorable aid from the international community.  During 
the Cold War, the aid by and large came from the Soviet Union, China and 
Eastern Europe, but during the post-Cold War period the North Koreans also 
began to court aid from the West.121  According to Eberstadt, North Korea was 
able to dictate the conditions for aid through “military extortion.”122  Marcus 
Noland agreed with Eberstadt and wrote, “The threat that North Korea poses is 
its sole asset”123 in extracting external aid.124  This meant North Korea had to 
remain a credible security threat to sustain itself, and this essentially became its 
new economic strategy.125  This being the case, Eberstadt asked the question, 
why does the international community appease North Korea?   
Eberstadt initially suggested “the governments with which North Korea 
today contends are, in the main, weak ones.”126  This is difficult to accept, even 
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if Eberstadt claimed he was being a bit cynical,127 since by almost any measure 
North Korea is weaker128 than any of the powers in Northeast Asia.129  The 
reality is, as of 2010, North Korea was on par with Ghana.  Both had about 24.5 
million people and their GDP were $1,800 and $1,700, respectively.130  
Nevertheless, Eberstadt went on to say one reason why these powers 
appeared weak was that in the 1990s, governments in Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow, 
Seoul, and Washington were all incapable of marshaling the means necessary 
to impose their will globally.131  They either focused more on domestic priorities 
or were less motivated to pay attention to what he called “nonimmediate 
problems,”132 and in some cases, he argued all of these factors applied.133  This 
eventually led them to settle for policies that ended up shielding the North 
Korean regime from collapse.134  I would agree with Andrei Lankov and offer 
another explanation.  North Korea was effectively using smart power despite its 
relative weakness to punch well above its weight to garner international 
attention and manipulate the major powers to extract huge amounts of aid.135  
However, what if the aid eventually ceased after recurring North Korean 
provocations?   
From 1995 to 1998, North Korea received $352 million in aid from South 
Korea, $349 million from the UN, and almost $300 million from NGOs and other 
countries.  In total, it is estimated that North Korea received over $2.3 billion in 
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foreign aid from the mid-1990s to early 2000s.136  According to Lankov, the U.S. 
initially agreed to provide part of this generous aid because it wrongly assumed 
North Korea would not survive and thus its “promised aid and concessions 
would not need to be delivered.”137  The problem was that North Korea was 
simply using the aid to bolster its military first-oriented economy.  Instead of 
using the generous foreign aid to rebuild its economy, Pyongyang continued to 
divert its limited resources to build up its military and called on the people to 
tighten their belts and simply work harder.138  This was another rational decision 
since the North Korean leadership could afford to lose some of its people, 
particularly those that it considered to be disloyal.  However, as part of its 
survival strategy it had to co-opt the military and the security services, and 
those loyal citizens that were totally committed to the regime.139  It took a while 
but the international community eventually figured this out and North Korea 
would have to find another strategy to sustain the regime.  
Victor Cha observed that North Korean intransigence eventually led to 
donor fatigue in 2002 and Western aid donations began to dry up.  By 2005, 
only China and South Korea were giving aid to North Korea.140  The U.S. 
provided only 0.57 million metric tons of food aid from 2002 to 2007, and most 
other countries also ceased to provide food aid.141  According to Patrick 
McEachern, the situation got worse for North Korea, as South Korean aid was 
also decreased significantly when Lee Myong-bak became President in 
February 2008.  South Korea offered only $7 million worth of humanitarian 
assistance in early 2008, whereas the previous two South Korean 
administrations offered an economic package worth about $11 billion.142  It was 
now clear the aid situation had changed for the worse for North Korea.  It was 
no longer able to dictate the conditions for aid.  The prevailing idea that Kim 
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Jong-il could simply extort aid with threats no longer seemed valid.  There was 
a clear limit to the generosity of international donors, and external factors such 
as the change of administration in South Korea also affected North Korea’s 
strategy.  If the economic strategy of extortion had failed and Kim was also 
unwilling to reform the economy, what was his next strategy for survival?  
Eberstadt and others offered more explanations for its survival.   
 
2.2.2 North Korean Illicit Activities and Economic Reform 
By 2006, North Korea observers noticed there were no credible 
indications that the country was about to collapse and questions were 
intensifying about Eberstadt’s earlier prediction regarding the end of North 
Korea.  He responded by writing that, by early 2004, the economic situation in 
North Korea seemed to have improved and the famine appeared to have ended 
by the early 2000s.143  Eberstadt attributed part of the improvement of the 
economy to funds obtained from North Korea’s illicit activities (e.g., 
counterfeiting of U.S. dollar bills, drug and weapons trafficking).144  A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study in 2008 estimated that a 
conservative estimate of North Korean illicit activities indicated the regime was 
generating up to $500 million a year but the growth potential seemed to be 
trending downward.145  A subsequent CRS study in 2013 concluded that, while 
North Korea was still involved in illicit activities, the magnitude of these activities 
had fallen since the 2000s.146  Furthermore, Lankov even suggested that it may 
be a mistake to exaggerate North Korea’s illegal activities since only a small 
amount of its funds come from illegal activities.147  While some of the illicit 
funding is still being used to buy the loyalty of the regime’s elite and to subsidize 
elements of its weapons development programs, it no longer seems to be a 
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major factor in regime survival.148   This may be due to increased international 
law enforcement efforts to target these activities, or North Korea could have 
found other sources of funding.   
John Park has suggested there was another alternative for the regime to 
raise the funds it needed to survive.  Park emphasized that North Korea’s core 
institutions (i.e., state, Cabinet and the army) all ran their respective trading 
businesses, mostly to facilitate the North Korea-China trade.  These trading 
activities helped fund North Korea’s state operating budget, and ensured elite 
loyalty to the Kim regime through the provision of luxury goods.  Park argues 
that these funds essentially became a useful ”coping mechanism”149 for Kim 
Jong-il as external pressure increased due to North Korean provocations.150  
Park’s initial appraisal of these North Korean state trading companies suggests 
they are a more sustainable source of funding for the Kim regime.  Park 
highlights these trading activities are growing “into a more vital commercial 
enabler for both the Kim Jong-il regime and the DPRK [or North Korea] state 
structure.”151  Even though these embryonic state trading activities at the time 
were insufficient to influence countrywide economic reform, they offered the 
Kims “flexible means for engaging in the closest form of ‘normal’ commerce that 
North Korea has with another country.”152   
On the other hand, the regime also had to deal with the growing threat of 
marketization of the domestic economy resulting from the people’s own coping 
mechanisms developed during the economic crisis.  What this implies is that it 
was wrong to assume foreign aid alone allowed North Korea to survive.153  
North Korean leaders again proved they were rational and pragmatic during the 
famine years.  They understood that if the people did not want to starve to death 
due to the breakdown of the Public Distribution System (PDS), they had no 
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choice but to ignore the rules and become an active participant in the 
emergence of “capitalism from below.”154  While North Korea’s leaders may still 
believe in their own style of socialism, they knew that resorting to the use of 
force to shut down the markets would eventually threaten the regime.155  North 
Korean leadership overlooked the loss of command of the economy because it 
was riskier to forcibly shut down the markets.  They may have assumed that as 
soon as the economic crisis was over they could roll back spread of markets.156  
This policy was acceptable to the state during the famine years and that allowed 
the people to violate the rules so they could survive that period. 
Lankov argues that by 2002 the majority of North Koreans were making a 
living through some kind of market activity, which was and still is illegal.157  The 
implication seems to be that, while state trading activities alone are insufficient 
to influence country-wide economic reform, the ubiquitous nature of these 
markets could have a lasting impact on the North Korean economy from below.   
Eberstadt later acknowledged there were some indications of “a new way of 
thinking”158 in the early 2000s,159 but argued North Korea was not implementing 
true reforms.160  Lankov agreed and stated that, as conditions improved, the 
Kim regime attempted to “revive the pre-crisis system.”161  The regime tried to 
clamp down on market activities as well as implementing currency reforms in 
2009.  The people rushed to protect their savings and panic buying followed.  
The regime closed all public markets in December 2009.  There were even 
occasional riots162 and some North Korean elites began to criticize the 
government.163   
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Again, rumors began to spread about the collapse of North Korea but 
nothing happened.164  Nevertheless, what it demonstrated was that, if the 
regime pushed the people too far, North Koreans were willing to push back.  
Unless North Korea is prepared to fully restore the PDS, which is an unlikely 
outcome, some form of marketization is likely to remain in North Korea for the 
foreseeable future.  This means that the regime is conceding some loss of 
control over the populace since official policy is that markets are illegal.165  How 
Kim Jong-un manages this potential threat to his regime could be a key 
determinant for his survival.  Currently, the Kim regime appears to be striking 
the right balance between ideological dogmatism and managed risk of 
expanding markets.  Eberstadt claimed that if and when Kim was prepared to 
embrace economic reform, outside observers would know because he would be 
willing to abandon nuclear weapons and moderate North Korea’s behavior 
toward the U.S.-South Korea alliance.166  Would North Korea be willing to give 
up its nuclear weapons?  Again, what is North Korea’s survival strategy and 
how is it achieving favorable outcomes even while strengthening its nuclear 
deterrence?   
 
2.2.3 Nuclear Weapons as a Survival Tool? 
According to Alexandre Mansourov, denuclearization of North Korea is 
unlikely without establishing mutual trust between the U.S. and North Korea.167  
He argued this was a very unlikely prospect since North Korea was convinced 
at the time President George W. Bush had a hostile policy of regime change.168  
North Korea also learned from Iraq (declaring it had no nuclear weapons 
emboldened the U.S. to invade)169 and Libya (giving up its nuclear program 
invited NATO to topple Qaddafi’s regime)170 that the best way to survive was to 
declare itself as a nuclear weapons state and continue to expand its weapons 
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program to “protect the ideology, system, freedom, and democracy chosen by 
its people.” 171  According to Jonathan Pollack, North Korea has become “a de 
facto nuclear-weapons state.”172  He also indicated all diplomatic efforts through 
2011 had failed to denuclearize North Korea, and there may be “no exit” from 
the status quo.173  In short, he argued for containment and hoped for change 
within North Korea, conceding North Korea has become a nuclear weapons 
state.  This begs the question how North Korea has managed to overcome 
U.S.-led sanctions for so long when three richly endowed Middle Eastern petro-
states – Iraq, Libya, and Iran – capitulated to external pressure.174 
One explanation is that external pressure could have unintended 
consequences of creating a “siege mentality”175 and helped the Kims to unify 
their people behind the regime.176  Another explanation is that the regime 
successfully employed a strategy based on a cycle of nuclear provocations.  
North Korea would begin by manufacturing a crisis; then it would be open to 
negotiations, only to backtrack to get a better deal.  If that failed, it would 
escalate the crisis and be willing to re-negotiate to continue the cycle.177  As 
Graham Allison recently noted, it is “the most inconvenient truth” that North 
Korea, as “one of the poorest and most isolated states in the world,” has 
managed to defy the U.S. and China.  Somehow North Korea has managed to 
expand its nuclear arsenal from two bombs worth of fissile materials and 8,000 
spent fuel rods in 2001 to an arsenal of ten bombs proven by three (now four) 
nuclear tests, and a credible long-range missile threat by 2014.  It also has an 
overt and perhaps even a covert uranium-enrichment program capable of 
producing more nuclear bombs.178  North Korea has also demonstrated it is 
willing to cross a declared U.S. redline by proliferating nuclear weapons 
technology to Syria.179  Even after these revelations, some agree with Pollack 
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that Washington has few or no options left to denuclearize North Korea.  
Despite the millions of North Koreans who died in the 1990s, nuclear weapons 
appear to have become a critical element of its survival strategy.180   
This realization suggests North Korea may have employed smart power 
to achieve nuclear weapons state status.  However, if Pyongyang continues to 
expand its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, there may come a time 
when the U.S. has no choice but to consider the use of force.  This means 
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missiles would no longer serve as a 
deterrent, but rather elicit a forceful U.S. response (discussed further in Chapter 
7).  Moreover, one could also argue Pyongyang’s conventional forces, 
especially its long range artillery, have served this deterrent role just as well.181  
Does this mean North Korea will be dependent on China for survival, or will Kim 
still be able to maintain North Korea’s independence and exploit China’s own 
interests to strengthen his economy? 
 
2.2.4 The China Factor 
If one accepts the argument that North Korea is unwilling to risk 
economic reform, and its provocations will no longer extract huge amounts of 
foreign aid, could China be the answer to North Korea’s survival?  Some 
suggest that as long as China remains a Communist state, in the sense that the 
CCP continues to be the leading party and the idea of democratic centralism 
remains in place,182 other Communist states in Asia (e.g., North Korea) are also 
likely to survive much longer.183  For instance, with the CCP in power, China 
would continue to act as a “‘safety valve’ of managed human traffic to China.”184  
This argument indicates illegal migration from North Korea to China could help 
the Kim regime relieve some of the domestic pressure from the discontented 
hostile class as the economic situation declines.  At the same time, remittances 
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from North Koreans and Korean-Chinese in China and their cross-border 
trading activities could also lessen the burden on the state to improve the 
domestic economy.185    
Nevertheless, if China’s economy fails to meet growth expectations and 
that leads to its own domestic instability, Chinese leaders will be confronted with 
a choice to either suppress discontent or liberalize the political system.186  If 
China decides to liberalize instead of reopening the playbook for Tiananmen, it 
could eventually choose to pressure the Kim regime.  Two ways to apply 
pressure would be either opening its borders to North Korea to encourage a 
mass exodus or attempting to seal its border to completely isolate the regime.187  
At this point, all this is mere speculation, but if China does hold the key to North 
Korea’s survival Kim Jong-un may have to finally decide whether to reform 
North Korea’s economy on his own terms or risk collapse.188  However, it may 
be a bit hasty to suggest North Korea is totally dependent on China for survival.   
A recent European Council on Foreign Relations study on China-North 
Korea relations points out the two countries drew much closer in 2010-2011.  
This study argued that China increased its economic influence on North Korea 
as the latter faced growing pressure from the UN.  Nevertheless, a surprising 
outcome from the European study is that North Korea is increasingly becoming 
more independent from China as well.  Some of the evidence noted includes 
two nuclear tests and another missile launch in April 2012 despite Chinese 
warnings not to escalate tensions189 (North Korea has since conducted another 
nuclear test and launched more missiles).190  North Korea also brazenly 
detained Chinese fishermen in the Yellow Sea.191  Moreover, a Chinese mining 
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company claimed North Koreans violated contracts192 and ignored investors’ 
rights.193   
In spite of these developments, the study argued China cannot afford to 
give up on the Kims.  What China wants is “a weak and isolated North Korea, 
but would find it much harder to establish relations of trust with a reformed 
regime – let alone with a transition or a reunified country.”194  Bruce Cumings 
also recently commented that the George W. Bush administration even reached 
out to the Chinese to call “for a joint US-China program to topple the North 
Korean government.”195  This went nowhere because China does not want 
North Korea to collapse, in part because its border would be threatened by a 
unified Korea with a large U.S. troop presence.  This suggests that, in some 
ways, China may also be dependent on North Korea, and if so could be a 
critical point of leverage for the Kim regime as it attempts to minimize its 
dependence on China.  This is another example of North Korea knowing the 
contextual intelligence regarding China’s strategic calculus for the Korean 
Peninsula so it can exploit the relationship for economic gain while protecting its 
independence.  Hence, it may be premature to assume China holds the key to 
Pyongyang’s survival, just as so many had mistakenly assumed the Soviet 
Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe also held North Korea’s “economic 
lifeline.”196   
In sum, the examination of Eberstadt’s warning about the end of North 
Korea has demonstrated that it has some shortcomings, but his work provides 
an important conceptual lens that can be applied to understand how changes in 
the North Korean economy can help make sense of complex events leading to 
its survival.  Furthermore, the review of North Korea’s economy has also raised 
other relevant explanations such as the role of China, debate over North 
Korea’s economic reform, a negotiation strategy of aid extortion, the role of illicit 
activities, and the significance of North Korea’s nuclear programs in its survival 
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calculus.  The review of these explanations so far indicates that all of them 
offered partial explanations, some more convincing than others, but many have 
lost their explanatory power over time and there seems to be no definitive 
answer to the roles these factors have played in North Korea’s survival.  Is the 
totalitarian explanation more convincing? 
 
2.2.5 Totalitarianism and the Survival of North Korea 
Another explanation for North Korea’s continued survival is the 
totalitarian nature of the regime.  As noted in Chapter 1, Friedrich and 
Brzezinski noted there are six traits that define totalitarian societies.  However, 
we have already discussed above that North Korea had lost command of its 
economy as markets continued to expand after the famine years.  Moreover, 
North Koreans also gained access to outside information as it penetrated the 
North Korean border in the late 1990s.  As a result, North Korea lost near 
monopoly control of information and its people are now more aware of the 
developments in the outside world.197  In other words, two of the six traits of 
totalitarian dictatorships have weakened since Kim Jong-il’s rule.  Nevertheless, 
Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind offer a useful interpretation of the Kims’ 
totalitarian system.  They argue that the Kims rely heavily on three tools in their 
totalitarian toolbox.  First, the Kims have carefully crafted social policies to 
prevent any opposition from forming and devised a system where the majority 
of the population is dependent on the state.  Second, the regime uses its 
internal security apparatus to deter and eliminate all opposition to the regime.  
Finally, they claim the regime has near total control of ideas and information, 
and uses this monopoly to promote its legitimacy and eliminate opponents.198  
As discussed above, they have lost monopoly control of information and more 
people are less dependent on the state due to expansion of markets but the 
secret police remain an effective tool of social control.  What is not a key trait of 
totalitarian regimes is “the manipulation of foreign governments.”199  However, 
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Byman and Lind correctly observe North Korea exploited both allies and 
adversaries to extract aid, and they reasoned it was due to external powers’ 
fear of North Korean instability, loose nukes, and costly conflict.200   
I argue that inciting fear in their neighbors was an important part of North 
Korea’s strategy to extract aid, but it ignores how Pyongyang also cultivated 
trust to secure diplomatic agreements or build bilateral relationships.  In other 
words, hard power alone cannot consistently achieve desired outcomes, even 
for rogue states like North Korea.  The shortcoming of the totalitarian 
explanation is that while it can show how the system maintains internal control, 
it fails to address how these regimes interact with the outside world.  As 
anticipated, others have argued that Pyongyang has transitioned beyond 
totalitarianism since the death of Kim Il-sung.  Patrick McEachern argues that 
North Korea’s bureaucrats in key institutions have a greater role in policymaking, 
particularly regarding foreign policy.201  Thus his argument provides a useful 
way to examine its foreign policy and offers a way to examine how North Korea 
uses smart power to survive.  He begins the discussion by arguing Kim Jong-il’s 
North Korea became “more moderate”202 than his father’s totalitarian state, and 
its post-totalitarian system utilized the expert knowledge of its bureaucrats for 
national-level decision-making.  This means the bureaucracy no longer simply 
transmits and implements “ideologically defined policy.”203  It participates in the 
policymaking process by providing “specified knowledge”204 to its leadership.  
Hence, instead of a single party developing and implementing policy based 
primarily on ideology, there is a greater diversity of inputs from the bureaucratic 
elements of the KPA and the Cabinet.   
What this means is that bureaucrats and party ideologues tend to have a 
moderating effect on national policy under a post-totalitarian system, which is 
more representative of a broader set of interests that are present in the state.205 
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McEachern argued that while this does not make the system democratic, “it 
does make it more liberal than its predecessor.”206  He also suggests this 
occurred because Kim Jong-il was weaker than Kim Il-sung due to his lack of 
charisma and revolutionary credentials, and he also faced more difficult 
domestic and international environment.207  As a result, McEachern argued that 
North Korea’s core institutions – Cabinet, KPA and party – each concurrently 
pursued conflicting strategic objectives.208  Most importantly, he wrote, “My 
theory argues that Kim’s power is limited in the sense that he rules through a 
rational bureaucracy.”209  This made McEachern realize North Korea’s “post-
totalitarian institutionalism is [why the system is] sustainable.”210   
I argue there is another way to interpret how the 1994 Agreed 
Framework was negotiated under former President Bill Clinton.  The agreement 
demonstrated how North Korean negotiators successfully leveraged the 
perception of Party and Military hard-liners in Pyongyang to gain the trust of 
their U.S. counterparts.  For example, during one episode of the Agreed 
Framework negotiations, Pyongyang requested assurance from the U.S. 
president and demanded energy assistance up front for freezing its plutonium 
program at Yongbyon and allowing IAEA monitoring of spent fuel rods, and 
halting the construction of two new nuclear reactors.  However, Pyongyang’s 
lead negotiator refused to concede on U.S. demands that North Korea must 
shut down the 5 megawatt (MW) reactor.211  North Koreans warned the reactor 
would be operating until the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) were delivered under 
the supervision of the U.S. and producing energy, and only then would 
Pyongyang rejoin the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  North Korea also refused 
to ship the spent fuel overseas.  Nonetheless, some in the U.S. viewed the 
proposal as a sign of Pyongyang’s flexibility.212   
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The KPA kept the pressure on Washington by issuing a statement that it 
must protect North Korea’s sovereignty, and thus it “can never allow any 
attempt to open up military facilities through special inspections.”  North Korean 
negotiators cautioned that if there was no deal, the KPA would call for restarting 
the 5-MW reactor and may even pursue reprocessing of plutonium.  They 
subsequently showed some flexibility by suggesting that if Washington would 
give Pyongyang more time on special inspections, it might result in North 
Korean commitment not to restart the 5-MW reactor.213  The U.S. speculated 
that this signaled either a lack of leadership consensus or an attempt by 
Pyongyang to get a better deal, but no one knew for sure.  The former supports 
McEachern argument there was institutional policy divergence, but this also 
suggests the possibility that Pyongyang’s main aim was to maximize its 
outcomes and that required careful policy coordination under a central authority.  
In other words, McEachern may have overlooked the possibility that North 
Korean institutions could in fact be coordinating their actions under a central 
authority to develop a strategy to exercise smart power.   
In fact, Kim Il-sung pointed out in the 1960s that one of the lessons he 
learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis was that “the most important thing is 
unity,” and “there is nothing to fear so long as the whole Party and the entire 
people are united.”214  One of Kim Jong-il’s own biographies suggests he 
learned this lesson well from his father.  Kim Jong-il stated that when he began 
to work at the Party Central Committee on June 19, 1962, “he ensured that a 
well-organized system for disseminating Comrade Kim Il-sung’s instructions 
was established throughout the Party, and a system for adopting measures for 
implementing his instructions and reviewing their implementation was 
established.”215  This suggests it is reasonable to argue North Korea’s 
institutions may have coordinated and focused their efforts on achieving 
successful outcomes.  If so, this would help to confirm that, even under Kim 
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Jong-il, North Korea’s core institutions generally followed direction from central 
authority and Kim may have succeeded in creating a “monolithic guidance 
system.”216  Most importantly, McEachern emphasizes that if one looks beyond 
the policy outcomes one can observe how divergent the groups are within the 
North Korean system.217  The problem is that observers cannot ignore the 
successful policy outcomes and simply focus on the North’s institutional media 
declarations.  Not linking the two appears to be the weakness of McEachern’s 
approach.  Simply because one observes one North Korean institution pursuing 
a hard line (e.g., deadly military clashes against the South in 2002), while 
another institution pursues a softer one (e.g., pursuing inter-Korean trade and 
congratulating the South for a successful World Cup),218 it does not mean 
central authority has lost control and its institutions have more power than they 
actually do.   
In sum, the evidence suggests that what McEachern has observed as 
post-totalitarian institutionalism219 could also be interpreted as a carefully 
crafted and centrally directed information campaign coupled with a thoughtful 
blend of hard and soft power to achieve Kim Jong-il’s aims.  Instead of a post-
totalitarian model sustaining North Korea with its core institutions working to 
prevent any one of them from dominating the others,220 what we have seen is 
the probability that a relatively weak North Korea could be surviving by 
maintaining unity under a single leader and ideology.  It is more likely that the 
Kims have co-opted their elites, to include the regimes’ bureaucrats.  Once they 
have been co-opted, “they shift from independent spokesmen to docile 
functionaries who depend on the government for their position and fortune.”221  
Having said that, what McEachern may have gotten right is that there are some 
elite bureaucrats that do participate in the policymaking process by providing 
their expertise to the North Korean leadership, but they have traditionally done 
so in support of the Kims.  This is why McEachern’s work is important to this 
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study because it helps to partially explain how North Korea’s strategy generally 
nets it something it wants and reveals the Kims are “playing a pretty good hand 
with a bad set of cards.”222  Could Kim Jong-il have done this without effective 
leadership?  I argue that was not possible and now examine the potential role of 
Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla legacy in his development as a leader.   
 
2.2.6 The Role of Kim’s Guerrilla Legacy in North Korea’s Survival 
Many scholars argue North Korea's claim that Kim Il-sung was 
responsible for defeating Japan is inaccurate.  Nonetheless, one of his official 
biographies claimed Kim Il-sung “had fought the million-strong army of 
Japanese imperialism for 15 long years and finally won freedom for the 
fatherland, overthrowing the Japanese imperialist brigands.”223  Another official 
biography claimed that after the Soviets declared war on Japan on August 8, 
1945, Kim led the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army as it fought alongside 
the Soviet Army to completely annihilate the Japanese Army by August 15, 
1945.224  Charles Armstrong makes it clear Kim never fought the Japanese 
during the Soviet liberation of Korea.  He highlighted that Kim and his guerrillas 
were forced to return to the Russian Far East (RFE) after they failed to cross 
the China-North Korea border in August 1945, but eventually managed to get 
on board the Soviet ship Pugachev and arrived in Wonsan, North Korea, on 
September 19, 1945.225  However, Bruce Cumings cautioned that Kim Il-sung 
was nevertheless a well-recognized and impressive leader of anti-Japanese 
guerrillas in Manchuria by the mid-1930s.  As a result, North Korean leaders 
continue to this day to “trace everything back to this distant beginning,”226 and 
above every other trait of the North Korean regime (communist, nationalist, 
rogue, axis of evil) stands its legacy as anti-Japanese fighters.227   
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Why is this relevant to North Korea’s survival?  Cheong Sung-Hwa 
emphasized that one of the few common denominators between the two Koreas 
was their hatred of Japan.  In South Korea, President Syngman Rhee used his 
long career as an anti-Japanese nationalist to bolster his political power since 
he was well aware that most Koreans hated Japan.  However, the most 
powerful political party in South Korea was viewed as a marginal ruling class 
that was labeled as pro-Japanese.228  For example, when the U.S. met with 
Japan and its allies in San Francisco in 1951 to reach a peace settlement with 
Japan, Washington attempted to include Seoul in the multilateral discussions.  
The British viewed the U.S. move as offensive because “British and 
Commonwealth soldiers’ memories of the brutality of Korean soldiers serving as 
prison camp guards of the Japanese Army in what was then still Burma or 
Malaysia powerfully informed this sentiment.”229    
Moreover, despite his nationalist credentials, Rhee lacked a political 
base in South Korea.  In fact, by the time Rhee returned to Seoul, his English 
was better than his Korean and the main reason he was chosen by the U.S. is 
because Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese nationalist leader, recommended him to 
General Douglas MacArthur as “a Korean that America could ‘count on’.”230  
Kim Il-sung was aware of many of these developments in South Korea.  He 
accused the U.S. of consolidating pro-Japanese elements after liberation to 
facilitate its colonial rule in South Korea.  He called out Rhee as a “long-fostered 
running dog” from the U.S. and a reactionary ring leader.231  Kim and Rhee both 
vowed to reunify the country by force and even before the start of the Korea 
War, conflict along the 38th parallel and rebellions within the South took 100,000 
lives.232  As a result, it should be no surprise that Kim Il-sung immortalized his 
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own anti-Japanese guerrilla experience in Manchuria.  According to Kwon 
Heonik and Chung Byung-Ho’s work on North Korean politics: 
 
We know that the Manchurian legacy was central to Kim Il-sung’s 
charismatic authority throughout his long political career.  We 
have seen also how this legacy was forcefully revived in the 1970s 
to become a singularly important saga in the national history and 
how this process was intertwined with the unfolding of the drama 
of the political succession from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il.233 
 
This evidence suggests the Manchurian legacy was part of the inheritance that 
Kim Jong-il received from his father as he became the Dear Leader.  The North 
Koreans continue to describe the Japanese colonial period as the period of 
military occupation.  They do so “knowing that South Korean officials cannot 
use the same expression for the same past,” because American soldiers have 
remained in South Korea since the end of the Korean War.  Hence, the Kims 
use of the “Japanese era as a means to reach and manipulate public sentiment 
at whim proved to be an incredibly powerful tool.”234  As discussed in Chapter 7, 
this remains true even under Kim Jong-un’s rule.    
This is why gaining a better understanding of Kim Il-sung’s experience in 
Manchuria is relevant to the Kims’ exercise of smart power.  The Kims’ 
legitimacy to lead North Korea is tied to this anti-Japanese legacy.  Kim Il-sung 
knew how Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) felt about the 
Japanese, and he used this understanding to indoctrinate those in the North 
that they were the true Koreans while their brethren in the South were being 
exploited by pro-Japanese Koreans and U.S. imperialists.  John Tirman was 
harsher than Kim Il-sung about Rhee and his regime.  Tirman said “the CIA had 
no illusions that he [Rhee] was anything other than a demagogue ‘bent on 
autocratic rule’.”  What is more, the CIA knew that Rhee “was aligned with a 
hard right wing that had collaborated with Imperial Japan and needed someone 
like Rhee, without the taint of Japan, to govern a new semifeudal state.”235  
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What this indicates is that not all of the myth of Kim’s cult of personality is a “lie” 
and thus it needs to be scrutinized more carefully in subsequent chapters.  
More importantly, Kim Il-sung appears to have revived his guerrilla legacy 
during the 1970s to help facilitate the smooth transfer of charismatic authority to 
his son.  Simply assuming everything about Kim is a lie carries its own risks and 
may lead to ignoring or misinterpreting North Korea’s policies and actions.  
Finally, I examine the role of ideology in North Korea’s survival.   
 
2.2.7 The Use of Juche Ideology to Unify the North Korean People 
 Charles Armstrong argues that North Korean ideology and its own style 
of socialism, plus its “going it alone” approach, have unified North Koreans 
behind the Kim regime and thus it is likely to survive for the foreseeable 
future.236  Armstrong argues that “for better or worse, it has worked.”237  North 
Korea has successfully resisted 20 years of forecasts in South Korea, Japan, 
and the West that its collapse was at hand.238  Despite the economic failure and 
political isolation resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites 
in Europe, Kim Il-sung had long prepared his people to pursue their own Juche 
ideology of self-reliance239 in “all areas of political, economic, and social 
activity.”240  Instead of opening up and implementing reforms like China and 
Vietnam, his son Kim Jong-il initially resorted to a strategy of isolation and 
strengthened central authority, emphasizing “a highly defensive nationalism”241 
to address external threats.242  He appears to have sensed that any potential 
benefits of reform were not worth the risk since South Korea appeared ready to 
absorb North Korea, similarly to the way East Germany fell to its fraternal and 
ideological rival.  Kim viewed reform as the root of evil, not a path to salvation.  
He apparently fought materialist corruption and the weakening of ideology.243  In 
order to survive, the Kim regime focused on further inculcating Korean 
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nationalism, strengthening the military and calling for complete loyalty to the 
Kim family.  The improvement of the lives of the North Korean people took a 
back seat to strengthening the Kims’ style of socialism.244  It signaled North 
Korea was like no other communist state and it would not collapse like most of 
the others.245   
Armstrong also argued “North Korea in the 1990s and early 2000s 
greatly expanded its political and economic ties with the capitalist West and 
embarked on limited economic reform, while insisting on unwavering adherence 
to Juche.”246  Armstrong views the “socialism in our style”247 concept as 
potentially having some flexibility.  He says “the core principle of Juche was not 
economic autarky, but political self-determination and freedom from outside 
control.”248  In actuality, Armstrong suggests Kim Jong-il must have known that 
dogmatic application of Juche and its unique socialism alone were not sufficient 
for North Korea to survive.  In addition, he was pragmatic enough to seek 
foreign aid, even from his archrival South Korea, which could have undermined 
the regime.249  Kim nevertheless managed to muddle through until 2010, but by 
then he had given up even the minimalist approach to economic reform and 
relied on China and nuclear weapons for regime security.250  On the issue of 
ideology, however, Kim Jong-il never lost faith in Juche or the Kim family’s own 
brand of socialism.251  However, Kongdan Oh disagreed by arguing that the 
Kims have had one principle and that was to ensure that the people are loyal to 
the Kim family.  The Kims are willing to use any ideology to include the Juche 
idea, military-first policy, and Kim Il-Sung thought to ensure mass obedience 
and loyalty.  Oh argued the masses “are no longer socialists; nor do they 
respect their leader.”252  In short, the North Korean system was rotting, ideology 
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no longer mattered, and the words of Kim Jong-il were meaningless.253  In the 
end, even Armstrong appears to admit ideology alone will be insufficient to 
ensure North Korea’s survival.254   
Victor Cha, on the other hand, warns that the end of North Korea is near.  
Cha argues that North Korean society is slowly evolving as a result of the 
invasion of information from the outside.  Cha boldly predicts North Korea will 
collapse sooner rather than later.255  Cha argues in his work, The Impossible 
State: North Korea, Past and Future, that the Kims may have survived because 
North Korea has never been a top priority issue for the U.S., like the unrelenting 
pursuit of Al Qaeda leadership or management of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
According to Cha, whenever a North Korean crisis floated up to the highest 
level, the main U.S. effort has traditionally been to de-escalate the situation 
through negotiations.  The U.S. was unable or unwilling to seriously consider 
ways to resolve the persistent crises permanently.  As a result of this “relative 
crisis indifference”256 syndrome in the U.S., and perhaps also due to North 
Korea’s fortuitous geographical inheritance of a shared border with China, it has 
managed to survive.  What this meant for Cha is that the North’s survival had 
nothing to do with the skills of its leaders and officials.257  It was purely “an 
accident of history.”258  Thus, a major crisis in North Korea or even reunification 
in the near-term was a realistic expectation for Cha.259   
Cha argued these outcomes were likely because of the “unique 
constellation of forces”260 gathering around North Korea resulting from Kim 
Jong-il’s death, the inexperience of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s growing 
marketization, and increased flow of information from the outside.  All of these 
forces would act in resonance to overwhelm the North Korean leadership and 
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bring an end to the Kim Dynasty.261  The incipient power of this unique 
constellation of forces emboldens Cha to simultaneously and paradoxically 
acknowledge and ignore North Korea’s history.  He is well aware North Korea 
has repeatedly demonstrated its resilience and unwavering will to survive on its 
own terms.  Nonetheless, Cha criticizes Korea analysts in the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC) for dogmatically clinging to the traditional way of thinking about 
North Korea.  Cha believes they are wrongly fixated on the fact that North 
Korea’s past successes will simply beget more success and it is destined to 
survive for the foreseeable future.262  Cha points out that, even if North Korea 
has survived numerous challenges in the past, the recent Arab Spring would 
indicate the end of North Korea is near and the status quo is unlikely to persist 
on the Korean Peninsula.  Cha emphasizes that no one predicted the Arab 
Spring, and sudden change even in North Korea cannot be ruled out.263   
Melanie Kirkpatrick agrees North Korea is vulnerable.  She recommends 
an “information invasion” to expose North Koreans to foreign ideas, to promote 
opposition, and to terminate the Kim regime.264  It is no wonder that the Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP) stressed that if “one discards socialism, it is death.  This 
is a bloody lesson that the people learned again from social historic realities in 
the nineties.”265  Moreover, other authoritarian regimes such as China have also 
resorted to similar tactics by firewalling certain words on their Internet to 
inoculate the regimes from the contagion effects of the Arab Spring.266  Bruce 
Cumings is even more blunt.  He says, “There will be no ‘Korean Spring’ until 
the Korean War is finally brought to an end, and until the two Koreas have 
reconciled along the path etched out by South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998 to 2008.”267  Part of the reason is because Kim 
commands a huge loyal army and there is no indication of general disloyalty 
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among the masses.268  Cha is undeterred by these arguments.  The Arab 
Spring gives him hope that even the most stable authoritarian regimes are 
vulnerable.  Cha writes that North Korea “is only as strong as its ability to 
control knowledge.  This control enables the regime to stand on its ideology.  
Without ideology, there is no North Korea as we know it.”269  Cha, however, 
admits he does not know when or how North Korea will end.270     
The review and critique of Cha and Armstrong’s work has raised the 
possibility that whether North Korea continues to survive may depend on its 
ideology and how resistant it will be to continued penetration of new ideas from 
the outside.  Both seem to agree that whether Kim Jong-un succeeds in 
strengthening the regime’s ideology is likely to be one of the key determinants 
of his successful rule of North Korea.  This suggests North Korea’s use of smart 
power could be significantly influenced by the need to strengthen its ideology 
and preserve its own style of socialism.  If one recognizes that the majority of 
North Korean defectors do not harbor any negative sentiment for Kim Jong-il,271 
then it suggests the systemic decay in North Korea may not be so severe and 
Kim Jong-il’s leadership could have been under-appreciated by some observers.  
The Kims may have survived in part because of their leadership ability, and not 
simply because of relative crisis indifference syndrome in the U.S. or their close 
proximity to China.  A closer examination of its leaderships’ interaction with the 
outside world is necessary.  Is it possible that the North’s survival had 
something to do with the skills of its leaders?  Are the Kims exercising smart 
power to survive?  A closer examination of Pyongyang’s domestic policies and 
its interaction with the U.S. and others is required to understand the role of the 
leadership and how they exercise smart power to survive.   
 
2.2.8 Existing Arguments for North Korean Provocations 
As mentioned above, there are many studies that have attempted to 
explain why North Korea conducts its provocations or hostile foreign policy 
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activities.  As Eberstadt and Noland have noted, one of the most common 
explanations suggest North Korea obtained foreign aid through “military 
extortion,”272 and its only asset to receive aid was the threat it posed to 
others.273  In short, Pyongyang had to manufacture crises to elicit aid to sustain 
itself, and this became its survival strategy.274  Chris Hill recently echoed this 
common understanding of North Korean provocations by highlighting that Kim 
Jong-un’s behavior seems to be imitating both of his forefathers.  Hill argued 
Kim continues to rely on the old tactic of creating “a crisis for no apparent 
reason, and expect a reward for ending it.”  However, he acknowledged that the 
problem for this argument is that Kim did not gain any reward for ending the 
recent landmine incident in August 2015 that maimed two South Korean 
soldiers.  After wondering why Kim may have manufactured the crisis, Hill 
speculated, “What Mr. Kim does seem to have received is South Korea’s 
agreement to stop the [loudspeaker] broadcast, which included some telling 
personal criticism of him.  And that may have been enough.”275  The problem is 
that the loudspeaker broadcast had been suspended by the South Koreans 
since 2004,276 thus there has to be another reason why Kim manufactured the 
landmine incident.  So why does North Korea resort to provocations? 
 
2.2.8.1 Understanding North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 
An important study that addressed North Korean provocations was done 
by Narushige Michishita in 2010.  He examined Pyongyang’s diplomacy and 
military activities from 1966 to 2008.  Michishita concluded that “North Korea’s 
objectives have changed significantly over time.”  During the 1960s, he argued 
North Korea’s aims were “ambitious, aggressive, and hostile” as it attempted to 
stop U.S. intelligence collection activities, create a second front in support of 
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North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and to incite a revolution in the 
South.277  However, since his study began in 1966, he failed to consider Kim Il-
sung’s peaceful reunification efforts during the fall of 1960.  On August 14, 1960, 
Kim offered “a new radical proposal” to reunify the country.  He proposed “a 
north-south Confederation and extensive economic and cultural exchanges and 
promoting the peaceful reunification of the country.”  He was so confident about 
what he was creating in the North; he pushed for free general elections 
throughout Korea “on a democratic basis without any foreign interference.”  In 
case Seoul refused his offer, he pushed for economic and cultural exchanges, 
which included Koreans traveling freely across the border.  Kim even offered to 
significantly downsize the KPA to 100,000 or less if the U.S. withdrew its troops 
from South Korea.278  In short, Kim may have been ambitious, but he was not 
aggressive or hostile in 1960.  What Kim Il-sung desired at the time was stability 
on the Peninsula to peacefully “unite the country under his leadership.”279  
However, perceived threats from Park Chung-hee’s military coup in 1961 and 
the Cuban missile crisis would change Kim’s calculus.280      
In the 1970s, Michishita argued Pyongyang’s aim remained ambitious 
but it also appeared to be more cooperative, especially with the U.S.  He argued 
the focus of the North’s efforts during this decade was to protect its territorial 
claims at sea, promoting a peace treaty with Washington, calling for U.S. troop 
withdrawal from South Korea, and continuing to destabilize South Korea.281  
Although Michishita was correct to point out that North Korea called for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops during this period, he appears to have overlooked the 
fact that Kim had launched a “peace offensive” toward Seoul and not 
particularly toward Washington (the Chinese were doing that).  As Bernd 
Schaefer stated, “Though socialist reunification was impossible…there now 
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existed realistic hope for a new regime in Seoul as a first step toward this goal 
[peaceful reunification]; the DPRK peace offensive denied the ROK [Republic of 
Korea or South Korea] regime [Park Chung-hee government] any ‘excuse to 
suppress democratic force’.”  Kim Il-sung sincerely believed in the early 1970s 
that his system was better than the one in the South and he would achieve 
success in getting rid of Park through democratic elections, and eventually be 
able to establish a “democratic unified government” after nation-wide popular 
election on the Peninsula.  However, the North Koreans would become more 
aggressive after Seoul promoted a two state solution (instead of a confederation) 
for its accession to the UN in June 1973 and the South Korean agents 
attempted to kidnap South Korea’s opposition leader Kim Dae-jung in Tokyo in 
August 1973.  The Soviets claimed Pyongyang would seek opportunities to 
pursue armed reunification as early as October 1973, “probably following a 
‘request’ for help from ‘democratic forces in South Korea’.”  Nevertheless, Kim 
allowed lower-level engagement to continue with Seoul from December 1973 to 
March 1975, and when a Korean resident in Japan from a pro-North Korean 
group in Japan attempted to assassinate Park in South Korea, the North 
claimed it was unaware of the plot.282          
Michishita argued that the more balanced effort of the 1970s became 
“extremely aggressive” during the 1980s as North Korea attempted to 
assassinate South Korea’s president and its agents bombed a South Korean 
airliner to destabilize the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul.  Michishita went on to 
suggest Pyongyang became “more decidedly defensive” and the most important 
aims became regime survival and procurement of economic aid.283  However, 
he seemed to minimize the influence of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy by 
arguing that Pyongyang’s coercive diplomacy “significantly slowed down the 
development of inter-Korean economic cooperation.”284  According to Jang Jin-
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sung, Kim Jong-il exploited the Sunshine Policy to save his regime.285  This may 
be an exaggeration but there is little doubt that the Sunshine Policy provided 
Kim opportunities to extract billions in hard currency and aid.  In fact, the reason 
why Michishita could argue North Korea’s “purely military objectives diminished 
in importance [after the late 1990s] while diplomatic and economic objectives 
loomed larger over time,” was largely due to the Sunshine Policy.  To be clear, 
he stated, “Since the 1990s, North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns have 
been about trading military capabilities for diplomatic and economic gains.”286  
However, this became less convincing as North Korea formally declared itself a 
nuclear weapons state in April 2013,287 and there is a growing concern 
Pyongyang would never abandon its nuclear weapons.288     
 
2.2.8.2 North Korea’s Use of Diversionary Theory 
Jung Sung-chul examined whether domestic unrest caused interstate 
conflict (i.e., diversionary theory).  After quantitatively examining over a million 
cases of conflict from 1920 to 2011, he concluded that “domestically-troubled 
states are more aggressive than others only toward certain type of states.”289  
He called this assertion “diversionary target theory,”290 and went on to claim 
troubled states “are more likely to initiate a military conflict against slightly 
stronger rising power states than other rising power targets, and prefer weaker 
territory targets to other territorial targets when choosing their military 
targets.”291  In order to validate his theory, Jung examined two cases and one of 
them was the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s (the other was 
South Korea’s troop deployment to Vietnam).292 
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Jung argued that the North Korean case “generally” supported his 
diversionary target theory because North Korea was in decline, it was isolated, 
and the Kims faced challenges from the KPA.  This forced the Kims to initiate 
the nuclear crisis in the early 1990s.  However, Jung appeared to be a bit 
hesitant about his conclusion because he later claimed that without access to 
North Korean documents he was unable “to reach a conclusion about whether 
North Korea’s initiation of crisis in 1993 was driven by its leader’s strategic 
calculation of domestic and foreign conditions.”  That said, Jung relied on Joel 
Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci’s work to support the argument that 
the Kims used external threats to consolidate power, call for more sacrifices, 
and eliminate the opposition.  According to this view, Kim Jong-il withdrew from 
the NPT in 1993 to “assert his authority over conservatives throughout the party, 
the government, and the military.”  Kim had no choice but to apply diversionary 
target theory because he lacked legitimacy and the economy was failing and he 
needed a foreign scapegoat to blame for his failures.293  As noted above, 
Michishita challenged this argument by suggesting Kim used his military-
diplomatic campaigns to trade his “military capabilities for diplomatic and 
economic gains.”294  It was not about creating a diversion; it was all about 
devising a strategy to attract foreign aid.  I also argue in Chapter 6, Kim had 
consolidated power by the time his father died in July 1994 and his core elites 
were united behind him as the North negotiated the nuclear deal in 1994.   
There was another recent study that considered whether the Kims might 
have used diversionary theory by examining three cases of North Korea’s 
“‘hostile’ diplomatic and military activities” from 1960-2011.  After examining 
North Korean provocations from the 1960s, the famine years of the 1990s, and 
Kim Jong-un’s succession, Robert Wallace concluded that diversionary theory 
applies only in “very limited circumstances” to explain North Korean 
provocations.  He admitted it was more credible to argue that external pressure 
led to Pyongyang’s hostile actions, such as combined U.S.-South Korea military 
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exercises and other activities associated with Seoul.295  Moreover, even though 
Wallace’s case studies did not include the Korean War, his brief coverage of 
North Korea after liberation in August 1945 noted that the “four groups [factions] 
united themselves into a single organization,” and the KWP “was solidified 
during the Korean War period.”296  This suggests if Wallace had also considered 
the Korean War as part of his study, then he may have been more careful in 
applying diversionary theory to North Korean provocations.  
 
2.2.8.3 Domestic Stability Driving North Korean Provocations 
Finally, the most recent study of North Korean provocations was done by 
Ken Gause in August 2015.  Although he briefly addresses provocations from 
the 1960s to 2009, his main focus is on understanding Kim Jong-un’s calculus 
for provocations and highlighting the regime’s escalation dynamics and 
decision-making.  First, he agrees with Michishita by repeating that “North 
Korea’s policy objectives have changed significantly over time – from ambitious, 
aggressive, and hostile ones in the 1960s, to more defensive and reactionary 
ones in the 1990s onwards (with the exception of the 2010 events).”  Second, 
although he claims “North Korea’s military actions have been consistent with its 
policy objectives,” he fails to discuss what those policy aims were for these 
provocations.  Third, he argues North Koreans chose the locations for their 
provocation based on local military advantage and their ability to control 
escalation.  However, it is arguable whether North Korea enjoyed military 
advantage in the DMZ where the landmine incident occurred on October 4, 
2015,297 or even at sea (e.g., use of covert action against the Cheonan in March 
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2010).  These two cases show the element of surprise also seems to be a major 
factor in North Korea’s provocation calculus.298   
Although Gause mentions the intense and violent period of provocations 
during the late 1960s, the only explanation he offers for the provocations was 
the fact the North Korean leadership had “coalesced around Kim Il-sung” after 
he had purged the Kapsan faction who opposed Kim Jong-il’s succession in the 
mid-1960s.299  With the exception of the Panmunjom ax murders in 1976, he 
viewed the 1970s as a “quiet decade,” whereas the 1980s was viewed as a 
return of violent provocations.  Gause claimed Kim Jong-il may have resorted to 
violence in the 1980s to demonstrate his leadership acumen as he assumed 
more power to run the “day-to-day operations of the regime.”300  After Kim’s 
death in July 1994, Gause argued Kim Jong-il began to conduct provocations at 
sea from the mid-1990s to the 2000s.  He characterized these years as a time 
when “North Korea began to crystalize its relationship with the South around the 
idea of acquiring a bargaining chip.”  As noted by others, North Korea used the 
“threat of violence” to extract rewards from Seoul.  However, Gause’s “major 
conclusion” was that during the reigns of Kim Il-sung and his son, there were no 
provocations during periods of domestic instability.301  As a result, he concluded 
that Kim Jong-un was also unlikely to initiate provocations during “a period of 
turmoil or transition within the leadership.” 302  According to this assertion, Kim 
Jong-un must have consolidated his power by the time the landmine incident 
occurred in August 2015.  That said, Gause seems to contradict himself by 
arguing that the Cheonan sinking occurred because Pyongyang was “engaged 
in a serious internal struggle tied to the Supreme Leader or the transfer of 
power.”303  Moreover, when the North Koreans attacked a South Korean Navy 
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patrol ship in January 1967, Kim Il-sung was still attempting to purge the 
Kapsan faction.304 
In sum, there are various explanations for North Korean provocations but 
they lack sufficient explanatory power.  More importantly, all of these studies 
begin their examination in the 1960s and that may have led to premature 
conclusions.  In other words, the genesis of provocations was not the mid-
1960s, but prior to the Korean War.  With this temporal framing, it is clear more 
research needs to be done to understand North Korea’s provocations, and the 
application of smart power framework using a multi-case study from the Korean 
War to 2015 offers a unique perspective.  
 
2.3 Research Problem and Question 
The review of the literature suggests there is no consensus in the 
existing literature as to why North Korea continues to survive and many have 
lost their explanatory power.  Moreover, existing efforts to understand North 
Korea’s provocations also revealed more analytical gaps.  Hence, my sense is 
that the application of smart power offers a fresh perspective on how North 
Korea survives.  Based on the research problem identified and the evidence 
provided above, I believe it is worth the effort to examine the possibility of this 
assertion, and therefore the research question of this thesis is as follows: 
 
Given that there is no consensus on how North Korea survives 
and why it conducts provocations; does the concept of smart 
power offer an alternative explanation for North Korea’s resilience?   
 
This research question is ultimately about telling a “new story” to gain a better 
understanding of the regime, and how it is likely to meet the challenges it will 
face in the future.  I will conduct this examination by focusing on the application 
of smart power as an analytical tool, and this thesis hopes to bring scholarly 
focus to an alternative explanation to the problem of understanding the Kim 
regime in North Korea.  More importantly, I argue this approach has the 
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potential to be transferable to explain how other authoritarian regimes manage 
to be so resilient in spite of the many challenges facing them and what they 
perceive as a hostile Western world led by the U.S.  
 
2.4 The Use of Smart Power as Original Contribution to Knowledge  
It may be counterintuitive for some North Korea observers (and others) to 
contemplate the Kims using smart power since we have seen how many 
observers focus on its coercive use of power.  Perhaps the same could be said 
of Russia and Iran.  For example, in 2011, Lada L. Roslycky argued that Russia 
was using smart power – “a combination of hard military power and soft power 
operations” – to encourage separatism in several countries in the Black Sea 
region.  However, she lamented that security analysts still tend to focus on 
traditional hard power concepts, and this lack of imagination has “led to 
opaqueness in the concept of soft power” and how authoritarian states use it to 
gain power.  As a result, her analytical effort fails to consider Nye’s smart power 
theory holistically and focuses mostly on how Russia uses its soft power tools to 
“build trust and loyalty” with the separatists in the Crimea.305   
With respect to Iran, Michael Eisenstadt has recently published a revised 
second edition of his earlier work (2011) on Iran’s strategic culture in November 
2015.  He presented his latest edition as an “attempt to convey the essential 
elements of the strategic culture of the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran]” to allow the 
U.S. to have a correct understanding of Iran.  This would allow it to respond 
more effectively to the threats posed by Iran.  He then argued, “The IRI has 
traditionally pursued a mixed soft/hard power national security that prioritized 
soft power over hard power.”  Eisenstadt also laments that U.S. strategists and 
policymakers are fixated on Iran’s hard power resources but Tehran “places 
greater emphasis on guile than on brute force, and on soft power than on hard 
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power.”306  Later he states, “While Iran has traditionally emphasized soft power, 
it has not ignored its ‘hard power’ assets, as indicated by its proxy warfare 
capabilities, its guerrilla navy, its robust missile forces, and its nuclear program.”  
He cites Iran’s recent commitment of troops to Syria and Iraq as an example of 
Iran using “hard power in certain situations.”307  In other words, Eisenstadt also 
fails to use Nye’s smart power theory as a framework to assess Iran’s behavior 
and focuses primarily on Tehran’s use of soft power.  This is not surprising.  In 
2011, Mai’a Davis Cross argued that while interest in smart power theory is 
growing, it is “useless” as an analytical tool and thus “smart power still waits on 
the sidelines of academic debates.”  Her own aim is to critique Nye’s work to 
“make smart power more analytically useful,” and evaluate Europe’s capacity to 
wield soft and smart power.308   
While Cross provided useful comments about some of the shortcomings 
of Nye’s smart power theory and clarified some of his concepts, she overlooked 
his claim that “a smart power strategy provides the answers to five questions,” 
(addressed in Chapter 1), which can form the basis for smart power analysis.  
More importantly, she is unclear about her own analytical framework for smart 
power that can be transferable because she attempts to show it by merely 
examining Europe’s capacity to wield smart and soft power.309  One would have 
to do something similar for other cases but there is no analytical foundation to 
begin the work, such as Nye’s five questions.  This preliminary review regarding 
smart power theory indicates scholars tend to believe over reliance on hard 
power to assess authoritarian state’s behavior is problematic (I agree), but they 
appear to focus too much on the elements of soft power and fail to fully consider 
how soft and hard power are used in tandem to achieve desired outcomes.  
Additionally, more research needs to be done to apply Nye’s analytical 
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framework and whether authoritarian (as well as other) states (and non-state 
actors) are using smart power.        
In the case of North Korea, I argue that holistic application of Nye’s 
concept of smart power can demonstrate how North Korea has learned (and 
sometimes made mistakes) how to successfully employ it to survive.  I will begin 
by briefly revisiting Nye’s concept of smart power.  As defined in Chapter 1, Nye 
defines smart power as the “ability to combine hard and soft power resources 
into effective strategies.”310  This means any state can use smart power, 
especially small and weak states like North Korea.  The essence of the concept 
is resolving the challenge of power conversion, and this requires an 
understanding of North Korea’s full range of power resources.  This means 
North Korean leaders must be able to combine their power resources effectively 
in various situations,311 and this demands acquiring contextual intelligence 
needed to understand the evolving situation.  Without proper knowledge of the 
situation, it would be difficult for North Korea to identify the proper mix of hard 
and soft power so they end up reinforcing each other to consistently achieve its 
desired outcomes.  More importantly, this suggests North Korea cannot 
exercise smart power with hard power alone; it also requires soft power.312  This 
study will apply these concepts in various cases from the early ruling period of 
Kim Il-sung to that of Kim Jong-un by focusing on the outcomes of provocations 
and whether the Kims were capable of exercising good strategy and leadership 
to achieve their aims.   
 
2.5 Designing a Conceptual Framework 
The review and critique of the literature have provided a comprehensive 
list of explanatory variables regarding the survival of North Korea, which I will 
call North Korea’s survival tools.  This does not mean these tools are only for 
regime survival but, when used effectively, they allow North Korea to achieve 
greater independence to pursue its own style of socialism, and sometimes 
punch far above its weight and take center stage in world affairs.  The origin of 
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North Korea’s development of these tools began with Kim Il-sung’s anti-
Japanese guerrilla struggle in Manchuria, but more tools were added to the tool 
box as Kim consolidated his power after the Korean War and contested for 
legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula with several South Korean leaders.  When 
Kim Il-sung died in July 1994, he conveyed to his son his guerrilla and 
totalitarian legacies based on the cult of personality.  Afterward, Kim Jong-il 
unexpectedly rose to the challenge to survive a “constellation of forces” that 
threatened his regime as he simultaneously faced the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the death of his father, and the failure of North Korea’s economy.   
Although North Korea’s traditional benefactors, China and the Soviet 
Union, abandoned the Kims for South Korea in the early 1990s, Kim Jong-il 
learned to leverage his nuclear program to maximize foreign aid and attempted 
to mobilize the population for the arduous march.  Kim was dogmatic in his 
belief in the Juche ideology but also pragmatic enough to know the common 
people in North Korea needed some coping mechanisms to survive the famine 
years.  In the process of learning how to lead North Korea, Kim Jong-il and his 
core elites effectively developed a smart power strategy based on a cycle of 
provocations to extract unconditional foreign aid and periodically basked in the 
international spotlight.  Kim accomplished this by exploiting South Korean, 
Japanese and American fears of North Korea’s collapse, and threats from its 
nuclear and missile programs.  Surprisingly, Kim and his negotiators were 
capable of seizing engagement opportunities to build enough trust to achieve 
desired outcomes.   
Today, his third son Kim Jong-un has inherited North Korea, but there is 
ongoing debate about what kind of system he inherited and questions also 
abound about how resilient the North will be with an inexperienced leader as 
more ideas and information penetrate North Korea from the outside.  Ultimately, 
Kim Jong-un’s ability to exercise smart power could determine whether he is 
capable of leading North Korea.  In order to discover whether he is capable of 
doing so requires an in-depth study of the three Kims’ rule of North Korea, with 
special emphasis on determining whether they were successful in achieving 
desired outcomes.  Therefore, the conceptual framework for this study uses the 
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qualitative research methodology of case studies by examining the enabling 
research questions identified at the beginning of Chapter 1.  The conceptual 
framework is highlighted in Figure 2.1 below.  It describes the key events that 
occurred in North Korea’s history which are associated with the question of 
North Korea’s survival.  It begins with Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla 
experience in Manchuria and ends with Kim Jong-un’s attempts to consolidate 
his power after the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011.  It also highlights 
the seven supporting questions that were generated by examining the existing 
explanations of North Korea’s survival.  Finally, the framework highlights the 
research question that the Kims have used various survival tools to support 
their smart power strategies.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 Summary 
The focus of the study will be examining the outcomes of North Korean 
strategy over time.  The review of the literature suggests, for the first time, an in-
depth study of provocations will be conducted from the Korean War to 2015.  
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework, produced by author
Kim Il Sung establishes his 
nationalist and leadership 
credentials in Manchuria and 
forms lasting relationships 
with his Minsaengdan group
Kim Il Sung consolidates 
power, aims for unification 
by force, promotes the Juche
idea, and establishes 
totalitarian control
Kim contests for legitimacy 
with ROK, calls for arduous 
march in the tradition of 
the guerrillas after Soviet 
collapse, and obtains aid  
Social control weakens 
during economic failure, 
focuses on strengthening 
ideology: Juche and Korean 
style of socialism
Kim Il Sung dies, successful 
transfer of power under 
son’s leadership, promotes 
military-first policy, and  
acquires nuclear weapons 
Most external aid ceases 
after mismanagement of 
aid and provocations. 
Exploits Chinese aid and 
trade to rebuild economy
Kim Jong Un consolidates 
power, strengthens nuclear 
deterrence, revives ideology 
to resist new ideas, and calls 
for improving the economy
1 How relevant is Kim Il Sung’s
guerrilla experience?
2 Was Kim Jong Il capable of maintaining 
totalitarianism despite relative weakness?
How critical is ideology to overcoming the 
regime’s weakness and promoting unity? 
3
5 4
What did the Kims learn from economic
failure following Soviet collapse?
6
7
Is NK exploiting China to strengthen its economy 
or is it dependent on China for survival?
Can North Korea under Kim Jong Un counter calls
for a North Korean spring with its own ideas? 
Use of smart power
to overcome its relative 
weakness to maintain 
independence
(smart power tool box)
Will nuclear and missile programs make NK more vulnerable?
8 What will be Kim Jong Un’s
strategy?
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The study will also apply, for the first time, Nye’s smart power theory as an 
analytical framework to determine how an authoritarian regime like North Korea 
converted its relatively limited power resources into successful outcomes.  
Having said that, the study acknowledges that each of the seven supporting 
questions offers only a partial explanation to the question of North Korean 
survival, but when considered holistically they complement our multi-case study 
of the Kim Dynasty.  As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, smart 
power in essence requires good strategy and leadership to convert resources 
into power that can secure desired outcomes.313  The question is: Are the Kims 
capable of exercising good strategy and leadership?  Some of the discussions 
above (e.g., extracting aid during the famine years and resolution of the BDA 
issue) suggest this is a reasonable proposition even under duress, which needs 
to be fully developed in the coming chapters.  Finally, a brief review of recent 
works on Iran and Russia’s use of power suggests additional research needs to 
be done by using Nye’s smart power as an analytical tool and that could reveal 
significant findings – both might be using smart power, not using soft and hard 
power disparately.  This also raises the question whether more work can be 
done to improve Nye’s smart power theory as an analytical framework.  The 
next chapter will discuss the research methodology to explain how it will meet 
the aims and objectives of this study.   
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an 
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity.  Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended 
to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners to resolve.  Achievements that share these two 
characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as ‘paradigms.’1  
  
       - Thomas Kuhn  
 
3.1 Introduction and Overview 
The aims of this multi-case study2 are to raise the level of understanding 
about how the Kims have managed to survive despite the growing international 
pressure; to offer North Korea’s use of smart power as an alternative 
explanation for its survival; and to recommend alternative policy strategies to 
address the North Korea problem.  In search of understanding this problem,3 
the study focuses on the research question, given that there is no consensus on 
how North Korea survives and why it conducts provocations; does the concept 
of smart power offer an alternative explanation for North Korea’s resilience?  
This chapter depicts the study’s research methodology to answer the research 
question by considering the following areas: (a) rationale for research design, (b) 
rationale for multi-case approach, (c) research strategies and samples, (d) 
summary of research design, (e) data analysis and synthesis, (f) trustworthiness, 
and (g) limitations and delimitations of the study.4   
 
3.2 Rationale for Qualitative Research Design5 
The qualitative research method is normally used to provide a thorough 
understanding of the research topic by incorporating the views of the study’s 
participants and the “context in which they live.”  It is helpful for “exploring new 
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topics or understanding complex issues; for explaining people’s beliefs and 
behaviour; and for identifying the social or cultural norms of a culture or society.”  
In short, qualitative research is well suited to address “‘why’ questions to explain 
and understand issues or ‘how’ questions that describe processes or behaviour.”  
Moreover, the following aims of qualitative research supports the study’s aim to 
gain a higher-level of understanding of the Kim regime and how it continues to 
survive despite its relative weakness:6 
 
 Understand from the participants’ perspective, “behaviour, beliefs, 
opinions and emotions” 
 
 Understand processes, such as how societies formulate policy decisions 
 
 Reveal the meaning that societies give to their past 
 
 Understand how people interact socially and their shared norms and 
values 
 
 Identify the context in which “social, cultural, economic or physical” 
movements occur 
 
 Provide a “voice to the issues of a certain study population” 
 
 Offer “depth, detail, nuance and context” to complex issues 
 
 Study “in detail sensitive topics” 
 
 Research topics that “may be too complex or hidden” to be examined 
quantitatively7 
 
These aims contrast with the quantitative research method whose 
purpose is to “quantify a research problem, to measure and count issues and 
then to generalize these findings to a broader population.”  The generalization 
of the findings is possible because the sampling is random, which is intended to 
provide “a study population that is representative of the general population.”  It 
is commonly acknowledged that the larger the sample size, the more valid the 
findings are likely to be, and the outcomes of the quantitative study would “lead 
to the identification of statistical trends, patterns, averages, frequencies or 
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correlations.”8  However, it is my contention that using quantitative research 
methods is unlikely to bring forth the quality of data necessary to address the 
purpose of the research.  Therefore, the aims of qualitative research methods 
identified above are better suited for this study.  
 
3.3 Rationale for Multi-case Methodology 
 According to Bloomberg and Volpe, there are five traditional approaches 
for qualitative research methods.  They include “case study, ethnography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, and narrative research.”  First, ethnography 
focuses on lengthy observations of the targeted population, frequently involving 
the researcher becoming immersed in the culture and everyday life with the 
goal of producing a complete “cultural portrait.”  Second, phenomenology 
focuses on illustrating the commonality among all participants with the aim of 
identifying the main themes of the participants’ “lived experience.”  This is 
accomplished by the researcher being deeply involved with a small group of 
participants for a “prolonged engagement” to interpret the meaning of the lived 
experience.  Third, grounded theory aims to “generate or discover a theory of a 
process, an action, or an interaction grounded in the views of the research 
participants.”  The theory is grounded by the data that are observed and 
collected about the participants over multiple stages.  The result is either new 
theory from the data or modification or extension of existing theory.  Fourth, 
narrative research focuses on the “experiences as expressed in lived and told 
stories of individuals or cultures.”  This tradition examines the lives of one or 
more people by the researcher retelling the story or stories through a “narrative 
chronology” to present the significance of the experience(s).9   
 This study will touch upon the lives of the three Kims, but it is not 
intended to be a life story – a narrative research or biography – of the three 
Kims.  The focus is on learning more about how North Korea continues to 
survive.  The first three approaches mentioned above are not feasible since I do 
not have access to “participants” required to address the research question.  I 
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am left with the final qualitative research approach: the case study method.  
This last approach examines “the bounded system (or systems) over time 
through in-depth data collection methods, involving multiple data sources.”  It 
comprises of providing “detailed descriptions of a setting and its participants, 
accompanied by an analysis of the data for themes, patterns, and issues.”10  As 
noted earlier in Chapter 1, Yin’s approach to case studies also reaffirmed that it 
is an appropriate method for addressing how and why questions.  Moreover, the 
enabling research questions will also help guide me to the relevant information 
required for studying how North Korea continues to survive.11   
 
3.4 Research Strategies 
According to Norman Blaikie, research strategies provide “logic, or a set 
of procedures, for answering research questions, particularly ‘what’ and ‘why’ 
questions.”  More importantly, he argues that “knowledge can only be advanced 
in the social sciences by using one or a combination of four research strategies, 
the Inductive, Deductive, Retroductive and Abductive.”12  This study will rely 
primarily on the deductive strategy, but will also utilize the remaining three 
strategies throughout.  First, the inductive research strategy aims to establish 
“limited generalizations about the distribution of, and patterns of association 
amongst, observed or measured characteristics of individuals and social 
phenomena.”  What this means for the research question is that all of the 
existing explanations of North Korea’s survival that the study has uncovered 
during the literature review allow this research to draw generalizations about the 
research question, and that helps us to look for those characteristics during our 
data collection effort.  This strategy acknowledges it is possible that during the 
course of the research we could “stumble across some other characteristics”13 
of how North Korea survives. 
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While inductive strategy is a necessary step to establish patterns and 
characteristics related to the research question, other strategies are needed to 
answer why14 or how15 questions.  The next step is to explain the patterns or 
characteristics that others have observed and the deductive research strategy 
aims to do this by “using an existing theory, or inventing a new theory.”  The aim 
“is to find an explanation for an association between two [or more] concepts by 
proposing a theory, the relevance of which can be tested.”  In this study, some 
of the association for the various explanations for why North Korea survives is 
identified by the inductive strategy,16 and the deductive strategy is used to 
consider smart power theory as an alternative explanation.  However, the 
ultimate goal of deductive strategy is to find the truth, but Blaikie claims to be 
more pragmatic and strives for “one amongst other possible explanations.”17   
Since we now have smart power theory as well as other explanations for 
North Korea’s survival, we will have to rely on the retroductive strategy to 
explain the “observed regularities.”  This requires collecting the data and 
walking them back to consider which of the explanations can best illuminate the 
observed regularities.  The challenge has always been discovering “the 
structures and mechanisms that are proposed to explain the observed 
regularities.”  However, our review of the literature has already led to several 
ideas that attempt to explain how North Korea survives, and smart power theory 
could also offer more than one interpretation to explain the data collected.  
Nevertheless, this strategy requires “disciplined scientific thinking aided by 
creative imagination, intuition, and guesswork.”18   
Despite the challenge, the abductive strategy could support the aims of 
both the retroductive and deductive strategies by enhancing our understanding 
of North Korea with special emphasis on determining the reasons for North 
Korea’s actions.  This is accomplished by examining the North Korean 
“meanings and interpretations, the motives and intentions, that [the North 
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Korean] people use in their everyday lives, and which direct their behavior.”  In 
short, it aims to describe the North Korean experience from the inside, 
understand the way they perceive the world, and discover why they behave the 
way they do.19   
Although there are limits to interpreting the North’s behavior, the North 
Koreans often attempt to justify their actions.  For instance, the findings indicate 
many of the provocations during the Cold War from the Korean War20 to the 
Korean Airline (KAL) 858 bombing21 were motivated by the Kims’ desire for 
reunification.  Although the U.S. denies it has a hostile policy toward North 
Korea, Pyongyang justifies many of its actions by citing U.S. hostile policy.  In 
fact, on August 31, 2012, Pyongyang explained why it believes U.S. hostile 
policy is the main obstacle to peace and stability in Korea.22  Within North Korea, 
allegations of U.S. hostile policy were broadcast by the regime to create a siege 
mentality,23 and when it attempted to regain control of the markets in 2009 the 
people resisted to protect their assets.24  However, there are other cases when 
the regime’s justification for its behavior is beyond belief or it denies 
responsibility.  This was the case when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il both 
blamed unidentified officials and soldiers for the Blue House raid25 and the 
kidnapping of Japanese citizens respectively.26  North Korea also refused to 
acknowledge the KAL 858 bombing and the Cheonan sinking.27  As a result, 
these cases do require an interpretation of North Korean behavior.  It is not my 
intention to claim I have discovered a new scientific method to interpret their 
behavior through this study.  What I have shown is that, abductive strategy, 
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when used as an iterative process, can be used as a hypothesis to help provide 
additional insights on the motives and meanings of the North’s actions.28  
 
3.5 Research Design, Case Selection, and Information Needed 
The study’s research design (see Figure 3.1) relies on the seven 
enabling research questions derived from the existing explanatory factors for 
North Korea’s survival to guide the collection effort for this study.  The strategy 
begins by examining how Kim Il-sung consolidated his power and laid the 
foundation for a totalitarian regime in North Korea.  It will also examine the other 
explanatory factors for North Korea’s survival discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 to 
help define the ruling style of Kim Il-sung and how he attempted to pass it on to 
Kim Jong-il after his death.  The understanding of the dynastic power transition 
between the two Kims and the process of Kim Jong-il’s power consolidation will 
allow us to make some deductions about the elements of continuity and change 
with respect to the survival tools that Kim Jong-il eventually adopted for himself.  
A similar approach will be used to understand Kim Jong-un’s meteoric rise after 
the death of his father to get a better sense of his developing ruling style based 
on his key actions to consolidate power.   
After examining the survival tools of the three Kims, I will focus on data 
collection for the multi-case study.  According to Robert Yin, there are six most 
commonly used sources of information for cases studies.  They include 
“documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-
observation, and physical artifacts.”29  I will primarily use two of the six sources 
of information to support my multi-case study.  First, I will rely on documentary 
information, such as letters, memoranda, speeches, announcements, minutes 
of meetings, media reports, communiques, and other written reports of events.  
Yin argues that the most critical use of documents is “to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources.”  As a result, well-thought-out searches 
for key documents are important to any information collection plan.30   
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Second, archival records will also be relevant to this study, and include items 
such as service and organizational records, maps, charts, lists of names, 
surveys and personal records.31  Sometimes they can be critical to a study, and 
this is likely to be the case for even an isolated society like North Korea as more 
archival records are being released from Eastern Europe, China and Russia.  
On the other hand, this study will not utilize interviews or physical artifacts, and 
envisions very limited use (if at all) of direct and participant observation of select 
events such as negotiations with the Korean People’s Army at Panmunjom from 
1997 to 1998 and as a member of the Six Party Talks from 2005 to 2006.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, I will use life stories32 that Yin mentions but chooses not to 
include as one of his six sources of information as well as various academic 
works that would meet the criteria of Catherine Marshall and Gretchen 
                                            
31
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., pp. 88-89. 
32
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3
rd
 ed., p. 85. 
 
Validate Survival Tools for each of the Kims
Literature Review
Examine Case Studies
Smart Power Theory
Synthesis
Data Collection
Phase I
Data Collection
Phase II
Data Collection
Phase III
Recommendations
Conclusions
Findings
O
n
go
in
g 
D
at
a 
A
n
al
ys
is
Identify Survival Tools for North Korea
Develop Rationale for Smart Power theory
Determine how the Survival Tools evolved over rule of the three Kims
Analyze the data for each of the cases
Analyze and interpret the 
findings to test Smart Power theory
Figure 3.1: Research Design Flowchart, produced by author, adopted from Bloomberg and Volpe
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Rossman’s historical analysis,33 which Yin does not mention in his discussion of 
sources.  Marshall and Rossman suggest that what Yin calls life stories is “a 
deliberate attempt to define the growth of a person in a cultural milieu and to 
make theoretical sense of it.”  The effort is on the needs of individuals and their 
experiences and how they attempt to cope with society.  It is noted for 
examining how culture changes over time, especially from an insider’s 
perspective of culture.34  This is essential to our research design, and the same 
is true for historical analysis.  In short, it is “a method of discovering, from 
records and accounts, what happened in the past.”  This goes beyond acquiring 
documents and archival records.  It may also include examination of fiction, 
songs, poetry, folklore and opinions.  More importantly, the purpose is to 
establish a “baseline or background” prior to conducting contemporary research.  
It may also reveal previously unexplored issues and others that may require 
reexamination “for which answers are not as definite as desired.”35           
As part of my information collection plan for this research, I have 
conducted targeted searches in databases ranging from the Columbia 
International Affairs Online (CIAO), CRS Reports, Digital National Security 
Archive, JSTOR, Praeger Security International Online, ProQuest, [North] 
Korean Central News Agency, Kim Il-sung’s multi-Volume Work, National 
Intelligence University’s Hughes Library Catalog and ebrary, National Archives 
at College Park, Maryland, North Korea International Documentation Project 
(NKIDP) at the Wilson Center, and United Nations Command’s records and 
other relevant academic works.  When the initial research is completed for each 
chapter on the Kims, the study will focus on identifying the tools each of them 
used to survive.  The second step in the research design is to identify specific 
issues for each of the Kims that will demonstrate how they all attempted to 
exercise smart power to achieve the desired outcomes necessary for survival.36   
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As discussed in Chapter 1, my personal experience has led me to 
believe the Kim’s might be using smart power to survive, and to compensate for 
that bias, the study’s approach is to select the cases that will disprove the smart 
power theory.  As suggested by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
I asked the question, “What evidence would convince us that we are wrong?”37 
and this approach is similar to the “crucial case” selection, where the “least-
likely case” to achieve an expected outcome is selected, but unexpectedly 
validates the theory.38  As a result, the study’s sampling focuses on cases that 
could validate the argument that North Korea is not using smart power.  In fact, 
on March 25, 2014, General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces 
Korea (USFK), stated in his Congressional testimony, “The Kim Jong-un 
regime’s overriding interest is ensuring its survival.  To achieve this, North 
Korea employs a coercive strategy, using force or the threat of force in an 
attempt to influence the United States and South Korea.”39  My argument is that 
use of hard power is not the only way North Korea achieves it aims.    
The third step in the research design is selecting the cases, and this 
required a review of Hannah Fischer’s comprehensive list of North Korean 
provocations from her CRS Report North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-
2007.40  However, since Fischer’s report ends at March 2007, her work has 
been supplemented by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) 
list of major provocations from the 1960s to March 2010.41  In order to identify 
provocations from April 2010 to August 2015, I have selected my own cases 
based on the definition of provocations identified in Chapter 1.  Fischer’s CRS 
report included over 160 provocations from 1950 to 2007, beginning with the 
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Korean War, while the CSIS record listed only two provocations from 2007 to 
2010 by using a different selection criterion – it had to result in casualties.42   
To go beyond the CSIS study which ended with the sinking of the South 
Korean naval ship Cheonan in March 2010, however, the most obvious 
provocations that were not included in the two studies are the North Korean 
artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, and the North Korean 
deployment of long-range missiles to threaten nuclear strikes on the U.S. with 
“smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear weapons in the Spring of 2013.”43  I also 
needed to consider two failed space launches in April 2009 and April 2012, and 
a successful space launch in December 2012.44  Moreover, North Korea 
conducted its second nuclear test in November 2009, a third in February 
2013,45 and a demonstration of force to threaten a nuclear ICBM launch against 
the U.S.46  The overall trend of provocations highlighted in the chart below 
shows the years 1969, 1974, 1978-1981, 1987, 1997-1998, 2003, 2005, 2012-
2013 appear to demonstrate higher levels of North Korean provocations and 
probably offer appropriate cases for this study.  Finally, I considered the 
landmine incident that severely wounded two South Korean soldiers in the DMZ 
on August 4, 2015,47 as the last case study.  The fourth nuclear test (alleged H-
bomb test) on January 3, 2016 will be addressed as a policy issue in Chapter 8 
but will not be examined as a case study.48    
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The question is which provocations should we consider for this study?  In 
an attempt to minimize case selection bias, the multi-case study will focus on 
North Korea’s use of hard power, which is plausible based on the realist 
assumption that the world is anarchic and the nation-state is the primary actor, 
and to preserve their interests, countries like North Korea will resort to the 
ultimate instrument of power – force.49  The rationale is that if the smart power 
theory is valid then the study can safely assume that, even in cases where 
North Korea appears to use only variations of force, closer examination is likely 
to reveal the Kims simultaneously employed other power resources to achieve 
their objectives.  If the study only examined one case, it might eventually 
discover the findings were an outlier but, by examining over ten cases with 
some variations in outcomes, it can mitigate this risk.50  The examination of 
diverse cases should result in meaningful generalizations concerning North 
Korean provocations,51 and for validating its use of smart power.      
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The fourth step is to further delineate the categories of provocations to 
consider some variations of the use of force since this study defines it broadly to 
include activities such as military invasion, infiltration of armed agents and spies, 
terrorism, actions that undermine progress in major negotiations, and ballistic 
missile and nuclear tests.52  This led to examining the definition from the 
discussion of interstate conflict behavior, and specifically those conflicts that 
eventually become militarized.  Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz’s study on 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) defines it “as a set of interactions between 
or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, 
or actual uses of military force.”53  While the overall study’s dependent variable 
is regime survival, these three elements from the MID definition will be the multi-
case study of provocations’ dependent variables and this variance on the use of 
force will give it some flexibility to explain some deviations in use of force 
outcomes.54  After considering these factors, the research ends up with 
approximately 50 cases where North Korea used force from 1948 to 2013, 
about 25 cases where it threatened the use of force, and roughly 30 cases 
where it displayed the use of force.  The other incidents of provocations that do 
not fall into any variations of the use of force number about 60.  They include 
the capture of North Korean spies, kidnapping of foreign citizens, discovery of 
infiltration tunnels in the DMZ, proliferation of arms and nuclear technology, and 
breakdown of nuclear negotiations. 
Now that the initial assessment of the provocations using the MID 
definition is complete, the fifth and final step is to follow Robert Yin’s 
recommendation and attempt to select the cases that “most likely illuminate” our 
research question.55  The selection criteria for our cases will be: (1) the study 
needs a unit of analysis (case) from all three Kims; (2) the preponderance of the 
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evidence must demonstrate that the Kims and/or the core North Korean elites 
(i.e., members of Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla band, and members of the Politburo 
and the National Defense Commission, etc.) deliberately planned and executed 
the provocation and it was not merely the result of unexpected happenstance 
(which would eliminate the two submarine incursions of 1996 and 1998); (3) use 
of kinetic force must have resulted in casualties; (4) and non-kinetic use of force 
(threat or displays of force) must have escalated the crisis beyond the Korean 
peninsula.  This process resulted in the selection of over ten cases during the 
Kim family’s rule of North Korea under one or some combination of the three 
Kims.56 (see Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1  Select Cases of North Korean Provocations, 1950-2015  
Kims/Year(s) Event Details 
MID 
Criteria 
Kim Il-sung 
(KIS) (1950-
1953) 
Korean War 
(case 1) 
 
North Korean (NK) surprise attack on 25 
June 1950 and United Nations 
intervention; conflict ends in Armistice in 
July 1953 (total U.S. casualties 
157,530).
57
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
KIS 
1968 
 
 
North Korean attack 
on the Blue House 
(case 2); 
NK capture of USS 
Pueblo (case 3); 
North Korean Ulchin-
Samchok raid  
(case 4) 
 
NK attempted to assassinate President 
Park Chung Hee at the Blue House in Jan 
1968; Attacked and seized USS. Pueblo 
with a crew of 83 in international waters 
also in January 1968; and conducted 
large scale military raids in South Korea 
at Ulchin and Samchok in October 
1968.
58
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
 
 
KIS and Kim 
Jong-il (KJI) 
Transition 
1976 
 
Panmunjom Ax 
Murders 
(case 5) 
 
NK soldiers attacked a U.S.-South 
Korean tree-trimming work team with 
axes at Panmunjom, killing 2 U.S. army 
officers and wounding 4 American 
enlisted men and 5 South Korean 
soldiers.
59
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
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KIS and KJI 
Transition 
1983 and 
1987 
 
 
Terrorism 
(Rangoon bombing in 
1983 (case 6) and 
the 1987 bombing of 
KAL Flight 858 
(case 7) 
 
Bomb killed 17 senior ROK officials and 
injured 14 who were accompanying 
President Chun to Burma in October 
1983; a bomb planted by two NK 
terrorists on Korean airliner in November 
1987 kills 20 crew and 95 passengers 
aboard, in midair over the Andaman Sea 
off the coast of Burma.
60
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
KIS and KJI 
Transition 
1994 
 
 
North Korean 
Nuclear Weapons 
Development 
(First Nuclear Crisis) 
(case 8) 
 
 
In March 1994, NK issued threat of war in 
an inter-Korean meeting at Panmunjom in 
response to Seoul mentioning the 
possibility of UN sanctions for its refusal 
to accept full international nuclear 
inspections.  U.S. considered military 
strikes against NK nuclear facilities.
61
 
 
Direct 
Threat to 
Use 
Military 
Force 
KJI 
2002 
Second Nuclear 
Crisis 
2002 
(case 9) 
 
Facing pressure to scrap a nuclear 
weapons program, NK warned U.S. in 
October 2002 it would take unspecified 
“tougher counteraction” if it did not accept 
talks.
62
 
 
Implied 
Threat to 
Use 
Military 
Force 
 
KJI and Kim 
Jong-un (KJU) 
Transition 
2010 
North Korean sinking 
of the Cheonan (case 
10) and the shelling 
of Yeonpyeong 
Island (case 11) 
 
 
Sinking of the Cheonan that killed 46 
ROK sailors in March 2010;
63
 NK shelling 
of Yeonpyeong island in November 2010 
killed two ROK Marines and two ROK 
civilians.
64
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
 
 
KJU 
2013 
 
 
Deployment of long-
range missiles to 
strike the U.S. 
(case 12) 
In April 2013, NK moved more 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to its 
east coast region.  The ballistic missiles 
were pointed toward the U.S. just days 
after North Korea threatened a 
“merciless” nuclear military strike on the 
U.S.
65
 
 
Display 
of 
Military 
Force 
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KJU 
2015 
Landmine Incident in 
the DMZ 
(case 13) 
 
I will examine the most recent provocation 
– the August 4, 2015 landmine incident – 
that severely wounded two South Korean 
soldiers in the DMZ.  After its 
investigation of the incident, the South 
Korean military accused the North of 
deliberately planting the mines near a 
South Korean army guard post.
66
 
 
Actual 
Use of 
Force 
 
In sum, my research design and case selection will validate the smart 
power theory by attempting to disprove it since all of the cases include variants 
of hard power usage.  One of the important questions of this study is whether 
the Kims were capable of exercising good strategy67 and leadership.68  That will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters, but a recent study by David Runciman 
highlighted that some authoritarian regimes learn faster than democratic ones, 
“particularly when it comes to avoiding the mistakes of the past.”  The problem 
is that these autocratic regimes often assume “that the future will continue to 
resemble the past.”69  What this suggests is that a significant miscalculation by 
Kim Jong-un, based on poor assumptions grounded in the past (e.g., no use of 
force by the U.S. no matter what the provocation), could lead to a surprise or 
even state failure.70  In other words, he must have good contextual intelligence 
and eventually become a leader that can exercise leadership beyond his 
inherited position as the Supreme Leader. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis and Synthesis 
According to Bloomberg and Volpe, the synthesis of the findings “is the 
process of pulling everything together,” whereas analysis “splits the data apart.”  
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This process begins by answering the research questions, cross-checking all 
sources to assess the findings, and validating my assumptions.71  After 
completing my research, the findings suggest Kim Il-sung’s smart power 
attempts only succeeded at the end when he transferred his power to his son, 
while Kim Jong-il was very successful in exercising it during a very difficult 
period in North Korea’s history.  More importantly, Kim Jong-un appears to have 
consolidated his power and seems to be learning how to exercise smart power 
based on the two provocations examined under his rule.   
 
3.7 Issues of Trustworthiness 
The next issue is to determine how to end up with “good and convincing 
research,” which is often equated with “credibility and dependability” in 
qualitative research.72  The matter of credibility questions whether or not the 
research findings are accurate and credible, and thus the aim is “not to verify 
conclusions, but rather to test the validity of conclusions reached.”  The 
credibility of research will ultimately be determined by examining the 
methodology and how well it addresses the proposed research questions, and 
by reviewing the rigor and the quality of the interpretation of the findings.  The 
issue of trustworthiness is also related to whether the findings are consistent 
and dependable with the acquired information.  While the researcher may 
anticipate some inconsistencies in research, it must be well documented and 
clearly understood when they occur.73   
The key to conducting dependable research is documenting “the 
rationale for all choices and decisions made during the research process,” in 
order to demonstrate the “transparency of method… of how all the data were 
analyzed and interpreted.”  The final aspect of trustworthiness that is relevant to 
this study is transferability.  It is the idea that “the reader determines whether 
and to what extent this particular phenomenon [the research topic] in this 
particular context can transfer to another particular context.”  Some have 
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attempted to bring more clarity to this concept by reframing it as “context-bound 
extrapolations.”  This is defined as “speculations on the likely applicability of 
findings to other situations under similar, but not identical, conditions.”74   As 
discussed above, my own sense is that smart power theory can be applied to 
other authoritarian regimes, such as Iran and Russia, to determine how they 
achieve their desired outcomes. 
 
3.8 Limitations and Delimitations 
I understand that every study has some limitations, which are defined as 
“conditions that may weaken the study.”  Some of these vulnerable conditions 
noted by previous researchers include selection bias of cases, determining 
suitable number of cases, over-reliance on particular sources of information, 
and general researcher bias.75  I am also concerned about the suitability of the 
selected cases as well as the number of cases I have chosen for this research.  
Although the initial review of the literature has indicated North Korea is capable 
of using smart power (particularly during the nuclear crises) to survive, I have 
intentionally selected cases that would at the outset support a counter-argument 
(cases using variants of hard power) to guard against my own bias based on 
experience and observation that North Korea is capable of using smart power to 
survive.  I attempt to avoid relying too much on certain sources of information by 
diversifying and combining several sources to compensate for weaknesses of 
some sources while utilizing the strengths of others.76  However, due to the 
opaque nature of North Korea, some issues may depend on a particular source 
more than others.  Moreover, I have chosen not to conduct interviews for this 
study because Nigel King and Christine Horrocks argue that the most important 
criterion for conducting this type of research is diversity.  They stressed “a 
purely ad hoc, opportunistic sampling strategy is not appropriate [emphasis 
mine]; rather, the sample needs to relate in some systematic manner to the 
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social world and phenomena that a study seeks to throw light upon.”77  As a 
result, a systematic approach would require interviews with at least former and 
current officials from all the 6PT countries, and that is unrealistic for this 
research.   
Another limitation of the study is that I do not understand Japanese and 
Chinese, and my Korean language skills have atrophied significantly in recent 
years to the extent I am unable to process the unique vocabulary associated 
with this research topic in Korean.  Thus, I have relied almost entirely on 
English sources of North Korean propaganda, news reports, defector accounts, 
policy papers, government reports, and academic works.  The shortcoming of 
this approach is that there may be some ground-breaking research done in 
Korean, Japanese, and Chinese that has yet to be translated into English, and 
that could skew some of my findings and analyses.  However, this can partially 
be overcome by examining sources such as the Cold War archival materials 
from the former Soviet Union, select Eastern bloc countries, and to a lesser 
extent China, since they continue to be compiled and translated by the NKIDP 
at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.  Charles Armstrong has in 
fact noted that “while NKIDP has held numerous conferences and produced 
good number of working papers, thus far no major scholarly work has fully 
exploited this vast store of materials on North Korea’s pre-1990s history.”78   
I also need to establish delimitations for the study by identifying the 
boundaries of my study – the task of narrowing the scope of the research.79  
Most importantly, this is not a history of North Korea or nuclear negotiations.  
While the study employs historical analysis and does address the nuclear crises, 
it is about determining what the survival tools are for the Kims and how they 
evolved as power was transferred from one Kim to another, and whether or not 
they consistently used smart power to survive.  This study builds off the growing 
perception that many have noticed: North Korean diplomats are using “nuclear 
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blackmail… with uncanny skill.”80  Again, one of the more aspiring aims of this 
study is to examine whether the smart power theory can be transferable for 
examining future North Korean actions and other authoritarian regimes use of 
limited power resources to achieve their aims.  In addition, it should be no 
surprise that others have examined most of these topics before, but initial 
reexamination of some issues suggests reviewing it from the origins of the 
North’s provocations is a worthwhile endeavor.  We must also be willing to 
understand the North Korean perspective from the inside and, to accomplish 
that, we need to take more time to know and understand North Koreans’ 
interpretation of history and why it matters.  The challenge is to identify the 
“observable implications” to provide the historical context.81   
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the thought process 
regarding the study’s research methodology.  I have argued that the first task at 
hand is to examine the rule of the three Kims to answer the enabling research 
questions.  The findings will lead to validating and perhaps identifying additional 
survival tools of the North Korean regime and how they have evolved from 
generation to generation.  They are also likely to reveal several challenges to 
the Kims’ survival, such as dependence on Chinese support, weakening of the 
totalitarian system, and increased pressure from international sanctions.  After 
this has been completed for each of the Kims, the difficult task of collecting the 
data for the multi-case study must be completed, and once the findings from the 
case studies have been determined, I can begin to interpret the overall findings 
to seek a higher level of understanding regarding the Kims’ survival strategy.  
However, there are some limitations that could weaken the study, such as 
researcher bias, but I believe I have acknowledged them and taken appropriate 
steps to mitigate most of them.  For instance, these efforts include what is 
essentially the use of the crucial case selection method and diversification of 
sources.  Moreover, by clearly identifying the scope of my research and 
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conducting an initial review of previous work on some of the cases, I have 
demonstrated the merits of this study.  The final step would be to move beyond 
the interpretation of the findings and conclude the study with a new story about 
North Korea.  That said, this story is not based on scientific theory, but as a 
hypothesis it has the potential to be transferable in examining other 
authoritarian states’ use of power resources. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RISE OF KIM Il-SUNG AND THE LEGACY OF THE SURYONG 
 
The most distinguishing feature about the Kim cult, then, is not its 
more extreme outward manifestations, extreme as they may be, 
but the intensity of the people’s feelings.  Even allowing for all the 
contrived displays of emotion and the feigned dedication of those 
who go along with the cult for reasons of self-interest, one cannot 
but be amazed at the overwhelming evidence of the people’s 
strong emotional attachment to Kim.1 
 
       - Helen-Louise Hunter 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is about the rise of Kim Il-sung as a Korean leader in 
Manchuria, how he used his “uncanny ability” to outmaneuver more qualified 
opponents, both at home and abroad, consolidate his power in North Korea,2 
and set the conditions for reunification during the early years of his rule.  
Meanwhile, he managed to modify a totalitarian system he inherited from the 
Soviets using Korean characteristics, which softened the terroristic control 
aspect of the system with time-tested elements of Confucian statecraft mixed 
with an ideology based on Koreans’ long desire for self-reliance and 
independence from foreign interference (i.e., Juche).  Kim managed to balance 
autarky and reliance on foreign aid to achieve early economic success after the 
Korean War; however, it was unsustainable, and the economy began to decline 
in the 1970s even as the North reached out to the West.  By the late 1980s, it 
lost the war of legitimacy with the South and was on the verge of collapse by 
the early 1990s.  Consequently, the regime shifted its aim from reunification at 
all cost to survival with nuclear weapons.  In the end, Kim earned the admiration 
of his people and had the foresight to groom his son for over twenty years to 
introduce the only hereditary dynastic succession in the Communist world.   
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An account of Kim’s rise begins first with his prudent use of the 
Manchurian guerrilla legacy as one of several “symbolic forms” that Kim used to 
promulgate his legitimacy and myth as an unrivalled Korean leader during the 
Japanese colonial period that was easily comprehensible and became a 
meaningful frame3 to position himself as the leader of all Koreans.  What’s more, 
when he saved a special group of alleged pro-Japanese Minsaengdan (MSD) 
suspects from the Chinese Communists, it signaled “the birth of Kim Il-sung’s 
leadership.”4  After liberation from Japan, his guerrillas were reborn as “heroic 
anti-Japanese warriors” and their ascension to power facilitated the rise of his 
cult of personality.5  Second, this chapter describes how various Korean 
factions from the ethnic Korean diaspora in Northeast Asia coalesced with the 
domestic faction at the beginning of the Soviet occupation in August 1945.  With 
unwavering loyalty from his Manchurian guerrillas and timely support from the 
Soviets, Kim began to consolidate his power and, while some of the tactics he 
employed were similar to other authoritarian rulers, some observers noticed 
what was unique about him was “his greater skill as a strategist and tactician.”6   
Third, the chapter examines the six traits of North Korea’s totalitarian 
system by using Friedrich and Brzezinski’s definition of it from Chapter 1.  The 
study reveals his tactics and strategies to complete his consolidation of power 
after the war and rebuilding of the country to achieve new heights in economic 
development.7  It also describes how Kim gained the support of the Soviets and 
the Chinese as well as others in the Communist bloc to benefit from their 
largess to outpace South Korea economically after the Korean War.  However, 
Kim’s economy began to slow a bit in the 1960s when socialist aid began to 
decline8 and that led him to search for Western capital and technology but it 
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failed.9  The North’s economy never regained its momentum for growth as 
regime stability and desire for reunification trumped almost everything else.  
This demonstrated that Kim underestimated the growing South Korean 
economy well into the 1970s and misread South Korean desires for democracy 
as support for his Northern regime.10  In other words, his commitment to 
achieve reunification clouded his judgement about the popular sentiment in the 
South and enticed him to pursue reunification until his death.  Consequently, 
Seoul’s hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games symbolized the end of Kim’s dream 
of reunification11 and the failure of the North’s economy in the early 1990s 
brought into question his regime’s survivability as his son’s succession loomed.     
Finally, what is surprising is that some knowledgeable observers of North 
Korea recognized there was “genuine belief held by the majority of the 
population in Kim’s greatness, benevolence and goodness” based on Korea’s 
neo-Confucian tradition.  Kim enjoyed this popular support, in part, through 
monopoly control of information (and other totalitarian tools),12 but one cannot 
ignore “he had charisma… His talent of establishing a real rapport with ordinary 
people was at the centre of the Kim cult, however much this may have been 
manipulated and orchestrated for political ends.”13  North Koreans proclaimed 
Kim as the Father of the Nation14 and fashioned a cult of personality unlike any 
other in the world that continues to deify him as the Supreme Leader 
(Suryong)15 and eternal President.16  This is a stark contrast to the common 
perception in the Western media that North Korea and its leaders are “bizarre” 
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and “irrational, demonic, and self-destructive.”17  In short, Kim appears to have 
been a capable and charismatic leader from a relatively young age who was 
adept at using whatever means available to him to achieve his aims.   
The questions is how did Kim become a god-like personage when there 
were so many others that could have ascended to power and how did he 
manage to survive for almost fifty years to ensure the first dynastic transition in 
the Communist world?  It is true that Kim was not highly educated, but he “was 
an ‘engaging… charismatic… compelling’ man of native intellect and ability.”18  
The study of his rise in this chapter and the subsequent examination of select 
events during his rule in Chapter 5 reveal how Kim was fixated on achieving 
reunification and instinctively attempted to use smart power strategies to 
achieve his aims and survive.  While Kim did have an uncanny and 
extraordinary ability to consolidate his power and achieve dynastic transition,19 
he failed to achieve what he desired most – reunification – despite his many 
smart power attempts to achieve it.   
As noted in Chapter 1, Carr argues that one must examine the past to 
understand the present.20  Han Hong-koo mimics Carr by arguing that history in 
the North Korean context “does not belong to the past, but governs the present.”  
He goes on to highlight that unless we understand the history of Kim Il-sung’s 
guerrilla movement in Manchuria, “we can explain nothing.”21  Bruce Cumings 
cautioned that only when one takes the time to understand North Korea would it 
be possible to forecast its behavior and do something about it.22  Han is even 
bolder by claiming, “north Korea’s real problem is that it is too predictable.  The 
basic direction adopted during the anti-Japanese armed struggle period of the 
1930s has not changed.”23  With this in mind, it is time to explore Kim’s past in 
Manchuria.   
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4.2 Guerrilla Legacy as “Symbolic” Foundation for Myth and Legitimacy 
Understanding Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla experience is essential to 
interpreting North Korean behavior.  It is no secret that until the late 1990s the 
South Korean government banned the promulgation of the role of Kim Il-sung in 
the Korean Nationalist movement, and many historians in the West largely 
ignored the anti-Japanese Korean Communist movement in China.24  According 
to Lim Un, a former colleague of Kim Il-sung who defected to the Soviet Union, 
many South Korean historians politicized the issue and refused to acknowledge 
Kim’s anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, alleging he was only a leader of 
“mounted bandits.”  Their aim was to accuse Kim of being a fake to promote 
anti-communism in South Korea.  However, Lim confirmed he was the real Kim 
Il-sung, but denounced his tyrannical rule and the lies he told about his activities 
in Manchuria to create the myth he was planning for the liberation of Korea in 
China while he was under Soviet protection in the RFE.25   
On the other hand, Kim Joung-won, a South Korean scholar, argued 
while there was no proof if the original Kim Il-sung ever existed, his legend was 
well known to many Koreans.  He acknowledged that Kim adopted his 
pseudonym of Kim Il-sung while in Manchuria during the early 1930s as a 
leader of a band of anti-Japanese guerrillas.  As a guerrilla leader, Kim learned 
some political skills as well as the import of the “instruments of force,” and 
demonstrated his leadership by keeping his band of volunteers together 
“against immense odds.”26  The Japanese in fact believed Kim would be leading 
a force of liberation, but they surrendered before Kim could join the fight with 
the Soviets.27  In the end, despite his anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, Kim 
was not on the short list of potential leaders of Korea at the time of liberation.  It 
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was more likely that most Koreans failed to take him seriously, since most of 
them viewed the name as a “half-legendary Figure.”28   
As a result, North Korea later fabricated the role Kim played in the 
liberation of Korea.  Although he fought the Japanese in Manchuria, Pyongyang 
manufactured his other achievement by claiming he “fought the million-strong 
army of Japanese imperialism for fifteen long years and finally won freedom for 
the fatherland, overthrowing the Japanese imperialist brigands.”29  Charles 
Armstrong makes it clear Kim never fought the Japanese during the Soviet 
liberation of Korea.30  More importantly, according to Sydney Seiler, North 
Korean historians hid the fact that Kim and his guerrillas had escaped to the 
RFE in late 1940 and sat out the rest of the war as an officer in the Soviet 
Army’s 88th Special Independent Brigade.  The unit performed intelligence 
collection operations against the Japanese in Manchuria but were forbidden by 
the Soviets from conducting combat operations against the Japanese because 
they had a non-aggression pact with Tokyo since April 1941.  Hence, both Kim 
and the Soviets had to hide this inglorious past because they “stood to lose 
much from a revelation of the truth behind Kim’s Soviet Army connections.”  It 
might have confirmed to some Kim was a Soviet puppet, and there is no doubt 
he had to escape to the RFE to save himself and his band of guerrillas31 
because the Japanese would have destroyed them.   
As a result, North Korean historians had to manufacture Kim’s guerrilla 
activities on Paekdu Mountain, on the northern tip of Korea, during the period of 
Kim’s sojourn in the RFE.  They claimed Kim Jong-il was born in a secret camp 
on the mountain on February 16, 1942, while his father “was making 
preparations for the final offensive against the Japanese.” (see Figure 4.1).  
This allegedly entailed deploying “small units, groups and political workers” 
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throughout Korea to resist the Japanese and set the conditions for liberation.32   
This was all myth, but when WW II was about to end in August 1945, Kim and 
his guerrillas attempted to cross the China-North Korea border, but they were 
forced to return to the RFE.  Although they somehow managed to get on board 
the Soviet ship Pugachev which arrived in Wonsan on September 19, 1945, the 
myth making led many of Kim’s critics to ignore his role in the Korean 
independence movement.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, Armstrong cautions that recent evidence “clearly shows 
that Kim Il-sung did play an important role in the anti-Japanese armed 
resistance in Manchuria, becoming by the late 1930s one of the leading figures 
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Figure 4.1. North Korean painting of Kim Il-sung, his first wife Kim Jong-suk, and their son 
Kim Jong-il at the cabin on Mt. Paekdu where North Korean historians claim Kim Jong-il 
was born at a secret guerrilla camp on February 16, 1942.  Source, Book cover, Kwon and 
Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics. 
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among both the Korean and Chinese guerrillas.”34  One of his most successful 
operations was the June 1937 attack on a Japanese unit stationed at the small 
China-North Korea border town of Bochonbo (North Korea), with about 200 of 
his men.35  According to Suh Dae-sook, Bochonbo “was the raid that made Kim 
famous and known to the Japanese.”36  Han Hong-koo goes further and says “it 
bestowed national fame on Kim Il-sung, who had previously been known 
primarily as a local hero in Kando and Changbai.”37  Similarly, Cumings argues 
that Kim was a well-recognized and impressive leader of anti-Japanese 
guerrillas in Manchuria by the mid-1930s.  As a result, North Korean leaders 
continue to this day to “trace everything back to this distant beginning.”38  Above 
every other trait of the North Korean regime (e.g., Communist, Nationalist, 
rogue, and axis of evil) stands the guerrillas’ legacy as anti-Japanese fighters.39  
Why is this relevant to North Korea’s survival?  What compelled Kim to create 
his cult of personality?   
Cheong Sung-hwa emphasizes that one of the few “common 
denominators of politics in postwar Korea” was both Koreas’ hatred of Japan 
(which arguably has not changed).  In Seoul, President Syngman Rhee also 
used his long career as an anti-Japanese Nationalist to bolster his political 
power since he too was well aware that most Koreans hated Japan.  However, 
the most powerful political party in South Korea was viewed as a “‘marginal’ 
ruling class” that was labeled as pro-Japanese.40  In other words, from a Korean 
nationalist perspective, the North had more legitimacy than the regime in the 
South after liberation. 
Kim was well aware of these political developments in South Korea.  He 
accused the U.S. of consolidating pro-Japanese elements after liberation to 
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facilitate Japan’s colonial rule.  He called out Rhee as a “long-fostered running 
dog” for the U.S. and a reactionary ring leader.  According to this view, North 
Koreans “became the masters of their destiny” while the South Koreans were 
“again condemned to slavish submission” to foreigners.41  Therefore, it should 
be no surprise that Kim immortalized his own anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy to 
bolster his legitimacy and to agitate the South.  Kwon Heon-ik and Chung 
Byung-ho’s work on North Korean politics highlights its significance: 
 
We know that the Manchurian legacy was central to Kim Il-sung’s 
charismatic authority throughout his long political career.  We 
have seen also how this legacy was forcefully revived in the 1970s 
to become a singularly important saga in the national history and 
how this process was intertwined with the unfolding of the drama 
of the political succession from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il.42 
 
This suggests the Manchurian legacy was not just about Kim Il-sung.  It became 
a family legacy that his offspring could inherit from him as successor.  In fact, 
Kim Jong-il honored his father’s guerrilla comrades by supervising the 
renovation of their resting place, the Graves of Revolutionary Martyrs, in 1975 
and 1985. (see Figure 4.2).  It became another symbol of Kim Jong-il’s filial 
piety toward his father and acknowledgment of the guerrilla revolutionaries for 
“whom the leader had deep affection.”43   
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Thus, the Kim family’s right to lead all of Korea begins with this anti-
Japanese legacy since Kim knew how most Koreans on both sides of the DMZ 
felt about the Japanese, and he exploited this popular belief to indoctrinate 
those in the North that they were the true Koreans while pro-Japanese Koreans 
and the U.S. imperialists were exploiting the masses in the South.  This 
narrative probably resonated in the South as well since many viewed the 
Southern government as undemocratic at the time.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
John Tirman indicated the U.S. government was aware President Rhee was “a 
demagogue ‘bent on autocratic rule’.”  Moreover, Rhee was reportedly chosen 
over other Korean leaders in the South because the hard right wing was largely 
perceived as Japanese collaborators.44  This kind of sentiment probably 
convinced Kim that most South Koreans’ preferred an anti-Japanese and 
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Figure 4.2. Revolutionary Martyr’s Cemetery in Pyongyang, commemorating Kim Il-
sung’s guerrilla comrades, who continue to watch over the Korean people and the 
capital city.  https://travelleronamission.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/north-korea-
pyongyang-big2.jpg  
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independent Nationalist government – his own regime in the North.  Having said 
that, what do we know about Kim’s leadership credentials? 
 
4.2.1 The Minsaengdan Incident and the Rise of Kim Il-sung 
What is less well-known about Kim Il-sung is that the CCP almost 
executed him as it began to purge Koreans en masse during the early 1930s.  
The CCP had cause to suspect the Koreans after a group of pro-Japanese 
Koreans in Kando (Chientao in Chinese) established the MSD – People’s 
Livelihood Corps – in February 1932.45  The MSD declared “its aim was to 
secure the livelihood of 400,000 Koreans in Kando and to build an earthly 
paradise for Koreans.”46  The MSD promoted Korean autonomy in Kando; some 
of its members even said Kando had historically been part of Korea and they 
had legitimate claims to the land.47  This led to an anti-MSD campaign by the 
CCP from late 1932 to early 1935,48 and resulted in the killing of up to 2,000 
Korean Communists and supporters.49  However, what is the significance of the 
MSD experience for Kim Il-sung?   
According to Han Hong-koo, the CCP in Manchuria became so obsessed 
by the prospect of MSD agents, they imagined 70 to 80 percent of Koreans 
living in the Kando base areas were pro-Japanese agents.50  By November 
1933, several CCP cadres began to suspect Kim as a MSD member.51  Kim Il-
sung claimed he was accused of being a pro-Japanese agent because he 
helped the Chinese Nationalist army procure materials for 500 uniforms with the 
help of a local landlord.  Kim argued that without his help these Chinese 
Nationalist soldiers would have deserted or surrendered to the Japanese.  He 
decided to help them because the Communist guerrillas may not have been 
able to establish and hold the guerrilla zones by themselves.  The CCP 
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reportedly accused Kim of “Rightist capitulation” for providing winter clothing for 
the Chinese Nationalist army, not taking the anti-MSD campaign seriously, and 
allowing a sizeable number of MSD agents into the guerrilla army.52  Han 
indicated that the CCP at this time were focused solely on the Chinese 
revolution, and any distraction to their revolutionary aims was not tolerated.53   
Han argued that Kim was saved by Shi Zhongheng, a Chinese guerrilla 
commander whom Kim reportedly rescued during a combined guerrilla attack 
against the Japanese in the city of Dongning.  Shi reportedly questioned how “a 
great Figure like Kim Il-sung could be a Japanese running dog and declared 
that if the CCP convicted him, then he would sever all his ties with the 
Communist guerrillas.”54  Additionally, “A [Chinese] Communist document 
praised Kim Il-sung, commenting that the besieged guerrillas could escape 
safely because of his ‘composed, unwavering, adroit, and flexible leadership’” 
during the Dongning battle.55  Since Shi was trusted by the CCP leadership in 
Manchuria, Kim was spared from the deadly purge.56   
According to Han, for the North Korean leadership, the MSD purge is all 
about Korean nationalism and Kim’s role in overcoming the Chinese tendency 
to protect their own revolution at the expense of Korean independence.  The 
Chinese Communists declared “that the right of self-determination for the 
minority peoples in China could only be enjoyed after ‘the final victory of the 
Chinese revolution and the complete expulsion of imperialist forces from 
China’.”57  This policy line was a problem for the Koreans in the CCP since the 
CCP made it clear that it would not tolerate Koreans pursuing anti-Japanese 
activities “only for the sake of the Korean revolution.”58  As a result, it is not 
surprising that Armstrong argued that the “fact Kim fought under Chinese 
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command and was himself a member of the CCP disappeared from North 
Korean histories after the Korean War.”59 
This seems to suggest Kim would have had a difficult time justifying 
himself as a ruler of North Korea if he had been a member of the CCP.  Despite 
this assertion, Kim disclosed in his memoir that, during the winter of 1931, he 
established contact with the CCP for the first time and “became a cadre of an 
organization of the Chinese party,” continuing his “relations with the Chinese 
Communist Party throughout the whole period of the anti-Japanese armed 
struggle.”60  He mentioned that the Comintern withdrew its recognition of the 
Korean Communist Party during the summer of 1928,61 and it later informed the 
Koreans that they would have to do their party work by joining the CCP.62  While 
Kim and other Korean Communists may have been frustrated with the 
Comintern’s ruling at the time,63 the fact that well over 90% of CCP members in 
east Manchuria were Koreans may have comforted them since they were 
essentially playing a leading role in the local party anyway.64  As a result, Kim 
appears to have adopted the long view and focused on laying the groundwork 
for establishing the Korean Communist Party as members of the CCP.65   
Han argues that the two most important lessons from the MSD purge is 
how it shaped the Juche ideology and idealized the unique relationship between 
the North Korean leader and his people.66  Han also emphasized that “the 
greatest significance in studying the MSD Incident lies in its long-lasting 
influence on North Korea and its ‘Great Leader’ Kim Il-sung.”67  Han stressed 
the MSD Incident is critical to Kim because it led him to the band of loyal 
guerrillas and orphans who would eventually follow him to Korea after 
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liberation.68  In fact, it is likely that only about 30 to 40 of his guerrillas had 
experienced the MSD purges out of approximately a hundred guerrillas who 
returned to Korea with him after Japan’s surrender.  The other 60 to 70 
guerrillas were from elsewhere in Manchuria or had joined the unit after the 
MSD purges.  Han argues these MSD guerrillas formed the core leadership of 
Kim’s regime which “was strong enough to shape the basic configuration of 
north Korean political culture.”69   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point is that, if one ignores or is unaware of the significance of the 
MSD incident in Kim’s leadership development, then it is likely to have an 
impact on the overall judgment about Kim, his leadership ability, and his 
subsequent actions in North Korea.  The story of Kim and his MSD guerrillas 
begins when Kim became the Third Division Commander of the Second Army, 
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Figure 4.3. North Korean painting of Kim Il-sung with alleged MSD agents at Mount Maan 
and Kim directing the burning of the CCP files that tainted them as pro-Japanese agents.  
Note: The website was no longer available after the initial download of the painting. 
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NEAJUA, in early March 1936.70  When Kim marched to Mount Maan with a 
small band of guerrillas to link up with a part of his command, he discovered the 
unit had not arrived.  The only option he had to form the unit was a band of 
about 100 MSD suspects.71  One of Kim’s biographies highlighted his “motherly 
affection” for these MSD suspects and claimed he viewed them as “the most 
valuable thing in the world.”  When errors were committed against them, Kim 
worked tirelessly to “rectify their errors with deep concern.”  Ultimately, Kim 
“infinitely loved and trusted them and trained all of them into indomitable 
Communists through education and actual struggles.”72   
According to Han, Kim reviewed the records of the MSD suspects and 
decided to give them all a second chance.  He reportedly ordered some of them 
to burn all the files that had tainted them at some risk to his own well-being and, 
needless to say, all of them broke down in tears. (see Figure 4.3).  Han writes, 
“The flames and the wailing symbolized the starting point of the unique 
relationship between Kim Il-sung and his followers that lasted almost six 
decades.”73  These MSD suspects formed two regiments74 of his Third Division 
and participated in the Bochonbo raid that would bring Kim fame.75  In addition 
to the MSD guerrillas,76 there were about 20 orphans77 from the guerrilla base 
camps who viewed Kim “as an absolute being,”78 and they would also form the 
core leadership of North Korea.  Most importantly, Han argues the MSD incident 
forced Kim to contemplate the issue of an independent Korean revolution, thus 
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planting the seed of Juche and shaping the formation of Kim’s relationship with 
the masses in North Korea.79   
 
4.2.2 Kim Il-sung and the Arduous March  
Another important element of Kim’s guerrilla legacy is the arduous march 
that was later evoked by the regime as the symbol of self-sacrifice during 
periods of crises, to include the famine years of the 1990s.  In 2007, Pyongyang 
claimed that the march was an epochal event for North Koreans, and clarified 
that it specifically refers “to the trek made by the main force of the Korean 
People’s Revolutionary Army from Nanpaizi, Mengjiang County, to Beiddingzi, 
Changbai Country” from early December 1938 to late March 1939.80  According 
to Suh Dae-sook, Kim had been active near the China-Korea border with about 
150 of his guerrillas and a similar sized Chinese force under the command of 
Cao Guoan.  Their battles against the Japanese included engagements near 
Mount Paektu in February 26, 1937.  This combined force of 250 guerrillas 
fought and killed 13 Japanese officers and wounded 14 Japanese soldiers in 
“the snow-covered highland where they [Kim’s guerrillas] were hiding.” (see 
Figure 4.4).  Suh also mentions another raid into Korea in May 1939.81  
Although the timeline is slightly off, the arduous march appears to coincide with 
the May 1939 raid.  Kim claimed this was the “bitterest time of trial in the entire 
history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.”  The Japanese were intensifying 
their “punitive” counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria and used their 
propaganda to claim Kim’s guerrillas were destroyed.82 
Kim claimed that the only way to boost the declining morale of the 
Koreans in Manchuria and Korea proper was to risk his own survival by leading 
guerrilla operations into Korea to demonstrate his troops were still alive to 
expose the lies of Japanese and to give hope to the Korean people.83  Kim 
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argued this 110-day march was so difficult that it could not be compared with 
any other revolutionary march in history.84  Kim claimed that at the early stage 
of the march his troops had two meals per day of gruel, and then they had to 
live on one meal a day until the food ran out.  The lack of food meant that there 
were “many short men among the anti-Japanese veterans” because they had a 
poor diet when they were young and they experienced difficult lives as 
revolutionaries.85  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim viewed the arduous march as the epitome of his guerrilla legacy 
because it demonstrated his guerrillas were “true sons of the fatherland and the 
people, and the revolutionary fighters were unfailingly loyal to their nation and to 
the cause of national liberation.”  Kim truly believed that his people for 
generations had to “learn and follow” the example of his guerrillas because they 
“rallied rock-solid behind their leader and did not relinquish their faith in any 
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Figure 4.4. North Korean painting of Kim Il-sung’s arduous march with his guerrillas.  
Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Volume 7 (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 2007), 32
nd
 page from the front cover (has no page number). 
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adversity.”  He touted all of them as immortal beings because their revolutionary 
spirit and the spirit of self-reliance convinced them of their ultimate victory.  
They also loved their revolutionary comrades no matter what the challenge they 
faced, and this helped them to overcome starvation and the cold winter “like 
immortal beings.”  Kim wrote that, because of the difficult international 
environment today, North Koreans were following the tradition of the arduous 
march.  The imperialists were now stronger than the Japanese he had faced in 
Manchuria and they were facing conditions “little short of war.”  The only way to 
survive was to adopt the same spirit of the anti-Japanese guerrillas during the 
arduous march.  In fact, this spirit helped overcome the challenges faced during 
rebuilding of the country after liberation, the Great Fatherland Liberation War 
(the Korean War), and post-Korean War construction.  As long as the people 
believed in the spirit of the arduous march, “self-reliance, fortitude and 
optimism,” North Korea would survive.86    
In sum, in spite of North Korea’s manufacturing of his activities on Mount 
Paekdu, Kim’s guerrilla experience had a lasting impact on the North Korean 
regime.  His leadership demonstrated as a young guerrilla leader under very 
difficult conditions taught him the importance of Korean self-reliance, and 
provided the confidence and the practical experience that he would later use to 
contest for North Korean leadership after liberation from Japan.  More 
importantly, the guerrilla legacy would later define the ideal North Korean 
revolutionary spirit and the arduous march would justify the regime’s endless 
calls for its people to sacrifice during difficult times.  The retelling of the arduous 
march implied that if the people remained steadfastly loyal no matter what the 
revolutionary task, they too could achieve immortality by following the lead of 
Kim and his guerrillas.  As he continued to consolidate his power after the 
Korean War, Kim noted his guerrillas were wasting away in obscurity after they 
returned to North Korea and criticized the functionaries for not holding their 
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guerrilla “revolutionary seniors in high esteem.”87  It signaled the rise of his 
guerrillas and the consolidation of his totalitarian rule.   
 
4.3 Totalitarianism as a Survival Tool: Kim Il-Sung’s Totalitarian Rule 
I begin by revisiting the six traits of totalitarianism to examine how Kim Il-
sung established his own totalitarian dictatorship (i.e., dominant ideology, single 
mass party, terroristic police control, monopoly of information, control of the 
military, and central command of the economy).88  As noted, the first of six traits 
of totalitarian dictatorships starts with official ideology that must be adhered to 
by all members of society, and Juche has remained the official ideology of North 
Korea arguably since 1955 (defined in Chapter 1).  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Charles Armstrong has argued Juche and the Kim regime’s own style of 
socialism, plus its going it alone approach, appears to be a unifying force for the 
North Korean people and partially explains the Kim regime’s resiliency.89     
 
4.3.1 Kim Il-sung’s Workers’ Party and Sorting of the Core Elite 
Second, there must be a single mass party with a hard core elite that is 
completely dedicated to the ideology and loyal to the dictatorial leader.  When 
Kim returned to Korea in September 1945, some argued he had to contest for 
power with four main ethnic Korean groups alongside Soviet occupation forces.  
They consisted of domestic Communists, those returning from China (i.e., 
Yenan faction), others returning from the Soviet Union with the Soviets (to 
include Kim Il-sung’s faction), and non-Communist Korean Nationalists from 
within Korea.90  On the other hand, the U.S. IC in July 1956 pointed out there 
were three groups of Communists vying for power in the North, consisting of 
domestic Communists, the Yenan faction, and the Soviet faction.  However, the 
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U.S. IC differentiated the composition of the Soviet faction by separating Kim’s 
Manchurian guerrillas from the Koreans from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.91   
Still others such as Glenn Paige and Lee Dong-jun argued there were 
five KWP factions.  While they also mentioned the Yenan and Soviet factions, 
their interpretation of the Soviet group did not include Kim Il-sung’s guerrillas.  
Their perspective on the Soviet faction included only those Soviet Koreans who 
returned with the Soviet Army in 1945 but had not been active in the anti-
Japanese movement prior to 1945.  They also separated the domestic 
Communists into two groups, one each from the South and the North.  They 
referred to Kim’s group as the Kapsan group since his guerrillas were 
associated with Korean Communists operating in the town of Kapsan in 
Northern Korea during the Japanese occupation.92   
Lim Jae-cheon, however, suggests that the Kapsan faction should not be 
considered as Kim Il-sung’s faction.  While it is true that this group formed an 
underground network in Kapsan to fight the Japanese and made contacts with 
Kim’s guerrillas starting in 1936,93 they should be considered as a separate 
domestic Communist group.  Hence, I argue it is more appropriate to call Kim’s 
group the Manchurian guerrillas (e.g., guerrilla faction or partisan group), even if 
they had associated with the Kapsan faction since the mid-1930s.  What this 
suggests is that there were six distinct groups vying for power in North Korea 
after liberation and they would all have a part in the establishment of the KWP 
and the North Korean revolution.  They are Kim’s Manchurian guerrillas, the 
Soviet-Korean faction, the Yenan faction, the Korean Communists from the 
South and the North, and the non-Communist Korean Nationalists.  The Kapsan 
faction belongs in the domestic Communist group.  This is important because it 
recognizes Kim’s guerrillas as a separate group with Nationalist credentials who 
were fully capable of “adapting Communist theory to local conditions.”  As 
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Henry Kissinger noted, Kim spent his life “fighting for national causes.”94  
Having clarified there were five other groups contending for power with Kim, I 
will examine how he established his single mass party.          
According to Lankov, in order to appreciate the attitude of the Soviet Civil 
Administration (SCA) in North Korea, one must understand how the Soviets 
attempted to apply the official line of Marxism-Leninism in North Korea and 
Eastern Europe.  The Sovietization of their satellites began with the initial 
phases of “‘people’s democracy’ and ‘people’s democratic revolution’,” and it 
would eventually evolve into a ‘socialist’ revolution.”  In practice, the united front 
of various factions would be formed to realize the people’s democracy and 
revolution, and that would be exhibited by land reform, nationalization of 
industry, announcement of gender equality, and democratic freedoms.95  Simply 
put, Hugh Seton-Watson described this Sovietization process in 1951 as a 
honeymoon period of genuine coalition, between Communists and other parties, 
followed by a bogus coalition when the dominant pro-Soviet Communist party 
effectively controls or isolates all other parties.  Eventually, the Communist party 
becomes the monolithic regime.  This aptly described what initially occurred in 
North Korea under Soviet tutelage.96  The question is how much credit does 
Kim deserve for establishing his mass party? 
As Lankov and Seton-Watson explained, there would be a period of 
genuine coalition in North Korea because it lacked a strong Communist party 
due to factionalism and Japanese suppression of their activities, and the Korean 
Communist movement would cease to exist by 1928.97  The Soviets had no 
choice but to consider Cho Man-sik, the leader of the non-Communist 
Nationalists in the North.  They relied on Cho’s pure Nationalist credentials to 
establish a “native governing body” on the northern half of the Peninsula.98  Cho 
was a respected Christian teacher who was a leader of the Christian movement 
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in Korea, which happened to be the only Korean movement of significance that 
was tolerated by the Japanese.  Lee Chong-sik argued that Cho’s Korean 
Democratic Party (KDP) had the potential to be an influential political party in 
North Korea but he refused to accept the five-year trusteeship99 that the U.S., 
Soviet, and British foreign ministers called for at the December 16, 1945, 
Moscow Conference.100   
According to Erik Van Ree, the U.S. State Department publicly 
announced in October 1945 that Koreans were not prepared to govern 
themselves and would require a period of trusteeship.  As expected, most 
Koreans perceived the plan as “‘a great insult to Korea’.”101  The Soviets 
eventually agreed to the trusteeship, which Korean communists had to follow, 
because they realized it could not occur without the establishment of a single 
unified Korean government, which they knew was unlikely without their 
consent.102  When the U.S. commander in the South persuaded Song Chin-u, a 
democratic leader, to accept the trusteeship, he was killed the next day.103  The 
leftist forces had enjoyed broad support in the South after liberation because 
many perceived leftism as “almost synonymous with the opposition to Japan 
and it made the Korean masses highly sympathetic to the left.”  While Koreans 
admired the leftists, the conservative forces on the right were perceived to be 
Japanese collaborators.  Yet, the forces on the right finally gained the political 
initiative by opposing the trusteeship, which was perceived by them as another 
form of colonialism.  This was significant because popular support for the left 
dropped significantly after the trusteeship debate as the left was forced to 
support it by Moscow.104   
When Romanenko, the head of the SCA, failed to persuade Cho Man-sik 
to accept the trusteeship on January 1, 1946, he was arrested.  Cho as a 
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Nationalist could not accept the Moscow Agreement, but some believed that if 
he would have gone along with the Soviets, they would have kept him on for a 
while as their preferred leader of North Korea.105  After Cho’s purge, his KDP 
still managed to win 351 seats during the nationwide people’s committee 
elections in November 1946.  The Friends Party of the Chondogyo group also 
won 253 seats, while the KWP won 1,102 seats.  Another 1,753 elected 
members claimed they had no party affiliation at all.  It was clear the political 
situation was in flux and the KWP had more work to do before it became the 
dominant party in North Korea.  According to Cumings, Kim appointed Choe 
Yong-gon, one of his guerrilla comrades, as head of the KDP in December 1946.  
Choe attacked the members of the KDP for being “petty-bourgeois” and 
harboring factionalism since most were former landlords and Christians.106   
Kim removed the opposition from the KDP by imprisoning its Christian 
leaders, and the police were willing to use force as they did when over twenty 
Christian protesters were killed in Sinuiju.  After the Sinuiju Incident, Kim 
tolerated the Christian churches until the Korean War but by then Christians 
were no longer a political force in North Korea.  Cumings argued Kim used 
similar tactics to eliminate “all nonleftist political opposition with a draconian 
thoroughness.”  Nevertheless, Cumings was reluctant to label the North Korean 
regime as a totalitarian one.  He argued that the state of affairs in North Korea 
was “less a totalitarian atmosphere” and noted that the regime was more 
concerned about enforcing its new regimented socialist lifestyle than achieving 
total domination over society.  That said, Cumings argues Kim was able to 
eliminate his opposition because he was simply better organized and the 
opposition was much weaker than his faction.  Hence, Kim could afford to be 
more selective during the purges because he was dealing with “numerically 
small classes and groups.”  Cumings also speculated that Kim may have 
refrained from indiscriminate purges because he learned from the CCP that it 
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was more preferable to “reeducate and reform political recalcitrants.”107  Lee 
Chong-sik also argued that Kim could have used brute force to eliminate his 
opponents but he knew that was undesirable.108       
While Kim may have shown restraint at times, he did not hesitate to 
eliminate his enemies.  He tried to purge General Mu Chong from the Yenan 
faction during the Korean War but Mu escaped because the Chinese intervened 
to save his life in 1950.109  Kim unfairly blamed Mu for the KPA’s heavy losses 
and his purges continued as Ho Kai, the leader of the Soviet faction, was also 
denounced for his “‘extreme leftist error’” in refusing party membership to hard-
working peasants.110  Ho allegedly committed suicide in 1951and Pak Chang-ok 
replaced him as the leader of the Soviet faction.111  Soon after the war ended, 
Kim attacked Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the South Korean Communists.  The 
regime held a military tribunal in early August 1953 and charged Pak and his 
followers for planning a coup and for being U.S. spies.  Yi Sung-yup, one of 
Pak’s followers, was accused of planning a coup with 4,000 South Koreans 
being trained in the north for guerrilla operations in the South.  Of the twelve 
accused, ten were sentenced to death, but Pak was spared execution until 
December 1955.112  However, Kim was not done with his purges.   
Kim Il-sung had to complete the consolidation of his power by eliminating 
the remnants of the Yenan faction and that meant purging Kim Tu-bong and 
Choe Chang-ik after the Third Party Congress in April 1956.  Kim accused them 
of dogmatically following “the experience of other countries,” and some of the 
Yenan faction led by Yun Kong-hum attacked Kim Il-sung for his growing 
personality cult and his directive style of leadership.  Kim Tu-bong demanded 
that the KWP give up its control of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), and 
another member of the Yenan faction sought independence of trade unions 
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from the KWP.  Finally, the Yenan group demanded that “the distorted history of 
the Korean Communist movement” which portrays Kim’s guerrilla faction as the 
“‘only true Communists’” be corrected.  Similarly, the Soviet faction also 
complained about Kim’s dictatorial style, but they were unpopular because they 
enjoyed special privileges as Soviet citizens.113   
Ken Gause argued both the Yenan and Soviet factions were emboldened 
to challenge Kim after the 20th Soviet Party Congress attacked Stalin in 1956.  
Both groups subsequently pushed for collective leadership in the North114 and 
were ready to challenge Kim’s dominance of the party.  This attempt occurred in 
April 1956 when Kim was on his trip to the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and Eastern 
Europe.  Key leaders of both factions participated, and the Soviet faction may 
have gained the support of the Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, while a 
Yenan Korean who was the North Korean Ambassador to Moscow attempted to 
gain the support of Soviet leaders in the Kremlin.  They sensed after the Third 
Party Congress in April 1956, that Kim’s guerrillas were preparing to take over 
the party leadership.  When Kim returned from his trip in July 1956, the party 
paper stated Kim was against the personality cult but acknowledged “the 
enormous contributions made by Stalin.”  The direct challenge to Kim came 
during the August 1956 plenum of the Central Committee of the party.  Both 
groups criticized Kim for his anti-people policies but they were suppressed by 
his men.  The revolt known as the “August Factionalist Incident” was initially 
viewed as a crisis, but it ended up strengthening Kim’s power.115   
Apparently, the Soviets and the Chinese both sensed a bloody purge 
was coming, and decided to send high-level emissaries Peng Duhuai and 
Anastas Mikoyan to urge Kim to exercise moderation in dealing with the rebels.  
Kim decided to let all of them out of prison and reinstated their party 
membership, but not their official posts.  When Peng and Mikoyan departed in 
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September 1956, the Yenan faction and its allies were vanquished.  The effort 
to root out supporters of the August Factionalists began in February 1957 and 
lasted until the end of the year.  The Central Committee would oversee the 
purges in each of the nine North Korean provinces to get rid of the anti-Kim 
elements.  The intent was to separate the masses from the leadership of the 
two groups, and a similar process occurred throughout North Korea when the 
Communists from the South were purged in August 1953.116  Many of the Soviet 
faction left the country prior to 1956 and their exodus continued until they were 
no longer a major factor in the KWP.  Some of the Yenan faction also managed 
to escape to China and the group was effectively eliminated by 1958.117  Lee 
Chong-sik’s study of the KWP argued that by 1958, the KWP became Kim’s 
party and the transmission belt for all his directives.118 
What is interesting is that despite the impression that these purges 
purged all of his enemies, Kim allowed some from the domestic and Soviet 
groups to serve in senior positions.  However, those from China were all purged 
by 1970.  The Chinese may have all been purged due to increased tensions 
between Pyongyang and Beijing during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.  
Perhaps most importantly, as Kim Jong-il was gaining prominence in the 1970s, 
a new group began to dominate the KWP leadership. (see Table 4.1).  In sum, 
despite the Kim faction’s unity, his success in eliminating the opposition and 
setting the conditions for further consolidation of power was not possible without 
direct Soviet military support from liberation to the end of 1948.  As a result, 
some argue Kim was a “faithful disciple of Stalin,” and he was a ruthless leader 
in employing Stalin’s “Machiavellian methods of removing his colleagues.”  
Nevertheless, his creation of a unified single party under his control suggests 
one must not ignore Kim’s “greater skill as a strategist and tactician,”119 
especially considering his age at the time.   
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Table 4.1. Changes in the Membership of the KWP Central Committee 
Party 
Congresses 
Total Domestic 
Group 
Soviet 
Group 
Yenan 
Group 
Partisans 
(Guerrillas) 
Unknown 
Group 
New 
Group 
1) 1st KWP 
CCM (1946) 
2) Re-elected 
to 2nd CCM 
3) Dropped 
4) Died 
 
43 
 
30 
 
12 
1 
13 
 
11 
 
2 
0 
6 
 
6 
 
0 
0 
12 
 
8 
 
4 
0 
4 
 
3 
 
0 
1 
8 
 
2 
 
6 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
1) 2nd KWP 
CCM (1948) 
2) From 1st 
KWP CCM 
3) New 
Members 
4) Re-elected 
5) Dropped 
6) Died 
67 
 
30 
 
37 
 
29 
35 
3 
21 
 
11 
 
10 
 
8 
13 
0 
14 
 
6 
 
8 
 
7 
6 
1 
13 
 
8 
 
5 
 
7 
6 
0 
7 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
0 
2 
12 
 
2 
 
10 
 
2 
10 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
1) 3rd KWP 
CCM (1956) 
2) From 2nd 
KWP CCM 
3) New 
Members 
4) Re-elected 
5) Dropped 
6) Died 
71 
 
29 
 
42 
 
28 
42 
1 
23 
 
8 
 
15 
 
11 
12 
0 
11 
 
7 
 
4 
 
2 
9 
0 
14 
 
7 
 
7 
 
2 
12 
0 
11 
 
5 
 
5 
 
10 
0 
1 
12 
 
2 
 
10 
 
3 
9 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
1) 4th KWP 
CCM (1961) 
2) From 3rd 
KWP CCM 
3) New 
Members 
4) Re-elected 
5) Dropped 
6) Died 
85 
 
28 
 
57 
 
31 
52 
2 
19 
 
11 
 
8  
 
7 
11 
1 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
0 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
2 
0 
35 
 
10 
 
25 
 
19 
15 
1 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
3 
0 
21 
 
0 
 
21 
 
2 
19 
0 
1) 5th KWP 
CCM (1970) 
2) From 4th 
KWP CCM 
3) New 
Members 
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31 
 
86 
9 
 
7 
 
2 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
32 
 
19 
 
13 
6 
 
2 
 
4 
68 
 
2 
 
66 
Note: KWP = Korean Workers’ Party; CCM = Central Committee Member; Designated 
Number CCM = Numbered Congress, Source: Suh Dae-Sook and Lee Chae-Jin, eds., 
Political Leadership in Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 164. 
 
4.3.2 Kim’s Manipulation of Secret Police and Neo-Confucianism 
Third, within the totalitarian system terror becomes the vital nerve of the 
political system, and demands complete loyalty from the masses and those 
118 
 
viewed as disloyal are exterminated or sent to the gulags.120  It should be no 
surprise based on his early purges that there was (and still is) an internal 
security apparatus that supported Kim’s rise to power and kept him there until 
his death.  The question is whether Kim relied solely on terroristic control or not.  
When the first governing body in North Korea was formed under the Five 
Province Administrative Bureau headed by Cho Man-sik, before he lost favor 
with the Soviets, it formed the “protection and security units (Bo-an-dae)” on 
November 19, 1945, to maintain social order.  According to Gause, many North 
Korean intelligence and security services today claim their origin to this day.  
After Cho was purged, Kim assumed control of the “Provisional People’s 
Committee” in February 1946, and his Protection and Security Bureau was led 
by Cho Yong-gun, one of his Manchurian guerrillas.  Cho also controlled 
“shadowy” intelligence organizations that were precursors to today’s State 
Security Department (SSD), which kept a close eye on “pro-Japanese and 
reactionary forces.”121        
In February 1947, the North Korean People’s Committee was established 
to form a more permanent government and the Bo-an-dae became the Bureau 
of Internal Affairs.  The security apparatus continued to evolve when North 
Korea was established on September 9, 1948.  The Bureau became the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and its headquarters consisted of four to five 
thousand personnel.  It had operational control over 12,000 police, 3,000 secret 
police, and 45,000 more personnel belonging to Security and Border Guard 
units as well as the Railroad Guard units.  The police elements provided 
traditional police services to maintain social order, the Security Guards units 
protected key facilities, and the Border Guards secured its national boundaries.  
However, the police also had their own informant networks to conduct normal 
police functions but also to monitor “individuals potentially harmful to the state.”  
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Prior to the Korean War, North Korea probably had about 400,000 informants in 
the police-monitoring network, roughly five percent of the population.122    
The Political Security Bureau (PSB), which functioned as the secret 
police, under the command of Pang Hak-se, was responsible for enforcing the 
people’s loyalty to the Kim regime.  Pang was a former Soviet security agent in 
Uzbekistan before his arrival in North Korea in 1945 and became known as the 
founding father of the North Korean secret police.  He was one of the few 
members of the Soviet faction that survived the purges of the 1950s and 
remained loyal to Kim until his death in 1992.  The PSB’s mission was 
“exposing and destroying all manner of plots and subversive activities” that 
threatened Kim’s new government.  This meant they were sometimes 
competing with the regular police but their responsibility extended beyond North 
Korea’s borders.  They performed foreign intelligence collection, 
counterintelligence activities, surveillance, and investigations of domestic 
organizations to include the KWP, Ministry of Defense, and state enterprises.123     
According to Gause, the secret police had a more extensive informant 
network than the regular police, although some informants may have served 
both of them in some places.  Surprisingly, one of the important tasks of the 
secret police was to gauge public opinion for the leadership.  These reports 
reportedly had the potential to shape policy and gave the PSB an indirect role in 
policy formulation.124  Cumings also noted that the regime collected information 
regarding individuals’ political statements, even if they were only rumors, to 
assess their loyalty and to maintain the regime’s pulse on popular opinion.  For 
example, the regime attempted to gauge public opinion in the South during the 
Korean War because “the most important mechanism for impressing the 
masses with the correctness and superiority of people’s sovereignty is the 
question of grasping what their opinions are, and how they can be changed… to 
sweep away antidemocratic phenomena and incorrect thought among the 
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village people.”125  This implies the regime did not rely solely on terroristic 
control of the population and considered other ways to influence the population 
and steer their thoughts in the right direction.   
Moreover, the Ministry of Defense also had its own internal police force, 
the Political Defense Bureau (PDB), responsible for “police related 
investigations within the armed forces.”  However, the MIA also had supervisory 
responsibility of the PDB.  As a result, Kim had established a system of 
overlapping intelligence and security apparatuses (i.e., the watchmen were 
watching each other) to exercise “regime control of the North Korean society” by 
1950.126  Kim would take additional steps to reorganize his security apparatus 
by strengthening the PSB and converting it into a new ministry, the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS), in March 1951.127    
According to Gause, the creation of the MPS signaled Kim’s desire to 
destroy all opposition to his regime.  When close to 700,000 North Koreans left 
for South Korea during the war, Kim became more suspicious of his people, and 
many were arrested and later executed or imprisoned.128  However, Kim added 
450,000 new members to the party, mostly peasants and workers, during the 
war from November 1951 to December 1952.  It is more likely he was 
concerned about those with the wrong class backgrounds such as Japanese 
collaborators.  This is because Kim’s revolution reversed the “social engineering” 
that it inherited from the Choson Dynasty by “lifting the long-abused North 
Korean peasants into the position of the favored caste [i.e., core class].”129  As 
Armstrong emphasized, the social transformation in North Korea meant that the 
“most oppressed groups of the pre-1945 society – including poor peasants, 
workers, women, and your people – were given new roles, material and political 
benefits, and higher social status in the new regime.”  The former elites, to 
include landlords and rich farmers, lost their wealth and status under the new 
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regime.130  From the oppressed group’s perspective, North Korea had finally 
created a hierarchical but just social order.         
 According to Robert Collins, North Korea’s reclassification of its social 
order was called songbun, which meant one’s “‘ingredient’ or material (as in 
substance or makeup).”  The North Korean regime determined the peoples’ 
songbun based on their family backgrounds as well as the individuals “socio-
political and economic behavior and performance.”  Collins argued that the aim 
of Kim’s social engineering after liberation was to empower the peasants and 
workers.  This was a popular initiative since 80 percent of the North Korean 
population was peasants.131  Hence, as a newly favored class, poor peasants 
contributed to North Korea becoming a more conservative communist society 
that opposed social change.132  As expected, millions from the hostile class 
(e.g., landlords, merchants, Christians, etc.) left North Korea as the regime 
persecuted the members of this class.  Their relatives who stayed behind were 
exiled to “isolated mountain areas in northern areas of North Korea.”133    
In 1957, the KWP issued a decree to conduct the first large-scale purge 
in North Korea, and the separation of the populace into the three social classes 
became reality.  Collins argues that songbun became the “starting point for the 
regime’s security policies.”  In 1958, the regime mobilized 7,000 investigators 
from KWP’s Administration Department, Organization and Guidance 
Department (OGD), Ministry of Interior and the Prosecutor-General to conduct 
the songbun investigations.  The findings resulted in 3,200,000 people being 
designated as members of the hostile class.  However, only 6,000 were 
imprisoned and 70,000 were exiled to the mountainous Northeast.  As they 
resettled in the isolated areas, their communities later became gulags.134    
According to Collins, there were additional songbun investigations of the 
entire population in 1966, 1967, 1972, 1980, 1983, and 1989.  There were other 
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limited investigations of North Koreans who came from the South and those 
who migrated from Japan in 1980 and 1981, respectively.  In 1970, Kim Il-sung 
formally declared there would be three classes within North Korean society and 
it was continuously updated through these investigations.  The first group 
consisted of the trusted core class, followed by the suspect wavering class and 
the undesirable hostile class.135  However, Suzy Kim highlighted the fact that 
many Koreans had migrated to Manchuria, China, and Japan during the 
Japanese colonial period.  Some had even traveled to the U.S. and Europe.  
When these people were forced to construct their own autobiographic narratives 
as the regime attempted to assess their loyalty, they attempted to defend their 
colonial experience.  Perhaps more importantly, “It was also an occasion for the 
formulation of one’s future purpose as a way to envision how one’s life fit in with 
the making of the North Korean revolution.”  She concluded that North Koreans 
attempted to use their personal autobiographies in various forms through the 
process of trial and error and aimed to “take their destiny into their own hands.”  
In other words, as one’s songbun was being determined by the state, it was 
plausible for people to learn how to influence the process of songbun 
investigations.  Although there was no guarantee that everyone could write their 
way out of bad songbun, however, the process of determining someone’s 
songbun may not have been as mechanical and bureaucratic as it seemed.136       
Nonetheless, there is no disputing that once people’s songbun was 
determined, it affected “who is employed where, who lives where, who is 
medically treated where and how, and who is fed by the state.”  This social 
classification system helped Kim to consolidate his power and retain political 
control of North Korean society.137  Since the core class consisted of about 30 
percent of the populace and the average or wavering class in the middle 
contained another 40 percent, it left the remaining 30 percent in the hostile 
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class for the security services to treat as pariahs.138  What is surprising is that 
regardless of songbun, most people appeared to have genuinely believed the 
regime’s popular narrative about Kim’s “greatness, benevolence and goodness.”  
According to Jane Portal, in addition to his innate charisma, Kim used neo-
Confucianism to portray himself as “the idealized [Confucian] gentleman,” the 
sage Kings of Korea.139  Kim knew what Koreans were familiar with – the 
symbol of sage Kings – and successfully used it to make the following 
connection with them: 
 
The genuine affection and respect with which people regarded 
Kim Il-sung is remarked upon by many observers.  There is no 
doubt that he had charisma and that he held a special appeal for 
women and children.  His talent of establishing a real rapport with 
ordinary people was at the centre of the Kim cult, however much 
this may have been manipulated and orchestrated for political 
ends.140 
           
There is no doubt North Korea is a police state, but paradoxically it seems 
apparent that “terroristic control” alone has not generated and sustained the 
people’s loyalty to Kim and his regime.  Helen-Louise Hunter, a former CIA 
analyst, came to similar conclusions when she noted, “One cannot but be 
amazed at the overwhelming evidence of the people’s strong emotional 
attachment to Kim.  With all the instruments of control at its disposal, North 
Korea’s leaders could never have created so intense psychological 
phenomenon had it not been for Kim’s own unique personality.”141   
 
4.3.3 Near-Monopoly Control of Communications 
Fourth, under Kim Il-sung’s rule, North Korea was “the most closed 
nation on earth and its people the least informed about the world outside its 
borders.”142  In most Communist countries, the people had to cope with other 
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information that challenged the false reality propagated by the regime.  The 
radio was the most popular medium that exposed people to undesirable 
information.  For instance, the Soviets were exposed to Russian-language 
broadcasts on Voice of America, BBC, and Radio Liberty during the 1970s and 
1980s, and this arguably contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.  The North 
Korean regime removed this threat by prohibiting the “sale and use of free-
tuning radio receivers.”  By the 1960s, North Koreans could listen only to state-
approved radio stations, and just in case some were willing to break the law by 
converting them into fully functioning radios, the regime’s security services and 
local citizens groups conducted surprise home inspections.  If caught with a real 
radio, one could expect to spend up to 12 years in prison.143   
The same could be expected of the print media, the Nodong Sinmun.  It 
is the official newspaper of the KWP and “is the mouthpiece of the Party.”  The 
paper was founded by a Soviet Korean named Ki Sok-pok in 1946, and it was 
reminiscent of Pravda of the Stalinist era of 1950.  The focus of the newspaper 
was “to educate, not to entertain” and, as such, the first four pages contained 
approved stories about the heroic exploits of workers, soldiers, and peasants.  
Sometimes it included “the greatness and wisdom of the Leaders as well.”  
Another page was dedicated to the misery of the South Koreans living under 
American imperialist rule and the last page noted the international news.  The 
same kind of propaganda is also promulgated on North Korean television since 
it is also manipulated to ensure only the official channels can be watched.144  
Thus, it is no surprise that Reporters Without Borders consistently ranks North 
Korea as the country with the worst press freedom,145 and confirms the KWP 
has near monopoly control of mass communication.146   
In addition to newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television, North Korea 
devoted significant amount of resources to promote its arts and live public 
performances and parades to “carry out revolutionary education of the 
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public.”147  As the country’s movie industry was declining, Kim Jong-il abducted 
South Korean filmmaker Shin Sang-ok and his ex-wife actress Choi Eun-Hee in 
1978,148 and opened a film studio bearing Shin’s name in 1983.  He gave Shin 
all the resources he needed to raise North Korea’s “cinematic profile.”  This 
cinematic work was serious business for Kim Jong-il, and he understood how 
important it would be for indoctrinating his people.  It was a powerful tool to 
visually demonstrate the regime’s ideals by allowing the “audiences [to] reenact 
the cinematic ideals” in their everyday lives.  According to Kim Suk-young, 
North Korea used “films, filmed stage productions, and some live stage 
productions, all engineered to create a simulacrum of utopian family-nation 
where illusion and reality coexisted in hyperreal performances.”  Through 
various government media and physical activities, people learned the correct 
political behavior and were expected to live their lives based on the ideal 
represented by actors, writers, directors and others involved in these 
activities.149  Consequently, Shin had to gain the approval of Kim Jong-il to 
ensure the movie script had the right material for ideological instruction.150   
While the process of selecting true revolutionaries to work in these fields 
as artisans was based on one’s revolutionary credentials, Kim Il-sung always 
believed that the North Korean people had to emulate the example set by his 
Manchurian guerrillas.  As discussed, they were the ones that “rallied rock-solid 
behind their leader and did not relinquish their faith in any adversity.”  After all, 
what is better than becoming an immortal being by displaying the correct 
revolutionary and Juche spirit?  Kim concluded that, as long as his people were 
united behind him, North Korea would survive.151  Of course, Kim also portrayed 
himself as the charismatic being that Koreans were longing for since the end of 
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the Choson Dynasty to create a strong and powerful country.152  Under these 
conditions, one can reasonably conclude that the constant repetition of 
propaganda with its targeted word usage from the state media (and various art 
forms) would unconsciously inculcate the masses to adopt the value judgments 
promoted by the Kim regime.153  However, Paul Fischer claimed North Korean 
propaganda became useless as the invasion of information intensified in the 
late-1980s in the form of VHS tapes and DVDs.154  Fischer overstated the facts, 
but the point is the regime’s control of information was beginning to weaken 
before Kim’s death. 
 
4.3.4 Kim’s Complete Control of the KPA 
Fifth, the totalitarian regime also controls the military.155  As discussed, 
Kim contended with several factions when he returned to Korea in September 
1945 and nearly all of them (with the exception of the domestic Communists 
from the South) had a select group of officers that formed the core of the KPA.  
They included officers from the Soviet faction such as Nam Il (KPA Chief of 
Staff during the Korean War), Yu Song-chol (Director of Operations Bureau, 
KPA, and interpreter to Soviet Advisory Group), Han Il-mu (KPA corps and 
Navy commander), and Kim Yil (Political Officer, KPA).  The Yenan faction 
appears to have posed the most significant challenge to Kim.  Its extensive 
combat experience with the CCP prior to liberation was valued, as thirty of its 
members became KPA generals during the Korean War.  They included Mu 
Chong (senior officer within the Ministry of Defense), Pak Il-wu (Deputy 
Commander of the Combined Chinese-North Korean Force), Kim Ung (Front 
Commander of KPA in 1951), and three other corps-level commanders.  
However, Kim’s guerrillas also occupied their share of the KPA’s leadership 
positions.  Kim was the supreme commander, Choe Yong-Kon was the Defense 
Minister, Kim Chaik (aka, Kim Chaek) was the Front Commander in 1950, Choi 
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Hyun commanded a corps, Kang Kon was the KPA Chief of Staff, and O Chin-u 
and Choi Kwang commanded KPA divisions.156   
According to Collins, Kim felt threatened by the Yenan faction after the 
Chinese intervened in the war, and as a precondition for assistance they 
expected to lead the combined force, which left the North Koreans as “the 
auxiliary force.”  This meant Chinese General Peng Duhuai had “operational 
control of the KPA.”  Kim responded to the growing threat from the Yenan 
faction by using the KPA’s political commissars from the General Political 
Bureau (GPB).  When Pyongyang was captured by the UNC after the Inchon 
landing, Kim ultimately blamed Mu Chong, and he would continue his purges by 
relieving Pak Il-wu, another Yenan faction member, in 1952.  In the end, he 
purged 90 percent of the KPA generals when the Korean War was over.157  
After taking complete control of the KPA, he prized both it and the KWP 
throughout his rule, but they “alternated slightly in importance” during his rule.  
When he died in July 1994, his son adopted the Songun policy and relied more 
on the KPA to consolidate his power.158  This suggests the Kims chose not to 
“dehumanize” the army since the prospects of war were real on the Korean 
Peninsula.  They needed to have some properly trained military officers even if 
the Kims did not completely trust them.159  As insurance, Kim also relied on the 
Military Security Command (i.e., internal security within the KPA) and the 
Ministry of State Security (i.e., secret police)160 to ensure the KPA and its 
generals remained loyal to him.   
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4.3.5 Initial Economic Wins, Global Outreach, but Ultimate Failure 
Finally, totalitarian regimes aim for central command of the whole 
economy.161  The intent is to regain control of the means of production from 
capitalist exploiters,162 but the management of the whole economy requires a 
huge number of public officials, both from the state and party bureaucracies.  
What they end up with is a parallel structure of party and state bureaucracies 
which some describe as “total bureaucratization” of almost all organizations 
within the totalitarian system.  This results in rising tensions between the state 
and party officials, as the party eventually attempts to exert its control over the 
economy.  As the totalitarian movement matures, the party bureaucrats and 
sympathizers successfully penetrate the state organizations and party loyalty 
replaces professionalism as the primary criterion for office.  The system of 
“cross-espionage and the institutionalization of mutual suspicion” keeps 
constant observation and surveillance using the secret police and other party 
organs to ensure political reliability of state bureaucrats.163   
North Korea’s economic trajectory was influenced by Japan’s 
industrialization of its empire during the mid-1930s.  Japan began to export its 
heavy industry from the metropole to the colonies, and places like Manchuria 
and the northern half of the Korean Peninsula “got steel mills, auto plants, 
petrochemical complexes, and enormous hydroelectric facilities.”164  However, 
Jon Halliday pointed out that the Japanese had sabotaged much of the industry 
before they withdrew from Korea.  Although North Korea inherited 65% of heavy 
industry from the Japanese, it was in total disarray.165  As a result, it took 
Pyongyang about two years before it could restore the economic order 
necessary to take advantage of its high level of industrialization.  This effort 
included Soviet advisors and even some Japanese managers who remained to 
help revive the old Japanese industries that were in disrepair and set the basic 
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conditions for realizing North Korea’s command economy.  Armstrong also 
credits the North Koreans for the role they played in jump-starting the economy 
and Kim’s own focus on developing a self-reliant national economy.166   
Kim instituted land reforms in 1946, nationalized industry, and devised 
more effective ways to collect revenue to fund his industrialization.  Kim also 
used “moral exhortation, material incentives, and when necessary force and 
punishment” to increase worker productivity.  By 1949, life in North Korea was 
difficult but people had enough to eat and had access to education and housing, 
even if party members had privileged access to food and other goods.  More 
importantly, rapid control of the economy and heavy industrialization positioned 
North Korea for war “with great speed and efficiency.”167  This meant that by 
June 1950, just before the war started, North Korea had managed to exceed 
pre-1945 levels of economic production.168          
The Korean War left the Korean Peninsula devastated, and up to three 
million Koreans from both sides were killed.  At the end of the war, Pyongyang 
stated its economy had regressed to 40% of its industrial and consumer goods 
output in 1949.  Moreover, it claimed the war destroyed about 750,000 homes, 
its transportation infrastructure, electrical power generation, the chemical 
industry, and fuel production.  In other words, North Korea was “virtually 
destroyed as an industrial society.”  Kim’s top priority was to rebuild the country 
and he was able to recover his industrial economy faster than the South, 
despite the severe damage caused by U.S. carpet-bombing of his cities and 
mass exodus of the people to the South.  In fact, the North’s growth probably 
outpaced the South into the early 1970s.  While Armstrong gave credit to the 
Soviets, remnants of Japanese colonial managers, and the North Koreans 
themselves for resuscitating the economy after liberation, he drew special 
attention to the assistance that the North attracted from the Communist bloc for 
rebuilding the country after the war.  He describes this effort from 1953 to 1962 
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by the socialist bloc as “the first and only time the Soviet Union, China and the 
Soviet-aligned countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia cooperated in a 
multilateral development project of such scale.”169 
Kim took advantage of this sympathy and generosity from the 
Communist bloc by devising his own economic plan for reconstruction in August 
1953, and it initially focused on a preparatory period of up to one year to assess 
the damage from the war and draft the plan to rebuild the country.  He then 
earmarked three years (1954-1956) for the economy to catch up to pre-war 
levels of development.  Once that was achieved, Kim planned to launch “a Five-
Year Plan [1957-1961] for the general industrialization of the entire country.”  
Kim warned his people they would have to make great sacrifices, but reminded 
them that they had already demonstrated they could do this after liberation, and 
now they had the support of their fraternal comrades along with the country’s 
abundant natural resources.  It helped the cause when the Soviets provided 
33.3% of the aid, China 29.4%, and the rest of the Soviet bloc provided the 
remainder (37.3%) from 1953 to 1960.  The East Germans led the rest of the 
pack with 14% of aid, followed by Poland (9.3%), Czech Republic (6.9%), and 
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Mongolia, and North Vietnam providing 
token aid and assistance.170   
In addition to the sympathetic aid and assistance from their fraternal 
brothers in the Communist bloc, North Koreans were mobilized again, just as 
they had been prior to and during the Korean War, and their industrial sector 
recovered rapidly.  The Soviets hoped most of the production from these 
industries would continue to be a “source of primary goods” for Moscow but Kim 
was already envisioning “autarky rather than incorporation into a Soviet-
centered international division of labour.”  Moreover, the priority of the self-
reliant effort was his military complex, and that would trump calls for producing 
consumer goods for the people.  Despite their differences, the Soviets built over 
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40 new factories after the war and transferred technology to Pyongyang gratis, 
perhaps providing up to $690 million in aid by 1959.  According to the Soviets, 
by 1960 (i.e., end of the Five-Year Plan) their “aid accounted for 40% of North 
Korea’s electricity generation, 53% of coke production, 51% of cast iron, 22% of 
steel, 45% of reinforced concrete blocks and 65% of cotton fabric.”171    
After this period of largesse by the Communist bloc, foreign aid was 
reduced significantly in the early 1960s even though Pyongyang continued to 
rely on long-term loans from them until the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While 
the North’s command economy owned 98% of its industry and almost 81% of its 
farms were collectivized by 1956, it failed to achieve the goals of the Seven-
Year Plan (1961-1967) and stopped publishing its economic output after the 
mid-1960s.172  According to Vice Premier Kim Il, the sense of abandonment 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis militarized North Korean society as it felt 
compelled to maintain 700,000 men in the KPA and another 200,000 in the 
police.  This was a huge financial burden and Pyongyang began to miss its 
economic goals.173  Armstrong argued this period could be seen “as the 
beginning of North Korea’s long, protracted economic decline” but it was difficult 
to notice from the outside as some Western economists still touted it as “an 
alternative development theory” in 1974.174   
Kim Da-sool, the lead delegate for the South Korean Red Cross during 
the North-South Red Cross talks during early 1970s also noted that even the 
South Koreans had assumed the North’s economy was perhaps more 
advanced than that of the South at the time.  However, as the two sides rotated 
the sites for the talks between Seoul and Pyongyang, the South Korean 
delegation “realized that the North Korean economy was nowhere near where 
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we had thought it might be,” but the country seemed “much more militarized.”175  
Many observers had a positive view of the North Korean economy in the early 
1970s even as Pyongyang was defaulting on its loans to Western and 
Japanese banks in late 1974.176  According to Cumings, during the 1960s and 
the 1970s, North Korea attracted attention from the Third World as a model 
country.  In fact, when Che Guevara visited the country in the 1960s, he 
“proclaimed it a vision of what Cuba would eventually become,” and some 
economists promoted its economy as a “‘miracle economy’.”177  Thus, it was not 
surprising that the North Koreans were able to secure capital and modern 
technology after the socialist camp could not satisfy them after 1962.  Its 
opportunity to obtain them from the West came after Cold War tensions began 
to ease in the early 1970s.178    
Pyongyang managed to attract almost $600 million dollars in contracts 
with firms in Japan and West Europe from 1970 to 1975.  Japan, France, and 
West Germany became the top three trading partners to North Korea, 
respectively.  For instance, West German firms such as Siemans were 
upgrading North Korean industries in the 1970s that were “rebuilt by the East 
Germans in the 1950s.”  In return, the North exported magnesite, copper, zinc, 
silver, and other raw materials to West Germany.  However, the global 
recession that followed the 1973 oil shock impacted North Korea as well and it 
defaulted on $200-300 million of its loans by mid-1975.179                
Nevertheless, it was still worthy of admiration and trust and Gavan 
McCormack and John Gittings continued to argue that Pyongyang had 
reportedly achieved the goals of the 1970-1976 economic plan.  Its purchase of 
Western industrial plants, with short-term credits, did not seem unusual as 
North Korea’s trade with the non-Communist world increased from almost none 
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in the mid-1950s to 27% by the end of the 1960s.180  They argued, “At worst, it 
temporarily bit off more than it could chew,” and had a positive assessment of 
the Juche path of its economy.  They forecasted Pyongyang would eventually 
produce its own advanced technology at home, expand its domestic energy 
sector via hydroelectricity, and increase exports of minerals, consumer goods, 
and machine tools.  Moreover, they claimed the South’s economy was in much 
worse shape with its “house built on sand” and “ultra-dependent economy.”181   
By the fall of 1976, it was clear McCormack and Gittings were wrong. As 
North Korea’s economy was feeling the pressure as its economic outreach to 
the West faltered, it decided to pursue illicit activities in Europe.  This was 
particularly damning since most of these activities occurred in Scandinavia, 
whose countries made a sincere attempt to improve relations with Pyongyang.  
In October 1976, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden all reported that 
North Korean diplomats were taking advantage of their tax exempt status by 
selling “alcohol and cigarettes on the black market.”  In Denmark, the police 
suspected they were also selling illicit drugs and subsequently Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway expelled the North Koreans without consulting Pyongyang.  
On the other hand, Sweden decided to consult North Korea to avoid the 
impression there was a joint Nordic action against it.  According to Erik Cornell, 
the Swedish Chargé d'affaires to Pyongyang at the time, North Korea wanted a 
face-saving way out since its ambassador was being implicated in the incident.  
Cornell made it clear to his North Korean counterparts that only those guilty of 
the crimes would be expelled and not all of the Embassy staff.  He also 
suggested that Pyongyang should recall these officials before Sweden was 
forced to expel them.  The North Koreans accepted the suggestion when 
Sweden pledged not to implicate their Ambassador with these crimes and to 
keep the matter as low key as possible.  Cornell concluded, “Any negotiation 
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worth its name would have to take place in Pyongyang, where those in power 
did not actually take part but were at least indirectly accessible.”182   
A report citing a North Korean defector in November 1976 indicated that 
Pyongyang had directed “every town and district” to create “work companies” to 
earn hard currency.  These companies across the country grew “peppermint, 
ginseng, medicinal herbs and mushrooms” to support the “newly established 
purchasing centre for foreign currency.”183  What this suggests is that it is 
plausible that North Korea may have established its “web of state trading 
companies”184 as early as the mid-1970s, but it was not fully understood until 
John S. Park described it as North Korea, Inc., with his work on North Korea’s 
trading companies in 2009.  Park has argued that North Korea created its 
network of trading companies that belongs to the KWP, KPA, and the Cabinet to 
generate revenue to support the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students.  
This event was hosted by Pyongyang in 1989, and it sought to recover from the 
loss of face due to the successful 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul.  Despite the 
Festival being a drain on the regime’s coffers, these companies “became a 
model for other DPRK state trading companies” and their revenues would keep 
the core institutions of the government functioning.185 
Moreover, even as the North’s economy muddled through the 1970s and 
1980s, indications are the PDS did not break down completely under Kim Il-
sung.  When Kim died in 1994, one study indicated the majority of the people 
(60.6%) were still getting their food through the PDS.  Others acquired their 
food primarily through markets (16.3%), personal plots (4.2%), bartering (3.7%), 
and finally foraging (11.9%).186  In other words, the majority of North Koreans 
under Kim Il-sung had reasonable access to food and only about 12% had to 
forage for food.  Thus, some argue that North Korea under Kim maintained “a 
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rigid command economy during the Cold War.”187  Still others claimed Kim Il-
sung “picked a convenient time to die, one that would prevent his legacy from 
being tarnished by the catastrophic events of the coming years.”  In sum, 
despite the totalitarian character of his regime, Kim understood his people and 
aptly used neo-Confucianism and his cult of personality to soften his rule and, in 
the end, most North Koreans remember his rule “with nostalgia at the relative 
plenty they had enjoyed during his lifetime.”188  This is surprising when one 
considers the totalitarian character of his rule.  How can this be explained?  
Next, the study addresses the kind of leadership and legitimacy Kim exercised 
during his rule.   
 
4.3.6 Kim’s Leadership Style and Legitimacy 
As discussed earlier, Kim did not rely solely on terroristic control to rule 
North Korea.  Kim Il-sung appears to have understood that force and legitimacy 
were both key sources of power and that they have a relationship – “force 
without legitimacy brings chaos; legitimacy without force will be overthrown.”189  
There seems to be near consensus that Kim ultimately enjoyed loyalty from the 
regime’s key institutions and the people, but what kind of legitimacy did he have?  
According to Max Weber, the discussion of legitimacy begins by first defining 
the concept of authority.  Weber defines authority as “the probability that a 
specific command will be obeyed.”  Moreover, authority that is obeyed for pure 
interest (pragmatic calculus), mere custom (habitual behavior), or mere affect 
(personal devotion of the follower) is judged to be relatively unstable.190  What is 
required for stability is legitimacy and there are three kinds of legitimate 
authority.   
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The first is legal authority where the purest type is based on the 
bureaucracy, and the people obey the rules and regulations, to include the 
person in authority.191  In 1948, North Korea promulgated its first Constitution 
and drew significantly from the constitutional traditions of the Soviets.  For 
instance, it granted rights to the country’s ethnic minorities even though nearly 
all of its citizens were Koreans.  At the same time, there were many factions 
vying for power and the KWP made concessions such as allowing private 
ownership of property and businesses.  It “also granted a long series of 
guaranteed rights, and privileges to citizens, such as freedom of speech, the 
right to religious practice, and the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and 
detention.”  However, it was only a matter of time before the Constitution was 
subordinated to the KWP as Kim consolidated his power.  This reality was 
revealed when the North revised its Constitution in 1972.  Juche became the 
state’s guiding ideology and elements that were borrowed from the Soviets 
were omitted from the revised version.  Kim also became the first (and only) 
President of North Korea and it was evident he “was accountable to no one.”192  
Although one could argue this indicated that Kim used legal authority to 
legitimize his rule, he was clearly above the laws and regulations as the 
Supreme Leader.  In other words, while he did not ignore the concept of legal 
authority, it is safe to say this is not how he derived his authority and legitimacy.  
In the second case of legitimacy, the focus is on traditional authority with 
the purest type being patriarchal authority.  It upholds the belief in the old social 
order and tradition, and the people “are completely and personally dependent 
on the lord.”  Even the system’s administrators are completely dependent on the 
ruler and, as a result, the ruler can indiscriminately exercise his authority.  
Weber noted that “sultanistic rule” represented the extreme form of patriarchal 
authority type,193 and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have argued that Kim Il-sung 
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was one of the few modern sultanistic rulers.194  However, Linz and Stepan also 
suggested that sultanistic rule is not a form of totalitarian rule since it does not 
have a ruling ideology.195  As a result, since Juche is the guiding ideology in the 
North, sultanistic rule should be ruled out, while patriarchal authority seems to 
describe how Kim eventually exercised his legitimacy. 
The final type of legitimacy is charismatic authority where the adoration 
of the people to the ruler and the ruler’s “gifts of grace (charisma)” form the 
base of legitimacy.  The purest form includes “the rule of the prophet, the 
warrior hero, [and] the great demagogue.”  The ruler is usually referred to as the 
leader and is followed by the disciple.  The followers obey the ruler for his 
exceptional qualities and they remain loyal as long as the ruler’s charisma “is 
proven by evidence.”  In short, if the charismatic ruler loses heroic strength or 
the people lose faith in the ruler’s leadership ability, the ruler’s reign would end.  
The ruler must achieve success or his authority may weaken.  Furthermore, the 
system’s administrators are selected based on their own charisma and personal 
loyalty to the ruler, and not on any special qualification.  This is crucial since the 
system’s success depends on the unity of the ruler and his administrators.196   
Some critics of Weber have noted that he failed to “make clear whether 
this gift of grace was a quality possessed by leaders independent of society or a 
quality dependent on its recognition by followers.”  Others even argued 
“charismatic phenomenon” does not have to be tied to Weber because it could 
be due to the person with the gift of grace, the unique situation, or the 
combination of both.  Still others focus on the importance of followers in their 
discussion of charismatic leadership.197  On the other hand, James Macgregor 
Burns completely abandoned the use of the term charisma because it “has 
been so overburdened” and it failed to serve as an analytical tool “under close 
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analysis.”  Burns preferred the term “heroic leadership,” which he defined as 
follows: 
 
[B]elief in leaders because of their personage alone, aside from 
their tested capacities, experience, or stand on issues; faith in the 
leaders’ capacity to overcome obstacles and crises; readiness to 
grant to leaders the powers to handle crises; mass support for 
such leaders expressed directly – through votes, applause, letters, 
shaking hands – rather than through intermediaries of 
institutions…A crucial aspect of this relationship is the absence of 
conflict.198              
 
The heroic leader appears when the existing system and its leadership fails to 
deliver during crisis and provides opportunities for others “equipped with rare 
gifts of compassion and competence” to challenge existing authority and 
tradition.199  Others agreed with Burns in part because charisma was often 
linked to dictators and dictatorships, and tended to minimize the concept of 
transformational leadership by being “an all embracing term” for it.200 
Despite the criticism, one cannot ignore “there is a consensus in the 
literature” that Weber is the established model for the discussion on charisma201 
and it appears to be a valid concept to analyze the Kim family leadership.  This 
is particularly true when one recognizes that Weber’s discussion of charisma 
was insightful enough to foresee the problem of leadership succession and how 
it would evolve during transitions of leadership.  He noted that one way is for the 
charismatic leader to select his successor and gain the support of his religious 
or military elite.  Sometimes, this could lead to “hereditary charisma” where the 
essential qualification is the blood ties to the leader.202  I will revisit how 
hereditary charisma applied to both Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un in Chapter 7, 
to avoid redundancy, by explaining how Kim Il-sung’s successors were chosen 
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largely based on their patrimonial lineage to the pure blood of Kim Il-sung and 
his first wife Kim Jong-suk. 
In the end, both patriarchal and charismatic authority offers a valid form 
of legitimacy for Kim Il-sung but legal authority seems less relevant for him.  
This leads to a discussion about power, which Nye admitted “is a contested 
concept,” but offered his own definition of power as being “the ability to alter 
others’ behavior to produce preferred outcomes.”203  That said, Bryan Watters 
highlighted many ways to obtain and exercise power: 1) Reward Power (i.e., 
rewarding followers for compliance),204 2) Coercive Power (i.e., obtaining 
compliance with threats), 3) Legitimate Power (discussed above), 4) Referent 
Power (i.e., “trusted and respected” by others), 5) Expert Power (i.e., derived 
from “experiences, skills or knowledge”), 6) Information Power (e.g., those in 
charge possess “needed or wanted information” to gain temporary 
advantage),205 7) Position Power (i.e., combination of legitimate, reward and 
punishment powers), 8) Personal Power (i.e., derived from combination of 
expert and referent powers), 9) Remunerative power (i.e., offering of material 
rewards), and 10) Normative Power (i.e., offering of symbolic rewards).206  As 
shown above, despite the totalitarian character of the regime, the story of Kim Il-
sung’s rise and consolidation of power indicates that, like many other leaders, 
he probably used all of these ways to gain and wield power during his rule. 
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 For instance, Kim used his anti-Japanese legacy to legitimize his rule 
and used the totalitarian system to ensure near monopoly control of information.  
He was not afraid to use coercive power to maintain control and to eliminate his 
enemies but Kim also used a combination of reward, referent, and positional 
power by effectively using his propaganda organs to establish a cult of 
personality that addressed the Korean people’s desire for independence from 
foreign domination.  In spite of this, Daniel Chirot argued that Kim was a tyrant 
because he attempted to “control all thought” of his people by portraying himself 
as a “Confucian sage.”  If Kim truly believed in his legitimacy to rule, it would not 
have been necessary to manufacture his cult of personality.  The fact he did so 
“proved Kim lacked the support of his people similar to other tyrannies.”  
Nevertheless, Chirot admitted, “It is much harder to tell what people really think 
in North Korea” because it is so isolated from the outside world.207  As 
discussed earlier, a former CIA analyst Helen-Louise Hunter concluded Kim 
used his charisma to connect with the people, which implied he was not a mere 
tyrant in the traditional sense.  If so, what kind of leadership style did he have? 
 According to Peter Northouse, “one of the more widely recognized 
approaches to leadership is the situational approach” that suggests “different 
situations demand different kind of leadership.”  In other words, to be an 
effective leader a leader must be capable of adapting “his or her style to the 
demands of different situations.”208  Thus, the situational approach includes four 
different leadership styles that attempt to identify “the behavior patterns of a 
person who attempts to influence other.”  They include directing (i.e., focusing 
on giving “instructions about what and how goals are to be achieved” by 
followers and providing careful supervision), coaching (i.e., focusing on directing 
as well as encouraging followers and eliciting their input), supporting (i.e., goals 
are important but “gives subordinates control of day-to-day decisions” while the 
leader is available to help solve problems), and delegating (i.e., focuses on 
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letting “subordinates take responsibility for getting the job done the way they 
see fit”).209  The fact that Kim Jong-il was able to establish a monolithic 
guidance system to control his party elites by 1973,210 suggests Kim Il-sung 
probably delegated his authority to his son in the early 1970s.  Moreover, as 
noted earlier, Kim’s MSD guerrillas formed the core leadership of his regime 
which “was strong enough to shape the basic configuration of north Korean 
political culture.”211  They were his followers but they were also his loyal 
comrades as well and he trusted many of them to help him achieve his aims.   
As Table 4.1 indicated, by 1961, Kim added 25 more of his guerrilla 
faction to the KWP’s Central Committee (CC) and almost a decade later 13 
more were added to the CC.  It seems plausible that as he consolidated power, 
Kim empowered his guerrilla comrades to help him achieve his goals.  Suzy 
Kim appears to support this assertion.  She argued that Kim Il-sung criticized 
the leaders of the local people’s committees (PCs) in 1952 for “‘coercively 
ordering the people around’” like former colonial officials “‘rather than motivating 
them and working on their behalf as their ‘loyal servants’.”  He reportedly 
advised that the leaders of the PCs should not “do all the work themselves, but 
rather to delegate, engaging the participation of the majority of the people.”  As 
North Korea was rebuilding itself after the Korean War, Kim encouraged them 
“to become self-reliant, ‘creatively deciding what to do in accordance with local 
conditions’ rather than ‘moving when pushed from the top, standing still without 
push, working like a machine by command, like puppets play’.”  Suzy Kim 
implies that this kind of direct democracy based on the PCs began to change 
after 1972, as they merged with the cooperative farms.212  As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, Kim may have been willing to delegate because he was so confident 
that everything was going according to plan until the early 1970s.           
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The evidence suggests Kim was probably capable of exercising all four 
styles of leadership, to include some aspects of the delegating leadership style.  
In other words, after Kim purged his main opposition by the mid-1950s, he 
began to empower his trusted lieutenants and they helped him run the day-to-
day operations of the affairs of state as they saw fit.  To be sure, they were also 
subject to careful monitoring, and if they failed to meet Kim’s expectations, they 
were likely to be purged (e.g., his guerrilla comrades who failed during the 
Second Korean War).  Along with the members of the Kim family (e.g., his 
younger brother Kim Young-ju and later Kim Jong-il), many of Kim’s Manchurian 
guerrillas and select group of loyal elites such as Pang Hak-se from the Soviet 
faction served him well.213  Others like the Kapsan group were not initially 
purged and appear to have been empowered, but when they challenged Kim’s 
authority over the succession issue in 1967, they too were purged.  What does 
this mean for the role of brute power in Kim’s leadership style?   
 According to Burns, “The leadership approach tends often unconsciously 
to be elitist; it projects heroic figures against the shadowy background of drab, 
powerless masses.”  His aim is to highlight both the leader and the follower and 
judging the effectiveness of leaders “by actual social change measured by 
intent and satisfaction of human needs and expectations.”  This means 
leadership goes beyond “mere power-holding” and is the antithesis of brute 
power.  Subsequently, he identified transactional and transforming leadership 
as the two basic types of leadership.  The transactional leadership defined as 
“leaders approach[ing] followers with an eye to exchanging one thing for 
another: jobs for votes, or subsidies for campaign contributions.”  On the other 
hand, transforming leadership is defined as identifying and exploiting “an 
existing need or demand of a potential follower” and the creating a “relationship 
of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts follower into leaders and may 
convert leaders into moral agents.”214  However, Watters pointed out that 
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transformational leadership can be both positive and negative by noting that 
Adolf Hitler was a transformative leader albeit a negative one.215 
 According to Chirot, Hitler as well as Mao and Stalin, “were all thought to 
be exceptionally skillful at adapting to new circumstances, listening to other 
opinions within their parties, and learning from their experiences.”216  Moreover, 
Burns credited Mao with being a “gifted political leader” because he understood 
what the masses needed and “the way in which those needs could be activated 
and channeled.”  This allowed Mao to lead a transforming revolution in China 
that changed the very fabric of Chinese culture and society.  This kind of 
revolutionary leadership can succeed when it has a “powerful value system,” 
can respond to the needs of the people, and can suppress dissent.  However, 
Burns implied that despite the need to suppress dissent, what men like Mao 
accomplished “qualifies as leadership when it [revolutionary leadership] is 
reciprocal in a situation of open conflict and as brute power when it is not.”217  In 
other words, when revolutionary leaders believe only they possess the truth, 
they become tyrants.218  As a result, one could argue that the evidence shown 
above suggests Kim Il-sung also led a transforming revolution in North Korea.  
Yet, when the regime promoted his cult of personality in the 1960s, his son 
instituted the monolithic guidance system in 1973, and the economy began to 
collapse near the end of his reign, Kim Il-sung eventually became more of a 
tyrant (albeit a popular one) and a negative transformational and transactional 
leader.  This discussion of leadership will provide the basis for examining his 
successors’ leadership styles in chapters 6 and 7.      
 
4.4 Summary 
First, I have argued that Kim Il-sung had an uncanny ability to 
outmaneuver more qualified opponents, both at home and abroad, to 
consolidate his power in North Korea, and set the conditions for reunification 
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during the early years of his rule.  Most of all, Kim believed he had more 
legitimacy to rule all of Korea as a former anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter, even 
though he hid his sojourn in the RFE and created the myth on Mt. Paekdu, than 
the leaders of the South who were largely former Japanese collaborators.  His 
Manchurian experience taught him how to lead men under difficult conditions, 
including subordinating himself and his men to the CCP.  Kim knew he was not 
allowed to fight for Korean independence until the CCP had defeated the 
Japanese, and as a Korean, even he would be vulnerable to accusations of 
being a pro-Japanese spy.  He would overcome the MSD purge to pardon the 
alleged group of MSD members at Mount Maan and, consequently, they would 
form a special bond with him and remain loyal to him as they fought the 
Japanese and returned to Korea after joining the Soviet Army in the RFE.   
Second, when Kim and his guerrilla comrades arrived in North Korea, 
they contested for power with five other factions to create a new nation under 
Soviet tutelage, and eventually gain the upper hand as other factions lacked 
their organization and leadership.  Some of Kim’s comrades would die during 
the Korean War but those remaining continued to help him purge the other 
factions in the midst of war and consolidated their power as they rebuilt the 
country after the war.  The Soviet and the Yenan factions decided to challenge 
Kim’s authority in 1956, and he had to tolerate a joint intervention from Moscow 
and Beijing for a little while, but eventually he purged most of his enemies by 
1961.  The final opposition from the Kapsan faction was eliminated in 1967.  
Whenever the North faced difficulty, he invoked the symbolic arduous march to 
call on his people to follow the lead of his guerrilla fighters who sacrificed 
everything for the Korean revolution.   
Third, Kim managed to create a totalitarian system with Korean 
characteristics, which softened the terroristic control aspect of the Soviet 
system with his cult of personality mixed with elements of neo-Confucianism 
and an ideology based on Korea’s long desire to seek self-reliance and 
independence from foreign interference.  Kim seemed to know he needed both 
power and legitimacy.  Kim appears to have started his Cult of Personality by 
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1956 to strengthen his legitimacy, but it intensified during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution in the 1960s as the Chinese became more hostile to Kim and North 
Korea.219  While he relied on his security services and the KPA to maintain 
control of key institutions and the populace, he also had charisma to lead his 
people as the Suryong and depended on his trusted lieutenants to achieve his 
aims.  It is also true that near the end of his rule, near monopoly control of 
information began to weaken, but he still managed to spread effective 
propaganda.  Kim used education, various forms of art, and public activities to 
inculcate in his people how to live the life of a true revolutionary.  North Koreans 
learned from books, movies, operas, and everyday life activities to become loyal 
revolutionaries of the Kim regime.  Furthermore, the KWP served him as the 
single party comprised of a loyal core elite coupled with Kim’s Juche ideology 
that was easy for Koreans to understand after centuries of being subservient to 
China, and their recent experience with Japanese colonialism.  Kim’s regime 
faced many challenges during his rule, but he appears to have earned the 
genuine admiration of his people and still “lives” as the eternal President.   
Fourth, Kim managed to achieve early economic success during the 
post-Korean War period with aid from the Socialist bloc, but growth was 
unsustainable without reform.  The economy began to decline in the 1970s and 
Pyongyang flirted with illicit activities in Europe after its economic outreach to 
the West and Japan failed miserably and had to encourage everyone to earn 
hard currency by selling locally produced commodities.  In other words, he laid 
the foundation for North Korea Inc. in the 1970s, and his regime just barely 
managed to exercise its “command” of the economy until his death.  Finally, one 
could argue Kim initially practiced positive transformational leadership but his 
promotion of the cult of personality and eventual collapse of the North Korean 
economy degraded his leadership type to one of negative transformational and 
transactional leadership.  In spite of this, Kim did not rely only on brute force to 
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survive and hold power.  He depended on many of his guerrilla comrades as 
well as other core elites that he trusted and managed to gain the admiration of 
his people with his charisma.  Next, the study examines several cases to 
determine whether Kim used smart power strategies to achieve his aims during 
his rule. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE KIMs’ LONG WAR OF REUNIFICATION 
 
One of the more extraordinary features of Kim’s [Kim Il-sung] 
foreign policy was his uncanny ability to navigate between Great 
Power interests to achieve his own ends.  He was the original 
author of the Korean War, but it was Stalin who made it possible 
and Mao who largely fought it.  After the war, he was able to 
secure his position by playing China and the Soviet Union against 
each other, as well as obtain vast amounts of economic aid from 
both powers.  The end of the cold war closed North Korea’s 
sources of support, but Kim again showed his extraordinary ability 
to leverage competing interests for his gain, this time by playing 
the nuclear card.1 
 
       - Shelia Miyoshi Jager 
 
5.1 Introduction 
After examining how Kim consolidated his power as the Supreme Leader 
of North Korea, the purpose of this chapter is to examine what Kim Il-sung 
managed to accomplish by pursuing his strategy of reunification.  This is an 
important question because no matter how uncanny his ability was in 
manipulating the great powers, his smart power attempts failed to achieve 
reunification before his death.  According to Nicholas Eberstadt, Kim’s “plan for 
unification-by-conquest was not a madman’s dream, but rather a careful, 
calculating, high-risk venture.”  He went on to argue that when the dream of 
reunification failed, Kim “evidently had no ‘fall-back plan’.”  In other words, he 
manipulated others to achieve his aims but by stubbornly pursuing forced 
reunification, North Korea “was caught in a trap of its own design.”2  However, 
what the evidence suggests is that, while North Korea persistently attempted to 
achieve reunification during Kim’s rule and ultimately failed, he came close to 
achieving his aim during the Korean War and managed to humiliate the 
Americans during the so-called Second Korean War in the late 1960s.  More 
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importantly, Kim’s provocations were designed to be low-risk ventures after the 
1960s and his fall-back plan was to designate his son as successor in the early 
1970s.  In short, while Kim failed to achieve reunification with smart power 
attempts, he managed to consolidate his power, played the nuclear card when 
his survival was at stake when Beijing and Moscow abandoned him, and 
groomed his son to wield smart power as a survival tool after his death.  
With that said, this chapter examines the Korean War as the first of a 
multi-case study.  As mentioned, Kim failed to achieve his aim to reunify the 
country during the war; however, he successfully navigated the complex set of 
motivations of Stalin and Mao to gain their approval for the invasion of South 
Korea in June 1950.  When the attack culminated at the Pusan Perimeter, Kim 
faced defeat at the hands of General Douglas MacArthur.  After the Inchon 
landing in September 1950, Mao felt compelled to rescue Kim due to his own 
threat perception of American imperialism.  The war ended with an armistice,3 
but Kim shamelessly claimed he had defeated U.S. forces in Korea,4 perhaps 
quibbling that a draw against the greatest military power in the world was a win 
for North Korea.  Henry Kissinger noted the Korean War was a “draw” but 
acknowledged it was the first American war in which its leaders abandoned 
victory as their war aim.  He also implied Kim earned his respect by exercising 
influence beyond his weight class by participating in “a three-cornered 
maneuver for dominance within the Communist international order [alongside 
Stalin and Mao], with Kim Il-sung driving up the bidding to gain support for a 
program of conquest whose global consequences in the end surprised all of the 
main participants.”5  Kim’s propagandists continue to exploit the war as another 
symbol to justify his Juche line and related policy choices.  Suzy Kim even 
argued, “The Korean War has become the single most defining national 
experience, leaving North Koreans with a fiercely autarkic mentality as a form of 
                                            
3
 Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), pp. 288-295. 
4
 Ho Jong Ho, Kang Sok Hui and Pak Thae Ho, The U.S Imperialists Started the Korean War 
(Pyongyang, North Korea: Foreign Publishing House, 1993), p. 241. 
5
 Kissinger, World Order, pp. 289-294. 
149 
 
internal cohesion against outside threats.”6  In other words, Kim failed to reunify 
the country but validated a siege mentality to maintain North Korean unity 
against external threats and that eventually produced a new normal of “a stable 
state of permanent crisis.”7 
Next, the study examined other North Korean provocations after the 
Korean War to determine what can be learned by using the smart power 
framework to examine the multi-cases.  The study examined how Pyongyang 
sought opportunities to attack the U.S. (e.g., shootdown of an EC-121 in April 
1969 and Panmunjom ax murders in August 1976) and to destabilize Seoul’s 
government (e.g., Rangoon bombing in 1983 and the KAL Flight 858 bombing 
in 1987) to create the conditions for reunification.  While the North often failed in 
the execution of its provocations, it became more emboldened to use limited 
force to achieve its aims when the U.S.-ROK Alliance chose not to retaliate 
against these provocations due to its fear of escalation to full-scale war.  More 
importantly, Pyongyang often used political and military diplomacy as well as 
covert and unconventional means of force to reduce the risk of escalation and 
to de-escalate the situation.  The non-forcible return of POWs during the Korean 
War and the Panmunjom ax murders were the exceptions where U.S. resolve 
demonstrated it could influence and deter North Korean provocations with 
determination and willingness to risk war.  With this in mind, I will briefly review 
Nye’s concept of smart power before proceeding with the rest of the chapter.   
 
5.2 Operationalizing Smart Power Theory  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Nye argued that smart power is the “ability to 
combine the hard power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction 
into a successful strategy.”8  That said, the method I use to illustrate how the 
actors employed smart power focuses on identifying the outcomes and hard 
and soft power actions by the actors involved, determining policy preferences of 
key actors, considering their power behaviors, and examining the actors’ 
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assessment of the probability of success of their actions.  Next, I examine the 
first of five cases of provocations – the Korean War – during Kim Il-sung’s rule 
to examine his strategy to achieve his aims from a smart power framework.  
 
5.3 Setting the Conditions for Internationalizing the Korean War 
The intent is not to revisit the entire history of the Korean War, but to 
examine whether Kim successfully employed smart power during the key 
phases of the war, which included the surprise invasion, the Chinese 
intervention,9 and the armistice agreement.  I argue it is difficult to understand 
the history of North Korean provocations without examining its origin, the 
Korean War.  I begin the multi-case study by highlighting the fact that after 
Korea was liberated from Japan, it was plausible that a leftist regime would 
have won without foreign interference.  In other words, the social conditions in 
Korea favored the Communists after liberation and Kim Il-sung may have 
assumed peaceful reunification was possible.10  However, after the Soviets and 
the Americans failed to reach agreement on a unified government,11 the two 
Koreas were established as independent states in the fall of 1948, and both 
aimed to win the war of legitimacy and reunify the Korean Peninsula by force.12         
 
5.3.1 Kim Promotes His Southern Invasion With Stalin And Mao 
Kim Il-sung attempted to set the conditions for reunification in early 1949.  
According to Wada Haruki, when Stalin met with Kim and Pak Hon-yong in 
March 1949 they did not discuss forced reunification.  However, others argued it 
was discussed on March 7 and Kim indicated his desire to liberate Korea by 
force before South Korea gained enough strength to attack the North.  He 
argued his forces were ready for the war and would be supported by “powerful 
partisan units in South Korea.”  Stalin was skeptical and Kim failed to convince 
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him that he would succeed.  Stalin informed Kim that his army was not superior 
to the South Korean army, both in quality and numbers.13  Stalin also felt the 
U.S. would defend the South and if Stalin violated his agreement with the U.S. 
to partition Korea at the 38th parallel he could not prevent the U.S. intervention.  
Nevertheless, Stalin gave Kim hope by agreeing to train his senior military 
officers in the Soviet Union since none of them had formal military training.  
Stalin also showed his willingness to assist in the development of Kim’s navy 
and air force as well.14   
Miyoshi Jager agreed that Stalin’s initial preference was to avoid a direct 
military confrontation with the U.S. since he believed Washington would 
intervene.  Thus he advised Kim to wait for the South to initiate a provocation 
before commencing his long-awaited quest for reunification.  Kim had no choice 
but to return to Pyongyang and bide his time but was satisfied that Stalin did not 
reject his plan to invade the South.15  Haruki argued that in an effort to persuade 
Stalin to support his invasion, Kim probably oversold the strength of his forces, 
and may have exposed his lack of experience as a military leader.  One could 
debate the military acumen of Kim, but what is evident is that by the time the 
war started on June 25, 1950, he enjoyed clear military advantages vis-à-vis the 
South and almost succeeded in reunifying the country.  How did this occur?   
As soon as Kim left Moscow, Stalin received a report from his 
ambassador in Pyongyang warning that the South might invade the north after 
U.S. troop withdrawals in May 1949.  His General Staff also warned, “A larger-
scale provocation was possible” from the South.16  This was worrisome enough 
for Stalin to question the balance of power in Korea.  As Hans Morgenthau 
noted, “The very existence of Korea as an autonomous state has been for more 
than two thousand years a function of the balance of power in the Far East, 
either in terms of the supremacy of one power that controlled and protected 
Korea or in terms of rival imperialisms meeting on the Korean peninsula and 
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establishing there a very unstable equilibrium for generally short duration.”  
China had been the dominant power in Korea with Japan periodically 
challenging its supremacy.  In the late 1800s, Russia and Japan contested for 
hegemony over Korea but by the end of World War II (WW II), with Japan and 
China weakened, the Soviet Union and the U.S. were positioned to vie for 
control over Korea.17  Stalin sought to maintain control over the North by 
securing a pro-Soviet government in Pyongyang to protect its strategic interests 
which included “its potential as a source of economic resources.”18  Hence, he 
was amenable to Kim’s request for more powerful weapons to deter a South 
Korean invasion and received over 50 aircraft, 87 T-34 tanks, 102 SU-76 self-
propelled artillery pieces, 25,000 rifles, and 7,000 pistols.19   
In late April 1949, Kim sent Kim Il, another one of his Manchurian 
guerrillas, to China to obtain Beijing’s military assistance for the invasion.  Mao 
cautioned the North Koreans not to invade until conditions were more favorable 
and indicated he would consult with Stalin before sending his troops to Korea.  
Mao, however, committed to sending two ethnic Korean divisions (about 20,000 
total troops) stationed in Manchuria “at any time.”20  He would later send about 
35,000 ethnic Korean troops from three divisions from July 1949 to April 1950.  
This was significant since “there were only three regular divisions, one infantry 
brigade, and two border security brigades” in the KPA by June 1949.21  As 
briefly mentioned above, Kim also assumed he would have support from a large 
number of Communist partisans in South Korea. 
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5.3.2 Seoul Eliminates the Communist Guerrillas in South Korea  
According to the CIA in February 1949, the Communist movement in the 
South was nascent and was likely to weaken further.  While its aim was to 
support the Soviet goal of absorbing the South by agitating popular sentiment 
against the government, conducting guerrilla operations, and fostering the 
narrative that “Communist domination is inevitable,” the CIA assessed that 
Communist strength in the South was insufficient to accomplish this aim.  The 
report, however, acknowledged the Southern Communists were capable of 
receiving trained guerrilla reinforcements from Pyongyang and assisting the 
KPA during an invasion by conducting assassinations, sabotage, and staging 
rebellions within the security forces.22  The CIA report also estimated that loyal 
Communists in the South, “those that braved various degrees of police action to 
assist the Communist program,” could surpass 600,000 while others associated 
with Communist front organizations could number about two million.  They 
included armed Communist groups that were operating throughout the South.23   
The Communist guerrilla movement on Jeju Island from 1947 to 1954 
clearly demonstrated the extent of the perceived Communist threat for the 
South Korean government.  In the end, the South Korean Army, police, and 
rightist youth groups killed or wounded about 25,000 to 30,000 civilians on the 
island as part of its counterinsurgency campaign.24  What was more of a 
concern to Rhee (and encouraging for Kim) was that about 2,000 South Korean 
constabulary troops from the 14th Regiment rebelled against his government in 
Yosu and justified its actions by stating the troops “refused to murder the people 
of Cheju-do fighting against imperialist policy.”  During the incident, about 1,500 
rebels and 1,200 civilians and government troops were killed, respectively.25  It 
is understandable why Kim may have been inspired by the Southern guerrilla 
movement and expected it to support him as he contemplated his attack on the 
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South.  In short, his anticipation of support from the Southern Communists 
during the initial phase of the war was rational – “in the standard sense that 
given their goals, they choose the best means of achieving them”26 – even 
though it never materialized due to brutal South Korean counterinsurgency 
operations.27  As the South was eliminating its Communist threat, it was also 
fighting with the North Koreans along the border. 
 
5.3.3 The Korean Border Conflict As Prelude to War 
On May 4, 1949, the Koreans fought a four-day battle near Kaesong 
along the 38th parallel that resulted in the death of 400 North Korean and 22 
South Korean troops, respectively.  North Koreans later alleged Kim Sok-won, 
who was commanding South Korea’s First Infantry Division, started the attack 
across the border.28  The fighting continued along the border for six months and 
Kim Sok-won later informed the representatives from the United Nations 
Commission on Korea (UNCOK) that the two Koreas were already at war and 
time had come for the South to unify the country by going north.29  Kim Il-sung 
remembered Kim Sok-won from Manchuria when they fought against each 
other, the former as a member of the CCP and the latter as a member of the 
Japanese Imperial Army.30  They were blood enemies and this past still gnaws 
at the “Korean national consciousness.”  This historical legacy is essential to 
understanding why, for the North Koreans, the Korean War is a continuation of 
the Korean civil war from Manchuria, not just because of the anti-Japanese 
struggle but the Korean quislings that fought for Japan31 (see Appendix A for 
background of the founders of the South Korean army).  Kim warned his old 
nemesis during a radio broadcast as the KPA attacked the South: “Kim Sok-
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won, I’m coming to get you, you won’t escape me now.”32  North Korea would 
use collaboration with the Japanese as the litmus test for everyone and knew 
that would make it more attractive in its war of legitimacy on the Peninsula.   
In fact, Kim and Pak Hon-yong were confident that they could win a 
nationwide election if it were held in September 1949.  On May 31, 1949, they 
along with Soviet General Shtykov proposed a general election to achieve 
peaceful reunification, which was ignored by South Korea.  Waruki argued the 
proposal was pure propaganda, and a likely attempt to deter a South Korean 
invasion.33  Ambassador Muccio stated in June 1949 that “it is the considered 
view of this Mission that neither South Korea nor North Korea, with what appear 
to be fairly evenly balanced military forces, is likely in the foreseeable future to 
assume the risks associated with a deliberate all-out invasion.”34  That being the 
case, Mao’s 35,000 ethnic Korean troops began to tip the military balance in 
Kim’s favor in July 1949 along with the large shipment of Soviet military 
equipment. 35  According to Jager, by this time Kim was convinced he could 
successfully reunify the country with Soviet support.  Moreover, Mao was also 
growing more confident as he pushed for his own treaty with Stalin in December 
1949.  A new treaty was signed on February 14, 1950, but Mao had to provide 
special privileges to Stalin in Xinjiang and Manchuria before Stalin committed to 
aid Mao if the U.S. attacked China.  Stalin still attempted to avoid war with the 
U.S. by demanding that a formal declaration of war had to be made.36  Mao was 
satisfied the new treaty would help him reclaim China’s proper role in the 
world.37  As a result of Mao’s growing power and influence, Stalin may have 
calculated that if his backing of Kim in Korea turned out well he would end up 
                                            
32
 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-
1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 569. 
33
 Haruki, The Korean War, pp. 24-25. 
34
 Haruki, The Korean War, p. 26. 
35
 Haruki, The Korean War, p. 25. 
36 
Jager, Brothers at War, pp. 58-60. 
37
 Jager, Brothers at War, p. 60. 
156 
 
with a hegemonic position in Korea and use it as leverage against Mao’s 
growing influence in Asia.38   
Stalin sent over 400 of his officers, the majority of them with combat 
experience during WW II, to North Korea by January 1950 and “there was little 
doubt that the [North Korean People’s Army] NKPA was better trained and 
equipped than its southern counterpart.”  Kim was now supremely confident of a 
quick victory.39  Kim left for Moscow with Pak in late March 1950, feeling 
confident he was in firm control of North Korea.40  Stalin may have felt the 
international situation had changed in Kim’s favor by the spring of 1950.  Mao 
had defeated the Nationalists in China and his forces were available to support 
the invasion, the Sino-Soviet security treaty would deter U.S. intervention, the 
U.S. domestic sentiment was against entanglement in Asia, and the Soviets had 
their own atomic bomb.41  Kim’s pestering of Stalin finally worked and Stalin 
approved the invasion in April 1950.  According to Kissinger, Stalin apparently 
changed his mind during Kim’s second visit to Moscow, and felt the U.S. would 
not intervene after Stalin and Mao had signed their treaty.  With respect to Mao, 
Kissinger argued that he was concerned about the likelihood of U.S. 
intervention and was fixated on his own goal of defeating the Chinese 
nationalists and reclaiming Taiwan.  Mao apparently believed “any project to 
conquer South Korea should be deferred until the completion of the Chinese 
Civil War through the conquest of Taiwan.”  However, Kim was convinced the 
U.S. would not tolerate two Communist victories in Asia and felt pressured to 
invade the South before Mao could attack Taiwan.42   
On the other hand, Cumings suggested Mao may have felt an obligation 
to support Kim because so many Koreans had sacrificed during the Chinese 
revolution, the anti-Japanese struggle, and the Civil War against the Chinese 
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nationalists.43  However, Kim Dong-gil refuted Cumings by arguing that Kim did 
not provide any soldiers to fight in the Chinese Civil War and only about 35,000 
ethnic Koreans from China were sent to North Korea by April 1950.44  In the end, 
Kissinger agreed with Morgenthau and concluded both Mao and Stalin aimed to 
become the dominant power in Korea and, worst case, “keep the other partner 
from achieving it.”  Mao then committed 50,000 ethnic Korean troops (but more 
likely 35,000) from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to Kim.45  
According to Kissinger, Stalin supported the invasion because he knew 
he would lose the warm seaport at Dalian and a unified Korea under Kim would 
be more accommodating to his naval requirements.  As a result, he told Kim he 
would support the war but frankly warned him, “If you should get kicked in the 
teeth, I shall not lift a finger.  You have to ask Mao for all the help.”  What Stalin 
was really saying was he sought a dominant position in Korea through Kim but, 
if that failed, he was going to make Mao pay to save Kim.  When Mao spoke to 
Kim in May 1950, Kim said he had gained Stalin’s support for the invasion and 
he could win the war before the U.S. intervened with the help of the southern 
Communist guerrillas.46  In his latest work, World Order, Kissinger emphasized 
that Mao’s support of Kim’s invasion of the South “delayed Chinese unification 
by a century” because America decided to protect Taiwan.  Kissinger also 
suggested that Stalin intended to bog down the Americans in a “cul-de-sac” in 
Korea to drain their resources, and sought to do the same with Mao because he 
feared Mao’s rising status.47  Mao also felt he was being encircled by the 
Soviets, who had long coveted a dominating position in Korea, and he was 
sensitive to playing a subservient ideological role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.48    
As the war seemed inevitable, MacArthur’s command believed the two 
Korean militaries were “about equal strength” in June 1950 by noting that the 
KPA had about 75,000 troops with an additional 20,000 border guards while 
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South Korea had roughly 88,000 troops.  Cumings cautioned that just looking at 
the numbers was misleading because it failed to consider that much of the KPA 
had been battle-tested in the war against Japan and the Chinese Civil War.49  
Still others, such as Kim Dong-Choon, emphasized that the KPA had 
advantages other than their combat experience.  While his numbers regarding 
the two armies were significantly higher than Cumings’,50 Kim Dong-Choon 
argued that the military capabilities of the two sides favored Pyongyang.  The 
South possessed only 14 liaison and 10 trainer aircraft, and the North had over 
210 fighter aircraft.  The South had no tanks or self-propelled artillery guns, but 
the North possessed close to 200 tanks and 180 self-propelled artillery guns.51   
In short, closer examination of Kim’s plan to invade the South confirms 
that the countries in Northeast Asia have historical distrust of each other and 
that significantly influenced their calculus regarding the Korea problem.52  Kim 
effectively manipulated this reality despite the fact the Soviets wanted to avoid 
World War III (WW III) with the U.S. and China sought unification with Taiwan 
as a top priority.  As Kissinger noted, Kim clearly demonstrated his ability “to 
manipulate” Mao’s and Stalin’s “mutual suspicions” to gain their support for his 
invasion of the South.53  It was clear Kim was earning a reputation for pulling 
well above his weight class as he involved the great Communist powers in his 
war of reunification.  Next, the study examines the Chinese intervention. 
  
5.3.4 China Intervenes in Korea After the UN Intervention 
The attack began on June 25, 1950, and achieved early success.  By 
June 27, the South Korean Army headquarters abandoned Seoul, and its 
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remnants followed within the next several days.54  The dire situation in Korea 
forced the U.S. to intervene but the prospect of mobilizing the international 
community through the United Nations (UN) was perceived as unlikely due to 
anticipated veto by the Soviets.  However, Stalin informed his UN ambassador 
to skip the meeting and the UN approved the decision to defend South Korea 
on June 27, 1950.  Cumings confirmed Stalin intentionally avoided the UN 
meeting to draw the U.S. into a strategic cul-de-sac to waste American blood 
and treasure, or perhaps to delegitimize the UN by portraying it as a tool of the 
Americans.55  It also seems to confirm he wanted Mao to pay a heavy price to 
protect the Chinese homeland.  After the surprise attack, Kim’s goal of 
reunifying the country within a month was almost within reach, but the United 
Nations Command (UNC) held the line at Pusan.56  As anticipated by Peng, the 
tide of the war turned against Kim in mid-September when MacArthur launched 
an amphibious landing at Inchon.  This led to the “great strategic retreat” of the 
KPA, and the success at Inchon inspired President Harry Truman to roll back 
Communism by reunifying the entire peninsula.57 
According to Cumings, Kim requested immediate Chinese military 
intervention on October 1, 1950.  Mao had already informed Stalin he would 
intervene with about twelve divisions; however, Stalin fearing WW III reneged 
on his pledge to protect the Chinese coast with Soviet air power.58  When UNC 
marched across the 38th parallel on October 9, 1950, Kim made a radio 
broadcast the next day to urge the KPA to “fight to the last drop of blood.”  He 
also called for the Communist guerrillas in the South to attack the enemy and 
appealed to his people to purge the spies and subversive elements.59  As 
discussed below, Kim was using the war to consolidate his power just like Mao.   
The CIA report on October 3, 1950, discussed the possibility of Chinese 
intervention in Korea.  The report cited the U.S. Embassy in London conveying 
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a report from the British, which indicated that Zhou Enlai had warned the Indian 
ambassador in Beijing that the PLA would intervene in Korea if the UNC 
crossed the 38th parallel.  Zhou also revealed that the Chinese would not 
intervene if only the South Koreans crossed the line.  However, the CIA 
questioned the reliability of K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, and 
assessed he was “being used by the Chinese Communists to plant this 
information in an effort to influence US and UK policy.”  Moreover, the CIA 
argued the Chinese would not intervene overtly in Korea because it was not in 
their interest to fight the UNC.60  This assessment ignored another CIA report 
from September 1, 1950, warning that the “stage has been set for some form of 
Chinese Communist intervention or participation in the Korean War.”  The report 
was uncertain if the Chinese intervention would be overt or covert, but it was 
confident “some form of armed [Chinese] assistance to the North Koreans 
appears imminent.”61   
When the Chinese warning to intervene in Korea was ignored by the 
UNC as the South Koreans attacked north on October 2, 1950, Mao decided to 
justify the intervention with the cry, “Resist America and aid Korea; defend our 
nation and guard our homeland.”  It linked China’s national interest with the 
Korean War.62  According to Jonathan Spence, Mao also used the rallying cry to 
launch a domestic propaganda campaign to consolidate his power in China by 
targeting “counterrevolutionaries and foreign spies.”  More importantly, Spence 
characterized Mao “as instigator and manipulator of the war on Korean soil” and 
argued he was doing the same thing in China.63  In other words, similar to Stalin, 
Mao was not simply being manipulated by Kim to intervene in Korea.  He 
viewed it as an opportunity to regain China’s influence in Korea as well as a 
means to justify his consolidation of power, despite China’s relative weakness 
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after WW II.  That said, Mao was still taking a risk and he would not have done 
so without Kim’s attempt to seize the opportunity to reunify Korea.  Mao was 
now committed to fighting the Americans and issued the order to “enter Korea 
immediately” on October 8, and chose Peng Duhuai as his commander.64   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River on 
October 14, 1950.  The intervention occurred a week earlier than planned 
because of the speed of the American advance into North Korea.  The first 
phase of the intervention would consist of three reinforced Chinese field armies 
from the 13th Army Group (about 40,000 men) tasked to fight the 8th U.S. Army.  
Subsequently, more Chinese field armies crossed the Yalu, and by the first 
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Figure 5.1. Resist U.S. and Support Korea to Save Neighbors and Ourselves, 
Chinese People Defending World Peace and Against U.S. Aggression 
Association, East China General Branch, 1951. 
https://www.liveauctioneers.com/item/16983672_resist-us-and-support-korea-
to-save-neighbors-and   
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week of November there would be 380,000 Chinese troops in Korea.  When the 
North Koreans abandoned their capital by mid-October,65 the Chinese were 
responsible for defending North Korea.  However, Kim wanted to save face by 
exercising sovereignty with the “illusion of command,” and the two sides agreed 
to finalize operational orders jointly but the final decision authority for all military 
operations belonged to General Peng, the Chinese commander.  With that 
settled, the CPV was ready to engage the UNC by the end of October.66   
The Chinese launched their attack on the UNC on November 1, 1950, 
and surprised MacArthur in Japan.  The belated Chinese intervention did not 
make sense to the Americans because, in their view, the Chinese had the 
perfect opportunity to end the war at the Pusan Perimeter and chose not to 
intervene.  They also assumed the Chinese feared U.S. air power that could 
easily destroy their massive but poorly trained armies.67  Even when U.S. aerial 
reconnaissance reported large numbers of enemy troops “all over the 
countryside,” the U.S. ignored the evidence.68  MacArthur seemed unfazed and 
anticipated “the greatest slaughter in the history of mankind.”  Some speculated 
that the reason the U.S. IC failed to forecast the Chinese intervention was 
MacArthur’s domination of “the flow of intelligence,”69 but success at Inchon and 
Truman’s own desire to roll back Communism probably played a role in the 
failure as well.   
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Map 5.1: The general movement of forces during the Korean War 
http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/7707/2101/1600/KoreanWarMap.0.jpg  
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As shown in Map 5.1 above, when the UNC advanced to its northern 
most point, MacArthur realized he was wrong and confirmed the Chinese had 
entered the war by November 6, 1950.  He claimed the UNC was facing 
“imminent defeat,” and when the U.S. Joint Chiefs pushed back he admitted the 
Chinese “of unknown strength” were slowing his advance in the east and 
attacking in the west.  It was possible that the Chinese would force him to 
retreat, but by November 9 MacArthur argued he could interdict Chinese 
reinforcements by stopping them with his air force as they crossed the Yalu.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese stopped their attacks on November 6, hoping their 
limited attack would deter further UNC movement north by demonstrating they 
had committed in strength.  However, the UNC launched another amphibious 
landing with the U.S. Army’s X Corps and, as a consequence, the Chinese 
committed 120,000 men against X Corps and another 180,000 men to attack 
the 8th U.S. Army.70  By late November, six Chinese field armies were fighting 
with units of the 8th U.S. Army, and they would stop its northern advance, 
destroy the South Korean II Corps, and attempt to seal allied escape routes to 
the south.71  During these battles, Mao’s oldest son, Mao Anying, was killed by 
U.S. Air Force bombing on November 24, 1950.  Mao left him in Korea “as an 
example of duty to the Chinese people.”72  He was a true volunteer and became 
a symbol of the Chinese commitment to North Korea as they attacked both X 
Corps in the east and 8th U.S. Army in the northwest.73  
As the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Communists, Truman warned 
during a news conference on November 30, 1950, that the U.S. “might use any 
weapon in its arsenal to hold back the Chinese.”  According to Cumings, the 
threat by Truman to use nuclear weapons showed why Stalin had been willing 
to abandon North Korea due to his fear of a global war, but Mao was ready to 
fight, albeit for a draw at the 38th parallel.74  However, Cumings seems to be 
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wrong about Mao.  Mao appeared undaunted by Truman’s threats and he was 
prepared to risk it all for a complete victory in Korea.75  In fact, Mao “had already 
declared the atomic bomb a paper tiger.”76  As the Chinese kept up the 
pressure, the UNC was prepared to evacuate Pyongyang on December 5.77    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Chinese and the North Koreans arrived in Pyongyang, and the newly 
confident Chinese would not settle for the status quo, and their hubris aimed to 
drive the UNC off the Peninsula.78  As the Communists regained the initiative in 
Korea, Cumings argued that MacArthur requested delegation of authority to use 
nuclear weapons on December 9, 1950.  He also provided a list of potential 
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Figure 5.2. Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, 
places a wreath at the tomb of Mao Anying on October 24, 2010, during the 60th 
anniversary of the CPV entry into the Korean War. 
http://www.network54.com/Forum/257194/thread/1288036777/last-
1288182634/60th%20anniversary%20for%20China%20entered%20Korean%20War 
 
 
 
166 
 
targets that required 26 nuclear bombs, and intended to drop four of them on 
the Chinese and four more bombs to eliminate “critical concentrations of enemy 
air power.”79  Despite the nuclear threat, Mao was hoping to win the war within 
six weeks, but General Peng was concerned about the CPV’s supply lines since 
they would have to make the long march toward Pusan.80  As the Chinese 
launched their attack on New Year’s Eve, the U.S. Air Force flew about 500 
sorties a day against the CPV in January 1951, bombing Pyongyang with 63 B-
29s on January 3 and following with another strike on the city with 60 B-29s on 
January 5.  The Chinese were undeterred and recaptured Seoul on January 4, 
but Peng stopped the advance at the 37th parallel on January 7.  Peng was 
cautious during the advance but Kim wanted to press the attack to achieve total 
victory.81  Peng was worried about pursuing a mechanized enemy with his 
peasant army and anticipated a difficult and protracted campaign.82   
President Truman vowed to continue the fight against the Communists; 
however, Secretary of Defense George Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) “were inclined toward US withdrawal and deployment of forces to Japan, 
where they expected the Soviet Union to attack.”  The JCS ordered MacArthur 
to withdraw to Japan if he felt the Chinese were capable of forcing the UNC 
from the Peninsula.  MacArthur offered to withdraw and defend Japan or 
conduct a limited attack against China proper with the Chinese Nationalists 
fighting in Korea and launching a separate attack on China.  The JCS rejected 
the idea on January 9, and the UN sought to end the war fearing a global war 
that might include the use of nuclear weapons.  Stalin proposed a truce with 
Mao on January 11, but Mao wanted to win the war.83  Peng, however, did not 
share Mao’s optimism.  He proposed two months of rest before the advance, 
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but informed Mao that Pak Hon-yong wanted to press the attack.  He finally 
convinced Pak they should advance with caution.84 
When the UNC counterattacked from Osan to Suwon (south of Seoul) in 
late January 1951, it caught the Communists by surprise.  It prompted Peng to 
contact Mao and call for a truce by suggesting that if they continued the fight 
their plans to equip and train the Chinese forces would be ruined.  Mao ignored 
Peng and ordered him to launch a counterattack.  Stalin acquiesced but some 
Chinese generals believed this was unrealistic.85  Peng followed orders and, 
despite the lack of supplies, he prepared to counterattack on February 11, 1951.  
At this point, Peng reported to Mao that “Kim Il-sung had come to his senses” 
and no longer expected easy victories.  When the Communist attack occurred, 
the UNC held and conducted a counterattack, forcing them to pull back.  Peng 
returned to Beijing for a meeting with Mao and convinced him to cease the 
offensive.  Consequently, the Chinese devised a troop rotational system for 
Korea with Kim’s approval.  As the UNC continued its offensive, the 
Communists withdrew from Seoul, established their defenses north of the 38th 
parallel, and halted their offensive on April 21, 1951.86  When MacArthur 
threatened to expand the war into China in March 1951 and encouraged Taiwan 
to open a second front in early April, Truman relieved him on April 11, 1951, 
and called for a negotiated settlement.87     
 
5.3.5 U.S. Achieves Moral Victory at the Negotiating Table 
On July 10, 1951, the two sides met in Kaesong to discuss the agenda 
for the armistice talks, but it took about two weeks before the Communists were 
ready to begin serious negotiations by proposing to establish the DMZ along the 
38th parallel.88  Kim and Mao had discussed this issue before and Kim viewed 
accepting the current battle line as “a serious political blow” and loss of “great 
                                            
84
 Haruki, The Korean War, pp. 162-163. 
85
 Haruki, The Korean War, pp. 162-165. 
86
 Haruki, The Korean War, pp. 166-167. 
87
 Haruki, The Korean War, pp. 169-170. 
88
 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Center of Military History, United States 
Army (Washington DC, 1992), pp. 35-40. 
168 
 
economic and strategic value.”  Kim claimed he would rather “continue the war 
without Chinese aid than to make such a concession.”89  Apparently Mao won 
the debate, and on November 27, 1951, the demarcation line along the current 
battle line was finally drawn on the map.90  There were other issues that were 
ultimately resolved (withdrawal of foreign troops91 and mechanism to oversee 
the armistice agreement) but the POW repatriation issue became the main 
sticking point for both sides.92 
 The Communists refused to accept the UNC condition for the POW 
exchanges.93  The UNC offered to return only 70,000 of the Communist POWs 
in exchange for 12,000 of its own troops, while the Communists claimed the 
UNC held 116,000 of its troops in the South.  In other words, the UNC was 
unwilling to forcibly return about 46,000 Communist POWs.  The Communists 
found this unacceptable, and cited “article 118 of the 1949 convention on 
prisoners of war.”  The relevant part of the article stated, “Prisoners of war shall 
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active 
hostilities.”94  This issue was difficult to resolve and the fighting resumed along 
the front line, but the casualty rates began to decline.95   
The talks resumed in May 1952 to resolve the issue of non-forcible return 
of POWs, but the Communists demanded the return of roughly 110,000 
prisoners.  The UNC identified only 83,000 Communist prisoners who were 
willing to return and, as expected, the talks dragged on, reaching another 
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impasse on August 3, 1952.96  The two sides met again on September 28, and 
the UNC made its final pitch to return those desiring repatriation and releasing 
others who did not want to be returned to their home country.  It then gave the 
Communists ten days to review the offer, and when they met again on October 
8 the offer was rejected.  The UNC negotiators warned they would not return 
until the Communists accepted the UNC proposals or offered their own 
alternative.  In short, the UNC was done talking but faced the difficult task of 
exerting the right amount of military pressure to “induce” concessions without 
risking the resumption of war.97 
 As the UNC walked away from the talks, the Communists responded to 
UNC pressure with “political and psychological warfare.”98  On November 30, 
1952, the Communists accused the UNC of killing 542 of its prisoners during 
the months of October and November, and wounding 32 of its troops at Koje 
Island in late November.99  According to Peter Beinart, after visiting with troops 
in Korea in late November 1952, Dwight Eisenhower concluded, “Militarily, 
unification was a pipe dream.”  He decided to accelerate the negotiating 
process by threatening the Communists that he was willing to “expand the war, 
and perhaps even use nuclear weapons.”100  The threat of escalation did not 
seem to achieve the desired effect.  The situation worsened when South 
Korean soldiers attempted to break up unauthorized military drills on Pongam 
Island.  As the melee ensued, the South Korean troops killed 85 prisoners and 
wounded 115 others.  The UNC appeared to be on the defensive regarding the 
POW issue but Eisenhower was sworn in as President on January 20, 1953, 
and softened his line by announcing he would remove the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
from the Taiwan Straits on February 2, 1953.101 
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 As the Eisenhower administration mulled over the POW issue, a major 
breakthrough came after the sudden death of Stalin on March 5, 1953.  The 
new Soviet government led by Georgi Malenkov disclosed its willingness to 
release nine British diplomats and missionaries held captive since the beginning 
of the war.  On March 28, the Communists accepted the UNC offer to exchange 
sick and wounded POWs.  This was followed on March 30 by Zhou’s statement 
that both sides “should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation 
of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon 
repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state 
so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.”102  After 18 
months at the negotiating table, the UNC had finally won “the principle of no 
forcible repatriation” from the Communists.  This battle to protect Communist 
defectors had been costly for the soldiers of the UNC, but the U.S. had “kept 
faith with the non-repatriate prisoners and won a psychological victory.”  The 
Communists had done all they could to discredit the UNC handling of its POWs 
by inciting riots and rebellions at the UNC camps, but the precedence set in 
Korea to allow prisoners to decide their future status became an integral part of 
international law.103   
The moral victory was costly for the UNC, whose casualties from when 
the negotiations started in July 1951 to November of that year, reached almost 
60,000 men, including 22,000 U.S. soldiers.  This was a huge sacrifice since, 
from the start of the war until the UNC march toward the Yalu River, the U.S. 
lost fewer than 28,000 men.  The Communists suffered much greater losses 
during the four-month period after the armistice began with approximately 
234,000 killed.104  The South Korean government’s sense of insecurity would 
pose the final challenge for the UNC as it prepared to take the final steps 
toward an armistice with the Communists.  On April 5, Rhee called for his 
soldiers to “drive to the Yalu [River] rather than a truce along the present lines.”  
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Next, Rhee threatened Eisenhower that if the UNC allowed the Chinese to 
remain in Korea he would withdraw his forces from the UNC and seek 
unification alone.  Eisenhower informed Rhee that the UN supported peaceful 
reunification of Korea, but it could not support reunification by force and urged 
him “not to attempt to block the armistice.”105           
 As the U.S. continued to engage with Rhee, it sensed that his aim was to 
bargain for “a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his 
people feel he is to have a voice in the armistice negotiations.”106  Rhee finally 
took decisive action on June 18 by unilaterally releasing 25,000 North Korean 
POWs who refused to return to the North.  The day before, the UNC POW 
camps held more than 35,000 nonrepatriate North Koreans but, after the 
release, the camps held only about 8,600 POWs.  The UNC immediately 
informed the Communists but they accused the UNC of colluding with Rhee.  
Nonetheless, the Communists signaled their willingness to end the fighting.  
Rhee finally agreed to support the armistice, but refused to be a signatory to it 
since that would acknowledge the division of Korea.107  On July 21, the UNC 
announced it was ready to deliver 69,000 Korean and 5,000 Chinese POWs, 
but it would free 14,500 Chinese and 7,800 North Koreans.  The Communists 
delivered a total of 12,764 UNC troops, including 3,313 Americans and 8,186 
Koreans.  The two sides signed the armistice on July 27, 1953.108  In sum, Kim 
was recognized for his uncanny ability to manipulate the interests of the Great 
Powers in the communist world to achieve his own ends, but he failed to 
achieve reunification during the war.  The question is what does the application 
of smart power theory tell us about Kim and his efforts during the Korean War? 
 
5.3.6 Smart Power and Beginning of the War of Reunification 
 First, what were Kim’s desired outcomes and did he achieve them?  It is 
clear Kim’s aim was to reunify the country but his strategy ultimately failed 
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because he did not plan for a U.S.-led international military intervention, 
miscalculated the potential for a popular rebellion in the South, and failed to 
follow up on Chinese warnings of a U.S. amphibious landing at Inchon.  After 
occupying Seoul, Kim was hoping for a South Korean revolution that never 
came and his forces failed to defeat the UNC at Pusan.  Another factor was the 
U.S. intensification of its air power to force culmination.  The Inchon landing 
may have been anticipated, but Kim lacked the resources simultaneously to 
defend it and continue the fight at Pusan.  He probably chose to continue the 
attack at Pusan because he was so close to achieving his dream of reunification 
and there was no certainty of a successful landing at Inchon.  Admittedly, it was 
a bold and risky move by MacArthur.  Kim settled for the armistice when the 
Chinese failed to reunify the country because the cost to achieve it through 
force was too high.  By the early 1960s, inciting a Southern revolution became a 
major pillar of Kim’s post-Korean War strategy to reunify the country.   
Second, which forms of power behavior did Kim believe was most likely 
to succeed?  When peaceful efforts to reunify the country failed after liberation, 
Kim believed the only way to achieve it was with armed force.  However, when 
he and the Chinese failed to achieve this aim, Kim focused on setting the 
conditions for consolidating his power in the midst of war as we have also seen 
in Chapter 4.  Kim also attempted to use coercive military diplomacy at the 
negotiating table but, when the U.S. demonstrated its will to uphold the POW 
issue on ethical grounds, Kim and Mao acquiesced.  The U.S. sacrificed 22,000 
of its own men to win a moral victory at Panmunjom.   
Third, what resources were available to Kim?  By June 1950, Kim used 
his “extraordinary ability” to persuade Mao and Stalin to support his war with 
large number of troops and equipment, respectively.  While the U.S. believed 
the KPA and the South Korean Army were roughly equal in strength, it 
overlooked the fact that many in the KPA had been battle-tested before the war 
and the KPA also possessed significant military capabilities.  It had over 210 
fighter aircraft, close to 200 tanks, and 180 self-propelled artillery guns.  
Although the powerful partisan units in South Korea never materialized after the 
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invasion, Kim appeared to be convinced that this revolutionary potential 
remained for him to exploit later in the war (and beyond).  However, when the 
KPA was forced to retreat after Inchon, Kim effectively lost sovereignty over the 
use of force to the Chinese in late 1950 and attempted to regain it from them as 
they negotiated with the UNC at the negotiating table at Panmunjom.   
Fourth, how did Kim view the likelihood of success for the invasion?  Kim 
was convinced he could successfully achieve reunification within a month, but 
he underestimated the historical legacy of the Great Powers vying for control of 
the Peninsula.  The war came at a time when there was no single hegemonic 
power in the region and it was almost inevitable Kim’s efforts to bring all of 
Korea into the Communist camp would be contested by the U.S. and other 
traditional powers in the region.  In the end, the major powers and the two 
Koreas had to settle for a divided Korea.     
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of the key actors?  Kim launched 
the invasion by finally convincing Stalin to support his war of liberation despite 
the risk of global war.  Simultaneously, Kim also convinced Mao to guarantee 
his survival in case he failed to achieve unification on his own.  Despite China’s 
relative weakness and desire to regain Taiwan, Mao justified the war as a 
defensive war to protect the homeland and also used it to consolidate his power.  
On the other hand, the Americans failed to understand how a minor actor like 
Kim could influence the likes of Stalin and Mao, but responded quickly to the 
North Korean invasion to restore the status quo.  After the success at Inchon, 
however, the U.S. tried to dominate the entire Peninsula by rolling back 
Communism.  This was an overreach that the Chinese could not accept, but 
Mao would also seek to do the same by pressing for an offensive to defeat the 
imperialists in Korea.  The U.S. would threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
the Communists, but the Great Powers settled for denying any of the others 
total domination over Korea.  Since the signing of the armistice, despite a wide 
range of provocations on the Korean Peninsula, the bitter memories of the 
Korean War have kept the Great Powers and the two Koreas from resuming a 
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full-scale war.109  Most importantly from the North Korean perspective, it formed 
a special relationship between China and North Korea that arguably remains a 
“durable friendship.”110  Next, before I examine the so-called Second Korean 
War of the 1960s, I consider the influence of the (first) Korean War on Kim Il-
sung’s nuclear ambition.  
 
5.4 The Origin of Kim’s Nuclear Ambition: The Korean War  
Natalya Bazhanova challenged the argument that Kim Il-sung began 
conceiving his nuclear ambitions before the late 1970s.  She claimed Kim did 
not pursue his nuclear weapons program as a survival tool until the late 1980s 
when he realized his conventional forces could not catch up to those in the 
South.  This is when Kim sought the cheapest and the most powerful deterrent 
– nuclear weapons.  She argued that by acquiring nuclear weapons Kim would 
“also check those who might attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of North 
Korea.”  They would also support the dynastic transition, distract the populace 
from their grievances, and enhance North Korea’s international prestige.  She 
concluded that the most important factor was to use the nuclear weapons to 
blackmail the U.S. to gain concessions and aid.111  I would argue that, if Kim 
was pursuing nuclear weapons for the cheapest deterrent and to secure 
independence, why wait until the late 1980s?  If that was the case, he should 
have started when his economy began to decline in the early 1970s.  The same 
is true if he sought international prestige and attempted to bolster his domestic 
position – he should have pursued it sooner.   
It is more plausible that Kim (and Mao) realized their nuclear ambitions 
during the Korean War, when both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower (not just 
General MacArthur) made it clear they were willing to use nuclear weapons to 
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break the stalemate with the Communists.112  Since the horrible effects of the 
atomic bomb were well-known after its use in Japan,113 it provoked a legitimate 
nationalistic call for “violent resistance”114 against the U.S.  This probably led 
Kim115 to secure a nuclear assistance agreement with the Soviets in 1959.116  
The start-up cost for this program was $500 million dollars for the nuclear facility 
at Yongbyon, and over 300 North Korean scientists began training in the Soviet 
Union.117  This level of commitment suggests Kim probably harbored his 
ambition for nuclear weapons soon after the Korean War.  Kim’s commitment to 
his nuclear program was validated after Park’s coup in South Korea on May 16, 
1961.  Park adopted a staunchly anti-Communist position and Kim’s dream of 
peaceful reunification after the fall of Syngman Rhee looked farfetched.118  
Moreover, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 could also have reinforced his 
desire to acquire a nuclear weapon when he realized the Soviets could no 
longer be trusted to provide their extended nuclear deterrence.119  In fact, Kim 
was preparing for nuclear war by December 1962.120  These developments 
convinced Kim to intensify his “efforts to achieve self-reliance in national 
defense… [and] called for simultaneous development of heavy industry and 
defense capabilities.”121  According to the Soviets, the North Koreans 
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approached the East Germans in August 1963 trying to “obtain any kind of 
information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry.”122   
The Soviets claimed that by 1966 North Korea had finally moved away 
from military tactics and doctrine based on the Manchurian guerrilla experience 
and the Korean War, and had begun to study Soviet doctrine, to include 
“missiles and nuclear weapons, under the circumstances of both offensive and 
defensive struggles.”  The KPA was training for nuclear warfare in 1967.123  
Others argued that the tipping point for weaponizing its nuclear program was 
probably when Pyongyang discovered Seoul was pursuing its own nuclear 
option in the 1970s.124  In July 1975, the Hungarians claimed that when Kim 
visited Beijing in April “the possibility of giving certain tactical nuclear weapons 
[to North Korea] in order to offset the [U.S.] nuclear forces in South Korea came 
into consideration.”125  According to the Hungarians, by February 1976 the 
North Koreans were claiming they possessed “nuclear warheads and carrier 
missiles, which are targeted on the big cities of South Korea and Japan.”  They 
also claimed they produced them by themselves.  Although the Hungarians 
recognized Pyongyang was attempting to catch up with Seoul (it built its first 
nuclear plant in 1978), they assessed its “hidden intention” was to acquire 
nuclear weapons.  This was understandable since The Washington Post was 
claiming “South Korea already possesses the technological documentation 
needed for the independent production of nuclear weapons.”126  In sum, 
evidence indicates Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was highly rational and 
was likely conceptualized during the crucible of the Korean War, and 
subsequent developments reaffirmed his commitment to acquire them.   
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5.5 The Second Korean War and the Resumption of Provocations 
Since the end of the Korean War, there were only two provocations127  
before they began to intensify in the late 1960s.  The fact that Kim chose not to 
be confrontational after the Korean War was rational since his priority was to 
rebuild the country, and many observers seemed to agree the North Korean 
economy was on a growth trajectory as it entered the 1960s.  According to Shin 
Jong-dae and others, the North Koreans believed the opportunity to reunify the 
country came after the popular overthrow of the Syngman Rhee regime on April 
19, 1960.  The North Korean leadership viewed this event in the South “as the 
first victory in the anti-American struggle in South Korea.”  They also believed 
Pyongyang had progressed far ahead of Seoul and that contributed to the April 
Revolution in South Korea.128  As discussed in Chapter 2, in August 1960, Kim 
made a radical proposal to reunify the country because he was convinced what 
he had created in the North would be attractive to many South Koreans.  He 
even proposed to downsize the KPA to 100,000 or even less if the U.S. was 
willing to withdraw its troops from Korea.129  In short, what Kim desired was 
stability on the Peninsula to “unite the country under his leadership.”130    
Nevertheless, Mitchell Lerner argued that when the North Korean 
economy displayed “obvious signs of collapse” by the mid-1960s, Kim had 
reasons to be worried about regime stability.131  According to Lerner, these 
failures threatened the fabric of North Korean society which “evaluated 
everything from within a construct that demanded economic stability and 
independence,” and led to visible deterioration of morale within North Korean 
society.  This eventually manifested in challenges to Kim’s authority, and 
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growing factionalism led to recurrence of purges in the mid-1960s of senior 
officials, such as former Minister of Foreign Trade Li Il-gyeon, former vice 
Chairman of the Party Central Committee Kim Chang-man, and the subsequent 
rise of “professional military men and other conservative reformers.”  In the end, 
Kim did not even spare the “more militant group” within the KPA.132 
As we have shown in Chapter 4, it was not so “obvious” that the North 
Korean economy was collapsing by the mid-1960s, but there was little doubt 
that Pyongyang was intensifying its military activities against the South at this 
time.  While Kim appeared to have adopted a policy of coexistence up until the 
early 1960s, he unleashed the KPA along the DMZ as military incidents nearly 
quadrupled “from 150 in 1966 to 566 in 1967.”133  Other sources cite only 80 
incidents in 1966 but they jumped significantly to “784 in 1967 and 985 in 
1968.”134  As North Korea’s provocations intensified, South Korea retaliated by 
conducting their own covert raids across the DMZ and one of them on October 
26, 1966, reportedly resulted in about 30 North Korean casualties.135   
South Korean attacks across the DMZ were a problem for the U.S.-South 
Korea Alliance because these raids were conducted without General Charles 
Bonesteel III, Commander UNC’s approval.136  By November 1966, General 
Bonesteel and the U.S. ambassador warned Seoul against cross border attacks, 
but they were aware South Koreans would continue their covert action if the 
KPA persisted in inflicting heavy losses on the South Koreans.137  As 
anticipated, South Korea continued to conduct unilateral covert attacks against 
the North with 2,400 special purpose troops under direct control of the Minister 
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of Defense.138  On November 8, 1966, the CIA speculated that the rise in North 
Korean provocations was a warning to the U.S. and South Korea not to deploy 
additional troops to Vietnam to demonstrate Pyongyang’s support to Hanoi.  
However, it ruled out the possibility that Pyongyang intended “to open a ‘second 
front’ in the Vietnam War.”139  The increased intensity of conflict resulting from 
North Korea’s provocations gained international attention in 1968.   
 
5.5.1 North Korea’s Failed Raid on the Blue House 
Thirty-one North Korean commandos infiltrated through the DMZ on 
January 17, 1968, to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee.  It 
took them four days to get to the Presidential residence (Blue House) but an 
alert policeman spotted them before they could launch the assault and almost 
ten South Koreans and five North Korean soldiers were killed during the firefight.  
Only one assassin managed to elude the South Koreans after the firefight but 
they demanded retribution.140  The interesting part of this case is that their 
mission might have succeeded had the commandos chosen to kill the four 
woodcutters who ran into them during their infiltration phase.  Yet, they let them 
go unharmed and they promptly informed the police.141    
According to Sheila Miyoshi Jager, after the failed raid on the Blue House 
it should have been clear to Kim that the people in the South were not “waiting 
for him to liberate them.”  For instance, on January 30, 1968, 100,000 South 
Korean students took to the streets to protest against Pyongyang.  As Kim 
observed this unfold, he claimed he was “mortified” at the outcome and blamed 
the attack on the South Korean partisans.142  In reality, Kim was not deterred by 
the anti-North Korean protests because he was probably convinced some 
groups in South Korea still had revolutionary potential.  As discussed further 
below, Kim may have attempted to start an insurgency in the Ulchin-Samchok 
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area in the fall of 1968 by sending 120 of his special troops143 because he was 
aware of the revolutionary potential in the area.  Kim may have been influenced 
by his experience during the Korean War when he sent approximately 1,600 of 
his partisans to the area during the first days of the War and “they occupied the 
Ulchin city offices and many nearby areas.”144  Kim had taken the first 
preparatory step to subvert Park’s regime by establishing the Revolutionary 
Party for Unification to aid the Communist front organizations in 1964.145  The 
intensity of Kim’s efforts to expand his influence in the South was evident when 
the South Koreans captured “2,462 North Korean agents, informants, and 
collaborators” in 1968.”146   
According to Jager, this attempt to accelerate the liberation of the South 
by motivating its pro-North Korean revolutionaries failed miserably.147  In fact, 
about two million South Koreans volunteered for the local militia (i.e., Homeland 
Reserve Defense Force (HRDF)) when Park called to enhance his defense 
posture.  The U.S. feared Park might retaliate and did all it could to restrain him 
from attacking the North.148  The Soviets also feared after the failed 
assassination attempt that Kim was provoking a war with the U.S. by seizing the 
Pueblo.  On January 31, Kim reminded the Soviets that “in case of the creation 
of a state of war in Korea as a result of a military attack by the American 
imperialists, the Soviet government and the fraternal Soviet people will fight 
together with us against the aggressors.”  Jager viewed this as an effort by Kim 
to “co-opt” the Soviets into another Korean War; however, by February, Leonid 
Brezhnev informed Kim he would not support another war and reminded him 
that their treaty was one of “a defensive character.”149  Yet, evidence below 
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suggests Kim did not intend to start another Korean War despite the moniker of 
these provocations being a Second Korean War.  Kim intended to use limited 
force to spark a revolution in South Korea to achieve reunification.  
 
5.5.2 Seizure of the Pueblo and Weakening of the Alliance? 
The U.S. faced its own security dilemma on January 23, 1968, when the 
North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo, a U.S. spy ship collecting intelligence 
off the eastern coast of North Korea (i.e., violation of its sovereignty)150 with 83 
officers and men on board, to include two civilian technicians.151  Although the 
crew of the Pueblo declared it was in international waters,152 the North Koreans 
“with a limited number of naval and air assets,”153 fired on the ship, resulting in 
one American killed and several others wounded.  The ship was boarded and 
taken to Wonsan Harbor; its crew was held hostage for almost a year and 
suffered repeated “torture, abuse, and public humiliation.”  Many Americans 
were infuriated with Pyongyang and some in the U.S. called for attacking North 
Korean warships, capturing its merchant ships,154 and blockading and 
conducting air strikes on Wonsan.  Still others considered encouraging the 
South Korean seizure of a Soviet spy ship.  U.S. frustration with Pyongyang did 
not end there as some Americans wrote to the White House calling for dropping 
“the hydrogen bomb” to “end it [North Korea].”155    
Senator Mendell Rivers from South Carolina also demanded the use of a 
nuclear weapon to completely destroy a target in North Korea, and even the 
cerebral U.S. Commander in Korea, General Bonesteel, reacted emotionally by 
issuing “a blunt nuclear ultimatum against Kim Il-sung: release the Pueblo or 
else.”  While things appeared to spiral out of control on the Peninsula, the U.S. 
faced significant setbacks in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive in late January 
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1968 as North Vietnam threatened key cities in South Vietnam and the U.S. 
Embassy.  President Lyndon Johnson assumed the capture of the Pueblo and 
the Tet Offensive were part of the Communists’ grand strategy, but seemed to 
have forgotten Park was almost assassinated.156   
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Without consulting Park, Johnson ordered Bonesteel to negotiate directly 
with the KPA at Panmunjom to secure the release of the crew of the Pueblo.  At 
the same time, Johnson felt obliged to deploy about 600 combat aircraft from 
six aircraft carriers and several U.S. Air Force units along with about 35 U.S. 
warships.  He eventually called up almost 15,000 Air Force and Naval reservists 
and deployed roughly 3,000 airmen to South Korea.  However, while the Air 
Force remained committed to this show of force in Korea for sixteen months, 
the Navy remained fixated on the Vietnam War and considered this effort in 
Korea as a waste of time.  Consequently, Johnson decided to de-escalate the 
situation by negotiating with Kim while using the show of force demonstration to 
deter, at least temporarily, North Korean provocations157 and to buy time to 
address Seoul’s allegation of U.S. appeasement.158        
President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance to Seoul on February 10, 1968, to 
stabilize the situation.  Soon after his arrival, Vance met with senior South 
Korean Army officers and quickly suspected they were ready to take revenge 
for the attacks on the Blue House and the Pueblo, and assumed Vance’s visit 
signaled tacit U.S. approval for “the great march north.”  The next day, he met 
with President Park and made it clear the U.S. wanted to avoid war in Korea, 
saying no “cross-border reprisals [could occur] without President Johnson’s 
approval.”  In fact, unless the North Koreans launched an all-out invasion, the 
U.S. would not support cross-border attacks from the South.  Vance then 
informed Park that Washington would resolve the Pueblo incident through 
negotiations with Pyongyang, and softened the blow by promising $100 million 
in military aid if Park pledged not to attack the North.159  Park weighed the offer 
for four long days and realized he could not start a war without U.S. backing, 
deciding to make the best of a bad situation by taking the U.S. offer.160    
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Although Michishita argued Washington and Seoul “disagreed over how 
to react to North Korean actions,”161 the South Koreans were fortunate that 
General Bonesteel worked closely with them to improve the combat readiness 
of the UNC by taking advantage of the crises to persuade Washington to send 
$230 million to the UNC.  He used the money to build a chain-link fence all 
along the DMZ as well as acquiring other counter-infiltration barriers and 
equipment to detect and neutralize North Korea’s unconventional threat.  The 
UNC also received six UH-1D helicopters to transport a quick-reaction force just 
in case some of the infiltrators made it across the DMZ or were inserted by sea.  
These measures on land were effective, but it was trickier to defend the sea 
infiltration routes.  However, the creation of the HDRF along with the South 
Korean Army’s civic-action program successfully promoted counter espionage 
operations.  According to Bolger, “the new UNC tactics worked,” and in 1968 
the North Koreans sustained “almost twice as many losses as in 1967.”162   
In light of these developments, the U.S. offer may have been a godsend 
for Park, since by demonstrating restraint to the U.S., he reaped even more 
benefits than “the so-called Vietnam War bonanza.”  That was a significant 
achievement since South Korea earned a billion dollars, obtained much-needed 
military aid and favorable loans, and received trade concessions from the U.S. 
for deploying about 320,000 troops to Vietnam from September 1964 to March 
1973.  More importantly, the U.S. suspended its criticism of Park’s government 
for its authoritarian actions and instead “began to praise his ruling capabilities.”  
Thus, the U.S. stopped meddling in South Korea’s domestic politics, and Park 
consolidated his power and became a true authoritarian dictator.163  In short, 
Park fared well despite initial tensions with the U.S. after the Blue House 
incident, but Bolger argued that North Korea “gained nothing by its ambitious, 
unconventional campaign.”164  Consequently, is it true that Kim gained nothing 
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from the Second Korean War? Why did he engage in the Second Korean War 
in the first place?   
 
5.5.3 Considering Diversionary Theory for the Second Korean War 
Mitchell Lerner argued it was more likely that Kim started the Second 
Korean War to find a scapegoat for the failures of Juche within the realm of 
independent economy and politics by manufacturing an external crisis to 
preempt potential threats to his rule (i.e., diversionary theory).  In short, he 
argued that failure of the North Korean economy by the mid-1960s forced Kim 
to start the war – despite some evidence the North Korean economy was not 
collapsing at the time.165  In fact, it was only during the North-South Red Cross 
talks in the early 1970s that both Koreas finally realized that Seoul had caught 
up to Pyongyang economically as the two delegations visited each other’s 
capitals.166  What is puzzling is that Lerner admits that “by all accounts there 
was no real political danger to Kim’s rule.”167  In fact, Wallace’s study of 
diversionary theory admits that North Korea’s diplomacy and military actions 
during the 1960s indicated “arguments against the applicability of the 
diversionary hypothesis (which hinges on domestic distress).”168 
As a result, it is likely that Kim had no reason to apply diversionary theory 
to remain in power in 1968.  M. Taylor Fravel’s critique of diversionary theory 
also noted that even “weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range 
of policy options to strengthen their standing at home.”  They range from more 
authoritarian control (which Kim did employ when necessary), to economic 
development (still seen as a viable option in the 1960s), to expansion of foreign 
cooperation (which was also a viable option).  All of them appeared to be better 
than taking risks associated with the failure of diversionary use of force.169       
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Another alternative (and plausible) explanation is that Kim was looking for an 
opportunity to reunify the country “through unconventional war.”  Bolger argued 
the timing was right when the U.S. deployed its ground troops to Vietnam in 
March 1965.  It would only be a matter of months before Park would deploy 
46,000 of his own troops to Vietnam.  Kim probably viewed this as Park 
overreaching by exposing himself to a two-front war, and the fact that the U.S. 
was also consumed with Vietnam made Park even more vulnerable.170   
As noted briefly above, Kim deployed about 120 Special Forces troops to 
the east coast of South Korea near the villages of Ulchin and Samchok on 
October 30, 1968, with the mission to establish guerrilla bases in the South.  His 
troops made their way near Ulchin to educate and to mobilize the people for 
guerrilla warfare, but one of the South Korean villagers escaped and reported 
the situation to the police.  This led to the deployment of about 70,000 South 
Korean troops to kill or capture the North Koreans.  After a manhunt lasting a 
couple of weeks, South Koreans killed 110 and captured 7 of the North Korean 
guerrillas.171  The U.S. military at the time concluded that the guerrilla mission 
was a lost cause from the start since Pyongyang apparently did not understand 
the situation in the South.172  While that appears to be true, Kim’s experience 
since the pre-Korean War period may have misled him to believe he could still 
create “a liberated zone in the Samchok area” during the fall of 1968.173   
However, Michishita did not account for the partisan raid or seriously 
consider Kim’s desire for reunification as an aim of the Second Korean War.  He 
argued Kim’s aims were gaining international prestige as a “true revolutionary in 
the international revolutionary movement,” obstructing U.S. intelligence 
collection efforts, assisting the North Vietnamese by opening a second front in 
Korea, consolidating his power, and possibly driving a wedge in the U.S.-ROK 
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Alliance.”174  According to Shin Jong-Dae, the North Vietnamese believed Kim 
hyped the tensions along the DMZ in 1967 to elicit aid from the Communist bloc, 
and it was an attempt to regain favor with the Chinese by fighting the Americans.  
In other words, Kim did little to affect the Vietnam War but used it to his 
advantage in Korea.  The Chinese also agreed that the rise in tensions was 
“directed at the normalization of relations with China.”  Similarly, the Romanians 
observed Sino-North Korea relations improved after the Second Korean War.175 
According to Paul French, China began to improve relations with North 
Korea in April 1969, and Zhou Enlai personally made the trip to Pyongyang in 
1970.176  East Germans reported on March 3, 1968, that Zhou had already 
written to Kim to inform him “that [anti-North Korea] positions of the Mao Red 
Guards are not identical with those of the PRC,” and expressed China’s 
“willingness to send volunteers to Korea.”  By January 29, 1968, small Chinese 
delegations had arrived to provide military assistance.177  On April 23, 1968, 
Kim met with a senior East German delegation, discussed the situation in China, 
and explained that “more than one million hostile troops are facing us directly.  
Therefore we don’t want ourselves to end the alliance with China since it would 
mean we will have enemies also in our back.”178  Kim could not afford to open 
another front as he faced the U.S. and South Korea after the provocations in 
January 1968.  Sergey Radchenko concurred that this was an attempt by Kim to 
attract aid and support from the socialist camp.  Kim milked the Soviet cow to 
survive by portraying North Korea as “the state that stood on the frontline of the 
struggle against American imperialism.”  Radchenko argued that “Soviet 
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support translated over the years into more subsidies for unpredictable and 
unreliable North Korea” because of Soviet “strategic concerns and ideological 
commitments” to Pyongyang.  That said, Radchenko admitted Soviet 
intelligence had indications that Kim might start another Korean War “with U.S 
forces bogged down in Vietnam,” and the Chinese were prepared to commit a 
million soldiers to Kim for another war.179                
 
5.5.4 The Second Korean War as a Battle of Succession? 
On the other hand, Lim Jae-cheon argued that the “Plan for the 
Liberation of South Korea and Unification” launched in January 1968 was 
envisioned by former Manchurian guerrillas Kim Chang-bong and Ho Pong-hak, 
the Minister of Defense and Director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, 
respectively.  They reportedly devised the plan to kill Park and capture the USS 
Pueblo on their own to oppose the rise to power as number two by Kim Il-sung’s 
younger brother in the mid-to-late 1960s.  It may have been a bold plan to exert 
control over the succession process.  These former guerrillas believed gaining a 
“political edge over Kim Young-ju after they succeeded in implementing the plan” 
would be a fait accompli for Kim to seek an alternative to his brother.  Kim 
ultimately chose his son because his brother became seriously ill (but he lived 
well into the 1990s), and the two former guerrillas were purged for being 
“military bureaucrats.”  Afterward, Kim reportedly sent his political commissars 
down to the regimental level in the KPA to reign in the generals in April 1969.180   
When Kim Il-sung met South Korean representative Lee Hu-rak during 
the North-South Talks in May 1972, he apologized for the botched 
assassination attempt on January 21, 1968, and blamed it on “certain leftist 
forces within North Korea.”  According to Kim Da-sool, the South Koreans were 
not convinced that the raid on the Blue House was instigated without Kim’s 
approval.  However, some suspected he would not have issued an apology 
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unless there was “certain conflict” among the leadership.  On the other hand, 
Lee Dong-bok was not convinced North Korea was “a divided house.”  As the 
inter-Korean talks began in the early 1970s, Kim exercised personal control of 
the Party, and it was unlikely “there was any room for any element in the military 
to hold that kind of a different view on South Korea.”181   
Bolger seems to agree with Lee Dong-bok by arguing that Kim purged 
the two generals and several other senior officers in charge of the 
Reconnaissance Bureau, KWP’s guerrilla operations, the KPA Navy, and 
several frontline corps in January 1969.  Kim reportedly executed Ho and Kim 
and one of the corps commanders, and imprisoned the rest because he was 
displeased with the outcome of the Second Korean War.  He blamed their lack 
of imagination for the guerrillas’ inability to win the hearts and minds of the 
South Korean farmers, which should have been resolved by including 
experienced KWP cadres in the mission.  North Korea had approximately 3,000 
“skilled operator-agitator[s]” who could have assisted in the training and 
recruitment of guerrillas.  Kim blamed them for failing to develop a strategy to 
mobilize an insurgency in the Taebaek Mountains.182  What Kim said about 
inciting South Koreans and the U.S. in February 1963 is quite telling: 
 
Don’t think that everything will be over when Pak Jung Hi [Park 
Chung-hee] is ousted.  The point is that the people [in the South] 
should be awakened.  All young people should be awakened, and, 
further, “ROK army” soldiers should be awakened.  They are now 
being awakened gradually.  We must help them to wake up 
quickly… The revolution in the southern half is also related in a 
large measure to the international situation.  A struggle against the 
U.S. scoundrels should take place everywhere in the world, 
driving them into blind alleys… Today the general international 
situation is favourable to our revolution.183 
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Kim expected his partisans to awaken the people at Ulchin but they failed 
and he was preparing for the right moment to strike the U.S.  As noted before, 
Bolger also believed the Second Korean conflict was a huge failure for Kim.  
The South Koreans supported their military, the changes that the commander of 
UNC had implemented since early 1968 paid off, and the South Korean military 
demonstrated that it was capable of dealing with “the best [soldiers] the north 
could offer.”  Bolger concluded these failures convinced Kim that his “dream of 
fomenting a serious anti-ROK insurrection” was over.184  Of course, Kim did not 
give up on this dream of reunification as shown later in the chapter.                                
 
5.5.5 Alternative Explanation for the Second Korean War 
I offer another explanation for the Second Korean War and the 
interpretation of its outcomes.  I agree with Bolger that Kim started the conflict 
because he finally saw an opportunity to finish what he started during the First 
Korean War,185 but this time he aimed to achieve reunification by 
unconventional means.  Even if Lim was correct about the succession 
controversy and Kim was telling the truth about the rogue leftist elements trying 
to kill Park without his knowledge, it does not explain why Kim continued to hold 
the crew of the Pueblo for almost a year and sought to develop a guerrilla base 
in the Ulchin-Samchok area in late 1968.  If Kim did not approve of the 
campaign, he would have issued an apology and ended it quickly after the failed 
attack on the Blue House.  While it is possible that the rogue generals may have 
challenged Kim’s selection of his brother as successor, it is also plausible that 
they were purged because Kim had delegated authority to them to execute the 
mission but they failed and Kim held them accountable.   
Richard Mobley also argued that part of the reason for the purge was the 
failure to incite a rebellion in the South but suggested these rogue generals 
were criticized severely by Kim for promoting the acquisition of high-tech 
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weapons that were completely unsuited for warfare in Korea.  However, 
Mobley’s argument that the purge meant “the decline of the partisan generals 
who fought with Kim Il-sung during World War II” lacks credibility.186  Although a 
new group of party elites was rising to dominate the party leadership by 1970, 
the second largest group in the party’s Central Committee remained Kim’s 
guerrilla faction. (see Table 4.1).  As a result, it is also plausible Kim may have 
approved the war but decided to purge only those responsible for the failures, 
and the purge may not have been related to the succession issue at all.  
Moreover, Bolger’s claim that Kim gained nothing from the Second Korean 
conflict also seems to ignore some positive outcomes for the regime.   
While the assassination attempt failed, the capture of the Pueblo was a 
propaganda boon for the North Koreans.  Initially many members of the Pueblo 
crew claimed they were shocked that Pyongyang failed to exploit the 
“staggering” intelligence value of the crew and the ship (this was incorrect).  
Lerner argued that was the case because the reason for the capture of the ship 
was “for domestic ideological purposes rather than as part of the Cold War.”  
Pyongyang’s aim was to coerce the crew to elicit confessions of espionage for 
propaganda purposes and thus largely ignored external matters such as the 
Cold War and Soviet influence.  Even the crew’s scripted apologies focused 
almost entirely on the domestic context by emphasizing the greatness of North 
Korea and Kim Il-sung.  According to Lerner, Pyongyang released more than 90 
press reports with over 300 words regarding the Pueblo incident while the crew 
was held in captivity, and over 50 of them emphasized the need to be vigilant 
against U.S. espionage.  These reports revealed that Pyongyang was insecure 
and isolated, but paradoxically it was also proud to hype Juche as a unique 
socialist system to achieve independence from outside interference.  Lerner 
concluded that the “gains of seizing the Pueblo were vast, as it provided the 
DPRK ruler with a wealth of Juche at a time when it was otherwise hard to 
achieve.”  Lerner agreed with Michishita that Kim arguably raised his status in 
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the international community to a level that was inconceivable before the incident 
by confronting the U.S.187  Mobley goes a step further by emphasizing that 
“North Korea’s one victory during the ‘second Korean war’ was in its handling of 
the Pueblo affair.”188     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite calls from many in South Korea and the U.S. for military action, 
President Johnson’s objective was to avoid escalation since he was mindful of 
the war in Vietnam.  Some in the U.S. Congress accused Johnson of failing to 
“stand up to North Korea and deplored the resulting loss of U.S. prestige.”  Kim 
held the crew in captivity for almost a year and agreed to release the crew only 
after securing a written apology, which Kim knew would be retracted by the U.S. 
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Figure 5.3. Cartoon of a KPA officer demanding a U.S. apology at Panmunjom, 
provided by Rose Bucher, the wife of the Captain of the USS Pueblo. 
http://www.usspueblo.org/Prisoners/images/NK%20Panmunjom%20cartoon.jpg 
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after the crew was released on December 23, 1968.  The U.S. was puzzled by 
this at the time but years later some realized Kim did not care about the U.S. 
recanting its apology because he had near monopoly control of the media and 
most North Koreans would be unaware.  Pyongyang kept the ship for its lasting 
propaganda value.  Even if this is all North Korea took away from the Pueblo, it 
challenges the argument that Kim gained nothing from these provocations.189    
Since 1967, however, John Walker, Jr., and his spy ring were working for 
the Soviets, and with the Pueblo’s cryptologic equipment they were able to 
“decrypt an estimated 1 million American messages.”  The Soviets likely knew 
much about U.S. plans related to the Vietnam War and informed the North 
Vietnamese.  As a result, it was not surprising that some U.S. commanders 
lamented it was almost as if “the Vietcong knew when we were coming and 
were waiting for us.”190  Moreover, a section from the National Security Agency 
(NSA) memorandum addressing the possibility that the Soviets may have 
“observed and/or tracked the USS Pueblo,” from July 28, 1969, was redacted in 
its entirety.191  This suggests there is a possibility that some evidence exists to 
implicate Soviet involvement as another NSA report suggested there was some 
evidence of Soviet jamming during the Pueblo incident.192  That said, there is 
recent evidence that the Soviets failed to provide significant intelligence to the 
Vietcong after the seizure of the Pueblo.   
According to Merle Pribbenow II, despite the speculation that the Walker 
spy ring allowed the Soviets to intercept U.S. communications, “there has never 
been any positive confirmation that the Soviets ever actually provided Soviet 
signals intelligence reports” to North Vietnam.193  However, the assessed 
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damage to U.S. signals intelligence from the loss of the Pueblo was significant.  
The NSA had initially indicated that “the possibility of compromise of U.S. 
[communications] traffic would have been negligible.”  It ignored the fact 
intelligence specialists from the crew “were extensively interrogated by special 
and apparently highly competent North Korean experts on cryptographic 
principles, operating procedures, and the relationship of keying materials.”194  
According to Jack Cheevers, one of the experts directing the interrogation was 
a KPA colonel who spoke fluent Russian and focused on members of the crew 
specializing in the intercept of Soviet signals.195  The North Koreans seem to 
know the significance of the materials and, assuming they passed all the 
equipment and manuals to the Soviets, the Soviets probably penetrated “the 
U.S. cryptographic establishment.”196   
These revelations contradict the accounts of the Pueblo crew that the 
North Koreans were unaware of the significance of the cryptologic materials and 
the men,197 and suggest it is possible that the Soviets observed, tracked, and 
jammed the Pueblo to assist Pyongyang in the capture of the ship to take full 
advantage of the Walker spy ring.  In fact, shortly after the Pueblo’s capture, “a 
North Korean aircraft flew to Moscow carrying 792 pounds of cargo, presumably 
the salvage from the Pueblo.”  Although the Soviets claimed they were the only 
ones capable of exploiting this material,198 the North Koreans knew exactly what 
they were doing.  According to Vitaly Yurchenko, a KGB defector, the 
equipment and materials from the Pueblo, coupled with Walker’s crypto keys, 
netted the Soviets so much information they had to build “a special building” to 
process U.S. communications.199  As a result, it seems plausible that the 
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Soviets and the North Koreans began to collaborate at some point to capture 
the Pueblo.  According to Mobley, the seizure of the Pueblo (and the EC-121 
shootdown in April 1969) was not initiated by a local commander, and new 
pieces of evidence “suggest orchestration by the national command authority 
[i.e., Kim Il-sung].”200  Assuming the Soviets desperately sought the crypto 
equipment to spy on the U.S. and the North Koreans wanted to improve their 
relations with the Soviets, their cooperation seems plausible.  By July 1968, 
Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow had noticeably improved as demonstrated by the 
positive media coverage of the Soviets during the 7th anniversary of their treaty 
of friendship.201  The question is, does the evidence suggest Kim exercised 
smart power during the Second Korean War?   
 
5.5.6 Smart Power and the Resumption of the War of Reunification 
First, what were Kim’s preferred outcomes for the Second Korean War?  
I argue Kim’s primary aim was not to start another Korean War because he no 
longer had the backing of Beijing and Moscow, but to incite a revolution by 
assassinating Park and sending his guerrillas to form a base for an insurgency.  
His aim was to agitate a select group of South Koreans at Ulchin-Samchok and 
envisioned this insurgency spreading across the South, but the strategy failed 
because the South Koreans desired democracy but not the kind Kim offered in 
the North (i.e., trappings of a people’s democracy).  Nevertheless, Kim 
successfully achieved his secondary aims by initiating the limited conflict and 
seizing the USS Pueblo and its crew.  These aims included enhancing 
international prestige within the Communist world, improving relations with 
China and the Soviet Union, and mobilizing the populace at home.  He may also 
have attempted to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea, but 
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despite initial tensions between the two allies the relationship improved quickly 
as the U.S. offered major concessions for Seoul’s demonstration of restraint.  
This was important since significant increases in South Korean casualties 
during this period convinced Park to conduct his own unilateral covert attacks 
against the North to deter North Korean provocations.  In spite of this, the U.S. 
commander in Seoul worked closely with Park and helped to reassure the 
viability of the Alliance by strengthening the UNC’s defensive posture.   
Second, which forms of power behavior did Kim believe was likely to 
succeed during the late 1960s?  Kim used hard power to incite a revolution in 
South Korea, and employed effective propaganda and military diplomacy to 
humiliate and coerce the Americans into signing a non-apology before releasing 
the American crew of the Pueblo.  The successful exploitation of the Pueblo 
incident largely overshadowed the failed assassination attempt on Park.  Kim’s 
use of force may have also persuaded China to improve relations with North 
Korea, which was a significant accomplishment due to the worsening of their 
special relationship during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.  Third, what 
resources were available to incite a revolution and to humiliate the U.S.?  Unlike 
the First Korean War, the continuation of the Korean War in the late 1960s was 
an unconventional war on land with a platoon of assassins and company-sized 
unconventional warfare forces from the KPA, and the provocation at sea with 
the USS Pueblo was also limited with a small conventional force consisting of a 
joint KPA air force and navy.  If the situation had escalated, Kim may have 
attempted to co-opt Beijing and Moscow for diplomatic and military support.   
Fourth, did Kim believe he could win the Second Korean War?  The risk 
of the provocations in 1968 was relatively low due to the limited forces involved 
but the potential for success was high because Kim probably assessed that 
both the U.S. and South Korea were overreaching in Vietnam.  Moreover, his 
highly trained commandos almost made it to the Blue House and might have 
succeeded without early warning provided by the South Korean wood cutters.  
Even after the failed assassination attempt on Park, Kim’s timing to seize the 
Pueblo was nearly perfect as it directed the spotlight away from Pyongyang to 
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Washington.  Kim quickly regained the initiative and fully exploited the 
propaganda value of the Pueblo incident before releasing the crew in December 
1968.  He was so confident after the seizure of the Pueblo, he deployed more of 
his commandos to Ulchin to start an insurgency.  The attempt failed but after 
the USS Pueblo incident was resolved, North Korean media announced that the 
U.S. imperialists “solemnly apologized” for their “brigandish crimes” and claimed 
“another great victory of the Korean people” that “crushed the myth of the 
mightiness of the United States imperialism to smithereens.”202   
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors during the crises?  
Kim had been tempted by the revolutionary potential in the South since before 
1950 and, although it never materialized during the Korean War, he continued 
to see opportunities to reunify the country when the South Koreans overthrew 
the Syngman Rhee regime in April 1960.  This gave Kim confidence that North 
Korea had progressed far ahead of Seoul and emboldened him to make a 
“radical proposal” to reunify the country.  Kim truly believed what he had created 
in the North would be attractive to many South Koreans at the time.  This was 
the first time Kim proposed to significantly downsize the KPA and floated the 
idea of U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea.  However, he realized Park Chung-
hee’s coup made his peaceful reunification efforts unrealistic, and when Seoul 
and Washington increased their commitments to Vietnam, Kim seized the 
opportunity to incite a revolution in the South.   
The South Koreans resisted Kim’s initiatives to destabilize the South by 
retaliating with unilateral covert strikes across the DMZ as more of their soldiers 
were being killed by the KPA.  Park eventually chose restraint and won a huge 
aid package from the U.S.  In addition, Park finally won full political support from 
the U.S. so he could consolidate his own authoritarian rule in Seoul.  Although 
the U.S. commander in Korea strengthened the UNC’s defensive posture, the 
U.S. probably gained the least from these events.  Washington had to pay 
handsomely to reassure Seoul because it needed to avoid a two-front war in 
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Asia.  Washington also had to swallow its pride by offering an apology to gain 
the release of its men, and lost valuable intelligence and cypher equipment to 
the Soviets.  Finally, despite the prevailing view that the Soviets were totally 
surprised by the Second Korean War, it is plausible that they at some point 
collaborated with the North to seize the Pueblo.  This is pure speculation at this 
point since NSA has yet to fully disclose its findings of Soviet complicity in the 
incident.  It also seems plausible that China eventually approved of Kim’s 
actions, was prepared to offer him support, and decided to improve relations 
with Kim after the crises.  However, the tables turned against Kim several years 
later at Panmunjom but, during the intervening years, U.S.-Chinese détente 
inspired North-South talks for the first time since the end of the Korean War.   
 
5.6 North-South Talks Foster Optimism before the Ax Murders of 1976 
In mid-July 1971, Zhou visited Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang to back-brief 
him on the U.S.-China rapprochement and to “reaffirm its alliance with the 
DPRK.”  Kim was led to believe the U.S. would be withdrawing from Taiwan and 
South Korea soon after the Vietnam War ended and, with this optimism, Kim 
proposed direct talks with South Korea.203  However, before Zhou’s arrival, Kim 
continued to argue for independent reunification of the Korean Peninsula.  On 
April 12, 1971, he proposed an “8-point programme of national salvation.”  The 
eight point program included withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, 
significant reduction of the armed forces on both sides of the DMZ (about 
100,000 each), holding democratic elections throughout both Koreas, promoting 
economic exchanges, and if necessary, settling for a confederation before 
reunification.204 (see Appendix B: 8-point reunification program).       
The South responded positively and the two countries’ Red Cross 
organizations met at Panmunjom on August 20, 1971.205  Kim Duk-hyun, a 
senior official in the KWP’s OGD, represented the North and his counterpart 
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was Chong Hong-jin from the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).  They 
met more than ten times before Chong snuck out of Panmunjom on March 28, 
1972, to arrange for secret talks between the two sides.  In May 1972, Lee Hu-
rak, Director of KCIA and a former non-commissioned officer (NCO) in the 
Japanese Army, made a secret trip to North Korea.206  Lee’s counterpart would 
be Kim Young-ju, the presumed successor to his older brother, and after a 
couple of pro forma meetings with him Lee met with the Supreme Leader.207   
 
 
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When they met, both agreed it was time to achieve reunification by 
themselves, without interference from the Great Powers.  Lee conveyed the 
message that his colleagues in Seoul were not the “front men” of Washington 
and Tokyo.  Kim stressed, “Our position is to oppose reliance on external forces 
on the issue of unification.  This is where I agree with Park Chung Hee.”208  Kim 
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Figure 5.4.  Lee Hu-rak, KCIA Chief, secretly meets with Kim in Pyongyang in May 1972.  
Kim’s younger brother is in the background.  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/dprk-
perspectives-korean-reunification-after-the-july-4th-joint-communiqu%C3%A9 
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also apologized for the attempt to assassinate Park in January 1968 and 
blamed it on “certain leftist forces,” but the South Koreans were not convinced.  
This admission was viewed as disingenuous since the North tried to kill Park by 
“planting a bomb at the National Cemetery in Seoul” on June 22, 1970.209    
 
5.6.1 North-South Talks Falter Despite Optimism 
Lee tried to secure a visit to Seoul by Kim Young-ju before he left 
Pyongyang but Kim informed him that his younger brother was sick and could 
not make the trip.  He would have to send another senior official to Seoul.  The 
South Koreans hoped for the second most powerful man from the North to lead 
the talks, but soon realized Kim Jong-il had won the struggle to be the 
successor.210  Consequently, Seoul accepted Kim’s representative to the talks, 
and it was evident that the two sides had different aims for pursuing the talks.  
The North sought to weaken Seoul’s ties to the U.S. (i.e., withdrawal of U.S. 
troops) and Japan with its charm offensive, and the South viewed it as a means 
to contain the growing military threat from Pyongyang by maintaining direct 
contact with the enemy.211  Nevertheless, the two sides issued a Joint 
Statement on July 4, 1972, which highlighted their principles for reunification.  
The most important point for Kim was to achieve reunification through peaceful 
means and without foreign interference.  Other elements of the agreement 
included promoting various exchanges, preventing armed incidents, 
establishing a North-South Coordination Commission, and “installing permanent 
direct telephone links between Pyongyang and Seoul.”212 
Despite the progress being made, some viewed the talks as short-term 
tactical moves for both sides and yet for most of the international community 
there was “soaring optimism about the chances for a rapprochement between 
the two bitter enemies.”  However, when the North Koreans visited Seoul during 
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mid-September 1972, the talks became a spectacle for one-upmanship as well 
as a source of “deeply felt emotions” for the Korean people, and eventually it 
failed as a negotiating mechanism.213  On September 17, 1972, Kim complained 
that “south Korean authorities turned their backs and were using double-dealing 
tactics instead of honestly implement the agreements stipulated in the [July 4, 
1972] joint statement.”  His call to establish a Confederation to achieve peaceful 
reunification “at the earliest date,”214 fell on deaf ears.     
In October 1972, Park cited the talks as justification for adopting the new 
Yushin (i.e., revitalizing reforms) Constitution that allowed him to remain in 
office for another twelve years with even more executive power.  He also 
arrested most of the political opposition and dissolved the National Assembly.  
Park claimed South Korea “must be strong and united to deal with the North 
and maintain its independence in a changing international environment.”  The 
U.S. recognized he was trying to establish “a completely authoritarian 
government,” and it disassociated itself from the move, but chose not to oppose 
his actions.  However, Washington felt compelled to intervene when the KCIA 
kidnapped popular opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel in 
August 1973.  Park probably intended to kill him but decided to place him under 
house arrest.  Pyongyang used the incident as justification to suspend the talks; 
however, when the KCIA killed a prominent university professor, Park submitted 
to U.S. pressure and fired Lee Hu-rak.  That was symbolic enough for Kim to 
restart the talks but at a lower level.215   
Tensions continued to escalate when Mun Se-kwang, an ethnic Korean 
who belonged to a pro-North Korean organization in Japan (Chosen Soren in 
Japanese), attempted to assassinate Park Chung-hee in August 1974.  His 
gunshot missed Park but killed the first lady during a ceremony in Seoul.  Park 
directed his anger against Tokyo instead of Pyongyang despite the fact the 
latter was probably responsible for the incident.  The relationship between the 
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two U.S. allies deteriorated so badly that the U.S. intervened to facilitate a 
carefully worded “letter of regret.”  Mun was executed by South Korea in 
December 1974.216  The North-South talks went on for ten more rounds from 
December 1973 to March 1975, but again they went nowhere.217  Kim blamed it 
on the South Korean “authorities” and called on them to “faithfully implement the 
three principles –independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity– 
and reaffirm the July 4 Joint Statement.”218 
 
5.6.2 North Korea Makes Progress on the Diplomatic Front 
Meanwhile, Kim Il-sung made the most of this time by establishing 
diplomatic relations with 55 countries from late 1970 to early 1975, to include 
five from Western Europe and many others that were purportedly non-aligned.  
He followed Park’s lead by revising the Constitution that formally established 
Juche as the North’s guiding ideology and put himself on par with Park by 
elevating his formal position from Premier to President.  This was another 
example of the one-upmanship between them since Kim was already calling 
himself Suryong, which was a term he had only “reserved for Lenin, Stalin, and 
Mao before he began applying it to himself in the 1960s.”  The North also 
reached out to the U.S., initially by inviting reporters from prominent American 
newspapers to Pyongyang and then contacting the U.S. Congress to elicit its 
help in removing U.S. troops from South Korea.219  For example, Selig Harrison 
from The Washington Post “performed the role of spokespersons for North 
Korea” to pressure Washington and Seoul.220  These alternative channels 
became long-term initiatives to influence the U.S., but by the spring of 1975 the 
success of the North Vietnamese forced Kim’s hand in dealing with South 
Korea.221 
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5.6.3 U.S. Defeat in Vietnam Intensifies Militarization of Both Koreas 
Kim visited Beijing on April 17, 1975, a couple of days after the fall of 
Phnom Penh and just before the U.S. lost Saigon on April 30.  Some argued 
Kim made the trip to gain China’s support to attack the South, but others 
suggest it is still unclear whether that is in fact what he aimed to achieve during 
the visit.222  What is clear is that by February 1975, Kim had authorized the 
construction of large tunnels to facilitate a “lightning attack” on the South, and 
provided the U.S. and South Korea with “tangible evidence of North Korea’s 
aggressive intentions.”223  Perhaps the East Germans were right to believe Kim 
was bold enough to float the idea of forced Korean unification before Mao died.  
The Chinese apparently denied the request but tried to soften the blow by 
offering economic aid; it reportedly fell short of Kim’s expectations.224   
On the other hand, Park also understood the implication of the U.S. loss 
in Vietnam and, when Washington failed to reassure him as the U.S. 
Presidential election loomed in 1976, he also pursued his own version of the 
Juche line.  In fact, Park was shocked when President Richard Nixon withdrew 
20,000 soldiers from South Korea in 1971 as part of his Guam Doctrine which 
called for U.S. allies to “assume more of the military burden.”225  Park made 
significant investments in heavy and chemical industries to lay the foundation 
for indigenous development of military power.  The U.S. was shocked to 
discover Park was already hedging by cooperating with France, as early as 
1972, to develop his own nuclear weapons.  The U.S. initially did not intend to 
confront Seoul and hoped to persuade Park to abandon his nuclear weapons 
program with U.S. commitment to support his civilian nuclear industry.  However, 
when Park refused to budge, Washington informed him “the entire US security 
relationship would be put in doubt if Seoul went through with the plan.”  In the 
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end, Park abandoned his nuclear program.  The U.S. sensed he would try to 
acquire nuclear weapons again and correctly forecasted that would entice 
Pyongyang to pursue its own program.226  After the U.S. averted a nuclear crisis 
with Seoul, it faced an unexpected provocation at Panmunjom. (see Map 5.3).    
In light of Jimmy Carter’s nomination as a Presidential candidate, Michishita 
speculated that Kim may have attempted the incident to coerce (but actually to 
co-opt) the Americans who supported the U.S. troop withdrawals to “raise their 
voice” to avoid “another messy and brutal war in Asia.”227      
 
5.6.4 North Korea Makes the Wrong Move at Panmunjom 
According to Wayne Kirkbride, around the middle of August 1976 a UNC 
crew consisting of South Korean civilian workers went to trim a poplar tree in 
the Joint Security Area (JSA), but some of the KPA guards informed them “they 
would be killed if they tried,” and the crew quickly returned to the UNC side of 
the JSA.  The U.S. commander at the JSA decided to send the South Korean 
crew back with a security detail several days later with an experienced 
American officer to lead the crew.228  On August 18, 1976, the work detail, 
comprised of five South Korean civilian workers, three UNC military officers, 
and seven soldiers, moved into the JSA at Panmunjom.  They intended to trim 
the poplar tree that was located near the Bridge of No Return and was blocking 
the line of sight between two UNC guard posts.229   
It did not take long after the workers began to trim the tree that about a 
dozen KPA soldiers arrived at the site.  Some claimed that the KPA officer 
initially did not object to the work after speaking with Captain Arthur Bonifas, the 
senior UNC officer in charge of the tree detail, but changed his mind and 
ordered Bonifas to stop work on the tree.230  Others argued that Lieutenant Pak, 
the senior KPA officer on the scene, was aware the KPA had already warned 
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the UNC side not to cut the tree several days earlier but they were back to cut it.  
This interpretation suggested the KPA attacked “knowing that the high 
Communist leaders would approve of any incident… and that Pyong Yang 
would shift the responsibility of any unprovoked attack to Seoul.”  Lieutenant 
Pak informed Captain Bonifas that the UNC team had to cease work until “the 
status of the tree” could be resolved “by a security officer’s meeting.”  When he 
was ignored, Pak threatened to kill all of the UNC crew.231   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, the two sides began to argue and one of the KPA guards 
went back to the barracks and returned with about twenty more soldiers.  
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Map 5.3.  Map of the JSA with the location of the Ax Murders. 
http://scribol.com/anthropology-and-history/the-axe-murder-incident-how-two-us-
officers-were-slain-in-koreas-dmz 
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Lieutenant Pak carefully removed his watch and put it in his pocket before 
ordering his soldiers to “kill” as he struck Bonifas to the ground while five other 
KPA soldiers joined the attack on the American officer.  Other KPA soldiers 
picked up clubs from their vehicle and went after the remaining UNC personnel.  
As the attack ensued, the KPA picked up axes that were abandoned by South 
Korean workers and used them during the attack.  When the attack was over, 
both Captain Bonifas and First Lieutenant Mark Barrett had been killed, and 
“their heads were brutalized beyond recognition.”  In addition to the brutal 
slaying of two American officers, ten more UNC soldiers were wounded.232  
When U.S. policymakers met in Washington “immediately after the incident,” it 
concluded that the incident was not a prelude to an invasion since the element 
of surprise had been lost.  Nevertheless, UNC raised the alert status and 
enhanced its intelligence collection efforts.  The North responded by publicly 
declaring its own move to prepare large segments of its society for combat.233   
 
5.6.5 U.S. Shows Resolve and Kim Il-sung Expresses Regret  
The UNC called for a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting with 
the KPA to discuss the incident while the latter attempted to delay the meeting.  
General Richard Stilwell, the Commander of UNC, wrote a letter to Kim Il-sung 
to protest the delay and to inform him that he would be at Panmunjom (but not 
at the meeting) with his senior MAC representative on August 19, 1976.  
General Stilwell made it clear to Kim that he “expected the North Korean senior 
member to be there” to discuss the “unprecedented murders of the UNC joint 
security force.”234  According to Michishita, Stilwell informed President Park that, 
based on the Pueblo experience, “a show force by itself would not impress the 
North,” and implied he was prepared to use force if necessary.235   
The KPA senior member, General Han Ju-kyong, showed up on the 19th 
to meet his counterpart, Rear Admiral Mark Frudden, the UNC senior member.  
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RADM Frudden emphasized, “This was not the eruption of an unplanned 
argument.  It was a deliberate murder of two UNC personnel who, while 
engaged in routine maintenance functions of a type your personnel perform, 
were attacked unmercifully by a numerically superior force, wielding axes and 
clubs.”  The admiral showed Han photos of the “brutal acts” and demanded this 
kind of atrocity never happen again, asking him to convey the UNC 
commander’s protest to Kim Il-sung.  Most importantly, he “warned that such 
belligerent acts could not be tolerated.”236 
General Han initially argued the KPA acted in self-defense against “a 
premeditated onslaught by an overwhelming force of your side,” and claimed 
five of his men were wounded, some of them severely.  He had the audacity to 
demand the UNC punish those who committed the provocations and, mimicking 
Admiral Frudden, requested “assurance that the UNC would not commit such 
provocations in the future.”  General Stilwell wanted to demonstrate to the KPA 
that the UNC would not tolerate violations of the armistice, especially in the JSA.  
He ordered the tree to be cut down, and the plan included U.S. Army engineers 
supported by South Korean special forces and U.S. ground forces.  The forces 
on the ground were further reinforced by “squadrons of F-111 and F-4 aircraft” 
deployed to South Korea as well as the aircraft carrier USS Midway and her 
task force afloat near Korean waters.  The U.S. also had B-52 bombers on 
station to support the operation.  On August 21, the UNC warned the KPA that 
there would be no violence if the UNC force was left alone to cut down the tree.  
Afterward, the engineers and the security elements moved in and cut down the 
tree without incident.  In fact, large numbers of KPA guards watched from afar 
as the UNC work force chopped down the tree.237 
The KPA called for another MAC meeting a couple of hours after the tree 
was cut down, and when the meeting commenced General Han stated, “It is 
regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area… An effort must be 
made so that such incidents may not recur in the future… Our side will never 
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provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs.”   
He then asked a message to be conveyed to General Stilwell, and upon UNC 
confirmation that the message was delivered the meeting ended.  This was 
perceived by the UNC as the first time that the North Koreans had issued an 
apology for a provocation,238 but the Americans may have been unaware that 
Kim Il-sung had apologized to the South Koreans for the failed assassination 
attempt on President Park during the North-South talks.239   
Nevertheless, the incident demonstrated that Pyongyang was astute 
enough to make a “good tactical move” by issuing an apology when its “interest 
would be advanced by a statement of regret.”  In this case, the North Koreans 
correctly sensed Stilwell was prepared to use force and it was in their interest to 
de-escalate the situation.  At the next MAC meeting on August 25, the UNC 
side pressed for holding those responsible for the killings accountable, and the 
North was prepared to respond by suggesting that the two sides’ security 
elements be separated by the MDL.  This was intended to prevent future 
incidents in the JSA by forced separation of troops along the MDL.  In short, 
despite the miscalculation at Panmunjom, Kim was rational enough to know 
when to back down.  The North knew the UNC would accept its proposal to 
separate the two sides along the MDL since the UNC proposed it in 1970, and 
the KPA now embraced it as its own idea.240  On August 28, the KPA also 
provided “‘all the assurances’ to the safety of the U.S. personnel.”241     
 
5.6.6 The Rise and Near Fall of Kim Jong-il at Panmunjom 
Michishita argued that the ax murder incident “seems to have 
been a premeditated, deliberate action.”  However, he also emphasized 
that “sheer chance also played a role.”  He mentioned the latter because 
the timing of the incident was determined by the UNC side and the axes 
used to kill the two American officers were brought to the scene by South 
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Korean workers.  He went on to suggest it was also possible that the 
KPA officer at the scene may have used his own initiative to conduct the 
attack.  That said, he was convinced that, while the KPA officer had 
some flexibility on the execution of the attack, the “decision to attack the 
Americans was made by the highest political authority in North Korea.”  
What is surprising is that Michishita argued Kim Jong-il may have been 
the one who issued the order in an effort to consolidate his power.242 
What this suggests is that Kim Il-sung may have been 
misinformed by his son about the incident.  Lim Jae-cheon appears more 
convinced than Michishita that Kim Il-sung may not have been 
responsible for the incident.  He also contends that by the mid-1970s Kim 
Jong-il “controlled every piece of information in North Korea,” and he was 
the “mastermind” behind the ax murders.  As Michishita noted, when Kim 
Jong-il was informed of the Americans working on the tree at the JSA, he 
instructed the KPA to “stop them ‘in a certain way’,” but after it became a 
political crisis, both with the U.S. and at home, the KPA had to take 
responsibility.243  What is a bit confusing is that Michishita claimed that 
the KPA officer responsible for the incident was “highly praised by the 
North Korean political leadership and was conferred a military order.”244  
In other words, the KPA was not punished, and suggests even if Kim Il-
sung was not aware of the plan he approved of it after the incident.   
Lim argued that the problem for Kim Jong-il at home was the 
overzealous evacuation of Pyongyang that allegedly angered Kim Il-sung.  
Lim concluded that if he had not been the son of the Supreme Leader 
“his status as the successor might have been challenged.”245  This is 
mere speculation since he was the son of the Supreme Leader and his 
position as successor had been effectively secured.  Kim became the 
head of the KWP Secretariat and a member of the Party’s Political 
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Committee in February 1974, and [un]officially became his father’s 
successor at the Ninth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee meeting 
that occurred around April 1974.  While his father was reportedly 
reluctant to designate him as successor, his old guerrilla comrades 
supported the decision.246  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Paul Fischer, Kim Jong-il eventually moved into an 
office near his father’s old office in 1976 when Kim Il-sung left for his new 
palace,247 and Daniel Tudor and James Pearson recently argued that 
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Figure 5.5.  In 1961, when Kim Jong-il was in his second year at Kim Il-sung 
University, he accompanied his father to the Taedok mountain army base to provide 
on-site guidance. This is reportedly the first time Kim Il-sung and his son provided 
on-site guidance together. It further supports the idea he was groomed for a very 
long time. http://www.chinasmack.com/2011/pictures/north-korea-leader-kim-jong-il-
dies-his-life-in-59-photos.html. 
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Kim Jong-il subsequently “had all of his father’s telephones rerouted 
through his own office.”  They claimed, “Whenever the leader expressed 
interest in a potential policy or new means of glorifying himself, Kim 
Jong-il showed an almost preternatural ability to anticipate his whims, 
and deliver on them.”248  An Tai Sung claimed, “Since February 1974, 
Chong-il has reportedly been in charge of North Korea’s operations 
toward South Korea and Japan.”  More importantly, rumors indicated Kim 
Il-sung was very ill.  It was well known he had a malignant tumor by the 
mid-1970s and that “he made a secret visit to Rumania in late 1974 for 
treatment for cervical cancer.”  By December 1975, Kim Il-sung was 
rarely seen in public and that remained true for most of 1976.249  The 
evidence suggests it is plausible that Kim Jong-il either followed up on 
his father’s plan to agitate UNC forces at Panmunjom or may have 
planned it himself to please his father.  In fact, the CIA apparently 
“concluded by 1976 that Kim Il-sung was no longer in charge.”250  Hence, 
despite the failure, what does the smart power framework suggest about 
the Panmunjom ax murders?        
 
5.6.7 Misreading U.S. Commitment and Lack of Smart Power 
First, what was the preferred outcome for the Kims for the ax 
murders?  It seems plausible that Kim Jong-il may have attempted to 
provoke an incident at the JSA to consolidate his power, but it is more 
likely that the Kims were both looking for an opportunity to cause an 
incident to prompt a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea after U.S. 
defeat in the Vietnam War in 1975.  As noted earlier, Kim il-sung realized 
after the 1960 revolution which overthrew Syngman Rhee that he could 
not expect reunification as long as Park remained in power and U.S. 
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forces were in Korea.  Zhou had also informed Kim several years earlier 
that the U.S. would withdraw from Korea after the Vietnam War.  That 
said, the attempt to agitate the Americans at the JSA turned the tables 
on the North Koreans, and drove Washington to demonstrate its 
commitment to Seoul and express its willingness to use force against the 
North for the first time since the end of the Korean War.  Kim Il-sung 
knew the incident forced him into a corner and had to issue an apology.     
Second, what type of power actions did the Kims believe would 
succeed at Panmunjom?  It appears that the central authority, whether it 
was Kim Il-sung or more likely his son, approved the coercive use of 
force against the American officers, but at the same time the North 
Koreans hoped the incident would encourage some Americans to call for 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.  In spite (or because) of the 
loss in Vietnam, the U.S. responded with its own demonstration of force 
to achieve its aim of cutting down the tree.  Third, what resources were 
available to the Kims to execute the assault at Panmunjom?  The KPA 
initially had only a dozen soldiers on-site when the UNC’s tree detail 
arrived at the poplar tree, but when the conversation between the two 
sides became contentious twenty more KPA soldiers arrived before they 
assaulted the UNC soldiers.  When the melee was over, they had brutally 
killed two American officers.  Although the timing of the incident may 
have been coincidental, the incident appears to be a well calculated use 
of force, albeit in very limited but brutal fashion.   
Fourth, did the Kims believe they would be successful?  Kim Jong-
il probably believed this was a low-risk affair but he failed to anticipate 
how the situation could quickly escalate out of control.  The KPA soldiers 
in the JSA went beyond his ambiguous instructions by seizing the 
opportunity to use the axes that were left by the South Korean workers.  
Had the KPA soldiers avoided the brutal killings, the outcomes could 
have been more successful since President-elect Jimmy Carter was 
already on course to consider the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.    
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Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors regarding the 
ax murders?  After U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, Kim 
believed the U.S. would be withdrawing from Taiwan and South Korea 
soon after the Vietnam War ended.  This convinced Kim to pursue direct 
talks with South Korea and called for independent reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula.  His eight point proposal included withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from South Korea, significant reduction of the troops on both sides 
of the DMZ, and a Confederation phase before reunification.  However, 
when the North-South talks failed, both Koreas began to intensify their 
militarization in the wake of the Vietnam War.  Kim built tunnels capable 
of inserting large formations of KPA troops into the South and Park 
began his own nuclear weapons program with the French.  As noted, the 
North initiated the Panmunjom incident but, when the situation got out of 
control after the brutality of the killings was disclosed, Pyongyang initially 
claimed self-defense.  When the commander of U.S. and UN forces 
clearly demonstrated his resolve to use force and Washington supported 
General Stilwell’s proposed actions in Korea, Kim made the rational 
choice by offering an expression of regret, which was accepted by the 
U.S. as an apology.  The UNC’s commitment to cut down the tree 
despite some risk of escalation demonstrated that, with clear resolve, 
North Korea could be influenced to alter its behavior.   
While some argued Kim Jong-il had to pay for his mistake at 
Panmunjom, his rise was meteoric and there was no indication his father 
was considering other alternatives as successor at this point.  However, 
it could be argued that this was the incident that began the process of 
Kim Jong-il learning valuable lessons from making “imprudent” 
decisions.251  He had to work on developing “the competencies and 
prudence necessary” to successfully manage the “complex issues” he 
would be required to face as the leader of North Korea.  Kim Jong-il 
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officially became the successor at the Sixth Party Congress in October 
1980.252  What is not often realized is that, with respect to targeting 
Americans, the North Koreans honored their pledge after the ax murders: 
“Our side will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only 
when provocation occurs.”  It demonstrated that if the U.S. was willing to 
use force, North Korea could be influenced to change its behavior.  As he 
continued to ascend to the apex of power, Kim Jong-il would get another 
chance to fulfill his father’s dream of reunifying the country. 
 
5.7 Another Bold Attempt to Reunify the Country in Rangoon 
On October 26, 1979, Park Chung-hee was assassinated after domestic 
unrest began to intensify as the South’s economy began to falter due to the 
global recession caused by rising oil prices.  Park and his advisors were 
meeting to discuss how to deal with the growing opposition, and when Park 
favored a “harsher crackdown” his intelligence chief killed him.253  The Kims 
probably wondered if this was finally the moment they had been waiting to 
reunify the country.  However, Chun Doo-hwan, another army general, usurped 
power with a coup d’état on December 12, 1979.  This led to greater instability 
in the South and the North most likely perceived it as another opportunity to 
destabilize the South, especially after Chun arrested opposition leaders Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung (both later became president) and massacred 
student demonstrators calling for elections in Gwangju in May 1980.  Moreover, 
the U.S. was accused of complicity in the Gwangju massacre because U.S. 
Ambassador William Gleysteen and General John Wickham both felt “it would 
be preferable to deploy the [South Korean Army’s] Twentieth Division rather 
than the hated special forces units, which had never been under US 
command.”254  Kim subsequently concluded after Park’s assassination and the 
Gwangju massacre, the most realistic way to reunify the country was to 
establish “a confederal state, leaving the ideas and social systems existing in 
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north and south as they are.”  He called the new state the “Democratic 
Confederal Republic of Koryo,” and suggested it should be a neutral state since 
it would be composed of two different political systems.255  As before, the Kims 
could not wait for peaceful reunification, but this time, they probably knew they 
were running out of time to reunify the country.      
 
5.7.1 Another Failed Assassination Attempt by North Korea 
On October 9, 1983, North Korea tried to assassinate Chun Doo-hwan 
when he was on a state visit to Burma with “the best and brightest of the South 
Korean government.”  Almost his entire cabinet was waiting for Chun at the 
Burmese National Cemetery for a wreath-laying ceremony to honor the 
country’s founder.  The South Korean delegation was unaware that North 
Korean commandos had prepared an ambush with a powerful bomb to kill Chun.  
The North Koreans had planned well but their team leader prematurely 
detonated the bomb when he mistook the South Korean ambassador’s car for 
Chun’s motorcade.  The blast let loose shrapnel and other projectiles that killed 
many officials; “four members of the South Korean cabinet, two senior 
presidential advisers, and the ambassador to Burma were blown to bits.”  The 
Burmese responded quickly and captured all three agents; one of them 
disclosed the detailed planning involved in the attack.  This led to another anti-
North Korean backlash in Seoul and Washington.256        
Most South Koreans were reminded that the threat from North Korea was 
real and supported the hardline position toward Pyongyang after the Rangoon 
incident.  A report in The Korea Times cited North Korean defectors who 
claimed North Korea was preparing for war.  In the U.S., a Heritage Foundation 
study claimed that North Korea “has a decisive military edge over the ROK” and 
highlighted its preparedness for war.  Chun Doo-hwan began to emphasize “the 
terrorist activities of the rogue North Korean regime,” while promoting “ideas of 
solidarity and appeals to the normative belief in ‘peace’.”  Instead of forceful 
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retaliation, Chun claimed he was committed to peace and dialogue despite the 
attempt on his life.  In other words, Chun (and the South Koreans) was rational 
and Kim (and his rogue regime) was “unpredictable and irrational.”257  The 
North, however, denied its involvement in the bombing.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Koh Yong-hwan, a former North Korean diplomat who 
defected to Seoul, this was not the first time Pyongyang had planned to 
assassinate Chun.  It planned to kill him during a state visit to Gabon in 1982, 
but Kim Jong-il reportedly scrapped the mission at the last minute because the 
incident would have spoiled Pyongyang’s reputation in Africa and this was too 
high a price to pay since it needed African support at the UN.258  Koh appears to 
have a point as Armstrong confirmed that about 60% of North Korea’s trade 
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Figure 5.6. The carnage after the North Korean bombing in Rangoon in 1983. 
http://static.businessinsider.com/image/5076a10decad04102c0001a9/image.jpg. 
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agreements from 1957 to 1982 were with countries in Africa, and it had roughly 
8,000 soldiers that were providing military assistance to about 40 countries from 
1966 to 1983 and many of them were in Africa.259  Koh also claimed that Kim 
Jong-il had recently assumed control of North Korea’s clandestine operations 
and implied he was responsible for the attack.260  Paul French seemed to agree 
by noting that, as of 1982, Kim Il-sung “went into a form of semi-retirement, 
increasingly transferring duties to Kim Jong-il.”261  That said, the preponderance 
of the evidence indicated that the North had done the deed but Pyongyang 
issued a rebuttal on October 12, stating Seoul’s accusations were 
“‘preposterous and ridiculous’ and declared that ‘we, by nature, have never 
undertaken an act of terrorism, nor will we’.”  It went on to criticize Chun for 
inciting “North-South confrontation” and warned its forces were “on the highest 
alert.”  The claim was not convincing as Burma, a country on friendly terms with 
the North, publicly stated it was “virtually certain that Pyongyang authored the 
attack”262 and “derecognized” Pyongyang.263  A CIA report on October 18 also 
declared, “There is very strong circumstantial evidence linking North Korea to 
the attempted assassination of President Chun.”264   
The CIA argued the North Koreans had a delegation attending a similar 
ceremony at the cemetery in August 1983, which gave them an “excellent 
opportunity to survey the scene and plan an operation.”  Furthermore, the North 
Korean ship, Tonggon Aeguk-Ho, visited the port of Rangoon from September 
17 to 23 to deliver Pyongyang’s aid to Burma.  It left the port on September 23 
for Sri Lanka but the port visit was “consistent with the dispatch of an agent 
team.”  The captured equipment was “similar or identical to gear used by North 
Korean agents who have infiltrated South Korea.”  In addition to the equipment, 
the employment of a three-man team, the attempted suicide by agents pending 
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capture, and maximum resistance when captured was consistent with North 
Korean agent operations in South Korea.  It took the Burmese three days to 
capture or kill (one was killed) the Korean commandos as they violently resisted 
Burmese security forces, and “at least three Burmese were killed.”265   
 
5.7.2 Chun Doo-hwan Wins U.S. Support by Showing Restraint 
Although the official narrative was about peace, when President Chun 
met with the remainder of his cabinet after returning from Burma his Minister of 
Defense Yun Song-min called for an air strike on the North.  Chun, true to his 
word, refused to use force against Pyongyang.  There were also indications that 
a frontline commander in the South Korean Army was calling for armed 
retaliation as well, and Chun had to caution his senior commanders that only he 
had the authority to take military action against the North.  Anyone who took 
matters into their own hands would be guilty of disloyalty, he insisted.  The 
situation remained tense and the U.S. Ambassador met with Chun to de-
escalate tensions and reassure him.  He informed Chun the U.S. knew the 
North Koreans were responsible for the attack but advised against retaliation.  
Chun showed restraint; the U.S. kept the USS Carl Vinson carrier battle group 
in “Korean waters” and enhanced its security posture along the DMZ.  President 
Ronald Reagan lauded Chun during his visit to Seoul in November 1983.  
Reagan told him, “We and the whole world admired your restraint in the face of 
the provocations in Rangoon.”266  
Again, the North Koreans attempted to recover quickly from the blowback 
resulting from the Rangoon bombing by pursuing trilateral discussions with the 
U.S. and South Korea “to bring peace to the peninsula.”  It suggests Pyongyang 
may have proposed this as a hedge against mission failure in Rangoon.  This 
was viewed as a significant change in North Korean policy to accept Seoul “as a 
full participant” in peace talks and it was conveyed to the U.S. by the Chinese 
before the bombing in September 1983.  China expressed its willingness to 
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cooperate with the U.S. to achieve peaceful reunification in Korea.  At the same 
time, Deng Xiaoping warned Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that 
Pyongyang had no intention to invade the South but, if the South attacked the 
North, “China will not be able to stay out.”  However, Deng felt betrayed after 
the Rangoon bombing and refused to meet with Kim Jong-il ever again because 
Deng believed he was directly responsible for the attack.  The U.S. initially 
responded positively to trilateral talks and Pyongyang quickly accepted, but 
then Seoul and Washington began to back-paddle.  The U.S. called for bilateral 
talks between the two Koreas as a precondition for the trilateral meeting, and 
Seoul demanded an apology for the Rangoon bombing before the talks.267  In 
the end, despite another failed attempt to kill a South Korean President, North 
Korea was not condemned by the international community as it had been after 
the ax murders in 1976.  Why did this occur? 
 
5.7.3 Failed Bombing in Rangoon to Expedite Reunification  
First, what was North Korea’s preferred outcome for the Rangoon 
bombing?  It was likely that Kim Jong-il was responsible for directing the 
bombing and his aim was to seize another opportunity to destabilize the South 
in order to spark a revolution.  Kim failed to achieve his aim due to one of his 
commandos detonating the bomb prematurely but Chun was forced to show 
restraint to gain support domestically and from the U.S.  Second and third, what 
was the form of power behavior assessed to succeed and the resources 
available for the Rangoon bombing?  It is clear Kim Jong-il believed that a 
carefully planned covert operation could have succeeded and they dispatched 
this limited coercive force of three commandos to kill Chun with a powerful 
bomb.  In case it failed, they avoided places like Gabon and were prepared to 
accept retaliation from Burma, knowing it was likely to be temporary.  Fourth, 
what was the probability of success?  Kim had reason to believe the operation 
would be a success due to its careful planning and, arguably, the only reason it 
failed was because Chun’s motorcade was delayed, only by chance.  However, 
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the trilateral talks proposal seems to suggest Kim was probably hedging and 
possibly intended to use it as a pretext to deny any involvement in the bombing 
had the commandos managed to escape.  It may have worked but two of the 
commandos were captured and confessed to the bombing.  
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors regarding the 
bombing in Burma?  Chun’s coup in December 1979 and the Gwangju 
massacre in May 1980 probably convinced Pyongyang to seize this opportunity 
to pursue another revolution in South Korea.  Based on its aims and various 
provocations since the end of the Korean War, a North Korean provocation 
should have been expected, and the Kims may have sensed time was running 
out as the South’s economy began to grow almost exponentially.  In spite of the 
Burmese and U.S. condemnation of Pyongyang for the incident, the North 
Korean regime denied it was responsible.  Pyongyang’s selection of Burma as 
the site to kill Chun suggests it wanted to mitigate the potential blow-back since 
it was a relative backwater in terms of international relations.  It is also possible 
that Pyongyang may have attempted to dupe Beijing to support its efforts to 
pursue trilateral discussions with Seoul and Washington as another way to 
claim plausible denial had the bombing been successful.   
On the other hand, some in South Korea called for military strikes against 
the North but Chun showed restraint, and similar to Syngman Rhee and Park 
Chung-hee, he gained U.S. support and legitimacy as a result.  The evidence 
suggests that, after the Korean War, as long as American lives were not 
involved – unlike the Pueblo and Panmunjom ax murders – the U.S. preference 
was de-escalation.  Deng Xiaoping was apparently disgusted that Kim Jong-il 
would deceive him and held Kim responsible for the attack.  In the end, it was in 
the best interest of all concerned to forget the Rangoon bombing and return to 
the status quo.  This may have emboldened Kim Jong-il to continue employing 
terrorism as a tactic to achieve his aims. 
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5.7.4 Kim Offers Humanitarian Gesture as Anti-Americanism Grows 
Kim Il-sung managed to de-escalate the situation by providing 
humanitarian assistance to the South during a natural disaster near Seoul that 
killed almost 200 people and left 200,000 more homeless in September 1984.  
The South accepted the aid and chose not to complain even when it discovered 
“some of the rice turned out wormy and the cement nearly unusable.”  (see 
Figure 5.7).  The North hailed it as a “great event, the first in the history of 
nearly 40 years of division.”  The two sides quickly agreed to talks that would 
eventually lead to discussion about a summit between the leaders of the two 
Koreas in September 1985.268   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 1986, the after-effects of the Kwangju massacre and the question of 
U.S. complicity began to intensify anti-Americanism in Korea.  When U.S. 
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Figure 5.7. North Korean aid delivered to South Korea in September 1984.  Collection of 
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Ambassador Richard Walker called student activists “spoiled brats,” and 
Secretary of State George Schultz lauded the Chun government for making 
progress toward democracy, it reinforced the idea that the U.S. was actually 
supporting authoritarianism in South Korea.  It did not help matters when 
General John Wickham characterized South Koreans “as ‘lemmings’ in need of 
strong leadership.”  As the narrative of anti-imperialism began to grow with the 
“radical and progressive political activist” community, the Chun government was 
forced to maintain the façade of pursuing “peace and unification” even if it had 
no intention to do so.269  Under such conditions, the summit failed to materialize 
during Chun’s rule, but there was another opportunity for the two Koreas to 
improve relations as the South geared up for hosting the 1988 Olympics.  
The awarding of the 1988 Olympics to Seoul in September 1981 had the 
potential to be an opportunity for Chun to further consolidate his power while 
considerably boosting South Korea’s standing in the international community.  
North Korea had to respond.  The North could either attempt to hijack the 
Games by co-hosting a significant portion of the events or persuading the 
Soviets and others in the socialist camp to boycott the Games.  Initially, it 
pursued a “more sophisticated policy” by proposing to co-host half of the 
Games and held four talks with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) from 
July 1985 to July 1987.  However, it ended up feeling betrayed by the IOC when 
Juan Samaranch appeared to renege on his promise to allow Pyongyang to 
host three full sports (down to two).  Kim was also disappointed that both 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng would not support an Olympic boycott.270  
The Soviets needed the Olympics to promote cooperation with the 
international community and the Chinese needed Seoul to help them develop 
their economy.  Seoul quickly sensed both China and the Soviet Union would 
not allow Kim to attack the South and adopted a hardline policy toward the 
North along with the IOC.  Seoul and the IOC collaborated to isolate Pyongyang 
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and make it known to the entire world that South Korea was winning the 
competition for legitimacy on the Korean peninsula.  The North Koreans walked 
away from the talks and felt abandoned by their allies, believing they had 
received unequal treatment during the negotiations with the IOC.  Sergey 
Radchenko viewed this outcome as a lost opportunity to improve relations 
between the two Koreas and to promote greater opening of North Korea.  In 
pursuit of short-term gains, the South wanted to bask in the glory of a 
successful Olympic Games and humiliate the North Koreans.  It is plausible this 
approach had a part in convincing the North Koreans to threaten the Games.271         
 
5.8 Bombing of KAL Flight 858 to Spoil the 1988 Seoul Olympics  
On October 7, 1987, two North Korean intelligence agents reported to 
the Foreign Intelligence Building to meet their Director of Foreign Intelligence.272  
The CIA suspected this was the headquarters of the North Korean Investigation 
Department, which was the KWP’s organ responsible for foreign intelligence 
activities.273  The Director informed the two agents their mission was to “destroy 
a South Korean airplane.”  He underscored the seriousness of the mission by 
highlighting that the mission was Kim Jong-il’s idea and he personally wrote the 
order by hand.  The Director tried to inspire the two agents by suggesting North 
Korea’s “national destiny will depend on it.”  He provided the rationale for the 
mission by emphasizing that South Korea’s political situation was “more volatile 
than at any time since the War of Liberation [Korean War],” as its government 
revised the Constitution and was preparing for an election.  The bombing of the 
plane would cause “chaos” and convince other countries to avoid the Seoul 
Olympics due to growing fears of terrorism.  Pyongyang envisioned the 
bombing forcing the cancellation of the Games and that, coupled with the 
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worsening political climate in Seoul, could present another opportunity for 
reunification.274    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Director of Foreign Intelligence reminded the two agents that Korean 
reunification “is the great goal of our generation.”275  The two agents took the 
following oath of loyalty before departure: 
 
The socialist revolution in South Korea is imminent, and our 
enemies have reached their most desperate hours.  As we 
embark upon our mission, we vow the following:  While we are 
undertaking the mission, we shall never forget the trust that the 
Party has placed in us and its concern on our behalves.  We 
pledge that we will follow the Revolutionary Rules and that we will 
fully cooperate with each other to accomplish our mission.  We 
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Figure 5.8. Mass uprising in South Korea in June 1987. 
http://physics.snu.ac.kr/hmin/pictures/pictures-democracy.html. 
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shall preserve the integrity of Our Dear Leader [Kim Jong-il] with 
our lives.276    
 
It is important to note that what Kim Jong-il was referring to as the “socialist 
revolution in South Korea” was most likely the June 1987 uprising. (see Figure 
5.8).  When Chun refused to consider constitutional reforms to allow direct 
presidential elections and appointed Roh Tae Woo, another military general, as 
his presidential candidate, it unleashed violent nationwide protests.  The 
Washington Post described Seoul as a “war zone,” and The New York Times 
reported how “for more than three hours the stone and tear gas canisters flew” 
in the city of Gwangju.277  Kim Jong-il’s order suggested he was aware of the 
protests in South Korea and he was directing provocations against South Korea 
by the mid-1980s, but it was puzzling why he would blow up a South Korean 
airliner full of South Korean workers.  Kim was desperate to fuel a revolution in 
South Korea and perhaps paying Seoul back for collaborating with the IOC to 
deny North Korea its “proper” role in the Olympics. 
 
5.8.1 Kim Jong-il Dispatches His Agents to Bomb a Korean Airliner 
North Korea sent the two secret agents to the Soviet Union before they 
traveled to Hungary and then to Austria under the guise of a Japanese father 
and daughter on holiday.  They moved on to Yugoslavia and finally arrived in 
Iraq to board the Korean airliner.  A support team of two agents met them at the 
Baghdad airport and delivered the bomb.  Once they got on board, they set the 
bomb to explode nine hours later and deplaned at Abu Dhabi after a short flight.  
The plane exploded with 115 passengers onboard before it could reach Seoul 
on November 29. (see Figure 5.9).  The Bahraini authorities apprehended the 
North Korean agents the next day; both attempted to commit suicide but the 
female agent Kim Hyun-hee survived.  However, from the beginning, Kim’s 
partner, who was a highly experienced agent, knew their itinerary was flawed 
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and could be a problem.  For example, how many Japanese tourists visit 
Belgrade?278  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The female agent was extradited to Seoul after two weeks of “relentless 
interrogation,” and she finally broke and confessed after eight more days of 
“more intense questioning in Seoul.”  She was tried and sentenced to death in 
Seoul, but President Chun pardoned her because she was perceived as “an 
innocent victim of a society that continues to lack any respect for human rights 
and is ruled by a reign of terror.”  Her testimony reinforced the totalitarian nature 
of the regime when she stated, “It is North Korean law that anyone who insults 
the Kim family is punished by being bludgeoned to death with an iron bar,” and 
“one wrong word and the whole family could be ruined.”  Yet, she remained 
defensive when South Koreans criticized Kim Il-sung as a “bad guy” by placing 
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Figure 5.9. Recovered parts from Korean Airline Flight 858 after bombing. 
http://www.koreabang.com/2013/videos/north-korean-terrorist-spills-all-on-south-
korean-talk-show.html. 
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the blame on Kim’s subordinates who “misguide him or don’t follow his 
directions properly.”279  She was wrong.  Kim Jong-il understood the 
implications of the 1988 Olympics.  It would symbolize to the world Pyongyang 
had lost the war of legitimacy with the South and he was desperate enough to 
use terrorism to undermine the games.280 
 
5.8.2 U.S. Designates North Korea as a Sponsor of Terrorism 
Kim Hyun-hee eventually reunited with her relatives in the South and 
pledged to expose the truth about the Kims’ rule in North Korea.  The North did 
not wait long to discredit its former agent.  Soon after her public confession of 
the bombing on January 15, 1988, Pyongyang produced another woman named 
Chung Hee-sun to discredit Kim’s story.  The North attempted to do this by 
refuting the story from South Korea that Kim had been the flower girl who 
welcomed a South Korean delegation to Pyongyang in the early 1970s during 
the North-South Talks.  The woman who claimed to have presented the flowers 
to the South Korean delegation denounced Kim’s story as South Korean 
propaganda and claimed to be a middle school teacher.  In other words, 
Pyongyang was accusing Seoul of framing the North Koreans for the bombing.  
South Korean intelligence agents sensed that North Korea had “been pushed 
into a corner” and it was “trying to find a way out of it.”281   
In early February 1988, Bruce Cumings wrote an article in The Los 
Angeles Times arguing that “North Korea adamantly denied any involvement, 
saying that it would never attack Korean workers, that it condemned terrorism 
and that no such woman had ever lived in the north.”  Cumings also indicated 
that Moscow had accepted Pyongyang’s account while Beijing “conspicuously 
refused to pass judgment.”  Cumings argued on North Korea’s behalf by stating 
that the bombing “is a sharp departure from [North Korea’s] previous behavior,” 
and it was difficult to trust the South Korean authorities because “confessions 
wrung through torture are still common.”  He also suspected the timing of the 
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alleged terrorist’s confession was suspect because it came soon after Moscow 
and Beijing committed to attending the Games.  Cumings concluded that 
Seoul’s aim was to isolate North Korea by attracting as many of its socialist 
partners as possible.282  He was correct about Seoul’s aim but wrong about 
Pyongyang’s responsibility for the bombing.                  
As the two Koreas attempted to discredit one another over the incident, 
there was enough concern about Seoul’s motives that the U.S. wanted to 
ensure Kim Hyun-hee’s confession was not coerced by Seoul.  It had a senior 
U.S. diplomat verify her story and, when satisfied it was genuine, designated 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.283  On February 11, 1988, the U.S. 
IC confirmed the bombing was conceived out of Pyongyang’s “frustration over 
its inability to cohost the 1988 Summer Olympic Games and its desire to portray 
Seoul as an unsafe venue for the Games.”  It also forecasted that the bombing 
was “the first incident of a campaign intended to raise doubts about South 
Korea’s ability to assure the safety of participants and attendees at the 
Games.”284  Perhaps that is why President Reagan and Secretary of State 
George Shultz raised the prospect of more terrorist acts by Pyongyang with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.  The Soviet official confidently 
responded, “Do not worry… We [the Soviet Union] will be in Seoul to compete.  
There will not be any terrorism.”285  He was right; there would be no more 
terrorist acts by Pyongyang to obstruct the Seoul Olympics and teams from 160 
countries attended the Games that began on September 17, 1988.  Most 
importantly, the successful Olympics marked Seoul’s “final victory over the 
North in economic terms – a competition that began in 1948.”  It also gave 
Seoul an opportunity to show case its “peaceful democratic transition” to the 
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world.286  This indicated Kim Il-sung’s war of reunification was finally over and 
demonstrated the Kims desperate attempt to continue the war.   
 
5.8.3 Desperate Last Attempt to Reunify Korea before the Olympics 
First, what was Kim’s desired outcome for the bombing?  Unless one 
believes Seoul extracted Kim Hyun-hee’s confession through torture, it is likely 
that Kim Jong-il personally directed the bombing of the South Korean airliner.  
He also made it clear that the aim of the mission was to achieve reunification of 
Korea but it failed.  Kim probably realized that the successful Seoul Olympics 
would symbolize to the world that the South had won its competition with the 
North.  The North initially attempted to co-host the Olympics but by July 1987 it 
refused the OIC’s offer.  The use of terror was a desperate attempt to threaten 
the Olympics in Seoul but the use of this tactic made it difficult for the South to 
retaliate since it took over two months for the CIA to disclose that Pyongyang 
was responsible.  By that time, it made no sense to escalate tensions when 
Seoul was preparing for the Olympic Games.   
Second, which form of power behavior was assessed to be more 
effective and third, what were the resources available for the mission?  Kim 
Jong-il again resorted to limited coercive force but this time he ordered two 
highly trained North Korean covert operatives to commit terrorism by blowing up 
a South Korean civilian airliner.  Arguably, it was a surprise even for North 
Korea since the plane was full of South Korean workers returning from difficult 
jobs in the Middle East.  This was in stark contrast to the North Korean 
commandos who decided to save the four wood cutters even if that risked the 
successful execution of their mission at the Blue House.  Some argued this was 
out of character even for North Korea, and the U.S. also had some doubts and 
had to confirm the female agent’s confession was not coerced by Seoul. 
Fourth, how did Kim Jong-il view the likelihood of success?  It is likely 
that Kim believed the mission would be a success due to the North Korean 
agents’ high level of training, but others involved in the mission knew the 
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mission could fail.  The plan appeared to have been rushed to exploit the June 
1987 uprising and, from the beginning of the operation, the more experienced 
agent realized the itinerary was flawed and predicted there might be problems.  
Kim should have been informed about the risk of failure but there was no way 
for the senior agent to remain loyal and express his concern about the operation.  
However, even if it failed, North Korea was prepared to deny it was responsible 
and probably knew the time required to conduct a proper investigation would 
complicate a timely response from Seoul.    
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of the key actors?  North Korea 
was again enticed by the building of popular momentum for a revolution in 
South Korea after Chun’s coup, the Gwangju massacre, and the June 1987 
uprising.  It seems evident that Kim Jong-il viewed it as the right moment to 
reunify the country.  Pyongyang could have co-hosted the Games but it refused 
to participate when the IOC’s offer failed to meet its expectations.  The South 
Korean military initially demanded retaliation but Chun was astute enough to 
know he had to show restraint.  Moreover, as expected, the U.S. provided 
legitimacy and support to his government despite the bloody suppression by his 
army in Gwangju.  However, the U.S. would pay for its support of Chun’s regime 
as more South Koreans began to perceive the U.S. as an imperialist power 
complicit with Seoul’s authoritarian regimes.  The U.S. finally reacted to North 
Korea’s use of terror and designated it as a state sponsor of terrorism.   
The successful Olympic Games in 1988 showed the world South Korea 
was on the path of becoming a “developed nation,”287 but also encouraged the 
U.S. to seek bilateral talks with Pyongyang.  Washington was finally willing to 
constructively engage Pyongyang on a wide range of issues, such as progress 
on North-South talks, recovery of U.S. remains from the Korean War, cessation 
of anti-U.S. propaganda, reduction of tensions along the DMZ, and 
abandonment of terrorism.  The two sides’ diplomats in Beijing met over thirty 
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times from December 1988 to September 1993 to pass “messages” but not 
much progress was made on substantive issues.288   
In the meantime, Moscow informed Pyongyang in September 1990 that it 
would normalize relations with Seoul, and Beijing notified North Korea in May 
1991 that it would support South Korea’s UN membership.289  Simultaneously, 
both of its allies demanded cash payments for their goods at market prices and 
Pyongyang angrily threatened the Soviets “it might have to develop further its 
own security capacities.”  Many observers viewed this “as a threat to develop 
nuclear weapons.”290  As Kim’s dream of reunification was slipping away, the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991291 and Moscow and Beijing established 
diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992.  The time had come for North Korea to 
pursue “genuine ‘self-reliance’ for the first time.”292  According to Ahn Byung-
joon, Kim Il-sung would play his “weak hand” by recasting North Korea’s  
“survival and security” by playing the nuclear card to buy his son more time.293      
 
5.9 Summary 
First, Kim Il-sung waged a long war of liberation from September 9, 1948 
(founding of North Korea) to September 17, 1988 (start of the Seoul Olympics) 
to implement his strategy of reunification.  What is evident is that even Kim Il-
sung, who was known for his “uncanny ability to navigate between Great Power 
interests to achieve his own ends,” could not achieve his primary aim of 
reunification – despite his smart power attempts he failed to achieve his 
principal aim.  However, he was able to recover quickly after the provocations 
and adjusted to the developing situation to gain the best possible outcome.  
Perhaps it is due to his Manchurian and anti-imperialist legacies but Kim never 
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gave up on his desire to achieve reunification, and seemed to believe at least 
until the early 1980s that most South Koreans preferred his regime over 
dictatorships in the South.  Kim was wrong but he kept on misreading popular 
rebellions in the South as support for North Korea.  Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests it is likely that Kim Jong-il was involved in all three of the provocations 
after the Second Korean War, from the ax murders to the KAL 858 bombing.  
The North Koreans also failed to realize a revolution in the South or force the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops, but the growing perception was that they could attack 
the South and the U.S. lacked the will to hold Pyongyang accountable for the 
provocations due to its lessons learned from the Korean War.   
Second, while Kim may have sensed abandonment by his two 
Communist patrons before the Seoul Olympics, he still felt betrayed by Moscow 
and Beijing when both demanded payment for goods at market rates in 1991 
and established diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992.  This came at a time 
when North Korea’s economy was in decline as demonstrated by the regime’s 
“‘Eat Two Meals a Day’ campaign in 1992.”294  Kim attempted to restore the 
balance of power on the Korean Peninsula by withdrawing from the NPT in 
March 12, 1993,295 to signal he would acquire his own nuclear weapons and 
made it clear survival was his principal aim as his final days neared.  The next 
Chapter will examine how Kim Jong-il played the nuclear card, but suffice it to 
say he played the weak hand very well to ensure regime survival.    
Third, the U.S. wanted to invoke another collective security arrangement 
at the UN to sanction North Korea after the NPT declaration, but countries in 
Northeast Asia opposed the move and sought to restore “the fragile balance of 
power on the Korean peninsula” through dialogue.296  As the next chapter 
considers the post-Kim Il-sung period, it begs the question will the U.S. be as 
willing to use force and communicate forcefully with the North Koreans to 
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resolve the nuclear crisis as it did to achieve its aims on the non-forceful 
repatriation of POWs or the ax murders at Panmunjom?  Would the South 
Koreans be convinced to forcefully retaliate again as they did during the late 
1960s when North Korea began to kill hundreds of its soldiers and civilians?  
Next, I examine how Kim Jong-il survived after his father’s death in July 1994. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SURVIVAL OF THE KIM DYNASTY UNDER KIM JONG-IL 
 
They [North Koreans] have learned now, through Republican and 
Democratic administrations, that this [coercive diplomacy] is an 
effective way to operate.  It yields concessions from the West 
while they continue to develop nuclear weapons.  I hope a future 
president and secretary of state will break the cycle.1 
       
- Dick Cheney 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In late 1994, Ahn Byung-joon argued “Kim Jong-il’s greatest asset is that 
he is the North’s only alternative” to his father.  Although he was groomed for 
over 20 years as the successor, and managed to develop his own group of loyal 
followers, Ahn claimed that “except for his erratic behavior, Kim is largely an 
unknown entity.”  Moreover, since he lacked charismatic leadership, like his 
father, his “reign may not last too long,” and thus it was not difficult for Ahn to 
imagine the rise “of reform-minded military-bureaucratic regime,” or “a violent 
collapse of the state.”2  Of course, Ahn was wrong.  In hindsight, Bruce Klinger 
observed in the fall of 2014, “Under Kim Jong-il, Pyongyang combined threats 
and assurances in a comprehensive strategy.”  Kim had “raised brinksmanship 
to an art form in order to gain multiple policy goals,” and despite the hardline 
approach often associated with his rule, Pyongyang “always calibrated its 
position to avoid crossing the Rubicon.”3  In due course, others would recognize 
him as a master strategist and this chapter supports this assessment.   
This chapter argues that Kim’s core institutions sometimes appeared to 
hold opposing policy preferences but it was all part of an overarching strategy 
directed by the center (i.e., Kim Jong-il).  In order to avoid direct confrontation 
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with the U.S., Kim led the development of an effective survival strategy to defy 
predictions that his end was near.  The aim of this chapter is to offer an 
alternative explanation that Kim Jong-il used smart power strategies to survive 
the famine years of the 1990s, the second nuclear crisis that began in 2002, 
and the use of force against the South in 2010.  The question is how did he 
develop these successful strategies? 
I argue that, while Kim Jong-il played a central role in the development 
and the execution of these strategies, it is likely that he had to cultivate his 
brightest, most loyal, and almost “untouchable” group of elite officials to assist 
his development and execution of smart power strategies to achieve his aims 
and ultimately survive.4  Although it is more accurate to argue only those with 
the Kim family bloodline are truly untouchable, there are some elites who may 
be purged for failing to meet the Kims’ expectations, but they will not be 
executed because they are members of the true core elite.  In other words, not 
everyone in the regime is expendable and loyalty matters.  For instance, Han 
Kwang-sang, who was a senior official responsible for managing North Korea’s 
foreign currency, was rumored to have been executed after he disappeared in 
March 2015, but he resurfaced in November 2015.  Some speculated “Han was 
punished and underwent some type of re-education.”5  Again, some regime 
elites who possess critical skills and/or the right family backgrounds (i.e., 
demonstrated loyalty) could be immune from the most severe punishment.    
On the other hand, Daniel Tudor and James Pearson suggest there is 
one “shadowy organization” that “may possess more power” than Kim Jong-un, 
and that is the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD).  This remains to 
be seen, but they argue it is “the only part of the state that sees and knows 
everything.”6  In fact, there have been many purges since Kim Jong-il’s death, 
but “the OGD leadership is essentially unchanged.”  The roughly 300-man OGD 
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owes its accumulation of power to Kim Jong-il as he became its director in 1973 
while ascending to power.  As they maintained the monolithic guidance system, 
the OGD kept files on the core elite, facilitated communications between core 
institutions and the Supreme Leader, issued directives, implemented and 
enforced policy, supervised personnel appointments, and took care of the Kim 
family.  They were united behind Kim because they did not have legitimacy 
without him.7  More importantly, it suggests Kim Jong-il had the opportunity to 
appoint his own people to key positions for twenty years before he assumed 
power and this allowed him to forgo a massive purge when he assumed power.     
As a result, instead of Kim Jong-il’s core institutions and elites being truly 
at odds over policy preferences, they were more likely to be unified behind the 
Supreme Leader and followed his direction and guidance through the OGD.  As 
discussed below, there were other key institutions that were essential to the 
success of Kim’s survival strategies.8  That said, I demonstrate how North 
Korea employed smart power by manufacturing a nuclear crisis to instill a fear 
of instability (not that it was unstable as diversionary theory suggests) during 
the famine years of the 1990s.  As the first nuclear crisis began to intensify in 
the early 1990s, Kim Il-sung persuaded former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to 
help him change the initial hardline policy preference of the Clinton 
administration.9  When Kim died in July 1994, the U.S. anticipated North Korea 
might cheat but, once Carter intervened, Washington was persuaded by 
formidable North Korean negotiators to make the deal with Kim Jong-il because 
it sought to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons.  Moreover, 
senior U.S. policymakers later agreed diplomacy was the best option.10  This 
meant the U.S. had to abandon its initial preference for UN sanctions and the 
use of force, which aligned with Pyongyang’s own preferences.   
Beginning in the late 1990s, Kim Jong-il also took full advantage of the 
“lure of reconciliation” after Kim Dae-jung became the President of South Korea.  
                                            
7
 Tudor and Pearson, North Korea Confidential, pp. 96-109. 
8
 Jang, Dear Leader, p. 15 and pp. 252-258. 
9
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 394. 
10
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 383. 
238 
 
When the first inter-Korean summit finally occurred on June 13, 2000, it was 
obvious Kim Jong-il had orchestrated the summit as if Kim Dae-jung was the 
“most important visitor ever to set foot in the North Korean capital.”11  Kim Jong-
il performed so well during the North-South summit it is worth taking the time to 
quote at length how the South Korean delegation described his performance: 
 
The impression Chairman Kim had made disproved all of the 
preconceived notions of him held by President Kim [Dae-jung] and 
the official and unofficial members of his delegation, and 
demonstrated the inaccuracy of the West’s information about him.  
Our previous image of Kim Jong-il was simply that he was a 
strange dictator.  We believed he had succeeded to power despite 
his incompetency and had been failing to feed the people, while 
consistently practicing a tyranny of fear.  He had been known to 
be a depressed, eccentric man with a speech impediment.  He 
was also known to be impulsive and unpredictable, making it 
difficult to anticipate what trouble he might cause next.  He was 
known to be obstinate, militant, and cruel, and to lead an 
extravagant lifestyle that involved drinking parties and 
performances of “pleasure teams.”  But the Kim Jong-il we 
actually saw was a different person.  He was well-informed, 
intelligent, smart, and quick-witted; he had a vast accumulation of 
knowledge from his long, more than thirty-years of experience in 
important party positions.  He was pleasant and had a good sense 
of humor.  He showed charisma and leadership.  At times, he led 
conversations in a rough voice in disregard of othe people.  When 
the situation permitted, he was very frank and candid.  He also 
seemed to try to conform to proper courtesy.12 
   
The summit was so successful that Kim Jong-il’s attractive power shaped 
the “ideas and beliefs” of the majority of South Koreans, as indicated by one 
South Korean poll in which 53 percent of respondents held the U.S. responsible 
for the nuclear crisis.13  Kim was able to persuade the South Koreans that he 
was no longer “a dangerous threat,” but “a wayward relative eager to mend 
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fences after so many years of hostility.”  Mike Chinoy described these 
developments as “a sea-change” in South Korean attitudes.”14  The South 
Koreans rewarded him by delivering $3 to 8 billion for organizing the summit.  
The summit achieved Pyongyang’s aims even though some in Seoul claimed 
“South Koreans were too ‘mature’ to fall for North Korean propaganda.”15  Even 
when Kim Dae-jung left office in February 2003, his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, 
continued to embrace Kim’s Sunshine Policy and remained at odds with 
President Bush.16  
North Korea was also defiant during the Bush administration by 
manipulating U.S. policy divergence with allies and partners in Northeast Asia 
and policy incoherence within the U.S. interagency between hardliners and pro-
engagement advocates.  North Korea’s ability to exercise smart power was 
measurably demonstrated when it convinced the Bush administration to 
abandon its initial hardline policy toward the regime, secured a second nuclear 
agreement in September 2005,17 and forced the U.S. Treasury Department to 
reverse course and resolve the BDA issue.18  This was a significant feat since 
Pyongyang had continued to ignore international warnings not to expand its 
nuclear arsenal, almost flaunted its illicit activities, and even proliferated nuclear 
technology to Syria.   
After Roh Moo-hyun left office, both the U.S.’s and South Korea’s 
policies toward the North began to coalesce toward a hardline approach when 
Lee Myung-bak became the new President in February 2008.  Kim Jong-il faced 
significant challenges, as Seoul arguably became Washington’s most important 
ally in Asia, soon after President Barack Obama took office in 2009.  Obama 
would not reflect the policy incoherence of the Bush administration and his 
counterpart in Seoul was in no hurry to engage Pyongyang without its 
commitment to denuclearize.  Kim responded with a missile launch and a 
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second nuclear test in the spring of 200919 and, despite his poor health, directed 
the succession of his son20 while overseeing two of the most provocative 
military actions against the South in 2010 since the end of the Korean War.  
Washington’s and Seoul’s efforts to retaliate after the Cheonan sinking fell short 
due to unwavering support for Pyongyang from Beijing and Moscow.21  South 
Korea began to reconsider its hardline policy,22 but Kim continued to apply 
pressure with an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island.23  After another 
diplomatic effort to pressure Pyongyang failed, the U.S. returned to Beijing to 
negotiate a third nuclear deal with the North in December 2011.  The deal was 
postponed due to the death of Kim Jong-il24 but Kim had demonstrated his 
mastery of smart power as he quickly laid the groundwork for a successful 
power transition.  However, before examining how Kim exercised smart power 
during his rule, I will briefly explain why the regime’s survival tools that Kim 
Jong-il inherited from his father will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8.     
 
6.2 Survival Tools: Kim Jong-il’s Family Inheritance 
As noted in Chapter 2, the examination of the literature suggests that 
these tools all played some role in the regime’s survival, but many of them have 
not stood the test of time while the explanatory power of others remains to be 
seen since the premise is still hypothetical and outcomes undetermined (e.g., 
without Chinese support or nuclear weapons, North Korea will not survive).  
Since Kim Jong-il did survive, the discussion regarding these two survival tools 
will continue in Chapter 7 when I examine the rule of Kim Jong-un and all of 
them will be re-examined in the concluding chapter.  That said, I argue that 
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even under a politically weaker Kim Jong-il (relative to his father)25 the 
application of smart power is an alternative explanation that is capable of 
providing more insights on how he survived.  The evidence indicates Kim led 
the development and implementation of effective strategies, sometimes using 
these survival tools and at other times acquiring them as a reward for the 
expression of his power during the famine years of the 1990s and the second 
nuclear crisis with the Bush administration.  Finally, Kim managed to negotiate 
his third nuclear deal with the Obama administration at the very end of his reign, 
but he died before it was consummated.  One can only imagine what might 
have happened if he had lived a little longer. 
 
6.3 Rise of Kim Jong-il and the Art of Transferring Charismatic Leadership   
When Kim Jong-il became the successor, many foreign observers 
believed he was “a playboy” and “would not outlive his father for too long, at 
least politically.”26   They were all wrong.  According to Andrei Lankov, he also 
became “a charismatic politician and shrewd manipulator who eventually proved 
to be a match for his ruthless and street-smart father.”27  The question is how 
did North Korea manage to transfer his father’s charismatic authority to Kim 
Jong-il?  As discussed in Chapter 4, Kim Il-sung’s legitimacy was based on his 
anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy and manipulated the patriarchal and charismatic 
authorities where the traditional social order, adoration of the people to the 
ruler, and the ruler’s “gifts of grace” reinforced his legitimacy.  As noted by 
Lankov, one could argue Kim Jong-il also demonstrated charisma, and 
benefited from Korea’s dynastic tradition (i.e., patriarchal authority).  However, 
to ensure the regime’s first succession of leadership, Pyongyang also revised 
the Constitution to establish legal authority to support the succession in 1992.28     
The North Koreans initially denounced the backward Confucian order but 
later restored it to prominence by emphasizing the two key tenets of chung 
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(loyalty to the ruler or the state) and hyo (filial piety) to restore Korea’s 
customary form of statecraft.29  In this traditionally Korean (and East Asian)30 
context, Kim Il-sung’s authority as the supreme ruler is not simply derived from 
the people’s dependence on him but instead is a manifestation of his role as the 
sage father-ruler based on the “patriarchal, familial-political order.”31  This 
narrative of Kim forming a lasting kinship with his guerrillas and orphans within 
the partisan family in Manchuria is constantly transmitted through epic stories, 
plays, films, poems, and art, and becomes the ideal familial relationship 
between the Kims and their people. 32  According to Lankov, Kim Il-sung was 
admired by many North Koreans even after his death, but “Kim Jong Il was 
probably the softest and most liberal” of the three Kims.  In fact, he had reduced 
the number of political prisoners from about 200,000 in 1994 to about “80-
90,000” by 2011.  He also overlooked the marketization from below, the growing 
border trade with China, and “chose not to punish excessively refugees found in 
China.”33  In other words, he may surprisingly have been a transformative 
leader by tolerating these social changes in North Korea. 
After Kim Il-sung’s death, his son derived his legitimacy in part “from his 
exemplary performance of his filial obligations to the nation’s dead father.”34  He 
mourned his father’s death for three years like a good Confucian son of old, 
appointed his father as the country’s eternal President, inaugurated a new 
calendar to commemorate his birth, and built numerous monuments and a 
mausoleum to house his father’s embalmed body for all to see as if he were a 
living being.35  With respect to charismatic authority, Kim Il-sung enjoyed one of 
its purest forms because of his anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy and, as we have 
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seen from the previous chapters, he and his group of MSD guerrilla followers 
would form the core leadership of North Korea.  In order to create the conditions 
for hereditary charisma, the North Koreans would have to completely 
manufacture Kim Jong-il’s ties to the guerrilla legacy.36   
One of the important symbols concerning the transfer of power is the gift 
of a pistol from Kim Il-sung to his son.  According to North Korean history, Kim 
Il-sung’s mother gave him the two pistols that his father left behind when Kim 
was 14 years old.  The message his father conveyed was “armed struggle was 
the supreme form of struggle for national independence.”37  In other words, 
those who took up arms to fight the Japanese would have the purest nationalist 
credentials.  Upon receiving the pistols, Kim began to cultivate his own 
“unshakable revolutionary resolve to restore national independence through 
armed struggle.”  Moreover, North Koreans later claimed this was the true origin 
of Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics, the idea that many have attributed to him 
since his father’s death.  This story, while manufactured, ties both Kims to the 
anti-Japanese and the anti-U.S. imperialist traditions of the North Korean 
revolution and reinforces the heroic nationalist bloodline of the Kim family.38   
In addition to reviving Confucian traditions and attempting to transfer 
charismatic authority, Pyongyang also established legal authority to support the 
transition.  In fact, Darren Zook described the 1992 Constitution “as the 
succession constitution,” since it was revised to support the transition of power 
“in a secure and orderly manner after Kim Il-sung.”  For instance, the National 
Defense Commission (NDC) became an independent body as the “highest 
military leadership organ” and Kim Jong-il became the Chairman of the NDC.  
This implied that he was formally being delegated more authority as the second 
most powerful person in North Korea since the revised Constitution gave him 
“independent authority to issue orders and edicts.”39  This was not intended to 
challenge his father’s presidential authority, but rather to signal to potential 
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challengers he had total control of the KPA.  After his father’s death, the North 
revised the Constitution again in 1998 and it permanently abolished the 
presidency by designating Kim Il-sung as the Eternal President.  Even though 
Kim Jong-il was able to consolidate his power, this move meant his father was 
ruling the country posthumously.  This elevated the position of the Chairman of 
the NDC “to the highest organ of military and political power” as Kim Jong-il 
became the undisputed leader.  Nonetheless, this symbolic gesture to 
memorialize his father implied Kim still needed him as a source of legitimacy 
“since any opposition to his rule would be in effect opposition to Kim Il-sung, the 
juche ideal and the very essence of the North Korean state.”40    
The problem that the Kims had to overcome was that “in the Communist 
movement, the positions of revolutionaries should be determined by the 
contributions they have made for the cause of the revolution and the people and 
by their future possibilities, and should not be influenced in any way by blood 
relations.”41  According to Kim Jong-il’s biographers, the old Manchurian 
guerrillas were well aware of this revolutionary principle, but they nominated the 
younger Kim because they considered him the future of the Korean revolution.  
They claimed that Kim Il-sung remained uncharacteristically silent and 
indecisive during this discussion at the February 1974 plenary meeting of the 
KWP Political Committee.  Kim’s guerrillas apparently sensed that he felt 
uneasy about his son becoming his successor and, although they had always 
carried out his orders unconditionally, this time “they would not obey the 
President’s intention.”  Without any opposition from his guerrillas, Kim 
reportedly declared, “If all the committee members are in agreement, I have no 
objections to Kim Jong-il being elected to the Political Committee.”42   
Despite Kim Jong-il’s biographers’ claims that his father was reluctant to 
choose his son as successor, the Supreme Leader probably had his own 
reasons for doing so despite Kim Jong-il’s lack of experience and 
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accomplishments at the time.  According to Kim Young C., the Supreme Leader 
may have chosen his son for the following reasons: 
 
First, the revolutionary cause of the great leader Kim II Sung 
cannot be completed in a generation.  It is a historic task that can 
be completed only through the efforts of succeeding generations.  
Second, the successor to the leader must emerge from the new 
generation, not from the present generation.  Third, it is necessary 
for a successor to the great leader to go through a preparatory 
period, learning and inheriting from the leader the thought, theory, 
and art of leadership.  Fourth, the successor should be a man who 
is boundlessly loyal to the leader and who embodies the leader's 
ideology and leadership qualities.  Jong II, described as “endlessly 
loyal to the great leader, perfectly embodying the ideas, 
outstanding leadership, and noble traits of the leader, and 
brilliantly upholding the grand plan and intention of the leader at 
the highest level,” is said to provide the perfect answer to the 
question of succession.43  
 
On the other hand, Lim argues that Kim Il-sung made the choice because of his 
concerns over the Soviets’ de-Stalinization campaign following the death of 
Stalin in 1953, Lin Biao’s attempted assassination of Mao after he became his 
successor, his brother’s poor health, his guerrillas’ opposition to his wife, and 
the state of his own health.  In other words, these factors led Kim to desire the 
most loyal successor who would promote his legacy while he was still alive.   
Yet, Kim Jong-il had demonstrated his ability “in the art and literature 
sector” and impressed his father and his guerrillas when he successfully 
coordinated the Fifth Party Congress in 1970.  He was also the oldest son of the 
Supreme Leader who had demonstrated capabilities to lead at a relatively 
young age.44  This suggests performance also mattered, and challenges 
Weber’s suggestion that administrators in the charismatic leadership system are 
by and large selected based on their own charisma and personal loyalty to the 
ruler, not based on any special qualification.  This suggests it is also plausible 
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that the Kims may have chosen many of their senior administrators because of 
their capabilities to perform key tasks required for regime maintenance but it 
was largely unnoticed until organizations like the OGD were examined (see 
below).  In other words, the system’s success depends on the unity of the ruler 
and his administrative staff,45 and their disciples’ ability to perform.  As a result, 
the discussion of leadership from Chapter 4 suggests Kim Jong-il was more 
than a transactional leader that used a directing style of leadership.  Similar to 
his father, he probably derived his power from a mix of the ten sources of power 
that Bryan Watters discussed in his work, and Kim likely relied on both directing 
and coaching styles with personnel in key institutions.  Despite Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright’s impression that his subordinates “had little or no 
independence or flexibility,”46 it is plausible that like other effective leaders, 
based on the situation, Kim was capable of using supporting and even 
delegating styles47 with those he trusted.   
For example, as Kim Jong-il rose to power in the early 1970s, he 
commanded the Three Revolutions Movement of young loyalist to “weaken and 
sweep away the old guard,” and those who performed well “were fast-tracked to 
positions of power by Kim Jong Il.”48  He trusted his negotiators, such as Kim 
Kye-kwan, and empowered him to negotiate on his behalf.  Moreover, when 
Kim reassigned General Kim Kyok-sik as the commander of the IV Corps prior 
to the provocations in 2010,49 the Supreme Leader most likely delegated his 
authority to direct the operations near the NLL.  Finally, Kim Jong-il approved 
the appointment of Jang Song-thaek as a member of the NDC in 2009 and Jang 
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played a central role in promoting the leadership succession to his son.50  
Although one could argue Kim was a negative transformational leader because 
he failed to meet the needs and expectations of the majority of his people, 
Lankov emphasized that “it was Kim Il Sung’s policies that made disaster [of the 
1990s] unavoidable.”51  Moreover, the evidence suggests Kim Jong-il relied on 
the core members of his regime to achieve desired outcomes.  Kim still used 
coercion after he consolidated power, but he seemed to have been judicious 
when he decided to do so.  Kim like his father did not execute everyone for their 
failures.52  Some were rehabilitated and Jang Song-thaek is a good example of 
this practice.  He disappeared from public view in 2003 but he returned in 2006 
to play a powerful role in North Korea under Kim Jong-il.53  As discussed in 
Chapter 7, Jang’s growing power after his father’s death would force Kim Jong-
un, perhaps at the urging of the OGD, to execute him in 2013.          
In sum, once Kim Jong-il proved himself to be a worthy successor, the 
regime used a mix of neo-Confucian and familial (i.e., patriarchal), and 
charismatic (guerrilla and anti-imperialist legacy) legitimacy to restore Korea’s 
traditional style of statecraft and establish hereditary charismatic authority in 
North Korea.  Once he consolidated power, Kim Jong-il’s leadership style54 was 
likely to have been a situational style that went beyond directing and 
transactional leadership.  However, the use of other leadership styles (e.g., 
delegating style) probably only applied to those within the true core elite or 
select number of bureaucrats involved in key regime activities.  Moreover, as 
discussed above, Lankov even argued his rule may have been the “most liberal” 
by North Korean standards.  For instance, when the regime’s attempt to regain 
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“political control” through currency reform in 2009 failed, North Korea’s Premier 
Kim Yong-il stated, “‘I sincerely apologize as we pushed ahead with it without a 
sufficient preparation so it caused a big pain to the people’ and the state ‘will do 
its best to stabilize people’s lives’.”55  As a result, the social change that Kim 
Jong-il permitted continues to this day (i.e., positive transformational 
leadership).  In short, Kim was in control, but his rule was not solely based on 
totalitarianism.  In fact, evidence suggests his rule led to a post-totalitarian 
transition in North Korea.  Next, I examine North Korea’s use of smart power 
from 1994 to 2011.  
 
6.4 Kim’s Use of Smart Power during Famine Years of the 1990s 
I begin by exploring the key factors that led to the first U.S.-North Korea 
nuclear deal, the so-called 1994 Agreed Framework.  Then I will consider how 
North Korea responded to U.S. demands to inspect an apparent underground 
nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri in the late 1990s and how it leveraged the 
Taepodong-1 missile launch in August 1998 to build trust with the U.S. 
leadership.56  What I argue is that, by closely examining Pyongyang’s formal 
and informal diplomatic efforts along with its other policies and actions since the 
1990s, evidence reveals the leadership in key North Korean institutions 
coordinated their actions under a central authority.57  The fact that U.S. 
negotiations with Pyongyang slowed down noticeably after Kim Jong-il’s stroke 
in 2008 suggests he was clearly in charge from the very beginning of his rule.58  
According to the Secretary of State’s Morning Intelligence Summary of March 
29, 1994, Kim Jong-il was “closely associated” with the ongoing U.S.-North 
Korea nuclear negotiations at the time and, for domestic purposes, he had to 
“prove he was not taken in by Washington and is capable of standing up to 
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outside pressure.”59  Consequently, how did Kim convince U.S. negotiators to 
negotiate a deal arguably in his favor when many in the U.S. cautioned that 
North Koreans could not be trusted?   
 
6.4.1 Agreed Framework: Origin of Kim’s Use of Smart Power 
It is probably an understatement to suggest that North Korean 
negotiators had a significant challenge in convincing the U.S. that they could be 
trusted as negotiating partners.  As anticipated, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) argued North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons and 
presumed it would also pursue a covert program.60  However, the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) believed a nuclear 
deal was possible because Pyongyang had long desired improved relations with 
Washington and sought stability during a period of leadership transition.61  U.S. 
negotiators at the time stressed they would rely on both multilateral diplomacy 
and bilateral talks to engage North Korea, and the latter was not a gift for its bad 
behavior but rather “a vector to convey U.S. perspectives unalloyed and 
undiluted by multilateral involvement.”  Sometimes the U.S. needed unfettered 
access to engage directly with North Korea to protect “its unique interests and 
objectives.”  More importantly, U.S. negotiators in the mid-1990s viewed 
bilateral negotiations as “another policy instrument in a pretty empty toolbox” to 
address the North Korean problem.62 
One of Pyongyang’s messages after Kim Il-sung’s death supported the 
INR position by suggesting “the ‘historic and significant’ Kim-Carter meeting” 
made negotiations possible.63  North Korea was referring to Kim Il-sung’s 
meeting with former President Carter on June 16, 1994.64  During this historic 
meeting, Kim noted the problem between the two countries was lack of trust 
                                            
59
 Department of State, “DPRK, Hoping for the Best, Bracing for the Worst,” The Secretary’s 
Morning Intelligence Summary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, March 29, 1994, p. 1. 
60
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 250. 
61
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 250. 
62
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 400-401. 
63
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 251-259. 
64
 Marion Creekmore, Jr., A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and 
North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), p. 148. 
250 
 
and stated North Korea had “no need and no way of using plutonium to make 
nuclear weapons.”  Kim indicated he was willing to give up the 5-megawatt 
(MW) reactor for a Light Water Reactor (LWR), would honor the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and would allow International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspectors to continue their monitoring activities in North Korea.  Carter 
believed Kim was sincere and went on CNN to explain the deal to pre-empt 
Clinton’s consideration of UN sanctions and U.S. military options.  Some in the 
U.S. administration were furious and discounted the readout from the meeting 
as nothing new, but were relieved Kim had “agreed to keep the IAEA inspectors 
in place.”65  President Clinton indicated he did not trust Pyongyang until he 
received a letter from Kim Il-sung confirming what Carter had said; he agreed to 
resume bilateral talks and hold off on sanctions.66  In short, Kim-Il-sung used his 
power of attraction and persuasion to convince Carter to change the U.S.’s 
initial preference for UN sanctions and the potential use of force. 
The problem was Kim unexpectedly died on July 8, 1994, before a 
nuclear deal was finalized, but President Clinton chose not to change his policy 
preference and offered condolences by “expressing sympathy for the North 
Korean people.”67  Carter was convinced Kim Il-sung was the final authority in 
North Korea and his promise to denuclearize was not going to be reversed even 
after his death.68  Later, Kang Sok-ju, the First Vice Foreign Minister,69 informed 
his counterpart Robert Gallucci, the chief U.S. negotiator at the time, that 
Pyongyang had softened its demands due to Washington’s symbolic gesture 
after Kim’s death.  Seoul later accused Washington of going soft on Pyongyang, 
but the U.S. emphasized it could no longer afford to stand by and watch the 
North Koreans “remove the spent fuel from Yongbyon.”70  As Albright noted 
later, it appeared as if the North Koreans knew when not to “push their luck,”71 
                                            
65
 Creekmore, Jr., A Moment of Crisis, pp. 153-184. 
66
 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 603. 
67
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 251-259. 
68
 Creekmore, A Moment of Crisis, p. 166. 
69
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 37. 
70
 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 264. 
71
 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p. 456. 
251 
 
which suggests their careful consideration of contextual intelligence as well as 
the probability of success. 
In September 1994, U.S. negotiators continued to press the North 
Koreans to freeze and dismantle their nuclear programs, ship the spent fuel out 
of the country as soon as possible, remain in the NPT, accept inspections of 
nuclear facilities, and improve relations with South Korea.  The North Koreans 
explained it was premature to talk about inspections “before trust was built” 
between the two countries.  They would agree to inspections only after the 
LWRs were built in North Korea.  U.S. negotiators believed informal discussions 
with North Koreans would yield better results and, as anticipated, Kang Sok-ju 
agreed to accept South Korean nuclear reactors, something he had resisted 
before, as long as the U.S. guaranteed their delivery.  Kang also softened his 
demands on normalizing diplomatic relations and trade with the U.S.,72  both 
being unrealistic demands at the time, and used them to his advantage to 
secure the LWRs, which was his aim from the very beginning.           
Pyongyang subsequently proposed a new deal requesting U.S. 
presidential security assurance and energy assistance before it would freeze 
and allow IAEA monitoring of spent fuel rods and halting the construction of two 
new nuclear reactors.  However, Kang refused to concede on the point that the 
5-MW reactor must shut down and warned the reactor could be operating until 
the new LWRs were producing energy, and only then would Pyongyang rejoin 
the NPT.  He also refused to ship the spent fuel overseas.73  The KPA appeared 
to keep the pressure on the U.S. by issuing a statement that it must protect 
North Korea’s sovereignty, and thus it “can never allow any attempt to open up 
military facilities through special inspections.”74  Kang cautioned that if there 
was no deal the KPA would call for restarting the 5-MW reactor and might even 
pursue reprocessing of plutonium.  Kang again showed some flexibility to gain 
trust by suggesting that if Washington would give Pyongyang more time on 
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special inspections it might result in North Korean commitment not to restart the 
5-MW reactor.75  After a Principals meeting in Washington, Gallucci received 
their approval to defer the special inspection until the LWRs’ key components 
were delivered.  U.S. policymakers also decided to secure the spent fuel right 
away but left open the timing of the shipment out of North Korea.  If the 
negotiations failed, the U.S. would pursue sanctions at the UN.76  Kang again 
managed to set the agenda for this round of talks to shape the U.S. position to 
align with his and gain concurrence to defer special inspections and to retain 
the spent fuel in North Korea for an unspecified amount of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the negotiations resumed at the working level, it was understood 
the U.S. “would not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons,” and the growing 
sentiment on the U.S. side was that North Koreans were ready to 
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Figure 6.1. Robert Gallucci and Kang Sok-ju signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework.   
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/04/05/world/05korea_accord1994.jpg  
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compromise.77  On October 6, 1994, Kang informed Gallucci that the KPA was 
arguing the deal was a trick to gain access to sensitive military facilities, and 
they could not agree to safeguards before the LWRs were provided.  As a 
result, senior INR analysts viewed Kang as a benign negotiator and believed 
there were policy disagreements in Pyongyang but North Koreans were ready 
to make a deal.78  However, it could also have been a well-coordinated North 
Korean effort to achieve increased leverage during negotiations with the U.S.  
Kang then offered to implement IAEA safeguards and special inspections once 
70 to 80 percent of the LWR components were shipped to North Korea.  Some 
U.S. negotiators trusted the North Korean negotiators and were convinced this 
offer was sincere and “were confident of a breakthrough.”  As the negotiations 
continued, Kang’s position was perceived to be weakening and he finally 
agreed to “full compliance with its safeguards obligations, including all the steps 
that would be required by the IAEA.”79  This seems to have been an obvious 
requirement if Pyongyang was prepared to freeze its nuclear programs.    
The U.S. negotiators assumed Kim had overruled the hardliners in the 
KPA who opposed the negotiations.  By October 14, 1994, Pyongyang indicated 
it would not construct any new nuclear facilities and halt its operations at the 5-
MW reactor.  Again, the former concession was not a major one since the North 
Koreans had yet to construct these facilities and to freeze the program they 
would have to shut down the 5-MW reactor.  Still, these were viewed as major 
concessions coupled with the “freeze and dismantlement of existing facilities.”  
North Koreans may have anticipated these concessions were enough to change 
the negotiating position of the U.S. in favor of its own interests.  This opened the 
door for the U.S. to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil as an alternative 
source of energy.  The last hurdle was a major disagreement on North-South 
dialogue as the final condition for the agreement.  The U.S. had to accept South 
Korean demands, as part of its parallel multilateral approach, for the inter-
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Korean talks to make the deal work.  The U.S. negotiators were sympathetic 
and observed “genuine disappointment on the faces of their [North Korean] 
counterparts” as they held firm on the inter-Korean talks as part of the deal.  
The U.S. continued to assume North Korean negotiators would have a difficult 
time with the KWP since the Party, not its diplomats, was responsible for North-
South relations.  They felt Kang caved in when he reluctantly accepted bilateral 
talks with South Korea.  This appeared to be a concession but both sides knew 
this was necessary to finalize the deal.  Pyongyang simply had to meet with 
Seoul to honor the commitment and the U.S. had to demand it to gain the 
support of the South Koreans.  The remaining obstacles to the agreement were 
finally resolved on October 17, 1994.80 (see Figure 6.1).  In the end, Gallucci 
defended the nuclear deal for saving the NPT, freezing of North Korea’s nuclear 
program, and offering the potential to dismantling of the existing nuclear 
program.81  Nevertheless, the perception was Kim had gotten a better deal. 
 
6.4.2 Post-Agreed Framework and the Use of Smart Power 
As the 1994 agreement was being implemented into the late 1990s, one 
of the obstacles that threatened the nuclear deal was the Kumchang-ri incident 
of the summer of 1998.82  DIA was convinced Kumchang-ri was a secret 
nuclear facility and North Korea “was cheating on the Agreed Framework,”83 but 
the inspection of the site in May 1999 failed to confirm this and disclosed it was 
only empty tunnels.84  Gary Samore, the National Security Council’s (NSC) 
nonproliferation expert, later took responsibility for advocating DIA’s incorrect 
assessment of the suspected nuclear site and wrote “that was the biggest 
mistake I made in my career as a civil servant.”85  In exchange for the 
inspection, Pyongyang received 600,000 tons of food aid86 and kept Kim Dae-
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jung’s hope of an inter-Korean summit alive.87  In this case, Pyongyang did not 
attempt to change the initial position of the U.S. but manipulated it to embarrass 
the U.S. and to acquire aid.   
After the Kumchang-ri incident, Washington began to focus on North 
Korea’s missiles and disclosed Pyongyang was ready to conduct another 
Taepodong missile launch.88  The U.S. became more concerned about 
Pyongyang’s missile programs after it launched a Taepodong missile in August 
1998, with the potential to threaten U.S. territory.89  In fact, some viewed it as a 
prototype nuclear ICBM test.90  The U.S. held a bilateral meeting with North 
Korea in October 1998 but it was unable to reach a missile deal.91  This forced 
President Clinton to salvage the Agreed Framework in November 1998 by 
appointing former Secretary of Defense William Perry “as coordinator for U.S. 
policy toward North Korea.”92  After Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, 
North Korea announced a self-imposed missile moratorium as long as talks 
continued with the U.S.93  The moratorium improved relations with Washington.  
The Perry visit resulted in a policy recommendation “to increase outside 
assistance… in exchange for steps by the North to reduce its threatening 
military posture.”  It was intended to be a litmus test not only for Pyongyang to 
honor the 1994 Agreed Framework but also to cease its missile launches and 
military provocations.94  Later in July 2000, Kim Jong-il informed Russian 
President Vladimir Putin he would give up his space launches if others provided 
assistance to launch his satellites.95  Kim Yong-ho provided more details by 
arguing that Kim and Putin “agreed that Russia could launch two or three 
satellites a year” if North Korea stopped producing missiles.  Albright apparently 
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was persuaded to consider the offer during her visit to Pyongyang in October 
2000, but it “vanished” as a viable solution during the Bush administration.  
Putin reportedly developed very close “personal ties” with Kim that even after 
the nuclear test in 2006, he offered to forgive $8 billion in North Korean debt.96     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A major breakthrough in bilateral relations came when KPA Vice Marshal 
Jo Myong-rak met with Clinton in the Oval Office on October 10, 2000, in full 
dress uniform.  Some believed Jo’s uniform symbolized KPA and KWP support 
of Kim Jong-il’s diplomatic efforts with the U.S.  Jo brought a letter from Kim 
Jong-il stating he “was prepared to cease the production, sale, and use of long-
range ballistic missiles.”  Jo also delivered the message that, if Clinton would 
visit North Korea, “Kim Jong-il will guarantee that he will satisfy all your security 
concerns.”  Clinton understood this meeting was about building rapport and 
turned on his charm so Vice Marshal Jo could convey the message that Clinton 
is “somebody that we can trust.”  When the two parted, all the Americans in the 
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Figure 6.2. Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rak meets with President Bill Clinton in the oval 
office on October 10, 2000. https://nkresearcher.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/cho-and-
bill.jpg?w=443&h=302&crop=1    
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room “knew there was something real here.  Kim Jong-il was ready to do a 
[missile] deal.”97  This was another successful attempt by the North to attract in 
order to shape U.S. policymakers’ ideas and beliefs to ensure the attainment of 
Kim’s policy preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinton decided to send then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to lay 
the groundwork for a potential summit with Kim in Pyongyang.98  She had 
already been informed by the State Department’s INR after the North-South 
summit that Kim’s performance had “undermined” the near consensus view in 
the U.S. Intelligence Community that he was “irrational and illogical.”  In fact, he 
was so well informed that “he may well know more about South Korea than Kim 
Dae-jung knows about events in the North.”  What’s more, the North was 
surprisingly flexible and it survived because it did not promote “an ideologically 
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Figure 6.3. Kim Jong-il meets with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang in 
late October 2000.   
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rigid foreign policy.”  In fact, “the policy reacted to changing circumstances in 
and around the peninsula.” 99  Again, this challenged the notion North Korea 
survives merely because of its fortuitous geographical location next to China.  
Kim Jong-il was capable of demonstrating his competence to garner respect 
and admiration by the U.S. 
Clinton also agreed to a joint communique with Marshal Jo, in which both 
sides vowed “no hostile intent” and committed to improve relations.  When 
Albright met Jo in Pyongyang, she presented him with a letter from Clinton 
laying out his expectations for her visit.  She finally met Kim Jong-il and he 
thanked her for Clinton’s condolence message sent after his father’s death and 
the recent U.S. humanitarian aid.  She raised the issue of missiles; Kim claimed 
he was selling missiles to raise money and would be willing to suspend sales for 
U.S. compensation.  Albright pushed back and questioned his rationale for the 
missiles, and Kim acknowledged they were also for national defense.  When 
she met Kim the next day, Albright raised several technical issues regarding the 
missile deal.  Kim surprised her by “answering the questions himself, not even 
consulting the expert by his side.”  He also raised the issue of hardliners in 
Pyongyang by noting that half of the KPA was skeptical of rapprochement with 
the U.S. and even some in the Foreign Ministry opposed it.  Kim said the 
“solution rested with normalization of relations.”100   
As Albright departed Pyongyang, she observed Kim Jong-il “was 
serious,” and confirmed other foreign leaders’ assessment that Kim “was an 
intelligent man who knew what he wanted.  He was isolated, not uninformed.”101  
The clear impression was Kim “made virtually all the decisions,” and as noted 
above, “Officials below him had little or no independence or flexibility.”102  
Albright concluded Kim’s aim was to normalize relations with the U.S., which 
would provide security assurance and legitimize his rule.103  Albright was 
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convinced that in exchange Kim was ready to make a missile deal with 
Clinton.104  When she returned to Washington, it was too late for Clinton to 
make the trip to seal the agreement with Kim in Pyongyang.105  Nevertheless, 
Kim’s power of attraction eventually led to easing of U.S. sanctions for the first 
time since 1993,106 and included lifting “restrictions on nonmilitary trade, 
financial transactions, travel, and official contacts.”107  Kim’s high-level 
engagement with Albright changed her initial impression of him and shaped 
U.S. policy preferences to align with his own.  In short, the evidence clearly 
suggests Kim Jong-il was employing smart power to survive during the famine 
years. 
 
6.4.3 Use of Smart Power to Survive the Famine Years 
First, what were Kim’s desired outcomes during the 1990s?  I argue the 
aim of reunification became aspirational after the death of Kim Il-sung, and as 
the economy collapsed, Kim’s primary aim was survival.  There is little doubt 
that the 1994 Agreed Framework helped North Korea survive the famine years 
by neutralizing the primary threat to its survival (i.e., the U.S.) and gaining 
economic concessions.  Once it pursued negotiations, the U.S. had to abandon 
the use of UN sanctions and military force.  A bonus for Kim was securing a U.S. 
agreement for the delivery of LWRs since it legitimized his right to a civilian 
nuclear program.  As the agreement was being implemented, the U.S. was 
convinced Kim was pursuing an alternative nuclear program at Kumchang-ri.  
The U.S. was proven wrong and was manipulated to provide additional food aid, 
but despite the incident, U.S.-North Korea relations improved at the highest 
levels.  As a result, Vice Marshal Jo met with President Clinton in the oval office 
and Secretary Albright met with Kim in Pyongyang.       
Second, which forms of power behavior did Kim prefer in the 1990s and 
third, what resources were available to implement his strategy?  Once North 
                                            
104
 Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 32. 
105
 Albright, Madam Secretary, pp. 466-469. 
106
 McEachern, Inside the Red Box, pp. 132-134. 
107
 Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 459. 
260 
 
Korea manufactured the first nuclear crisis to bring the U.S. to the negotiating 
table, it used its experienced diplomats to persuade their U.S. counterparts that 
their primary aim was to normalize relations with the U.S.  At the same time, 
elements of the KPA and the KWP were used as negotiating leverage to 
pressure the U.S. to accept many of their demands.  In spite of the plausible 
use of deception at Kumchang-ri, once the agreement was made, North Korea 
used high-level diplomacy to achieve its aims.  This included active participation 
by one of the most senior KPA generals and the Supreme Leader himself.  In 
exchange for normalizing relations, they offered to address all of the U.S.’ 
security concerns about North Korea.  This strategy was very effective in 
securing the first nuclear deal and to build trust between the two sides.  In the 
end, it bought Kim more time to ensure his survival and legitimize his rule. 
Fourth, what was Kim’s assessment of the likelihood of success?  North 
Korea had manufactured its first nuclear crisis but once President Carter 
intervened to defuse the crisis the probability of success increased as long as 
Pyongyang was willing to address Washington’s concerns about its nascent 
nuclear program.  North Korean diplomats worked closely with their U.S. 
counterparts to convince them that they were serious about negotiating a 
nuclear deal with the U.S. but successfully argued that unless the U.S. showed 
some flexibility the KPA and the KWP would oppose the deal.  They correctly 
assumed U.S. priority was to eliminate the growing nuclear threat from North 
Korea and de-escalating the nuclear crisis in Korea.  Despite Seoul’s concerns 
over being left out of the talks, Pyongyang did not view Seoul as a major 
obstacle to negotiating a deal with the U.S.  Once the two sides overcame the 
tensions resulting from the Kumchang-ri incident, North Korea seemed to 
realize high-level engagement would improve the likelihood of success.  It 
almost persuaded Clinton to visit Pyongyang to resolve the missile issue.    
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors during the crisis?  
North Korea appeared to have made several concessions, the most important 
being the freeze of their nuclear programs, but the perception of the outcomes 
was that North Korea had won the negotiations.  For instance, Dick Cheney 
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later opposed the second nuclear deal with Pyongyang because he believed 
North Korea had pocketed Washington’s concessions (i.e., security assurances, 
shipments of heavy fuel oil, and provision of LWRs) while it continued to 
develop its nuclear weapons.  This came about because Pyongyang carefully 
orchestrated the perception of policy divergence in Pyongyang among its key 
institutions to exercise smart power.  Some observers began to argue the 
Agreed Framework and subsequent agreements with North Korea indicated that 
“once the North’s leadership had made such a decision, the general pattern was 
for the talks to move steadily toward resolution.”108   
This set the stage for normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations,109 and 
Clinton was given much of the credit for creating the “momentum of 
engagement” with Pyongyang.110  The key was Clinton’s decision to coexist with 
Pyongyang and his ability to persuade the Kim regime he was serious about 
normalization.111  After he left office, Clinton lamented to Kim Dae-jung, “If I had 
one more year in office, the fate of the Korean Peninsula would have been 
different.”112  What the evidence thus far suggests is that Pyongyang carefully 
orchestrated a smart power strategy to build trust and persuade Washington it 
was a credible negotiating partner, despite the coercive elements of its strategy.   
In sum, the evidence shows that by almost any measure Kim Jong-il and 
his elites had demonstrated that they were fully capable of exercising leadership 
and effective smart power strategies to change the initial preferences of the 
U.S.  They accomplished this primarily through the use of high-level 
negotiations and engagements to shape U.S. policymakers’ ideas and beliefs 
about the regime and its leadership as well.  That said, the 1994 agreement 
may have prevented another war on the Peninsula, and halted the construction 
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of two larger North Korean nuclear reactors.113  In other words, Pyongyang also 
had to give up something to receive U.S. concessions, and this actually helped 
to establish some level of trust between the two sides before the end of the 
Clinton administration.  The South Koreans were troubled they were not 
included in the negotiations but settled for Pyongyang’s reluctant agreement to 
hold inter-Korean talks.  The question is how would the North Koreans respond 
to President George Bush’s hardline stance toward Pyongyang in early 2000s? 
 
6.5 Kim’s Continued Use of Smart Power during the Bush Years 
I have thus far shown how Pyongyang used smart power in the 1990s to 
survive the famine years by manufacturing nuclear and missile crises during the 
Clinton administration.  However, before I discuss how Kim persuaded former 
President Bush to change his initial policy preferences and exploited Seoul’s 
Sunshine Policy, I will examine North Korean institutions that were assisting 
Kim in the development and implementation of smart power strategy.   
 
6.5.1 The OGD and Kim’s Other Smart Power Institutions 
According to recent revelations from Jang Jin-sung, a high-level North 
Korean defector from the United Front Department (UFD), the UFD was 
responsible for producing Pyongyang’s smart power strategy vis-à-vis South 
Korea114 as the institution responsible for “all matters related to South Korea.”115  
According to Jang, Kim was “slowly losing his iron grip over the people” by 
1999, but South Korea’s Sunshine Policy saved his regime.  He claims 
Pyongyang initially viewed the Sunshine Policy as “soft-power tactics” to cause 
systemic collapse, but Kim directed the UFD to develop “a ‘Sunshine 
Exploitation’ strategy” to “extract much-needed economic benefits from South 
Korea while making as few concessions as possible.”  As we shall see, the 
support of the Sunshine Policy in mid-1998 from the North Korea-born CEO of 
Hyundai, Jung Joo-young, helped to legitimize the two Koreas’ engagement.  
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The UFD mobilized all of its resources,116 including extremely sensitive 
information about the South,117 to develop a mixed strategy of engagement on 
land to extract aid and use military provocations along the NLL “as a bargaining 
chip” by “offering to cease provocations.”118    
In other words, UFD developed North Korea’s smart power strategy in 
response to the South’s Sunshine Policy, and the threat of provocations along 
the NLL was surprisingly intended to ensure the sustainment of Seoul’s 
largesse.  The first naval engagement of Yeonpyeong on June 15, 1999, 
initiated the hard power element of the strategy and the second NLL clash 
during the World Cup in June 2002 attempted to internationalize the strategy 
but also portrayed the clash as “an accident.”119  In addition to the UFD, Jang 
claims there are five other important organizations essential to Kim’s survival.  
They are the OGD (as discussed), the Propaganda and Agitation Department120 
(where Kim Jong-il learned how to use the art of propaganda to control his 
people),121 Office 38 (manages Kim’s money),122 Office 35 (collects intelligence 
overseas), and the Ministry of State Security (physically controls those who 
cannot be controlled by propaganda and monopoly control of information).  One 
can envisage how the OGD, which Jang describes as “Kim Jong-il’s executive 
chain of command, which sits above the constitution and has unrestricted 
jurisdiction to intervene in any sphere,” played a significant role in the 
development of Kim’s smart power strategies.123  As discussed earlier, this 
seems to suggest Kim may have been using supporting and delegating 
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leadership styles with the OGD (and perhaps others) to effectively manage his 
smart power strategy.  The question is who works in these organizations? 
Similar to Jang, who was the only one of the six ultra-elite North Korean 
poets working for the UFD, and was “admitted” to Kim Jong-il’s innermost circle 
for writing an “epic poem” about the Military-First Policy, one can imagine others 
in these core organizations achieving similar status for the key roles they play in 
the regime’s survival.  According to Jang, once someone achieves the status of 
the admitted, it guarantees “a privilege of immunity that was powerful beyond 
imagination: not even the highest authorities of the DPRK could investigate, 
prosecute, or harm one of the Admitted.”  The only way the admitted could be 
purged was for “treason and for the Organization and Guidance Department to 
receive explicit permission from Kim Jong-il himself.”  In other words, those in 
the OGD were the only ones who had the power to eliminate the innermost core 
of the elite and were almost untouchable since they answered only to the Kims 
and had the prerogative to intervene in any sphere of state affairs.124   
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Figure 6.4. Choe Ryong-hae giving guidance at an unknown facility, which suggests 
some core elites, had delegated authority to issue guidance and direction. 
https://www.nknews.org/2014/05/not-likely-that-choe-purged-according-to-sk-ministry/  
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As a result, it is conceivable that many of North Korea’s best and 
brightest work in key institutions required for regime survival, who are also “loyal 
and fearless”125 and led by Kim Jong-il, and who are supported by the OGD and 
other core institutions to develop and implement effective smart power 
strategies.  What this suggests is that totalitarian control126 alone does not 
guarantee regime survival; it must also have a strategy to deal with the outside 
world.  This also means that within the core elite there must be some personnel 
who are intellectually capable of developing effective smart power strategies 
and exercising some delegated authority. (see Figure 6.4).  For example, U.S. 
Ambassador Christopher Hill described Kim Kye-kwan, his North Korean 
counterpart at the 6PT, as “intelligent, and self-confident, and thoughtful” during 
their encounters.  However, Hill speculated that Kim may have appeared so 
because he did not have to rely on prepared talking points; he had been on the 
job for over a decade and could have memorized all the talking points.  In short, 
Hill could not imagine Kim offering his own thoughts or deviating from pre-
approved negotiating positions from Pyongyang127 but still made the point to 
emphasize how Kim debunked the perception North Korean diplomats were 
“robotlike negotiators.”128  I argue it is more likely Kim chose not to refer to his 
talking points because he had mastered the nuclear issues from Pyongyang’s 
perspective over a long period of time and was empowered to convey them to 
others.  His expertise helped Pyongyang secure the best deal and survive.     
 
6.5.2 Kim’s Use of Smart Power vis-à-vis U.S. Allies 
I will now examine how North Korea remained defiant during the Bush 
administration by manipulating U.S. policy divergence with allies and partners in 
Northeast Asia, and policy incoherence within the U.S. interagency.  Ultimately, 
Pyongyang secured a second nuclear agreement with the U.S. in September 
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2005,129 despite ignoring international warnings not to expand its nuclear 
arsenal and proliferate nuclear technology.  North Korea also ignored U.S. 
concerns about its covert uranium enrichment capability to provide a second 
path for producing nuclear weapons.  This outcome is puzzling since President 
Bush unceremoniously rolled out his hardline toward Pyongyang during his first 
meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung in March 2001.  During the 
meeting, Kim pitched his rationale for the Sunshine Policy by emphasizing 
engagement was the best way to address the threat from Pyongyang.  Bush 
apparently interrupted Kim to express his doubts about negotiating with North 
Korea and made it clear he loathed Kim Jong-il.  Moreover, during the press 
event with reporters, Bush referred to Kim as “this man,” which most South 
Koreans found “disrespectful and offensive.”  Indeed, Kim later said Bush 
“humiliated me by calling me ‘this man’.”  Secretary Powell described the 
meeting with the South Korean president as a fiasco and it set a negative tone 
for U.S.-South Korea relations for several years.130  How did this occur?   
 
6.5.2.1 The Sunshine Policy and Policy Divergence with Bush 
The North Korean famine beginning in the mid-1990s gradually changed 
South Korean perceptions of North Korea; it humanized their brethren in the 
North and they were no longer viewed automatically as a threat.  North Korea 
gradually managed to re-shape the ideas and beliefs about it in the South.  This 
made it possible for politicians like Kim Dae-jung to pursue an open-ended 
engagement with Pyongyang.131  Kim’s Sunshine Policy of engagement gained 
momentum even after North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japan 
in August 1998.  As mentioned earlier, the launch concerned Washington, and 
also troubled Tokyo, but Seoul dismissed it as a mere demonstration meant to 
rally domestic support behind Kim.132  Nevertheless, the Sunshine Policy would 
be tested along the NLL when KPA patrol boats crossed it 52 times from June 7 
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to 14, 1999.  This predictably led to an armed clash on June 15, in which an 
estimated 17 to 30 North Koreans were killed and at least one KPA patrol boat 
was sunk.  The South Koreans had nine sailors wounded and some of their 
ships were damaged during the skirmish.133  Kim Dae-jung argued his strong 
response during the incident demonstrated his approach was not an 
appeasement policy.134   
Why would Kim Jong-il escalate tensions along the NLL when Seoul was 
clearly trying to engage Pyongyang?  Seoul believed the NLL incident occurred 
because the KPA was trying to meet its crab quota, which had doubled, to earn 
foreign currency.135  As noted earlier, the UFD developed a sunshine 
exploitation strategy to extract maximum concessions from Seoul while offering 
as little as possible.136  The timely visit to North Korea by Hyundai founder Jung 
Joo-young led to food aid from the South and the international community.137  
The South chose not to escalate, and under Kim Dae-Jung it provided 950,000 
tons of fertilizer and 1.14 million tons of food aid.138  Seoul established trust with 
Pyongyang,139 but may have taught it to rely on military provocations along the 
NLL as an integral part of its foreign policy strategy.140  As one would suspect, 
the North Korean leadership viewed the results as a “phenomenal success” of 
its sunshine exploitation policy.141  This was not achieved by chance or luck. 
North Korea continued to use high-level engagements and attenuated 
the use of hard and soft power to influence key players in Northeast Asia.  
Despite the escalation of tensions along the NLL, Pyongyang knew when to 
support the Sunshine Policy.  For example, it suspended the launch of a 
Taepodong missile in September 1999, after rolling it out onto the launch pad 
for all to see.  North Korea also empowered Lim Dong-won, South Korea’s 
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Minister of Unification, who was originally from the North, by embracing him as 
a key interlocutor in fulfilling the Sunshine Policy with Pyongyang.  When Lim 
visited Pyongyang in 1991 to promote Korean reconciliation under South 
Korean President Roh Tae-woo, the North Koreans arranged a meeting with 
Lim’s “long-lost sister,” and that reportedly shaped his positive view of the 
Sunshine Policy.142  They co-opted Jung Joo-young as well, who was also from 
the North, and envisioned the inter-Korean summit through him in December 
1998.143  Lim became the architect of the Sunshine Policy,144 and followed up 
with the North Koreans to finalize the deal for the 2000 inter-Korean summit.145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Lim, the summit resulted in significant confidence-building 
measures that would eventually lead to peace on the Korean Peninsula.  They 
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Figure 6.5. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung links hands with North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-il during a farewell luncheon after the North-South summit in Pyongyang on June 15, 
2000. http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/1395274-3x2-940x627.jpg  
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included the establishment of a hotline, several reunions of separated families 
from the Korean War, North-South ministerial meetings, cultural exchanges, 
suspension of psychological operations along the DMZ, development of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), tours to Mount Kumgang, and the removal 
of landmines to open two corridors within the DMZ.146  These outcomes suggest 
the North Koreans can be meticulous in their attempts to acquire the contextual 
intelligence necessary to develop successful smart power strategies.  Having 
said that, one has to wonder why Bush accepted another nuclear agreement 
with Pyongyang in September 2005 after declaring he “didn’t trust North Korea 
to honor any nonproliferation agreement” and pledged not to have dialogue with 
Pyongyang.147  How did Kim change Bush’s hardline policy position?   
In March 2001, Bush made it clear that Clinton’s policy of engagement 
had failed, and “North Korea would have to change its behavior before America 
made concessions.”148  Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor, 
apparently believed the Sunshine Policy came close to appeasement of North 
Korea and Kim Dae-jung’s “largesse was helping to prop up the regime.”149  
When former Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated to the press that the 
Bush administration was willing to negotiate with Pyongyang, Bush was 
“stunned” and forced him to issue a reclama.150  Powell later stated, “I had to go 
out and in an embarrassing way to say to the press, ‘well, you know we’ll study 
it’.”151  This was “a bad omen”152 for the Bush administration.153 
Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech in January 2002 caused alarm when many 
interpreted the phrase as a prelude to regime change in Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea.154  As expected, North Korea expressed its displeasure and warned that 
the KPA was “firmly determined not to allow any aggressors to dare invade the 
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inviolable territory of our country but wipe them out to the last one at the risk of 
their lives.”155  Seoul also interpreted the speech as U.S. declaratory policy to 
bring “down North Korea through military ‘preemption’ and ‘regime change’.”156  
However, when Bush visited South Korea shortly after the speech, he toned 
down his rhetoric and stated the U.S. “had no intention of invading or attacking 
North Korea.”  Kim Dae-jung also persuaded Bush not to use the Axis of Evil 
moniker during his public remarks and encouraged talks with Pyongyang.157  By 
August 2002, North Korea was using its UN office in New York to approach 
Leon Sigal, a former New York Times reporter,158 to convey its desire to 
address U.S. security concerns if Washington would end its hostile policy.159 
(see Appendix C for how North Korea perceives U.S. hostile policy). The North 
was reaching out to informal contacts in the U.S. that they trusted to deliver 
indirect messages to the U.S. government.  
 
6.5.2.2 The Japanese Abductee Issue and Miscalculation 
As the U.S. continued to mull over its strategy for North Korea, the CIA 
warned in September 2002 that it had detected “Pyongyang’s covert program to 
produce highly enriched uranium.”160  Meanwhile, Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro of Japan visited North Korea for his first summit with Kim Jong-il on 
September 17, 2002, with the hope of normalizing relations with Pyongyang.161  
(see Figure 6.6).  The Japanese had been coordinating with the North Koreans 
since late 2001 in Beijing but they were also meeting them secretly in New 
York.162  The plan was for Koizumi to issue “an apology for the ‘unfortunate 
past’ and financial incentives were to be part of the deal.”  However, during the 
summit Kim responded with his own apology for abducting Japanese citizens.  
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According to Alexis Dudden, this was a bold move for both Kim and Koizumi.  
Koizumi wanted to settle the matter of history with North Korea to settle things 
with things with Pyongyang, and Kim “clearly understood that political apologies 
were the name of the game” and offered regret for the eight dead abductees.163       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Kim and Koizumi miscalculated the potential reaction by the 
Japanese public.  It appears that Koizumi assumed the resolution of the nuclear 
issue would help him overcome the sensitive abductee issue, and Kim also 
failed to grasp how emotional the abductee issue would be in Japan.  Kim might 
have been enticed to come clean on the abductions to obtain $5 to 10 billion in 
Japanese aid.164  Kim’s claim that only five Japanese were alive and many of 
their graves were lost during heavy storms was unacceptable to the 
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Figure 6.6. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi in September 2002. http://nypost.com/2016/01/10/how-north-korea-
kidnapped-hundreds-brainwashed-them-into-spies/  
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Japanese.165  On the other hand, Dudden argued that Kim may have been 
“misguided” when he issued the apology but it was “an attempt to generate 
legitimacy for himself abroad and at home.”  He sought international legitimacy 
with the unexpected apology for the abductions and legitimacy at home by 
expanding his nuclear programs and defying the U.S.166   
After the summit, the Japanese focused solely on the abduction issue 
despite the growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang.  It did so because the 
Japanese government and the media had been ignoring the abductee families’ 
pleas for assistance, and Kim’s revelation highlighted the fact that both had 
failed to protect their own people against North Korean agents.  Tokyo had little 
choice but to exploit the incident to summon “the myth of Japanese 
togetherness.”  However, for most Koreans, the Japanese reaction to the North 
Korean abductions made little sense since they have “yet to deal with the tragic 
stories of the millions of Asian lives ruined by the forced separation and 
abductions perpetrated by its colonial and wartime government.”167  Japan’s 
myopic focus on the abductee issue avoids sensitive questions like “’Why does 
Pyongyang hate Japan so much?’ and ‘Would Japanese cities or the U.S. 
military bases in Japan be North Korea’s target?’”168  Thus, Kim may have been 
wrong about the Japanese reaction, but most Koreans were also surprised by 
what they perceived as Japanese over reaction considering Tokyo’s own tainted 
historical legacy.  Kim probably believed telling the truth about the abduction 
scheme would help him gain some legitimacy and significant concessions from 
Japan.  He was wrong.  The public outrage in Japan compelled Tokyo to 
resolve the abduction issue before discussing any other issues with Pyongyang.  
Nonetheless, Koizumi encouraged Bush to send his envoy to Pyongyang to 
resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.169   
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6.5.2.3 The HEU Revelation in Pyongyang and U.S. Containment 
Cheney and others had been arguing that states like North Korea would 
never give up their nuclear weapons, and called for more sanctions to hasten 
regime change.  Rice favored the hardline position, but she recognized it would 
not succeed without Chinese and South Korean support.  She also knew there 
was no support at the Pentagon for the use of force in Korea.  Rice persuaded 
Bush after Koizumi’s call to accept the North Korean invitation by sending Jim 
Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to 
Pyongyang.  She reassured Bush that Kelly would deliver a tough message and 
confront the North Koreans about uranium enrichment.  The hardliners in the 
administration did not trust the State Department, and Kelly was under strict 
instructions to deliver only the approved talking points.170   
On October 4, 2002, during Kelly’s meeting with First Vice Foreign 
Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was the lead negotiator for the 1994 agreement,171 
Kang reportedly “admitted to having a covert uranium enrichment program.”  
When Kelly’s team sent a cable to Washington from the British Embassy in 
Pyongyang,172 the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) revelation was leaked to the 
media and the U.S. decided to halt the shipment of heavy fuel oil to 
Pyongyang.173  On October 25, 2002, North Korea’s Central News Agency 
(KCNA) announced that Kelly accused Pyongyang of a covert HEU program 
“without producing any evidence,” and claimed it “suffered a loss of electricity” 
because the U.S. failed to provide the LWRs after eight years of construction.  
In other words, North Korea was accusing the U.S. of failing to live up to the 
Agreed Framework, and therefore it “was entitled to possess not only nuclear 
weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that, so as to defend its 
sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the 
United States.”174  
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The day after the KCNA report, Bush reaffirmed during an Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Mexico that the U.S. would not 
attack or invade North Korea.  Bush believed Kim confessed because the U.S. 
was serious and “he needs assistance from the United States.”  Nevertheless, 
Bush indicated talks were out of the question due to the revelation of 
Pyongyang’s HEU program.175  Some argued Bush and Cheney decided to 
overlook the North Korean nuclear problem until they “dealt with Iraq.”176  As the 
invasion of Iraq loomed, Pyongyang continued to signal its willingness to return 
to the negotiating table.177  On November 2, 2002, the North Koreans invited 
former Ambassador Donald Gregg and former reporter Don Oberdorfer to 
Pyongyang to find a way to engage the U.S.  After discussions with Vice 
Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan and KPA Lieutenant General Li Chan-bok, 
Gregg and Oberdorfer met with Kang Sok-ju.  Kang claimed he had just come 
from a meeting with Kim Jong-il and wanted to convey Kim’s personal letter to 
President Bush.  According to Kang, Kim’s letter stated that if the U.S. 
recognized North Korea’s sovereignty and provided security assurances, the 
two countries should be able to resolve the nuclear crisis.  If Bush was willing to 
make “a bold decision,” Kim was willing to do the same.178  When Gregg and 
Oberdorfer returned to Washington, they met with then Deputy National 
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, delivered Kim Jong-il’s letter, and suggested 
this was a “golden opportunity” to engage Pyongyang.  Hadley was not 
receptive and Bush never responded to the letter.179  Although North Korea 
continued to engage through informal channels to influence U.S. officials, the 
tactic failed.  More importantly, the readout from the Kelly trip to North Korea 
effectively ended the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the NSC adopted a policy 
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called “tailored containment,” which meant the U.S. would exert more pressure 
to change the behavior of the Kim regime.180   
According to Mohamed Elbaradei, former Director General of the IAEA, 
Pyongyang responded by requesting the IAEA remove its seals and monitoring 
equipment as well as its inspectors from Yongbyon after the heavy fuel oil 
shipments ceased in late 2002.  This signified the last obligation that was met in 
accordance with the Agreed Framework.  Pyongyang continued to escalate by 
withdrawing from the NPT on January 10, 2003, took steps to restart the 
reactor, and began reprocessing its spent fuel.  Elbaradei claimed the IAEA 
informed the UN Security Council (UNSC) about the situation in the North, but it 
failed to take action due to the coming war with Iraq.181  At this point, the 
prospect of North Korea producing a nuclear bomb and eventually developing a 
capability to threaten regional allies and possibly the U.S. had become “a 
distinct possibility.”182  When Pyongyang’s informal attempts to reach out to the 
U.S. failed and the U.S. began to increase pressure on the regime, the North 
continued its smart power attempts to influence U.S. policy preferences. 
Despite its actions against the IAEA, Pyongyang continued to reach out 
to the U.S. by contacting former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson through 
its UN office in late December 2002.  As the crisis appeared to worsen in 
January 2003, Powell approved of Richardson’s meeting with the North 
Koreans in New Mexico.  After the meeting, Richardson was certain Pyongyang 
was attempting to improve relations with the U.S. and was ready to make a 
deal.  According to Mike Chinoy, the Bush administration also ignored this 
attempt by Pyongyang to pursue engagement with the U.S.183  However, former 
North Korea Envoy Charles Pritchard revealed that Powell asked him to reach 
out to the North Koreans in New York after the Richardson meeting.  He was 
told to keep it close-hold because Powell was “a little out front on” engaging the 
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North Koreans.  The pointed message to Pak Gil-yon, North Korea’s UN 
Ambassador, was that “Secretary Powell was now in charge of North Korea 
policy; accordingly, with respect to that policy, Pyongyang should listen only to 
the president and the secretary of state.”  Pritchard also conveyed the State 
Department’s preference for engaging Pyongyang directly, instead of it using 
intermediaries like Richardson.  Needless to say, Pak was confused about the 
mixed messages coming out of Washington.184    
After the call ended, Pritchard cautioned Powell that he sensed that 
Pyongyang was no longer engaging in a game of brinksmanship but was 
preparing to “produce nuclear weapons.”  He reasoned that its failing economy, 
perceived U.S. hostile policy, and its refusal to accept bilateral talks “led them to 
believe regime survival was at stake.”  Pritchard summarized by proposing that 
if the U.S. were to offer “a security guarantee or nonaggression pact, from their 
[North Korean] point of view it would serve the same objective: security and 
regime survival.”  In short, Pritchard believed time was running out on 
preventing a nuclear breakout by Pyongyang, but if the State Department acted 
quickly it could stop North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.185  This 
suggests that at least some in the Bush administration were beginning to be 
persuaded by Pyongyang’s efforts to negotiate directly with the U.S.       
As the discussion between the U.S. and the North Koreans continued, 
Kelly asked David Straub, the State Department’s Director for Korean Affairs, to 
fax three paragraphs of the relevant text of the President’s State of the Union 
Address to the North Korean delegation in New York as a gesture of good 
will.186  Again, it demonstrated that the State Department’s Asia hands were 
aligned with the North Koreans in their preference for negotiations.  During his 
State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, Bush declared, “The North 
Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek concessions.  
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America and the world will not be blackmailed.”187  He continued to send mixed 
signals by also stating the U.S. was seeking a peaceful solution and “the North 
Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when 
it turns away from its nuclear ambitions.”188  However, with the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq looming, the U.S. deployed bombers, fighters, and an aircraft carrier to 
Korea and the Western Pacific, seemingly sending a not so subtle message to 
Pyongyang.  When Secretary Rumsfeld declared the U.S. was pulling back its 
combat troops from the DMZ, it caused alarm in Seoul.  Many South Koreans 
feared “a U.S. preemptive strike on North Korea.”189  The North Korean Foreign 
Ministry declared the U.S. “is the only party who is threatening our sovereignty 
and our right to survival, and it alone has the responsibility and ability to remove 
the danger.”190 
While on his way to Seoul for the South Korean presidential inauguration, 
Powell stopped in Beijing to propose that Beijing host the Five Party Talks with 
North Korea, including the two Koreas, the U.S., China, and Japan.  He 
proceeded to Seoul without a Chinese response.191  As President Kim Dae-jung 
left office in February 2003, his successor Roh Moo-hyun embraced the 
Sunshine Policy and sympathized with Pyongyang’s position that its nuclear 
ambition was a deterrent for a possible U.S. attack.  The call for diplomacy 
resonated in Japan as well and Koizumi sought another summit with Kim Jong-
il, and expressed concern about the U.S.’s tailored containment strategy.  As 
North Korea abrogated the Agreed Framework, Koizumi stated, “If you read the 
North Korean announcement carefully, their consistent stance is to seek a 
peaceful resolution.”  Koizumi continued to use his influence with Bush to 
moderate the U.S. approach with Pyongyang.192  While Pyongyang failed to 
make progress with the hardliners in the U.S., it successfully shaped South 
Korean and Japanese perceptions to align with its own policy preferences.   
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According to Robert Carlin and John Lewis, China could no longer sit on 
the sidelines.  It feared Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT signalled 
resumption of its nuclear weapons program, and the escalation of tensions 
between the U.S. and North Korea over the HEU issue could spiral out of 
control to threaten its borders.193  China urged North Korea to de-escalate, and 
reportedly stopped its oil shipment for three days.  Simultaneously, Chinese 
leaders urged moderation with Powell and Bush, but Bush continued to resist 
bilateral talks with Pyongyang.194  Meanwhile, China sent its Vice Premier to 
North Korea in early March to float the idea of Powell’s Five Party Talks.  When 
North Korea refused to participate, Vice Premier Qian Qichen countered with a 
suggestion for trilateral talks among the U.S., China, and North Korea.195 
The North Koreans met with Prichard and Straub in New York on March 
31, 2003, and warned they were building a nuclear deterrent because of the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq.  However, the State Department chose not to share this 
information with the White House and the rest of the interagency because it 
believed the revelation would negatively affect the resumption of talks with 
Pyongyang.196  This indicated some in the State Department judged conveying 
North Korean threats would hurt their efforts to resume negotiations and were 
willing to risk a backlash from the hardliners in Washington.  Prichard indicated, 
“Pyongyang continued to request bilateral talks through the U.S.-DPRK New 
York channel,” and the various coordination efforts in New York, Beijing, and 
Pyongyang resulted in the Trilateral Talks by mid-April 2003.197  Pritchard 
subsequently noted that China requested that Washington use Beijing as the 
primary channel of communications with Pyongyang, and that signalled China’s 
readiness to assume the leading role in denuclearizing North Korea.198    
When Bush and others discovered Powell withheld information about 
North Korea’s threat to build nuclear weapons, Bush and Rice lost confidence in 
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the State Department and sought more control over North Korea policy.199  
When the U.S. delegation met with Assistant Secretary Kelly on April 17 to 
discuss the upcoming trilateral meeting, the hardliners opposed any bilateral 
discussions with the North Koreans, and Pritchard resigned on April 18, 
2003.200  On the same day, the KCNA disclosed Pyongyang was having 
success in reprocessing its spent fuel rods but, when it realized it may have 
overreached, the North Koreans revised the statement by suggesting that the 
final preparatory phase before reprocessing had been completed.  This seems 
to indicate Pyongyang is capable of realizing the contextual intelligence 
necessary to achieve successful outcomes.  This adjustment in the statement 
was apparently ambiguous enough to persuade all three parties to attend the 
talks in Beijing on April 23, 2003.  The head of the North Korean delegation 
stated Pyongyang was ready to “dismantle” its nuclear program, open its 
nuclear facilities to inspectors, and stop selling its missiles.  However, the North 
Koreans demanded “normalized relations, economic aid, security guarantees, 
and a nonaggression pact.”  When Kelly deployed only his approved talking 
points, the North Koreans indicated they already had nuclear weapons, and 
whether they tested or exported them would depend on U.S. actions.201   
President Bush characterized these comments by the North Koreans as 
blackmail, and called for strengthening missile defense.  Rumsfeld later 
convinced the Senate to support the acquisition of “‘bunker busting’ nuclear 
weapons” to target underground facilities in North Korea.202  The U.S. also 
continued to increase its efforts to pressure North Korea.  The U.S. initiated the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to target North Korea’s illicit trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles.  These efforts to pressure 
Pyongyang probably reinforced the idea that Washington was still targeting 
North Korea and demonstrated Pyongyang’s strategy was not working with 
Bush and the hardliners.  However, it achieved some success when China and 
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South Korea refused to join the PSI effort.203  According to Chinoy, North 
Korea’s UN representatives met again with Pritchard (he had already resigned) 
and Straub on July 8, and declared they were making nuclear weapons after 
reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods.204   
As the situation intensified, the Chinese attempted to influence Kim Jong-
il by sending Dai Bingguo, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, to North Korea on 
July 12, 2003, to deliver a letter from Hu Jintao.  The Chinese promised more 
economic aid and committed to obtaining “a promise of [U.S.] nonaggression in 
return for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”  Kim’s only 
precondition for engaging the U.S. was having meaningful dialogue.  After 
visiting with Kim, Dai met with Rice, Powell, and Cheney, and delivered Hu’s 
letter to Bush.  Hu argued for more trilateral talks, and Powell reluctantly agreed 
with the condition as long as North Korea agreed to include Seoul and Tokyo 
later.  Pyongyang then asked to include Moscow as well.205  Pyongyang with 
Chinese support was finally making some progress in changing the initial 
preference of the U.S. hardliners regarding talks with North Korea. 
When the North Koreans finally arrived at the 6PT on August 28, 2003, 
Kim Kye-kwan, their head of delegation, claimed North Korea did not seek to 
possess nuclear weapons.  As long as the U.S. abandoned its hostile policy and 
stopped threatening the North, Pyongyang was prepared to dismantle its 
nuclear program.  Kim proposed that Pyongyang give up its nuclear program in 
exchange for heavy fuel oil and more food aid.  The North Koreans would also 
freeze all of their nuclear activities and allow the IAEA to perform its oversight 
functions, if the U.S. agreed to a nonaggression treaty and the other parties 
agreed to compensate them “for loss of electricity.”  He even offered to settle 
the missile issue after Pyongyang normalized relations with Washington and 
Tokyo.  Once the LWRs were delivered, North Korea would dismantle its 
nuclear program, but Pyongyang denied U.S. allegations concerning its HEU 
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program.206  The U.S. delegation refused to accept a “give-and-take” 
denuclearization process and continued to demand “complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible dismantling” of Pyongyang’s nuclear program before it could offer 
any concessions.207  According to Cheney, the demand for CVID symbolized 
the hardline position that the U.S. does not “negotiate with evil… We defeat 
it.”208  While Kelly rejected the nonaggression treaty proposal, he cited Bush’s 
commitment not to invade or attack North Korea.  The North Koreans warned 
they would respond to U.S. hostile policy with a nuclear deterrent.209  
According to Lim Dong-won, the South Koreans viewed the 6PT as “a 
U.S. hardliner-designed scheme to form a five-state anti-North Korean front, 
pitting five countries against one – North Korea – to force it to surrender by 
pressure and isolation.”210  Victor Cha seems to confirm this sentiment when he 
suggested that the 6PT format is better than the old one because five parties 
telling the North Koreans they need to abandon their nuclear weapons is “a lot 
more credible than one country doing so.”211     
The talks ended without a Joint Statement, and the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry blamed the impasse on U.S. “negative policy” and its threatening 
posture toward North Korea.  So far, Pyongyang was still able to shape Beijing’s 
views to align with its own policy preferences despite its threats to test a nuclear 
weapon.  Moreover, it had not given up on its efforts to reach out to the U.S.  
On August 30, 2003, North Korea invited Frank Jannuzi and Keith Luse, senior 
staffers from the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Pyongyang.  
When they met with Kim Kye-kwan, he characterized Kelly’s remarks at the 6PT 
as U.S. demands for unconditional surrender, and reminded the staffers that 
North Korea was not Iraq.  He also warned that Washington needed to learn 
how to live with North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.  The staffers left 
believing North Korea would go nuclear as soon as possible, as Pritchard had 
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warned earlier.  However, Kim showed some flexibility by conveying that high-
level talks could resolve the issue.212   
On October 11, 2003, Powell persuaded Bush to offer “a written pledge 
not to attack North Korea,” but he came short of agreeing to a formal 
nonaggression treaty.  This was a “shift in emphasis” for Bush and when he 
mentioned this to Hu Jintao, Hu quickly dispatched a senior Party official to 
Pyongyang.  This was the first indication that Pyongyang’s smart power strategy 
was working on Bush when he finally abandoned his initial preferences for 
engaging North Korea.  North Korea continued to warn of a possible nuclear 
test and launched a “new cruise missile,” and the KCNA initially called Bush’s 
offer “shameful.”  However, it soon back-paddled before the arrival of the 
Chinese envoy and disclosed it was willing to consider the U.S. offer.  Again, 
this suggests Pyongyang had sufficient contextual intelligence to moderate its 
position to achieve successful outcomes.  On October 30, 2003, Kim Jong-il 
agreed to return to the 6PT, but Pyongyang attempted to set the agenda for the 
talks by making it clear that it sought a “package solution” based on the 
“principle of simultaneous action.”213   
North Korea offered to freeze its nuclear program on December 9, 2003, 
in exchange for energy assistance, lifting of economic sanctions, and de-listing 
it from the State Department’s list of terror-sponsoring countries.  Bush ignored 
the offer, but China lobbied the U.S. for another round of 6PT with a proposed 
Joint Statement at the end of the talks.  The U.S. demanded that the Joint 
Statement include CVID of Pyongyang’s entire nuclear program.214   This was 
unacceptable to Pyongyang and Beijing’s effort to resume 6PT in December 
failed.215  Nevertheless, Pyongyang was persistent in its efforts to engage the 
U.S. by attempting to set the agenda for the talks.  
` In January 2004, North Korea announced that it would host another 
group of Americans for a visit to Yongbyon.  They included John W. Lewis from 
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Stanford, Senate staffers Jannuzi and Luse, U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried 
Hecker, and the recently retired Jack Pritchard.  Kim Kye-kwan informed the 
group Pyongyang was hoping to achieve a breakthrough by demonstrating 
transparency at Yongbyon.  The group was shown empty canisters in the 
storage pond, and then taken to a reprocessing facility where North Korean 
nuclear scientists provided a jar of weapons-grade plutonium.  During the 
discussions, they made it clear the KPA already possessed a nuclear weapon.  
The American visitors were convinced Pyongyang was serious, but when they 
informed U.S. officials about the Yongbyon visit some were not overly 
concerned because they believed Pyongyang already had nuclear weapons.216  
The U.S. appeared uninterested in North Korea’s attempt to use its unofficial 
contacts and the Senate staffers to influence its preferred policy positions. 
As the U.S. delegation prepared to return for the next round of 6PT, Bush 
continued to demand CVID, which meant Pyongyang was expected to disclose 
its HEU program.  When the second round of 6PT resumed in February 2004, 
Bush was persuaded to abandon more of his initial preferences by approving 
bilateral talks with the North Koreans within the 6PT process.  Kelly focused on 
the HEU program and stressed the U.S. would not return to the Agreed 
Framework, but the North argued Washington was wrong in Iraq and demanded 
evidence for the HEU.  Kim also asked what the U.S. was prepared to do after 
North Korea gave up its nuclear program.217  North Korea condescendingly 
demanded “a ‘verifiable, irreversible’ commitment” from the U.S. to abandon its 
hostile policy.218  It also claimed, “CVID is a term for a defeated state, and we 
are not a defeated state.  CVID is a humiliation to the DPRK.  We won’t accept 
this at all.”219  The U.S. later promised “multilateral security assurances” and 
withdrew its demand for CVID language and settled for “comprehensive 
dismantlement,” but the talks recessed without a Joint Statement.220  However, 
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Bush was again persuaded to abandon another one of his strong initial 
preferences by conceding on the CVID for another formulation for 
denuclearization.  It was a clear measure of North Korean smart power.   
The Chinese must also have sensed some progress was being made 
with the U.S. because they chose to issue “a formal chairman’s statement,” 
which highlighted that all parties agreed to a “step-by-step process of ‘words for 
words’ and ‘action for action’” to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.  This 
concept, based on reciprocity, would become part of the Joint Statement in 
September 2005 and subsequent agreements.221  The U.S. hardliners, however, 
continued to express their initial preferences to pressure North Korea when 
Cheney visited Beijing in April 2004.  He warned the Chinese that Pyongyang 
could transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, and if North 
Korea refused to abandon its nuclear arsenal he issued a veiled threat to the 
Chinese that others in Northeast Asia would also acquire nuclear weapons.  
The North Koreans were furious and stated Cheney’s linking of Pyongyang to 
Al-Qaeda was “an expression of total ignorance.”  However, when Kim Jong-il 
visited Beijing on April 19, 2004, he committed to another round of 6PT.222   
Later, in May 2004, Selig Harrison, former journalist and scholar, visited 
Pyongyang and met with senior North Korean officials.  During the meeting, Kim 
Yong-nam, Chairman of the SPA, emphasized that North Korea has the right to 
earn hard currency by exporting missiles, but denounced terrorist groups and 
pledged Pyongyang would never transfer nuclear materials to “al-Qaeda or 
anyone else.”  North Korea’s Foreign Minister claimed his country’s desire to 
possess nuclear weapons was purely for deterrence and it was willing to 
abandon them if the U.S. would take simultaneous steps toward resolution.  He 
warned time was on its side as the North enhanced its nuclear deterrent.223     
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As the U.S. continued to build its case for more pressure against North 
Korea, Koizumi seemed to ignore Washington by agreeing to a second summit 
in Pyongyang in May 2004.  During his meeting with Kim Jong-il, Koizumi 
offered “$10 million in medical supplies and 250,000 tons of food.”  In 
exchange, Kim allowed eight family members of abductees to depart for Japan.  
Kim also said he was ready to denuclearize if the U.S. was willing to negotiate 
bilaterally.  At the end of the summit, Koizumi stated, “I felt personally that North 
Korea is interested in moving forward in a positive way with six-party talks… It is 
up to the U.S. to make a decision on what sort of approach it should take.”224   
When the 6PT resumed on June 23, 2004, Kelly stressed the U.S. would 
not provide any lasting benefits until the complete dismantlement of the North’s 
nuclear program.  Kim Kye-kwan called for rewards in exchange for a freeze, 
and emphasized his expectation for rewards along the way before final 
dismantlement.  After the plenary session, Kim and Kelly held bilateral talks the 
next day, in which Kim threatened that unidentified hardliners in Pyongyang 
were calling for a nuclear test.  As anticipated, another 6PT ended without a 
Joint Statement.225  However, when Powell met his North Korean counterpart a 
week after the 6PT at a meeting in Asia, Paek Nam-sun indicated that if the 
U.S. was willing to offer rewards, such as provision of energy, sanctions relief, 
and de-listing from the state sponsors of terrorism list, Pyongyang would take 
steps toward denuclearization.  Powell replied the U.S. did not have a hostile 
policy and had no intention to invade or attack North Korea.  He encouraged 
Pyongyang to denuclearize, address the HEU issue, and stop threatening to 
conduct a nuclear test in order to build trust.  Paek said that if the U.S. 
renounces its hostile policy Pyongyang was ready to resolve all these issues.226  
As time went on, North Korea probably sensed it could change Bush’s initial 
preferences regarding the talks but the U.S. kept the pressure on. 
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In September 2004, the U.S. pitched its allegations about Pyongyang’s 
HEU program by sending a briefing team led by Kelly to Beijing.  Some within 
the U.S. delegation “found it less than compelling,” and the Chinese were also 
skeptical.  More importantly, “Bush signed the North Korea Human Rights Act,” 
which granted North Korean refugees asylum, increased U.S. radio broadcasts 
aimed at Pyongyang, and supported organizations promoting human rights in 
North Korea.  Pyongyang argued the new U.S. legislation was more evidence of 
U.S. hostile policy.227  On February 10, 2005, Pyongyang declared it possessed 
nuclear weapons, retracted its unilateral missile moratorium from 1999, and 
refused to participate in the 6PT.228  North Korea resorted to threats to force 
change in U.S. policy preferences. 
 
6.5.3 Bush Reverses Course and NK Demonstrates Smart Power 
During the second Bush administration, Powell, Richard Armitage, and 
Kelly all departed the State Department.  Condoleezza Rice became Secretary 
of State and quickly tapped Ambassador Christopher Hill to replace Kelly.229  
According to Rice, Hill “had an understanding of the region yet none of the 
innate prejudices,” and “he was a creative thinker and a tough, persistent 
diplomat who had helped Richard Holbrooke face down Slobodan Milosevic in 
Serbia.”230  Moreover, the war in Iraq had become a disaster and managing it 
took most of the energy of the principals in the NSC.231  Rice persuaded Bush it 
was time to negotiate seriously with Pyongyang.  Despite the growing 
skepticism over Kim Jong-il’s willingness to abandon his nuclear programs, she 
felt it was worth the effort to induce Kim to do so by offering a step by step 
approach to benefits.  She persuaded Bush to give her more flexibility in 
negotiating with Pyongyang.  Rice’s strategy, however, depended on convincing 
the other members of the 6PT to withhold benefits if Pyongyang failed to live up 
to its obligations.  The U.S. continued to take defensive measures against WMD 
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proliferation and missile threats, but seemed to acknowledge that the goal was 
changing regime behavior, not the regime itself.  Rice was confident Hill could 
move the 6PT process forward with her support and oversight.232       
According to Hill, he agreed to accept the job because he believed the 
U.S. had to negotiate directly with the North Koreans within the 6PT process 
but, more importantly, the U.S. had to establish “patterns of cooperation” with 
other parties in Northeast Asia, particularly South Korea.  He was also hopeful 
about the negotiations because the influence of the neoconservatives in the 
Bush administration was beginning to wane as policy failures such as Iraq 
began to pile up.  He was hopeful that a more pragmatic group, such as 
Secretary Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley, would help him deal with 
the “neocon deadenders” as he prepared to denuclearize North Korea through 
tough negotiations.  However, Hill soon realized that, in light of the policy shifts 
occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time, the neocons led by Cheney and 
Rumsfeld would “make North Korea their final battle.”233  That said, North Korea 
finally had the right Secretary of State and a bold U.S. negotiator who was 
empowered to negotiate a deal with Pyongyang, which gave it an opportunity to 
achieve significant outcomes while offering acceptable concessions.      
Chris Hill quickly demonstrated his boldness by calling a “diplomatic 
audible” when the Chinese failed to show for a trilateral meeting with the North 
Koreans on July 9, 2005.  The original plan was for him to hold a trilateral 
meeting in Beijing with his Chinese and North Korean counterparts to resume 
6PT, but the plan called for the early departure of the Chinese to facilitate a 
bilateral meeting between Hill and Kim Kye-kwan.  This arrangement satisfied 
Washington (no bilateral talks with North Korea) and Pyongyang (bilateral talks 
with the U.S. as a precondition for resuming 6PT) because both could claim 
they adhered to their principles for the talks.  However, when the Chinese failed 
to show, Hill made the tough call to meet with the North Koreans and was later 
criticized by some as a negotiator having “gone rogue.”  Hill argued he made 
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the “only call” by accepting the bilateral meeting, even though it went against 
U.S. policy at the time, with Kim Kye-kwan because the purpose of the carefully 
choreographed trilateral meeting was to restart the 6PT.234     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bilateral meeting with the North Koreans in Beijing got the 6PT back 
on track and when it finally resumed on July 26, 2005, Hill had some flexibility 
for give-and-take negotiations.  His aim was to demonstrate to all the parties 
that the U.S. was committed to the success of the 6PT process, and he was 
willing to stay in Beijing as long as it took to secure a meaningful Joint 
Statement.  He worked hard with his South Korean counterpart, Song Min-soon, 
to build a straw man for the Joint Statement, and it would focus on the need for 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs.  Song wanted to push back on 
the Japanese effort to include the abductee issue into the document by arguing 
that perhaps thousands of South Koreans were abducted by Pyongyang.  
However, the Japanese could not let go of the abductee issue and, as a result, 
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Figure 6.7. Chris Hill meeting with South Korean negotiator Song Min-soon and North Korean 
negotiator Kim Kye-kwan at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/30/xin_28090220084596731961.jpg  
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the five-on-one scenario that was envisioned against the North Koreans did not 
materialize at the 6PT.  Instead, Seoul became more disenchanted with Tokyo, 
especially when it was the only party that refused to participate in the provision 
of heavy fuel oil to encourage Pyongyang to freeze its plutonium plant and 
accept IAEA monitoring.  The situation was so bad between the two sides that 
Hill scrapped the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral talks.235  One could argue that, 
while North Korea failed to obtain significant aid from Japan due to the 
abductee issue, it was successful in dividing the two U.S. allies at the 6PT and 
weakened the U.S. effort to pressure Pyongyang at the talks.  
As the talks resumed in September, the North Koreans pushed for 
provision of LWRs in the Joint Statement236 and Chris Hill accepted the vague 
language on LWRs because it would be considered only after Pyongyang met 
all of its NPT obligations.237 (see Figure 6.7).  Hill was surprised that “the North 
Koreans received an extraordinary amount of sympathy from the Chinese and 
the Russians for its ‘right’ to have a civil nuclear program.”  At the same time, 
U.S. conservatives who disapproved of negotiations with Pyongyang opposed 
the 6PT process going forward due to the ambiguity over the LWR issue, and 
these included some members of Hill’s delegation from the interagency.238  Hill 
was satisfied with the concessions he offered since the September 19, 2005, 
Joint Statement obligated North Korea to abandon “all nuclear programs in 
return for security guarantees, economic and energy assistance, and a 
willingness to proceed with a peace treaty.”239  The U.S. acknowledged 
Pyongyang’s security concerns by offering assurance in the statement not to 
attack or invade North Korea.240   
The talks appeared to be on track, but Hill’s closing statement sent from 
Washington clarified that the provision of LWRs would not occur until the other 
parties verified Pyongyang had eliminated all of its nuclear weapons and related 
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programs.  This unilateral condition was unacceptable to Pyongyang, and it 
argued that without provision of LWRs it would not accept its obligations in the 
Joint Statement.241  More importantly, Hill’s statement warned the U.S. “will take 
concrete actions necessary to protect ourselves and our allies (whether they 
asked for it or not) against any illicit and proliferation activities.”242   
 
6.5.4 Resolution of BDA: True Measure of Kim’s Smart Power 
Chris Hill was unaware, however, that while he worked hard to negotiate 
a nuclear deal with the North Koreans the Treasury Department would 
designate BDA in Macao as a “primary money laundering concern.”  The 
designation noted the BDA’s relationship with several North Korean entities 
engaged in illicit activities.  The unanticipated result was almost complete 
isolation of North Korea from the international financial system but “a train 
wreck” for the 6PT.243  Hill believed that Treasury’s actions by “media-savvy” 
political appointees to publicize North Korea’s illicit activities were a mistake 
since the information could have been used to collect more evidence to 
pressure Pyongyang.  Hill argued Stuart Levy from Treasury had oversold the 
department’s ability to pressure Pyongyang.  More importantly, all the parties, 
perhaps with the exception of Japan, were infuriated with the BDA designation 
since it shut down the 6PT process.244  Pyongyang adroitly managed to convert 
its illicit activities to its advantage and gained the support of the Chinese, 
Russians, and even the South Koreans in blaming the U.S. for disrupting the 
implementation of the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement. 
The Treasury Department defended the BDA designation and argued it 
was not a deliberate attempt to derail the 6PT.245  The BDA in fact had become 
a major concern for the U.S. since early 2005, and as the 6PT was about to 
resume during the summer of 2005 Treasury felt it had sufficient evidence to 
target BDA.  It claimed the State Department’s Korea specialists were skeptical, 
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but accepted the designation as a law enforcement action when Treasury finally 
designated BDA on September 9, 2005.246  Hill seems to disagree with this 
interpretation by writing that “the publicizing of our efforts was undermining the 
negotiation track.  And what’s more, they seemed intended to do just that.”  
When the 6PT resumed on November 9, 2005, as anticipated by Hill, it made no 
progress at all.247  As the U.S. waited for Pyongyang to return to the 6PT, Bush 
revealed his “grand bargain” to Hu Jintao during his visit to Washington in April 
2006.  Bush informed Hu that he was willing to sign a peace treaty with Kim 
Jong-il and recognize his regime if Kim gave up his nuclear weapons.  
However, when National Security Advisor Hadley interpreted this to mean 
regime change was no longer an option, Bush informed Hadley he was wrong 
and this was “regime change by other means.”248   
Almost on cue, Pyongyang launched more missiles on July 4, 2006, and 
conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006.249  Bush responded by 
declaring his redline for North Korea after the nuclear test.  On October 9, 2006, 
Bush declared, “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to 
states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United 
States…and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences 
of such action.”250  The UNSC also condemned the missile launches and issued 
its Resolution 1695.251  As noted earlier, Russia supported the North by offering 
to forgive its $8 billion in debt.252  When the 6PT finally resumed in December 
2006, Pyongyang viewed the BDA action as a U.S. attempt to pursue a policy of 
“carrots and sticks,” and warned it would respond with “dialogue and shields.”  
Some viewed it as a not-so-veiled threat to conduct a second nuclear test.253   
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Hill and Rice, however, convinced Bush to allow his first official bilateral 
talks with the North Koreans in Berlin without any third party involvement.  This 
was yet another indicator North Korea’s smart power strategy was beginning to 
bear fruit.  After Hill met with Kim Kye-kwan on January 16, 2007, the U.S. 
agreed to resolve the BDA issue.  In the end, both sides seemed to view the 
meeting as an opportunity to establish mutual trust, and it cleared the way for 
6PT to resume on February 8, 2007.  After more difficult negotiations, an 
agreement to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement254 was finally 
reached on February 13, 2007.255  It was clear those in the U.S. who favored 
negotiations with Pyongyang were beginning to gain advantage and U.S. policy 
aligned more with Pyongyang’s own preferences to move the denuclearization 
process forward.  However, the hardliners in Washington viewed the agreement 
as “disgraceful” and embracing of “Clintonism.”256 
 
6.5.5 U.S. Restraint after Pyongyang’s Nuclear Proliferation to Syria 
As the State Department attempted to resolve the BDA issue, few in the 
U.S. knew “there was no on-off switch to this kind of pressure,” and it would be 
difficult to unravel what Treasury had unleashed in September 2005.  The North 
Koreans knew exactly what was at stake, not only the $25 million but restoration 
of their financial reputation.257  The U.S. decision to proceed with the nuclear 
agreement became problematic when the Israelis accused the North Koreans of 
proliferating nuclear technology to Syria in mid-April 2007.  They provided 
overhead imagery of the facility as well as photos of North Korean officials at 
the site.  Bush informed his senior advisors not to leak this information and after 
further review of the intelligence, he refused to bomb the nuclear facility 
because the U.S. IC assessed with “low confidence” this was a “plutonium 
reprocessing operation or a warhead development program.”  Despite the 
evidence suggesting North Korea had crossed Bush’s October 2006 redline, he 
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was not willing to risk the progress being made with Pyongyang as IAEA 
inspectors returned to North Korea.258  Hence, the agreement to resolve the 
BDA issue proceeded but the Treasury officials later claimed Chris Hill’s 
diplomatic team were overzealous in trying to fix the problem.   
The Treasury and State Departments literally waged a bureaucratic 
battle over the BDA issue, and when it was settled, the U.S. found a way to 
transfer $25 million from BDA to North Korea.  The U.S. had the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York wire the money through a Russian bank to North 
Korea in June 2007.259  Treasury officials admitted that the “North Koreans had 
expertly turned the tables,” and the U.S. was manipulated by Pyongyang just as 
the financial pressure seemed to be mounting on the Kim regime.260  This 
seems to suggest that Pyongyang had convinced the State Department to align 
its preference with its own for the sake of denuclearization, and forced the 
Treasury Department to abandon its initial preferences regarding the BDA 
issue.  It was a huge win for Kim Jong-il, and signalled the dysfunctional nature 
of U.S. North Korea policy within the interagency.   
The U.S. policy reversal was quite remarkable since it continued even 
after Israel bombed Syria’s Al Kibar facility in September 2007.261  Bush asked 
what impact this would have on the 6PT, and Chris Hill indicated that he could 
use the incident to inform the North Koreans that “as long as they engaged in 
this type of behavior either we or someone else would come after them.  They 
would never have a day of rest.”  Hill was also permitted by the CIA to disclose 
photos of North Koreans meeting with Syrian nuclear experts.  Kim Kye-kwan 
discredited it by claiming it was “photoshopped,” but at the conclusion of the 
6PT on October 3, 2007, he agreed to provide a “complete and correct 
declaration of all its nuclear programs.”  Kim also agreed to disable nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon and reaffirmed the pledge “not to transfer nuclear 
                                            
258
 Baker, Days of Fire, pp. 541-553. 
259
 Zarate, Treasury’s War, pp. 257-264. 
260
 Zarate, Treasury’s War, pp. 264-265. 
261
 Thomas H. Henriksen, America and The Rogue States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), pp. 130-134. 
294 
 
material, technology, or know-how.”262  It is likely that Pyongyang began to 
disable its nuclear program because of the resolution of the BDA issue, but it is 
plausible that it might have been influenced by the U.S. disclosure of its nuclear 
proliferation to Syria.  That said, Bush chose not to publicize this violation at the 
time to publicly pressure Pyongyang.   
North Korea responded promptly by inviting select members of the U.S. 
delegation to the 6PT to Pyongyang in late 2007, and provided “specialized 
aluminum” to the team as a matter of transparency.  When the team returned to 
the U.S. and the material was analyzed by the U.S. IC, it was revealed that it 
contained traces of HEU.  Although the revelation would bring more criticism 
from conservatives after it was leaked to the press, Hill emphasized that the 
progress made on the HEU program would not have occurred without 
negotiations.  Hill took a trip to North Korea himself to visit the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility in November 2007 to observe the shutdown of the reactor and 
meet with U.S. technicians at the site.  He realized that the steps taken to 
disable the reactor made the cooling tower useless and proposed to have it 
destroyed to show tangible progress toward dismantlement.263   
Hill met with Kim Kye-kwan in Geneva in March 2008 to discuss 
Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration and to remind him of the HEU program, but 
Kim refused to acknowledge the existence of the uranium program.  They met 
again in April 2008 in Singapore and the decision was made to focus on fully 
disclosing the plutonium program.  The North Koreans agreed to provide the 
records of its plutonium program dating back to 1986.264  Some officials in 
Washington probably were concerned North Korea’s HEU program was not part 
of Hill’s deal in Singapore and pressured Bush to disclose what the U.S. knew 
about Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation to Syria.265      
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Again, North Korea demonstrated the effectiveness of its smart power 
strategy by persuading the U.S. to abandon its initial preferences regarding the 
HEU and settle for a plutonium-based declaration.  By early 2008, Pyongyang 
had received 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, but it complained it was promised 
300,000 tons more and withheld its full nuclear declaration.266  The continuation 
of the diplomatic track was bewildering to some observers since Bush had 
declared Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation as a clear redline.  Instead of 
increasing pressure on Pyongyang, it appeared as if Washington was turning a 
blind eye.267  Hardliners like John Bolton viewed these developments as 
evidence of the State Department’s bureaucratic triumph over Bush as the U.S. 
adopted most of the key elements of Clinton’s failed 1994 Agreed 
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Figure 6.8. The Cooling Tower at Yongbyon being destroyed in June 2008. 
http://images.csmonitor.com/csm/2013/04/Yongbyon.jpg?alias=standard_600x400  
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Framework.268  On the other hand, Chris Hill argued that the diplomacy 
provided access to information regarding Pyongyang’s plutonium program that 
“no one had obtained before.”  He even argued his “negotiations threatened the 
theory that nothing could be achieved by talking with dictators.”269  In the end, 
North Korea had crossed Bush’s redline and by showing restraint, he taught 
Pyongyang the U.S. did not have the will to protect itself and its allies.   
In May 2008, the U.S. finally disclosed to the media the evidence of 
Pyongyang’s proliferation of nuclear technology to Syria.  At about the same 
time, the U.S. received “18,000 pages of documents” concerning North Korea’s 
plutonium program at Yongbyon.  On June 27, 2008, North Korea demonstrated 
its commitment to dismantle its nuclear program by blowing up the cooling 
tower at Yongbyon.270  Watching the cooling tower collapse on television, “Bush 
said with satisfaction, ‘Now that’s verifiable’.”271 (see Figure 6.8).  This was a 
symbolic gesture but Washington was concerned about Pyongyang’s 
incomplete nuclear declaration.  There were even some reports that North 
Korea had received $2.5 million for allowing the media to film the destruction of 
its cooling tower.272  After North Korea sent its official nuclear declaration to the 
Chinese on June 26, 2008, which included the precise amount of plutonium it 
used for its first nuclear test, it was still viewed as incomplete.273  Hill made one 
last trip to Pyongyang in October 2008 to secure an agreement on verification 
protocols.  The North Koreans refused to cooperate, however.274  It appeared 
as if Pyongyang had offered its minimum concessions and, when its offer to 
start the verification process by getting people on the ground first was rejected 
by Hill, the North Koreans chose to stop cooperating.  This ended Bush’s efforts 
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to pursue a negotiated nuclear settlement with Pyongyang, but the outcomes 
demonstrated North Korea is capable of executing smart power strategies to 
achieve its aims.  
 
6.5.6 North Korea Offsets Bush’s Hardline with Smart Power 
First, what was Kim’s preferred outcome with the U.S.?  North Korea had 
improved its relationship with the U.S. during the Clinton administration but the 
Bush administration made it clear from the beginning it was prepared to nullify 
Clinton’s nuclear agreement with North Korea and pursue regime change in 
Pyongyang.  It viewed Seoul’s Sunshine Policy as appeasement and Bush’s 
Axis of Evil speech in January 2002 was perceived by many as a declaratory 
policy to seek regime change.  After the revelation of North Korea’s HEU 
program, many in the U.S. concluded Pyongyang will never abandon its nuclear 
weapons and abrogated the Agreed Framework.  Moreover, Kim’s apology on 
the abductee issue galvanized anti-North Korean sentiment in Japan but due to 
its myopic view regarding the issue, Tokyo was no longer a major player in 
nuclear negotiations.   
The U.S. began to exert increased pressure on Pyongyang, including 
promotion of PSI and passage of human rights legislation.  It was evident to 
Pyongyang that Washington posed the only threat to its survival.  The 
progressive Roh Moo-hyun government in Seoul, a U.S. ally, showed sympathy 
for North Korea’s position that its nuclear program was a deterrent for U.S. 
attack.  This was a bad omen and when the war in Iraq became a debacle for 
the U.S., the Bush administration was forced to pursue negotiations with 
Pyongyang.  After difficult negotiations, the U.S. agreed to provisions of fuel, 
sanctions relief, and de-listing of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in 
exchange for North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement.  The second nuclear 
agreement ensured North Korea’s survival as long as it continued to take small 
steps toward dismantlement of its plutonium based nuclear program, but the 
threat of regime change was perceived as real in Pyongyang, and it hedged by 
refusing to acknowledge its HEU program until Bush left office.  Moreover, it 
probably gave Kim (false) confidence that U.S. was reluctant to use force 
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against him even after Bush and Hill had warned the U.S. would protect itself 
and its allies against North Korean illicit and proliferation activities.                    
Second, which forms of power behavior did Kim view as most effective to 
achieve his aims?  Kim may have attempted to gain some legitimacy by issuing 
an apology to Japan regarding the abductee issue but it galvanized anti-North 
Korean sentiment in Japan.  However, most Koreans on both sides of the 
border may have perceived the Japanese reaction as unjustified since Tokyo 
has refused to settle its own crimes during the colonial period.  Also, there is 
some confusion about Kelly’s meeting with Kang but Pyongyang may have 
attempted to use coercion in October 2002 by revealing to Kelly it possessed a 
covert uranium enrichment program.  The regime quickly denied it made the 
revelation when it was disclosed in the press and accused the U.S. of trying to 
justify its efforts to abrogate the Agreed Framework.  At the same time, it 
attempted to co-opt former U.S. officials and reporters to convey Pyongyang’s 
willingness to resolve the nuclear issue with the Bush administration.   
When the U.S. ignored the positive gesture, North Korea withdrew from 
the NPT and began reprocessing its spent fuel but had already contacted 
former Governor Richardson to convey the same message – it wanted to 
negotiate with the U.S.  Some in the State Department sensed the North 
Koreans truly felt threatened by the U.S. and were preparing to produce nuclear 
weapons but they could be stopped through negotiations.  Others in China, 
Japan and South Korea were concerned as well and proposed multilateral talks 
to resolve the nuclear crisis.  When these talks made no progress in 2003, 
North Koreans invited more Americans to Pyongyang and attempted to 
convince them they already possessed nuclear weapons, but the U.S. was 
unfazed by the threat.  When talks resumed, North Korean negotiators claimed 
hardliners in Pyongyang wanted to conduct a nuclear test.  It later retracted its 
missile moratorium in February 2005 when Bush signed the Human Rights Act.  
This was a not so subtle threat North Korea was developing a nuclear ICBM 
capability.  Yet, the Bush administration’s tipping point for negotiating with North 
Korea was not its nuclear threat, but the military disaster in Iraq.   
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The U.S. had little choice but to negotiate with North Korea despite its 
belief that Pyongyang could not be trusted.  Nevertheless, Bush’s hubris 
claimed the aim of negotiations with North Korea was regime change.  He 
empowered Secretary Rice and Chris Hill to negotiate and implement the deal 
without interference from the rest of the interagency.  This eventually led to a 
dysfunctional interagency process that led to the BDA debacle that forced U.S. 
diplomats to turn on their own Treasury counterparts to resolve the BDA issue.  
This coupled with U.S. inaction after Pyongyang’s proliferation of nuclear 
technology to Syria demonstrated the North’s power to manipulate the U.S.                       
Third, what resources were available to Kim to implement the strategy?  
Kim Jong-il engaged directly with Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to gain 
major concessions from Seoul.  He also engaged Koizumi to normalize relations 
with Japan.  He may have assumed that his personal involvement and a bold 
apology would be sufficient to gain significant concessions from Tokyo as well.  
Kim was wrong but Japan became more isolated within the 6PT process when 
its primary aim was resolving the abductee issue, which other 6PT members 
viewed as less significant than the nuclear issue.  The North Koreans at the 
same time attempted to increase pressure on the U.S. by revealing as much as 
they could about their nuclear programs to a select group of U.S. interlocutors, 
both official and unofficial, to attract nuclear negotiations or convey nuclear 
threats.  The North Koreans also knew the U.S. was concerned about its 
growing missile capabilities and when the Bush administration began to 
increase pressure, it responded by retracting its unilateral missile moratorium 
and conducted a nuclear test and missile launches.  The North Koreans also 
had experienced diplomats to negotiate nuclear deals and monitor the course of 
its implementation to protect its aim of survival.  Finally, Pyongyang leveraged 
Beijing and Seoul’s desire for stability on the Korean peninsula to pressure the 
U.S. to negotiate a nuclear deal.   
Fourth, how did North Korea view the likelihood of success of its strategy?  
North Korea was probably uncertain that it could deter Bush from seeking 
regime change after his declaration of the Axis of Evil and the invasion of Iraq.  
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The North attempted various forms of coercion and persuasion to seek bilateral 
negotiations.  It took several years before bilateral negotiations resumed but it is 
plausible that Pyongyang sensed that the probably of success increased when 
the direction of the war in Iraq turned unfavorably for Bush and when he finally 
sent an experienced negotiator to Beijing to negotiate a deal.  Similarly, Kim 
probably believed that coming clean about the abduction issue with Koizumi 
would have led to normalization with Japan but he was wrong.  On the other 
hand, Kim likely had little doubt he could maximize concessions from Seoul 
during the Kim and Roh years of progressive rule as long as he demonstrated 
some restraint.   
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors?  North Korea 
offered to dismantle its nuclear program for more oil and food.  It was also 
willing to freeze its nuclear activities and undergo IAEA inspections for a 
nonaggression treaty.  Japan was willing to normalize relations with the North 
but the abduction issue constrained Tokyo’s options unless Pyongyang was 
prepared to resolve the issue.  The U.S. indicated it would take nothing short of 
CVID of North Korea’s nuclear program before offering any concessions.  North 
Korea warned unlike Iraq it had nuclear weapons.  It wanted a package solution 
that obligated both sides to take simultaneous action.  Pyongyang had to make 
sure the U.S. got the message by showing several Americans it possessed the 
materials to build a nuclear bomb.  Bush finally approved bilateral talks with 
Pyongyang and settled for comprehensive dismantlement instead of CVID.   
The U.S. shared its information about North Korea’s HEU program with 
Beijing to pressure North Korea but the Chinese were not convinced.  However, 
when the U.S. passed its North Korea Human Rights legislation the North 
Koreans declared in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons and 
signaled they would resume their long range missile launches.  This was 
apparently enough to convince Secretary Rice and others to persuade Bush to 
negotiate with North Korea, especially as the war in Iraq was unravelling.           
While Bush aimed for regime change in North Korea, Chris Hill embraced 
his new role as the U.S. negotiator and intended to demonstrate the U.S. was 
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serious about collaborating with others to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, while Bush aimed for regime change.  Hill admitted there was a cost to 
making progress at the 6PT.  The U.S. concessions to North Korea included 
contributing to the shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, removing 
Pyongyang from the Trading with the Enemy Act, and de-listing Pyongyang as a 
state sponsor of terrorism.275  However, Hill argued that it was worth the cost 
because the U.S. reputation in Asia benefited by being an active part of the 6PT 
and, unlike the past, Pyongyang was blamed for the breakdown of the talks.276   
Chris Hill criticized the hardliners in the Bush administration for opposing 
any deal with Pyongyang, while offering no policy alternatives other than 
alienating South Korea and weakening the U.S. position in Asia.  While he 
admitted diplomacy does not work all the time, he could not imagine any other 
alternatives but diplomacy for dealing with North Korea.277  However, one could 
argue that the BDA designation, which surprised Hill and disappointed most of 
the other parties, probably hurt the U.S. reputation as a member of the 6PT 
process.  This was a result of the constant infighting between Hill and hardliners 
in the Bush administration, and the situation made it difficult for the U.S. to 
develop an effective strategy to deal with North Korean intransigence.  North 
Korea is a difficult problem as it is but the situation gets much more difficult 
without the Presidential leadership required to develop and maintain broad 
interagency support for a unified denuclearization strategy.   
The evidence demonstrates that Bush was generally not aligned with his 
allies and partners on North Korea policy but still believed his pressure on 
Pyongyang made the difference in making some progress toward the North’s 
nuclear dismantlement.278  Bush’s hardline policy worried Pyongyang but his 
lack of a coordinated interagency strategy led to significant missteps, and the 
implementation of the February 13, 2007 agreement failed to yield a “diplomatic 
                                            
275
 Hill, Outpost, p. 285. 
276
 Hill, Outpost, p. 290. 
277
 Hill, Outpost, p. 395. 
278
 Bush, Decision Points, pp. 425-426. 
302 
 
victory.”279  North Korea was willing to accommodate the Bush administration by 
taking some steps toward nuclear dismantlement, but it did not trust the U.S. 
and refused to declare its HEU program.  Instead, Pyongyang demanded 
bilateral talks with the U.S. to resolve the nuclear problem and more effectively 
leveraged its expressions of coercive and persuasive power to achieve its 
desired outcomes with the U.S., South Korea, and China.  Bush finally gave up 
on the 6PT process in late 2008 when North Korea failed to resolve the issue of 
verification and U.S. concerns persisted over the lack of transparency in the 
North’s nuclear declaration.280  While Bush received some credit for his 
strategic decision to engage Pyongyang directly in 2007,281 his initial resistance 
to engagement and subsequent inaction, especially after North Korea’s nuclear 
proliferation, may have taught North Korea “that there was almost nothing it 
might do on the nuclear front that would trigger a forceful response from 
Washington.”282  True or not, one of the problems for Pyongyang was that Kim 
Jong-il was in poor health by the fall of 2008 and he had failed to designate his 
successor.283   
 
6.6 Kim Responds to U.S.-South Korea Policy Alignment after Bush 
In February 2008, Lee Myung-bak, the new South Korean President, 
“accused the two previous [South Korean] administrations of propping up the 
North Korean regime and making it even more dangerous.”  Lee’s aim was not 
to provide any assistance without “meaningful concessions from the North.”  
Moreover, Lankov argued when President Barack Obama took office in 2009, 
he was also in no hurry to engage the North.  As a result of these unfavorable 
conditions, “North Korean strategists decided that it was time to manufacture a 
new crisis.”  The use of this tactic was predictable since it had been so 
successful in extracting “concessions from their adversaries/donors.”  Lankov 
argued the new crisis began in July 2008 when a KPA soldier shot a South 
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Korean female tourist near the Kumgang tourist zone, and that ended Hyundai’s 
tourist venture with Pyongyang.284  That being said, if North Korea’s aim was to 
squeeze more concessions by manufacturing a crisis, causing an incident that 
would force Seoul to end the joint venture at the Kumkang resort, a reliable 
source of hard currency, seems to be a bad miscalculation.   
What is more likely is that the shooting of a South Korean tourist was an 
accident and North Korea was highly sensitive to anti-regime propaganda after 
Kim Jong-il suffered a major stroke in August 2008.  Kim’s situation was so dire 
the North Koreans may have secretly arranged for a French neurosurgeon to 
visit Pyongyang to revive him from a coma.285  The North Koreans issued an 
immediate apology after the shooting incident, but claimed the South Korean 
victim played a role in the incident by ignoring its regulations.  Carlin and 
Oberdorfer claimed Seoul shut down the tours due to public outrage “even 
before all the facts could be determined.”  The KPA warned it would have to 
respond by taking “strong military counteractions against even the slightest 
hostile actions in the tourist resort area of Mt. Kumgang and the area under the 
military control.”286  The situation quickly escalated after the anti-North Korean 
activists launched their leaflets across the DMZ in November 2008 and when 
Seoul refused to stop the launches, Pyongyang suspended the tours at 
Kaesong city near the DMZ.  It also threatened to shut down the KIC but Seoul 
refused to cooperate with Pyongyang.287       
Many wondered how Obama would deal with Pyongyang as Bush’s 
negotiation efforts ended in late 2008.  His inauguration speech in January 2009 
suggested Obama would follow Bush’s lead and his desire to negotiate with the 
North Koreans appeared conditional.  He viewed North Korea as a corrupt 
authoritarian regime that had to “unclench” its fists before the U.S. would reach 
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out to it.288  As speculation grew about the succession process after Kim Jong-
il’s stroke,289 Pyongyang tested Obama’s resolve by declaring a satellite launch 
on February 24, 2009.290  It perceived the allegation and the attempt to levy UN 
sanctions as “a revelation of hostility towards it.”291  As Pyongyang proceeded 
with the launch on April 5, the Obama administration led the effort to issue a 
strong UNSC statement.  The North Koreans responded by “expelling the IAEA 
inspectors and removing the seals and cameras monitoring the Yongbyon 
reactor,”292 and declared “it would build its own LWR.”293  On May 25, 2009, 
North Korea conducted its second nuclear test.  The U.S. ceased negotiations 
and gave Pyongyang an ultimatum: “End your nuclear program if you wish to 
gain international acceptance and assistance or face ever-increasing pressure.”  
The U.S. was willing to wait and see how North Korea would respond.294  Some 
described this approach as “Bush Lite.”295   
North Korea responded by declaring it would start uranium enrichment 
on June 13, 2009.296  About this time, Kim Jong-un was being revealed as the 
designated successor as North Korea’s propaganda organs began to release 
short hagiographies of the 27-year-old third son of the Supreme Leader.297  On 
a positive note, in August 2009, Kim Jong-il met with former President Clinton to 
gain the release of two American journalists who inadvertently crossed into 
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North Korea.298  Kim then offered Lee Myung-bak an inter-Korean summit, and 
the two sides initiated secret talks in October 2009 to coordinate the conditions 
for the summit, but the talks broke down in November.  Seoul claimed the North 
“asked for too much compensation.”  As the summit talks were faltering, the 
South Korean navy fired on a North Korean patrol boat after it crossed the NLL 
“by mistake.”  Carlin and Oberdorfer believed this was when Kim Jong-il 
decided “it was time to teach the Blue House a lesson.”299  However, Kim was 
running out of time to prepare his son to replace him and probably felt the 
pressure to accelerate the grooming process.  North Korea announced in 
September 2009 that its “experimental uranium enrichment had entered into the 
‘completion phase’.”300  After that, the North’s rhetoric would end and it would 
launch one of the most provocative military campaigns since the end of the 
Second Korean War in 2010.  The question is why? 
 
6.7 Rush to Succession: Cheonan Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Attack 
According to Bruce Bechtol, Jr., North Korea signaled its displeasure with 
the South Korean Navy in January 2009 by warning it to cease its “hostile 
posture” along the NLL and threatened it would protect its sovereignty at sea.  
Then it reshuffled the senior leadership of the KPA to prepare for the 
provocations of 2010.301  On the other hand, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., 
highlighted the reorganization of North Korea’s intelligence and security 
services from 2009 to 2010, which was intended to deal with “increasing levels 
of unrest and corruption” within society and the KPA.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the reorganization established the Reconnaissance General 
Bureau (RGB).  The RGB was formed by merging the KWP’s Operations 
Bureau (e.g., responsible for training of intelligence agents and their infiltration), 
Office 35 (e.g., collected foreign intelligence and overseas operations), and the 
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Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) Reconnaissance Bureau (e.g., 
responsible for anti-South Korean operations such as the raid on the Blue 
House in 1968 and the Rangoon bombing in 1983).  Like many others, 
Bermudez attributed the sinking of the Cheonan to a YEONO-class submarine 
from the RGB, but he also warned of “more provocative operations in the 
future.”302  In short, Kim was preparing his intelligence, special operations, and 
conventional forces for a well-organized provocation campaign in 2010.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed earlier, General Kim Kyok-sik was reassigned as the 
commander of the IV Corps, which is the unit best positioned to influence 
events near the NLL.  Kim was also prepared to teach Lee a lesson after the 
South Korean Navy fired about 50 rounds at a North Korean naval ship after it 
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Map 6.1. Map of the Cheonan attack.  
http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.103563.1274553241!/image/452947464.jpg_gen/
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inadvertently cross the NLL in November 2009.  Moreover, the KPA conducted 
“large-scale artillery live-fire exercises” along the NLL in late January 2010.  
This was probably a rehearsal for the attack on Yeonpyeong Island,303 and 
confirms the North carefully planned the provocation campaign for 2010.  The 
provocation campaign started with the surprise sinking of the South Korean 
Naval ship Cheonan south of the NLL and near the Northwest Islands (NWI) on 
March 26, 2010.304 (see Map 6.1 above). 
While Bechtol argued the attack on the Cheonan was primarily motivated 
by revenge, a South Korean official speculated the aim was to validate the 
North’s asymmetric capabilities and it would use similar tactics in the future.305  
Victor Cha agreed with the others that the attack was likely in retaliation for the 
2009 naval clash, another attempt to gain concessions, and a demonstration of 
its enhanced naval capabilities.  Cha added that North Korea may be pursuing 
its own hardline policy due to uncertainties associated with leadership 
succession.306  Still others argued that the attack may also have been Kim’s 
response to Lee Myung-bak’s decision to “almost entirely dismiss the Kim 
[Jong-il]-Roh [Moo-hyun] summit agreement.”307     
Kim and Roh met in early October 2007 and agreed to take several steps 
to improve inter-Korean relations.  One of the steps included resolving tensions 
along the NLL:    
 
[E]stablishing a West Sea “special peace and cooperation zone 
comprised of the Haeju District (in North Korea) and its 
neighboring areas” and “pushing ahead with the establishment of 
a joint fishing area and peaceful waters, the construction of a 
special economic zone, the practical use of Haeju Port, the direct 
passage of civilian vessels to Haeju, and joint use of the estuary 
of the Han River.”308 
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This was a sincere and perhaps naïve attempt by Roh to turn the waters along 
the NLL “less volatile.”  However, when Lee replaced Roh in February 2008, he 
assumed North Korea was in decline and “the best way to encourage those 
trends was to turn off the aid and cash spigot and deal with Kim Jong-il from a 
position of strength.”  Thus, from Kim’s perspective, Lee was intentionally 
abrogating “one of the main goals of the summit [which] was to create a 
framework for easing tensions in the West Sea.”309  As a South Korean official 
suspected, Kim used his asymmetric capabilities (i.e., superiority under sea), 
but he also aimed to weaken Lee’s hardline policy.    
After the Cheonan sinking, Lee kept his cool by requesting “an 
independent, multinational civilian-military investigation” comprised of 
representatives from the U.S., UK, Sweden, and Australia.  In the interim, on 
April 17, Pyongyang denied any involvement in the sinking that killed 46 
members of the crew.310  As discussed, some also argued that North Korea 
aimed to bolster its succession process by attacking the Cheonan,311 but the 
argument is weak since the North could not maximize the propaganda value of 
the successful attack.  This is likely despite reports Kim Jong-il may have visited 
the RGB soon after the attack.312  Some even argued that the KWP cadres 
were giving lectures that the KPA had taken revenge presumably for the 2009 
naval incident and the South Koreans were now in fear of the KPA.313  This 
seems to defy logic (unless it was only to boost the morale of certain units in the 
KPA) since North Korea refused to acknowledge it had sunk the South Korean 
ship.  Thus, the aim appears to have been revenge and not to bolster the 
succession by claiming a victory.   
On September 12, the multinational investigation officially concluded 
“that a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the Cheonan.”  
However, Seoul decided to release a preliminary report on May 20, three days 
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before the start of the campaign season for the local government elections. 
Some accused Lee of exploiting the sinking of the Cheonan to bolster the ruling 
party’s election prospects.314  There were press leaks indicating that “two or 
three” North Korean submarines were missing from their home ports before the 
attack and the crew were recognized for their bravery.315  Thus, many were 
convinced the North Koreans were responsible and “the smoking gun was the 
discovery of key parts of a North Korean torpedo near the spot of the sinking.”  
However, for many progressive South Koreans “there were enough ambiguities 
and inconsistencies” in the multinational report for them to question North 
Korean complicity.316  A South Korean poll indicated after the final report was 
released that its findings were not widely accepted since only about 33 percent 
of those polled were convinced North Korea was responsible for the attack.317  
Some observers concluded the lack of support for the investigation was largely 
due to the Lee administration’s “heavy-handed approach in dealing with the 
incident, and its reluctance to address or even allow for questions or concerns.”  
In fact, the government threatened to file “defamation charges against leading 
figures who questioned the government’s findings, doubted a link to North 
Korea, or proffered alternative explanations.”318         
In spite of the lingering questions about the findings of the investigation, 
Seoul and Washington viewed the results as conclusive.  Therefore, they chose 
not to offer any concessions for simply returning to the status quo, and the U.S. 
demonstrated its solidarity with South Korea when the U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) warned against further provocations and President 
Obama reaffirmed the U.S.’s “extended nuclear deterrent to South Korea.”  The 
two allies condemned the hostile action and referred the case to the UNSC.  
Seoul finally agreed to participate in the U.S.-led PSI to combat the spread of 
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WMD and related activities.  In order to address the North’s conventional 
threats, the South conducted a joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise that 
included a U.S. aircraft carrier.  More importantly, the “careful, deliberate 
approach” of President Lee, despite calls for retaliation, gained the respect of 
Obama and elevated the status of South Korea as America’s “linchpin” in Asia.  
Obama agreed to delay the wartime operational control (OPCON) from April 
2012 to December 2015 due to the worsening security environment in Korea.  
According to Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, Lee’s measured approach also won him 
the support of the G8 countries as they “condemned the attack on the 
Cheonan.”  However, tellingly, Moscow and Beijing refused to accept the 
findings of the multilateral investigation and opposed any action to condemn or 
punish Pyongyang.319 
On the other hand, Jeremy Chan offers a more critical interpretation of 
actions taken by South Korea and China following the Cheonan Incident.  Chan 
argued that both countries attempted to maintain a delicate balance between 
their security and economic interests.  It was true Seoul took several tough 
measures against Pyongyang, including its declaration to restrict trade and to 
resume loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ; however, it chose not to 
suspend its joint venture with Pyongyang at the KIC,320 which earns the Kim 
regime about $80 to 100 million a year.321  Furthermore, after the ruling 
conservative party’s lackluster performance during the local election in June, 
Chan highlighted that most South Koreans were sympathetic and were 
generally ambivalent “toward North Korea’s involvement in the Cheonan 
sinking, as well as one of resignation toward China.”322  The ruling party had 
lost ten of sixteen key local races and many viewed this “as a rebuke of Lee’s 
post-Cheonan posturing.”323  This persuaded Lee to reconsider his hard line 
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toward Pyongyang, which was known as “strategic neglect,” and he began to 
sense his hardline approach was probably the wrong strategy.324  Oberdorfer 
and Carlin confirmed that when Lee left office he “had not in the end left the 
situation in better shape.”325  
By September 2010, Seoul signaled a change in its approach when it 
decided to send $8.5 million worth of humanitarian aid to the North for the first 
time since Lee took office in 2008.  This aid was officially provided to assist in 
the recovery of Sinuiju after severe flooding, and Pyongyang reciprocated by 
releasing a fishing boat and its South Korean and Chinese crew.  There was 
also a report suggesting that Seoul was ready to offer another KIC-like joint 
venture to the North, which signified its desire to de-escalate.  If this was simply 
another one of Kim’s crisis manufacturing strategies to gain concessions from 
Seoul and Washington, it was an opportune time, but he ignored Lee’s 
reconciliatory attempt.326  Then Kim sent a message to Washington that he had 
an advanced HEU program by revealing it to Siegfried Hecker, former director 
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and his colleagues from Stanford 
University on November 12, 2010.  Hecker was granted access to view 2,000 
centrifuges because North Korea “wanted the world to know,” and it trusted 
them “to report its nuclear advances…accurately.”  Hecker was concerned the 
North Koreans would make more nuclear weapons with enriched uranium and 
perhaps even sell it for the right price.327  Before the U.S. could react, the KPA 
attacked Yeongpyeong Island in late November 2010.328  Three batteries of 
KPA multiple rocket launchers fired about 170 rounds towards the island.329 
(see Map 6.2 below).  But why did it attack the Island? 
According to Bechtol, one of the traits of North Korean provocations is 
that “North Korea denies responsibility for the event.”330  In many cases this is 
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true as noted by the Cheonan incident, but as discussed in Chapter 5, there are 
some cases, such as the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the EC-121 
shootdown, when Pyongyang is willing to accept responsibility.  In the case of 
Yeonpyeong, it was prepared to justify its actions.  This is demonstrated by a 
lengthy excerpt from a communique issued by Kim Jong-il on November 23:   
The south Korean puppet group perpetrated such reckless military 
provocation as firing dozens of shells inside the territorial waters 
of the DPRK side around Yonphyong Islet in the West Sea of 
Korea from 13:00 on Nov. 23 despite the repeated warnings of the 
DPRK while staging the war maneuvers for a war of aggression 
on it codenamed Hoguk, escalating the tension on the Korean 
Peninsula…The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK standing 
guard over the inviolable territorial waters of the country took such 
decisive military step as reacting to the military provocation of the 
puppet group with a prompt powerful physical strike.  It is a 
traditional mode of counter-action of the army of the DPRK to 
counter the firing of the provocateurs with merciless strikes.  
Should the south Korean puppet group dare intrude into the 
territorial waters of the DPRK even 0.001 mm, the revolutionary 
armed forces of the DPRK will unhesitatingly continue taking 
merciless military counter-actions against it.331 
 
As shown, this was another carefully planned provocation that was directed by 
Kim Jong-il.  He made it clear the KPA warned the South Korean military 
several times prior to the attack but these warnings were ignored.  Thus, the 
KPA was justified to defend the North’s sovereignty, which had been repeatedly 
violated.  Yet, despite the carefully crafted argument about the defensive nature 
of the Yeonpyeong Island attack, one could not ignore it was the first artillery 
attack on South Korean civilians since the end of the Korean War332 and killed 
two South Korean civilians, two Marines, and wounded 19 others.333  
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The brazen attack and ineffective response by the South resulted in 
slightly over 80 percent of South Koreans lamenting that “the South Korean 
government should have taken a strong military action in response to the 
North’s attack on the island.  In the event of future provocations, 40.5 percent 
favored a limited military response and 25 percent favored strong retaliation 
with an all-out war mobilization.”334  The growing pressure from the public and 
the realization that China’s priority interest vis-à-vis Korea remains “securing 
regime survival in Pyongyang,” even in the face of overwhelming evidence of its 
culpability, convinced Seoul to strengthen its alliance with the U.S.  However, 
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Map 6.2. Map of Yeonpyeong Island artillery attack. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Yeonpyeong#/media/File:Yeonpyeong_
shelling.png  
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the show of alliance solidarity after the Cheonan Incident, including the July 
2010 warning by the two allies’ defense and foreign ministers that they would 
not tolerate Pyongyang’s “irresponsible behavior,” and the show of force 
deployment by the USS Washington aircraft carrier task force during the same 
month, did little to deter North Korean provocations.335    
According to Chan, the question of why the North shelled the island 
baffled strategists in Seoul, Washington, and Beijing.  As already mentioned, 
Seoul was poised to reengage Pyongyang just prior to the attack, and Beijing 
was pressuring the members of the 6PT to return to the talks as new revelations 
about Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program were disclosed following 
Hecker’s visit to North Korea.  Therefore, Lankov’s argument that the aim of the 
provocation was to gain concessions336 can also be ruled out for Yeonpyeong, 
and the evidence also challenges other interpretations that the North Koreans 
were crying out for attention or could actually have been threatened by the LFX 
near the NLL337 (it occurs almost every month).  A more likely explanation is 
that the two attacks were a single campaign designed to seek revenge for the 
November 2009 naval clash, which also tested its asymmetric capabilities and 
highlighted the cost of dismissing the Kim-Roh summit agreement of 2007.  In 
the end, the Yeonpyeong attack facilitated the propaganda needed to promote 
the power succession after Kim Jong-un was designated as successor, and the 
effects of both provocations weakened Lee’s hardline policy toward the North.   
This argument is supported by reports that Kim Jong-il visited Beijing in 
August 2010 to gain China’s endorsement for his succession plan with Kim 
Jong-un.338  Simultaneously, he attempted to revive North Korea’s relationship 
with China by portraying it “as a special, extraordinary, revolutionary friendship” 
on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Chinese intervention in the 
Korean War.339  His son was soon anointed as the “Young General” in October 
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2010 during the 65th anniversary of the KWP.  Kim Jong-un was with his father 
as he visited economic and military facilities and the North Korean media listed 
“him first among the officials accompanying his father.”340  According to 
defectors, shortly after the Yeonpyeong attack, Kim Jong-un “was touted as an 
‘artillery wizard’.”341  In this context, one can see why Zhang Liangui from 
Beijing’s Central Party School argued Kim Jong-un initiated the provocations in 
2010 to “mobilize the military and consolidate his power.”342  Although North 
Korea adamantly denied responsibility for the sinking of the ship, it carefully 
planned the attack on the island and offered credible justification for it.  Kim 
Jong-il declared for domestic and external audiences that the KPA was 
defending the North’s sovereignty as the South Koreans encroached upon its 
territory based on a unilateral declaration of the NLL as the de facto 
international boundary.343  Moreover, North Korea even offered a half-hearted 
statement of regret on November 27 for the loss of civilian lives.  Its state media 
also asserted the enemy “is now working hard to dramatize ‘civilian casualties’ 
as part of its propaganda campaign… If that is true, it is very regrettable but the 
enemy should be held responsible… [for] deploying civilians around artillery 
positions and inside military facilities before the launch of the provocation.”344   
In the end, Seoul did not retaliate beyond returning artillery fire in self-
defense,345 and Chan concluded “the greatest lesson learned from the Cheonan 
sinking may be that no act of North Korean intransigence is unforgivable.”346  
When South Korea announced it would conduct another LFX in December, 
Admiral Michael Mullen, then-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quickly 
dispatched to Seoul to “deliver a message of strong U.S. support, while seeking 
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to ensure the South Korean operation did not lead to escalation.”347  This 
signalled Seoul’s new resolve to deter North Korean provocations as it 
conducted the LFX on December 20, 2010, despite Pyongyang’s threats to 
retaliate.  It indicated South Korea was finally willing to risk escalation of the 
conflict to break the cycle of provocations.   
The South’s initials steps were to establish a division-sized Northwestern 
Islands (NWI) Defense Command to protect the five remote islands near the 
NLL, changed the rules of engagement, developed U.S.-South Korea military 
plan to counter the North’s provocations, conducted joint military exercises,348 
prevent North Korea’s merchant ships from using South Korea’s sea-lanes, and 
declared it would resume psychological operations along the DMZ.349  North 
Korea responded by declaring that the December LFX “was aimed at saving the 
face of the present puppet authorities now finding themselves in such profound 
ruling crisis…The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK did not feel any need 
to retaliate against every despicable military provocation like one taking revenge 
after facing a blow.”350  This was a rational choice since South Korea was 
prepared to respond to any North Korean provocations, but does the evidence 
suggest Kim exercised smart power during the two provocations in 2010? 
 
6.7.1 2010 Provocation Campaign Against Lee and for Succession 
First, what was Kim’s desired outcomes for the provocation campaign in 
2010?  As discussed, some have speculated that the two provocations were 
another attempt to gain concessions by resuming the cycle of provocations.  
However, the likely aim of the Cheonan sinking was to seek revenge for the 
2009 naval clash by using the North’s asymmetric capabilities to deny 
culpability after the incident.  The attack on the Cheonan also could have been 
a reminder to Lee Myung-bak that dismissing the 2007 Kim-Roh agreement was 
a mistake.  Moreover, the Yeonpyeong Island attack facilitated the leadership 
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succession process in North Korea by demonstrating that Kim Jong-un was to 
be admired and respected because he was capable of defending North Korea’s 
sovereignty and weakened Lee’s resolve to continue his hardline policy.  Kim 
also attempted to improve relations with Beijing ahead of the leadership 
succession by highlighting the special relationship forged during the Korean 
War in October 2010.  More importantly, Lee’s poor handling of the 
provocations forced him to reconsider his hardline policy but the artillery attack 
on Yeonpyeong convinced many in South Korea that effective use of force will 
be necessary to break the cycle of provocations.   
Second, which forms of power behavior was likely to succeed?  North 
Korea used covert action to sink the Cheonan and refused to acknowledge the 
findings from a multilateral investigation that found it responsible for the incident.  
It might have assessed that it would be difficult for the subsequent investigation 
to produce conclusive evidence against North Korea due to the nature of the 
attack by a submarine.  It may not have been a huge surprise for the Chinese 
and the Russians to back the North Koreans but many South Korean 
progressives were manipulated to believe Pyongyang was responsible for the 
attack.  Kim probably understood that South Korean society was divided along 
progressive and conservative lines after a long decade of contested progressive 
rule.  However, just as the crisis caused by the Cheonan incident was de-
escalating, Pyongyang launched an artillery attack on a South Korean island.  
As before (e.g., USS Pueblo incident) it justified the attack by arguing self-
defense because its territorial sovereignty was allegedly violated during a South 
Korean live fire exercise near the NLL.  Kim may have been emboldened by the 
outcome of the Cheonan sinking to launch the artillery attack, and offered a 
half-hearted apology to control escalation.  The Lee administration’s failure to 
act decisively during the Yeonpyeong attack meant the loss of his credibility and 
eventually forced him to reconsider his hardline policy.   
Third, what resources were available to support the attacks?  North 
Korea had generally shown restraint during the decade of the Sunshine Policy 
because the progressive governments in Seoul were more than willing to offer 
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concessions for its good behavior.  This was not the case with the Lee 
administration and Kim felt that the use of force was necessary to influence 
Lee’s hardline approach.  Nevertheless, he was careful to use covert action by 
using a submarine from the RGB to minimize the risk of South Korean 
retaliation.  The success of the mission against the Cheonan led him to conduct 
a limited artillery attack to bolster his son’s competence as the defender of 
North Korea’s sovereignty.  The South Korean military’s response was poor and 
forced it to take bold measures such as the establishment of a new command to 
deal with North Korean threats against the Northwest Islands.      
Fourth, what was Kim’s assessment of the probability of success?  Kim 
probably knew that attacking South Korean naval ships with his own (i.e., 
surface warfare) was a losing proposition as recently demonstrated by the 2009 
naval clash.  He correctly assessed that using covert assets from the RGB 
would improve his likelihood of success.  In other words, he used his strengths 
of surprise and underwater warfare to defeat a much more capable South 
Korean surface navy.  Even when the KPA engaged the South Korean military 
with artillery, they had the advantage of surprise and lengthy preparations.  The 
South Korean military also exposed its lack of preparedness when it failed to 
respond effectively to the KPA’s artillery attack.    
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors?  President Lee 
Myung-bak’s conservative government in Seoul ascended to power in February 
2008 after a decade of progressive rule in the South.  Lee believed his 
predecessors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s naïve engagement with the 
Pyongyang simply propped up the regime and increased the threat to Seoul’s 
national security.  Hence, Lee demanded North Korea take concrete measures 
to denuclearize before any further assistance would be provided to the North.  
Soon after President Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, Pyongyang 
attempted to coerce Seoul and Washington.  It launched another satellite 
launch and conducted a second nuclear test in February and May 2009, 
respectively.  This was followed by an announcement that the North would 
pursue its own LWR.  These developments convinced Obama to pursue a 
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hardline policy and Kim Jong-il probably hoped to regain the initiative by hosting 
former President Clinton in Pyongyang in August 2009.   
The North Koreans released the two American reporters during Clinton’s 
visit, but the long awaited Kim-Clinton meeting failed to generate any 
momentum for diplomacy between the two sides.  The North then reminded the 
U.S. that it had a HEU program in September 2009.  Kim Jong-il then pursued 
diplomacy with Lee Myung-bak by proposing an inter-Korean summit, and the 
two Koreas initiated secret talks in October 2009.  The talks broke down in 
November but tensions rose on the peninsula when the South Korean navy 
fired on a North Korean naval ship after it inadvertently crossed the NLL.  This 
appears to have been the tipping point that set the stage for the covert sinking 
of the Cheonan in March 2010.  In spite of the multilateral investigation’s finding 
that North Korea was responsible for the attack on the Cheonan, both Moscow 
and Beijing were not convinced Kim was responsible for the attack.   
The U.S. ignored them and reaffirmed its extended nuclear deterrence to 
Seoul, postponed the transfer of wartime OPCON from 2012 to 2015, and 
conducted combined ASW exercises with a U.S. aircraft carrier.  Seoul 
reciprocated by finally joining the U.S.-led PSI.  It also restricted trade with 
Pyongyang, but decided not to close the joint economic venture at Kaesong. 
As the U.S.-South Korea alliance demonstrated its solidarity, some polls 
in South Korea suggested that the majority of South Koreans were not 
convinced North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan.  Lee’s 
hardline policy was being questioned and eventually discredited when his ruling 
party suffered a major setback during the local elections in June 2010.  The 
poor showing in the local election pressured Lee to soften his approach to 
Pyongyang.  Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il visited Beijing in August to gain China’s 
support for Kim Jong-un’s succession.  As pressure on Lee intensified in South 
Korea, he offered to provide almost $9 million in humanitarian aid when North 
Korea suffered severe flooding in September 2010.   
When the situation appeared to de-escalate, the KPA fired on 
Yeonpyeong Island in November and killed four South Koreans and wounded 
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almost twenty others.  As Kim contemplated the artillery attack, he may have 
invited Hecker in November to reveal his HEU program to remind Washington 
that forceful response beyond self-defense would be counterproductive.  The 
South Korean military responded poorly to the attack and U.S. signalled its 
primary aim was de-escalation when Admiral Mullen was dispatched to Seoul 
after the attack.  On November 27, North Korea even offered a half-hearted 
statement of regret for the loss of civilian lives to deter South Korean retaliation.  
When South Korea decided to conduct another LFX in December, North Korea 
threatened to counter attack but it was manipulating Seoul because it knew the 
South Koreans were prepared to strike.  The situation de-escalated but South 
Korea established a new NWI Command to deal with future provocations.  
  
6.7.2 Obama Re-engages Pyongyang but Kim Jong-il Dies 
It did not take too long after the provocations in 2010 before the U.S. 
reconsidered its position and resumed dialogue with the North Koreans.  The 
momentum to resume talks began with the Russians announcing that North 
Korea was willing to consider “a moratorium on nuclear test and ballistic missile 
launches” and more in March 2011.351  The U.S. invited Kim Kye-kwan to New 
York in July 2011 for an exploratory meeting with U.S. officials.  This indicated 
Obama was growing uncomfortable with the so-called policy of “strategic 
patience” that resulted in the absence of diplomacy with Pyongyang and 
“prioritized the improvement of inter-Korean relations before any bilateral 
contact with the US or multilateral talks would resume.”  Washington began to 
pressure Seoul to “stop obsessing about the apology for the Cheonan” as a 
precondition for dialogue.  The U.S. chose to negotiate to deter provocations, 
fully recognizing Pyongyang had not shown any intention to denuclearize.  
Obama was probably concerned about the resumption of hostilities on the 
Peninsula as some in Seoul indicated they were ready to “clean North Korea’s 
clock” to “re-establish deterrence.”352   
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By December 2011, diplomacy was in full swing and another nuclear 
deal was being finalized in Beijing even after the increased intensity of 
provocations in 2010.  The deal would have been signed in December, but it 
was briefly suspended when Kim Jong-il died on December 19, 2011.353  
However, before he died many assumed he was unable to fully groom his son 
to assume power and North Korea would initially adopt a “collective” style of 
leadership consisting of his uncle Jang Sung-thaek, aunt Kim Kyong-hui, and 
General Ri Yong-ho, the Army Chief of Staff.354  The assumption that Kim Jong-
il would use the regency system was plausible since he had been groomed by 
his father for a long time.  Within this context, it is plausible that the 
provocations in 2010 were executed to “establish the credentials of these new 
leaders, just as the Rangoon bombing in 1983 and the downing of a Korean Air 
                                            
353
 Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 452-453. 
354
 Beck, “North Korea in 2010,” pp. 37-38. 
 
Figure 6.9. A crowd watches as statues of North Korea founder Kim Il-sung and his son 
Kim Jong-il are unveiled during a ceremony in Pyongyang in April 2012.  
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/13/opinions/whiton-north-korea-defense-minister/  
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jet in 1987 can best be explained as efforts by Kim Jong-il to consolidate his 
own power.”355  Perhaps most importantly, it would take well over 20 years after 
his succession before the U.S. would recognize Kim Jong-il as a competent and 
trustworthy leader.   
 
6.8 Summary 
First, the evidence suggests that Kim Il-sung and his son both 
understood the concept of smart power before its time, but Kim Jong-il was 
more effective in using his key institutions to develop smart power strategies.  
There are indications that he employed a situational leadership style, though he 
seems to have favored directing and coaching styles of leadership.  The 
evidence suggests it is also plausible that Kim may have used supporting and 
delegating styles with a select group of trusted core elites and key bureaucrats 
(e.g., trusted members of the Three Revolutions Movement, members of the 
OGD, key KPA generals, and diplomats).  He needed them to manage the key 
institutions and oversee the execution of approved strategies to achieve his 
aims.  Second, North Koreans were able to exert influence over their targets of 
influence by offering a freeze of their nuclear program in the mid- to late-1990s, 
a self-imposed missile moratorium in 1999, exploiting familial ties of South 
Korean elites to the North, and a partial dismantlement of their plutonium 
program in 2007.  However, they also used timely provocations along the NLL, 
missile launches, revelation of the HEU program, and nuclear tests to influence 
the policy preferences of others. 
Third, Kim Jong-il earned his reputation as the leader who successfully 
“combined threats and assurances in a comprehensive strategy,” and “raised 
brinksmanship to an art form in order to gain multiple policy goals.”356  He 
demonstrated this skill by securing agreements with three American presidents, 
two of whom pledged they would not negotiate with him unless he committed to 
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denuclearization prior to negotiations.  Hence, he demonstrated he was even 
more capable than his father in exercising smart power.   
Fourth, the successful application of smart power does not mean 
mistakes or some failures did not occur, such as the failure to understand the 
negative impact of the abductee issue with Japan, and back-peddling after 
initially dismissing Bush’s offer not to attack North Korea in October 2003.  
What this demonstrates is that wielding smart power is difficult.  It requires 
leadership at the highest levels and development of effective strategies that 
demonstrates understanding of contextual intelligence, imagination, flexibility, 
and rationale.  In the end, if one is convinced Kim Il-sung is the one responsible 
for the collapse of North Korea’s economy, Kim Jong-il may have survived, in 
part by using a mix of positive transformational and transactional leadership.  
This makes it plausible that the North Korean regime may experience instability 
without Kim Jong-il’s leadership to direct and oversee smart power strategies.  
Next chapter examines the issue of continuity and change since Kim Jong-un’s 
sudden rise to power in late 2011, and considers the prospects for his survival.  
What the evidence suggests is that he must prove his competence and at least 
some degree of benignity before the U.S. and others will take him seriously.    
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CHAPTER 7 
KIM JONG-UN’S BYUNGJIN REVIVAL OR SLOW DECAY? 
 
Kim [Jong-un] may be the undisputed captain of the North Korean 
ship, but that ship may be the Titanic.  Kim Jong-un has 
maintained Kim Jong-il’s foreign policy, but appears to be 
implementing it in a more volatile, reckless, and unpredictable 
manner.  When compared to his father, Kim Jong-un seems 
amateurish and lacking his father’s calculating, incremental 
approach toward achieving objectives.  Indeed, it appears Jong-un 
may not have a game plan at all.1   
 
       - Bruce Klinger 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the issue of continuity and change 
since Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power in December 2011, and consider the 
prospects for regime survival.  As the preceding chapter has shown, Kim Jong-il 
was well prepared to assume the reins of power, but some observers have 
recently concluded that Kim Jong-un’s initial steps appeared to be amateurish 
and lacking his father’s strategic acumen.  That said, it begs the question 
whether Kim Jong-un can prove his detractors wrong and devise a successful 
strategy to prolong his rule.  The evidence below suggests that after four years 
(as of December 2015), he may be in the final phase of power consolidation 
and has shown some indication that he is capable of exercising smart power.  In 
addition to high-level purges (which is expected in North Korea during power 
consolidation), he has attempted to use Kim Il-sung’s legacy and provocations 
to secure his legitimacy and to demonstrate his leadership, respectively.  That 
said, I begin by highlighting how Kim Jong-un became the successor. 
 
7.2 Sudden Rise of Kim Jong-un and Truncated Succession Process 
As we have seen, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il both held extraordinary 
powers as the Supreme Leader.  However, there was no guarantee that Kim 
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Jong-il could pass the mantle of familial rule to his son.  Due to the dominant 
role of the leader of the regime, Kim Jong-un still has to show his potential as a 
worthy successor capable of leading and overseeing the regime’s core 
institutions and elites.  He must be able to construct his “own bases of support, 
a coalition that will forgo challenges in return for some quid pro quo in the form 
of policy, rents, or office.”2  Without Kim’s own ability to lead and sustain the 
transfer of charismatic authority, he will be vulnerable to manipulation both from 
within the regime and without.  The question is why he was selected as the 
successor and how does the regime justify his rule of the Kim Dynasty. 
 
7.2.1 The Kim Family’s Criteria for Choosing the Successor 
According to Kim Hak-joon, Kim Jong-il established several criteria for 
selecting his successor and began thinking about the succession process in 
2002 (when he became 60 years old).3  First, the successor had to be from the 
main branch of the Kim family, which means being a direct descendant of Kim 
Il-sung and his first wife Kim Jong-suk, who fought with him against the 
Japanese in Manchuria.  As a result, even within the Kim family, the blood line 
was a discriminator and the successor had to have pure revolutionary blood.  
This ruled out the offspring of Kim Il-sung’s second wife Kim Song-ae, who “had 
no connection with the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement.”4  Kim Jong-il’s sister 
Kim Kyong-hui attacked her stepmother in front of Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla 
comrades during his 60th birthday celebration in 1972.  She argued that “the 
sacred position of the first lady was occupied by a woman who had no career in 
the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement,” and the old guerrillas reportedly “wailed” 
and “cried out Kim Jong-suk’s name.”5  His daughter’s demonstration led Kim Il-
sung to force his second wife to keep a lower public profile.6  She briefly 
returned to the spotlight when former President Jimmy Carter went to North 
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Korea to resolve the nuclear crisis in June 1994.  However, when Kim Il-sung 
died in July 1994, only she was allowed to attend the funeral, not her sons, and 
she eventually disappeared from public view in 1997.7            
After purging his stepmother from political life, Kim ensured his half-
siblings from his father’s other wives would not threaten his rule.  Only those 
descendants from his parents and their offspring would be qualified to rule and 
that meant even Kim Il-sung’s younger brother Yong-ju would have to be 
sidelined from politics.  Kim Yong-ju had led the powerful OGD and served on 
the Politburo and the Party Secretariat, and as we have seen in Chapter 5, 
South Koreans assumed he had been anointed as Kim’s successor.  By 1974 
his nephew managed to out-maneuver him and he was banished from 
Pyongyang “to a local rehabilitation center on the pretext of ‘curing his failing 
health’.”8   He was allowed to return to the capital in 1993 as a member of the 
Politburo and vice chairman of North Korea but his status was downgraded to 
“honorary vice-chairman” in 1999.  Next, Kim Jong-il exiled most of his half-
siblings from the “side-branches” to North Korea’s diplomatic missions in 
Eastern Europe.  As Kim’s status as successor solidified in the late 1980s, 
Pyongyang’s propagandists argued the successor had to come from the next 
generation and he was the only one qualified as the first son of Kim Il-sung and 
his first wife.  The narrative also noted that “the successor must be chosen 
within the party by the party,” and highlighted the “principle of the party’s 
primacy over the military.”9   
Kim Jong-il used these criteria and principles to select his own successor.  
He would choose one of his own sons since they were the only ones from the 
next generation with the pure blood of the original line of Kim Il-sung.  The 
problem was his first son Kim Jong-nam was illegitimate since “his mother, 
Song Hye-rim, already had a daughter from her first marriage,” and her 
songbun was also bad because she came from a wealthy family in South 
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Korea.  To make matters worse, several members of her maternal family 
defected to the West.  She was ultimately hidden from Kim Il-sung due to her 
poor songbun, and Kim was forced to marry Kim Yong-suk in October 1973.  
They had a daughter named Kim Sul-song in 1974 and, based on the criteria 
and principles Kim Jong-il had established, she has the purest blood of all his 
children but her mother was not favored by him.10  Some argue that as the 
“purest of the pure bloods” Sul-song has significant influence within the regime 
as a mentor of Kim Jong-un’s sister Yo-jong as she expands her portfolio of 
managing the Kim family’s money and the regime’s security services.11   
As Kim Jong-il’s wife’s health declined further in 1975, he sent Song to a 
hospital in Moscow and fell in love with Kim Jong-un’s mother Ko Young-hee.  
However, Ko also had bad songbun because her family was from a community 
of Korean residents in Japan (Chosen Soren) who returned to North Korea 
during the 1960s, and some members of her family also betrayed Kim by 
defecting to the U.S.  That said, Ko was not married when Kim Jong-il met her 
and he was devoted to her for 28 years until her death in August 2004.  She 
was honored with a burial in Pyongyang.12        
 Kim Jong-il had to choose between one of his sons with Ko, and their 
offspring would form the new patrilineal line of descent for the Kim regime.  Kim 
had to choose between Jong-un and his older brother Jong-chol, and some 
claimed this was probably decided as early as 2003.  According to this view, 
Jong-chol lacked ambition and Kim Jong-il had ruled him out as successor 
“since he is effeminate,” while Jong-un was more like his father.  He apparently 
displayed as a young boy his “leadership [ability] and a strong desire to win,” 
and “a ruthlessness that Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il regarded as an important 
leadership attribute.”13  However, according to Confucian tradition, his mother 
may have pushed for the older Jong-chul to become his father’s successor in 
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2002.  Kim may have indulged Ko by appointing Jong-chol as the vice director 
of the powerful OGD in July 2003, but by early 2006 he failed to meet his 
father’s expectations.  He reportedly fell out of favor when he was exposed at 
an Eric Clapton concert in Germany.14 
Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il had visited China in mid-January 2006 and met 
with President Hu Jintao, who urged him to reform.  Some argued Kim may 
have rehabilitated Jang Song-thaek in 2006 to help him “emulate China’s 
economic policy,” while others claimed Jang was needed to ensure a successful 
transfer of power to one of his sons.15   The return of Jang was significant 
because Kim Jong-un’s mother apparently had him purged in 2004 after foreign 
media reported that Jang was the most likely successor if the regime suddenly 
collapsed.  According to Kim Hak-joon, Ko relied on two powerful OGD first vice 
directors, Ri Je-gang and Ri Yong-chul, to attack Jang and his supporters.  
However, Ko passed away in 2004 and Kim Jong-il probably needed Jang as 
he began to groom Jong-un as his successor in 2006.  Thus, it was not a major 
surprise when Jang returned from his brief hiatus to become the head of the 
administrative department, which oversaw the MSS, the MPS, the Central 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the Central Court.  As Jang began to assume 
administrative control of the security apparatus, the cult of personality began to 
embrace Kim Jong-un.  The young Kim had graduated from the “Kim Il-sung 
Comprehensive Military University” on December 24, 2006, and was praised for 
his thesis on “the great theories of military strategy” advanced by both his father 
and grandfather.  By the fall of 2007, Kim Jong-un’s birth place was designated 
“as a historical site.”  The process of succession was accelerated in August 
2008 when Kim Jong-il had a stroke.  He informed the OGD and the KPA that 
he had chosen Kim Jong-un as his successor on January 8, 2009.16   
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7.2.2 Truncated Grooming Process and Leadership Development 
When Kim Jong-un became the successor, Bruce Cumings argued “it is 
in his interest to lay low and gain experience, while seasoned old guard runs the 
country.”17  Surprisingly, he seemed to be everywhere with his new wife Ri Sol-
ju and attempted to show he was in charge.  More importantly, unlike his father, 
“Jong-un is the spitting image of his grandfather when he came to power in the 
late 1940s, even to the point of shaving his sideburns up high.” (see Figure 7.1).  
It is almost as if the regime was trying to make up for his lack of experience and 
leadership by arguing that “the DNA passed uncontaminated” from Kim Il-sung 
to his grandson.18  The regime was carefully crafting his image to exploit Kim Il-
sung’s cult of personality.  According to a recent survey of defectors, this 
strategy appears to be working because “a significant number of North Koreans 
feel much hope about the third incarnation of Kimhood, finding the young leader 
attractive and somewhat charismatic.”19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Kim Hak-joon, the first symbolic step in the grooming 
process was taken in early 2009.  The regime reportedly designated “a special 
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Figure 7.1. Photos of Kim Jong Un and his grandfather Kim Il-sung 
http://search.aol.com/aol/image?q=photo+of+Kim+Jong-un+and+Kim+Il-
sung&page=2&oreq=f32698ec3a9f491981bcf04df531eeeb&v_t=na  
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task force consisting of top experts in the fields of politics, economics, culture, 
and military affairs, most in their forties and fifties,” to prepare Kim Jong-un as 
the next Supreme Leader.20  As discussed in Chapter 6, Pyongyang also 
conducted a space launch in February 2009 and a second nuclear test in May 
2009, and some argued these provocations were “aimed at tightening national 
unity through the creation of national tension.”21  In the midst of these 
provocative acts, the regime attempted to elevate the status of Kim Jong-un as 
the successor.  Its Kim Jong-un promotion campaign included a song called 
“Footsteps,” which symbolized Kim following his father’s example as the 
Supreme Leader, and foreign missions in Pyongyang were notified of his official 
status as the successor.  The regime also disseminated “leaflets and posters in 
an effort to sanctify Kim Jong-un.”22  In March 2009, a month before the revision 
of the Constitution, Kim Jong-un was appointed as the minister of the MSS, the 
regime’s “core instrument for intelligence, coercion, and terror.”23  Kim would get 
to know his key security personnel and learn how to wield coercive power.  As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the regime also established the RGB to conduct a 
provocation campaign against the South in 2010.     
In April 2009, North Korea updated its Constitution and began the 
preamble by exalting Kim Il-sung.  It noted that “Comrade Kim Il-sung authored 
the immortal Juche idea and, by organizing and leading the anti-Japanese 
revolutionary struggle under its banner, created the glorious revolutionary 
traditions and achieved the historic cause of national restoration.”  He was also 
credited with “developing the Republic into a socialist country centred on the 
masses, into a socialist State which is independent, self-sufficient and self-
reliant in defense.”  Furthermore, it claimed Kim “always mixed with the people, 
devoted his whole life to them and turned the whole of society into a large family 
which is united in one mind.”  Since he lacked legitimacy, it implied Kim Jong-un 
would try to emulate his grandfather.  Kim Il-sung was also hailed for “regarding 
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the reunification of the country as the supreme national task.”24  This suggested 
reunification would remain an aspirational goal of the regime.    
The Constitution also reaffirmed that, as the Chairman of the NDC, Kim 
Jong-il is the Supreme Leader of the nation and “the supreme commander of 
the whole armed forces.”25  As the Supreme Leader, Kim approved the 
appointment of Jang Song-thaek as a member of the NDC, and some argued 
this was done “to prevent and suppress any organized resistance to the 
consolidation of the succession regime, and that Jang would play a crucial role 
in the whole process of consolidation.”26  At the same time, the two senior OGD 
officials who helped Kim Jong-un’s mother purge Chang in 2004 – Ri Yong-chul 
and Ri Je-gang – suddenly died in the spring of 2010.  For example, “Ri Je-
gang died in a car accident” just before Jang became a member of the NDC 
and led to speculation he was assassinated.  These purges were followed by 
the promotion of Choe Ryong-hae, the oldest son of Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla 
comrade Choe Hyun.27  In hindsight, these purges of OGD officials may have 
indicated an ongoing power struggle between Jang and the OGD that started in 
2004 and would not be settled until after Kim Jong-un assumed power.28   
 
7.2.3 Death of Kim Jong-il and the Short Period of Regency 
After his father’s death, there were several high-level military and party 
officials who were perceived as essential to Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of 
power.  Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, the chief of the KPA general staff, was 
supposed to be a guardian of Kim Jong-un but he was purged from all of his 
posts on July 16, 2012.  However, General U Tong-chuk, vice director of the 
MSS and classmate of Kim Jong-il at Kim Il-sung University, was promoted as 
one of the vice-chairmen of the NDC.  It was reportedly the first time an MSS 
official had been elevated to the NDC.  When the former head of the MSS, 
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General Ryu Kyong, was executed in January 2011, General U became its new 
director.  Kim also replaced Kim Yong-chun, the Minister of the People’s Armed 
Forces, with General Kim Jong-gak.  Kim Yong-chun had been a graduate of 
the elite Mankyongdae Revolutionary School, Kim Il-sung University, and the 
Soviet Military Academy in Frunze.  He was an important supporter of Kim 
Jong-il’s succession in the 1990s and remained a core member of the regime.29 
His replacement along with the other senior personnel moves suggested the 
regency period would be brief and more purges would follow.   
Moreover, Kim Jong-un chose not to observe the three year mourning 
period when his father died, breaking from Confucian tradition that was 
observed after Kim Il-sung’s death.  He only waited several months before he 
assumed power and some interpreted this as a message that Kim Jong-un 
would be different and gave hope that “the golden age of Kim Il Sung would 
return.”30  Kim probably had no choice but to show some early wins to 
demonstrate his competence to become the Supreme Leader.  That said, Kim 
initially appeared to honor the nuclear deal his father had approved in 
December 2011, but his plan to conduct another space launch spoiled the deal 
that he agreed to on February 29, 2012 (i.e., Leap Day Deal).  The deal 
obligated North Korea to “implement a moratorium on long-range missile 
launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon.”31  The U.S. also 
expected Pyongyang to allow IAEA monitoring of its uranium program and the 
disabling of the 5MW reactors.32  However, it was soon apparent that the deal 
was not what Kim was looking for to demonstrate his leadership credentials.   
On March 16, 2012, North Korea’s Committee for Space Technology 
announced that the “Kwangmyongsong-3, a polar-orbiting earth observation 
satellite, will be blasted off southward from Sohae Satellite Launching Station… 
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between April 12 and 16, lifted by carrier rocket Unha-3.”33  Pyongyang was well 
aware of U.S. sensitivity toward another space launch.  It carefully signaled the 
launch well in advance and claimed it “will strictly abide by relevant international 
regulations and usage concerning the launch of scientific and technological 
satellites for peaceful purposes and ensure maximum transparency.”34  The 
North even took the unusual measure of opening its new launch facility on the 
west coast to the foreign media.35  It also made it clear the launch trajectory 
would avoid Japan.  When it failed on April 13, North Korea announced the 
“satellite had ‘failed to enter its preset orbit’.”36  Pyongyang had been arguing all 
along that it had no reason to nullify the Leap Day Deal by launching a long-
range missile, and claimed the launch was to commemorate the 100th birthday 
of Kim Il-sung on April 15, 1912.37     
Nevertheless, this was a bit too convenient and convinced the U.S. that 
Pyongyang was not committed to denuclearization.  The U.S. promptly 
abrogated the Leap Day Deal and pursued additional sanctions.  However, it 
may have been a lost opportunity to at least freeze North Korea’s nuclear 
program and perhaps continue the dismantlement that Chris Hill had started.  If 
lack of trust was an issue for both sides, they could have taken some measures 
to build trust.  According to Roderick Kramer, these measures could have 
included sending “loud, clear, and consistent signals” instead of settling for 
ambiguous agreements.  It also helps to have a “clearly articulated plan for 
disengagement” that is known to all in case someone cheats (i.e., escape 
clause), have empathy for the other side’s position, and constantly verify to 
ensure your trust is not violated.38  In short, it would have been prudent to 
ensure each other’s positions were made clear to the other side before the deal 
                                            
33
 KCNA, “DPRK to Launch Application Satellite,” March 16, 2012, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-
e.htm (accessed June 22, 2015). 
34 
KCNA, “DPRK to Launch Application Satellite.” 
35
 Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 453-455. 
36 
Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 453-455. 
37 
KCNA, “U.S. Should Not Apply Double Standards to DPRK's Satellite Launch,” March 27, 
2012, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 11, 2014). 
38 
Roderick M. Kramer, “Rethinking Trust,” Harvard Business Review, June 2009, pp. 3-9. 
335 
 
was made – there should not have been any confusion about the consequences 
of the space launch since it was also a problem in 2009.     
In May 2012, North Korea revised its Constitution again and proclaimed, 
“In the face of the collapse of the world socialist system and the vicious 
offensive of the imperialist allied forces to stifle the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Comrade Kim Jong-il administered Songun politics; thus he 
safeguarded with honour the achievements of socialism which are the precious 
legacy of Comrade Kim Il-sung.”  Kim Jong-il was also credited with developing 
North Korea as “a nuclear state and an unchallengeable military power.”  Kim 
Jong-il was thus granted the title of the “Eternal Chairman” of the NDC and Kim 
Jong-un was given the new title of “First Chairman” of the NDC.”39  What this 
indicated was that to bolster his lack of legitimacy, Kim Jong-un would justify his 
policies by recalling existing policies and accomplishments of his forefather’s.     
On August 12, 2012, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry attempted to defend 
its sovereign right to a space program.  The Foreign Ministry asserted, “It is true 
that both satellite carrier rocket and missile with warhead use the similar 
technology.  However, when other countries conduct satellite launch, the U.S. 
neither takes an issue with any of it, calling it a missile launch, nor takes actions 
like imposing sanctions.”40  The point was that Washington viewed its “satellite 
carrier rocket as a long-range missile” as a threat because it viewed North 
Korea as an enemy.  Pyongyang also revealed part of its decision-making 
process when the Obama administration first objected to the launch of the 
“Kwangmyongsong 2” satellite in 2009.  The regime argued it felt compelled to 
respond with a second nuclear test, and when the U.S. levied more sanctions 
after the nuclear test, Pyongyang started to build its LWR.41    
The North claimed, “The respected Marshall Kim Jong Un wants to open 
up a new chapter for the development of relations with the countries friendly 
                                            
39
 Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2012),   
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Democratic_People%27s_Republic_of_Korea
_(2012) (accessed July 12, 2015). 
40 
KCNA, “DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in Resolving Nuclear Issue,” August 
31, 2012, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 11, 2014). 
41 
KCNA, “DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in Resolving Nuclear Issue.” 
336 
 
towards us, unbound to the past.”  It also reminded the U.S. that Kim Jong-il 
was serious about improving relations with the U.S. in the late 1990s.  
Subsequently, it presented the U.S. with two choices.  One option is to get rid of 
its Cold War mentality and “renounce its anachronistic policy toward the DPRK.”  
The other option is for Washington to continue its hostile policy, and North 
Korea will respond in kind.  In the end, it warned the U.S., if it failed to address 
its hostile policy, North Korea would keep its nuclear weapons and modernize 
and expand “its nuclear deterrent capability beyond the U.S. imagination.”42        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The U.S. and others in the international community ignored the threat 
from Pyongyang and issued another UNSC resolution to censure North Korea 
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Figure 7.2. North Korean propaganda leaflet post card obtained by Group 
Captain Athol Forrest, NZ Air Force, Retired, from his daughter who had visited 
Pyongyang on a tour in October 2015.  The poster says "responding to [U.S.] 
hardline with super hardline." (Translated by author). 
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after the December 2012 space launch.  The resolution targeted key personnel 
involved in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs and levied international 
pressure to deter further testing of its missiles.  Similar to what occurred in 2009, 
North Korea responded to the sanctions by conducting a third nuclear test on 
February 13, 2013.  After the test, it claimed it had “miniaturized” a nuclear 
device in “a safe and perfect manner.”43  The problem for the U.S. is that the 
provocations did not end with the reported miniaturization test as its forces 
began to prepare for its annual training exercise with the South Koreans.    
 
7.3 Kim Responds to Military Exercises in the South to Consolidate Power 
On March 7, 2013, North Korea condemned the combined U.S.-South 
Korea military exercise FOAL EAGLE that was being conducted from March 1 
to April 30.  The KCNA commentary highlighted that many U.S. “ultra-modern 
nuclear war means,” such as a nuclear aircraft carrier, B-52 bombers, and F-22 
stealth fighters were going to be involved in the exercises.  The KCNA took 
issue with South Korean claims that “B-52 and F-22 are ‘capable of preempting 
an attack on the abode of the headquarters of the north’ being undetected by 
radar.”  It concluded, “This proves that the on-going drills are an unpardonable 
terrorist act and a drill for preemptive nuclear attack aimed at harming the 
headquarters of the revolution and the social system in the DPRK.”44   
On March 9, 2013, KCNA claimed that many South Korean civic groups 
opposed large U.S. military exercises in the South, and highlighted two other 
military exercises called KEY RESOLVE and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, 
and claimed they prove that “the Korean War has not yet ended.”45  On the 
same day, the UNSC passed another resolution to sanction North Korea for the 
third nuclear test.  Pyongyang viewed it as violation of its sovereignty and 
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claimed it was an unjust action led by the U.S. and the resolution would only 
heighten North Korea's “anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist sentiments.”  This would 
motivate the North Korean people and the KPA to strengthen the defensive 
oriented nuclear deterrent to counter U.S.-led provocations.46  Next, the North 
continued to characterize the combined exercise in South Korea as the “largest-
ever nuclear war maneuvers” preparing to topple the regime.  It followed this up 
by nullifying the Korean Armistice Agreement as well as all existing North-South 
agreements of non-aggression.47  The Supreme Command placed the entire 
country on war footing on March 11, 2013,48 and Kim visited a KPA unit near 
the DMZ to demonstrate his leadership.49  The stage was set for Kim to show 
his ability to defend the sovereignty of North Korea against the U.S. imperialists. 
 
7.3.1 North Korea Claims It Possesses a Nuclear ICBM Capability  
On March 20, 2013, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry mentioned the B-52 
deployments to Korea.  It manipulated the B-52 sorties on March 8 and 19 by 
characterizing it as “an unpardonable provocation” to demonstrate U.S. 
strategic nuclear strike capabilities even as the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula was “inching close to the brink of war.”50  The next day, Pyongyang 
also underscored the deployment of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, 
and highlighted the fact that in the past U.S. deployment of nuclear strike 
capabilities had been kept secret.  Although B-52s were overtly deployed after 
the ax murders,51 it argued the public disclosure of B-52 flights confirmed it was 
“an open nuclear threat to the DPRK.”  North Korea warned, “If the U.S. sends 
B-52 to Korea again, it will meet catastrophic end by the strong military 
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counteraction of the DPRK.”52  The Supreme Command emphasized that the B-
52 deployment from Guam on March 25 conducted simulated nuclear strikes 
against North Korea and its targets included North Korea’s supreme leadership.  
These provocations proved the U.S. and its allies were exploiting the space 
launch and the nuclear test as pretext to pursue hostile activities.  It vowed to 
“take counteraction to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the supreme 
leadership.”53 
As tensions continued to rise, the U.S.-South Korea alliance completed 
the combined Counter-Provocation plan in March 2013 to respond more 
effectively to North Korean provocations.54  On March 28, Pyongyang reacted 
by stating that the “keynote of the war scenario called ‘joint operational plan’ is 
that the south Korean puppet forces and the U.S. imperialist aggression forces 
would jointly counter the DPRK's ‘provocation of a local war’.”  Pyongyang 
argued this plan was developed by the “U.S. and the puppet warmongers” to 
trigger a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.55  When the U.S. decided to 
deploy a B-2 stealth bomber to fly over Korea for the first time on March 28, Kim 
Jong-un called an urgent operational meeting the following day to discuss the 
KPA’s Strategic Rocket Force's readiness to conduct “firepower strikes.”  North 
Korea also indicated the U.S. had defied the “meaningful warning” made by the 
Supreme Command of the KPA on March 26 to halt the provocations.  Kim 
reportedly said at the meeting, “If they make a reckless provocation with huge 
strategic forces, the KPA should mercilessly strike the U.S. mainland, their 
stronghold, their military bases in the operational theaters in the Pacific, 
including Hawaii and Guam, and those in south Korea.”  After receiving 
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operational updates on the nuclear threats from the U.S. and the “technical 
conditions of the strategic strike means of the KPA,” Kim signed the plan for the 
KPA to standby to fire its nuclear ICBMs.56  The ensuing mass rally in 
Pyongyang called for a “final decisive battle against the aggressors including 
the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean group of traitors.”57 
On March 30, 2013, North Korea declared Kim’s decision to prepare for 
“do-or-die battle” to end the “long-standing showdown with the U.S.” would open 
a new era.  Under his rule, the U.S. would no longer threaten North Korea with 
nuclear weapons.  It boasted hostile forces “should clearly know that in the era 
of Marshal Kim Jong Un, the greatest-ever commander, all things are different 
from what they used to be in the past.”  It also warned, Pyongyang “will 
immediately punish any slightest provocation hurting its dignity and sovereignty 
with resolute and merciless physical actions without any prior notice.”58  This 
warning was accompanied by another one claiming that the future of the KIC 
will depend on the behavior of puppets in Seoul and their reactionary media.  
North Korea took issue with the South Korean claims that the KIC was kept 
open because of the money.  It asserted that North Korea kept it open because 
of its concern over South Korean businesses that would face bankruptcy.59   
The Central Committee of the KWP adopted a new strategic line on 
March 31, 2013, aimed to expand the regime’s nuclear capabilities as well as its 
economic development (i.e., Byungjin line).60 (see Appendix E).  Perhaps more 
importantly, the regime also revealed that the Byungjin line was initiated by Kim 
Il-sung in 1962.  This inexorably legitimized the policy and signalled Kim Jong-
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un would also favor improving national defense in order to “build a powerful 
socialist nation.”61  In other words, unless he has the resources to do both, he is 
likely to revive his grandfather’s policy that favored security over the economy.  
On April 1, Pyongyang attempted to garner sympathy for its claim for future 
space launches by establishing the State Space Development Bureau.  It 
disclosed its aim to become a “world-class space power by exercising its 
legitimate right to space development for peaceful purposes.”62   
The SPA concurrently passed a law stating that North Korea “is a full-
fledged nuclear weapons state.”  It claimed its nuclear weapons were a “just 
means for defence” and served “the purpose of deterring and repelling the 
aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly 
retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression until the world is 
denuclearized.”63  After justifying its space and nuclear programs, North Korea 
continued to escalate tensions by shutting down the KIC on April 8.  The North 
cited “a string of invectives hurting the dignity of the DPRK, talking about 
‘source of money,’ ‘detention’ and ‘hostages’,” as justification for withdrawing all 
of its workers from the KIC.  It reminded Seoul that the complex was built to 
symbolize both sides desire for “reconciliation, cooperation and reunification,” 
but it had become “a theater of confrontation between compatriots and war 
against the north.”  It also asserted Pyongyang “gets few economic benefits 
from the zone” and had to make a significant concession by providing a large 
area of “military strategic importance” to establish the complex.64   
Kim subsequently visited several military units and deployed his “missile 
units to the eastern coast.”  Some observers speculated the deployed missiles 
were targeting Guam.65  On April 4, Seoul “confirmed that Pyongyang has 
moved a missile with ‘considerable range’ to its east coast.”  This confirmation 
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from Seoul came after the KPA had “announced it had been authorised to 
attack the US using ‘smaller, lighter and diversified’ nuclear weapons.”  Some in 
Japan began to speculate “the missile could be a KN-08, which is believed to be 
a long-range [mobile] missile that – if operable – could hit the US.”66  As 
tensions began to rise, some noticed the Chinese were seriously considering 
“how severe its sanctions on Pyongyang should be while not forcing the 
collapse of the North Korean regime.”  Beijing stated it “was strongly dissatisfied 
with and firmly opposed” the nuclear test but, as before, it also encouraged 
Pyongyang and Washington “to make concessions to achieve a negotiated 
settlement.”67  When Kerry visited Seoul on April 12, he reassured South Korea, 
and warned, “North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power.”68    
Meanwhile, these nuclear provocations led to more speculation in 
Washington that “North Korea may have the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon 
on a missile” and senior U.S. officials were trying to downplay the North Korean 
threat.  However, by this time the media had disclosed that DIA “assessed with 
‘moderate confidence’ that North Korea has the ability to deliver a nuclear 
weapon with a ballistic missile, though the reliability is believed to be ‘low’.”69  
On April 18, 2013, President Obama refuted DIA’s claim by stating “he doesn't 
believe North Korea can fit a nuclear warhead on a missile.”  That said, he 
indicated he had to heighten the U.S.’s defensive posture by deploying missile 
defense systems to Guam “to guard against any miscalculation on their part.”  
Obama was aware of North Korea’s use of provocations to achieve its aims, 
and reiterated the point that “since I came into office, the one thing I was clear 
about was, we're not going to reward this kind of provocative behavior.  You 
don't get to bang your spoon on the table and somehow you get your way.”70 
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Despite Obama’s hardline approach, Kerry was attempting to find a 
diplomatic way out of the situation as he visited Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.  He 
set preconditions for talks by stating, “The North has to move toward 
denuclearization, indicate a seriousness in doing so by reducing these threats, 
stop the testing and indicate it's actually prepared to negotiate.”  However, 
North Korea called this a “crafty ploy” by the U.S. and claimed it can only 
pursue talks when it “has acquired nuclear deterrent enough to defuse the U.S. 
threat of nuclear war unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy and nuclear 
threat and blackmail” against Pyongyang.71  Kerry called on China to “‘put some 
teeth’ into efforts to press Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions,” and 
cautioned “if North Korea's 30-year-old leader went ahead with the launch, ‘he 
will be choosing, willfully, to ignore the entire international community’.”72   
 On May 1, Kim visited the MPS to encourage the personnel to continue 
“defending the party, social system and people in their struggle to decisively foil 
the enemies' moves to stifle the DPRK.”73  After Kim met with the member of his 
internal security forces, North Korea accused the U.S. and South Korea of 
provoking the North again with a live fire and anti-submarine warfare exercises 
on May 5 in the West Sea.  It warned that even if “a single shell drops over the 
territorial waters of the north during the provocative shelling drills,” the KPA will 
respond with “a prompt counteraction.”74  On May 13, Pyongyang announced 
that it would never give up its eternal treasure of the nation – its nuclear 
weapons.  It stated, “There have been big and small wars in the world for nearly 
seven decades since the appearance of nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons 
states have never been exposed to any war.”  Under Kim, North Korea claimed 
it now possessed “smaller, lighter and diversified powerful nuclear deterrence.” 
As a result, the U.S. could no longer threaten it with nuclear weapons, and 
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Pyongyang’s “nukes can never be a bargaining chip under any circumstances 
as they are stipulated by a law of the DPRK.”  Nevertheless, it appeared to 
leave open the prospect of denuclearization by stating, “There can be no 
discussion on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula unless the U.S. rolls 
back its hostile policy toward the DPRK and defuses its nuclear threat.”75 
On May 22, Kim Jong-un sent his special envoy Vice Marshal Choe 
Ryong-hae to Beijing.76  Choe met with Fan Changlong, member of the Political 
Bureau and the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) on 
May 24 to convey the message that “the friendship between the DPRK and 
China was sealed in blood in the hard-fought battlefields including the anti-
Japanese war, the war for liberating Northeast China and the Fatherland 
Liberation War, adding that it is an issue of particular importance in defending 
socialism in the two countries to boost the exchange and cooperation between 
the two armies.”  Both sides apparently agreed to improve military relations.77  
Cho also met with Xi Jinping during the visit and stated, “The Chinese party and 
government have consistently supported the building of a thriving socialist 
nation of Korean style,” and wished North Korea well in “developing the 
economy and improving the standard of people's living.”78 
Vice Marshal Choe’s visit to China seemed to de-escalate the situation 
on the Peninsula as North Korea chose not to launch its deployed missiles.  
However, readout from his meeting with Xi suggested that the Chinese leader 
sent a strong message for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and 
return to talks.  Subsequently, more North Korean officials visited China for 
“strategic dialogue” and Li Yuanchao, China’s Vice President, visited North 
Korea in July 2013 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War 
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Armistice.  Some observers were convinced China was finally using its leverage 
to influence North Korea.  They speculated Kim may have expressed regret that 
he “had been too harsh toward the United States and South Korea,” and 
supported Beijing’s efforts to resume 6PT.  Pyongyang then resumed talks with 
Seoul and agreed to reopen the KIC.79  That was sufficient to de-escalate the 
situation in Korea for the remainder of 2013.  In the end, missile deployment to 
the east coast was only a demonstration of force, but the issue of North Korea’s 
nuclear ICBMs would become a potential survival interest for the U.S.      
 
7.3.2 North’s Nuclear ICBM Capability: Potential for Miscalculation   
While from Pyongyang’s perspective it may be rational to counter that the 
fall of Qaddafi was a ruse by the U.S. to disarm and overthrow rogue states, 
and justify its effort to expand its nuclear deterrent,80 this could be a serious 
miscalculation.  Admittedly, the U.S. has traditionally avoided the use of force 
against Pyongyang since the end of the Korean War, but it may not be able to 
ignore a direct threat to the homeland from North Korea’s nuclear ICBMs.  Thus, 
while Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities may have deterred the use of force 
against the regime, one could just as easily argue its conventional forces have 
served this role equally as well.81  The Kim regime must realize that by 
continuing to expand its nuclear weapon and missile programs it invites more 
intense international pressure.   
The question is, despite its rational calculus (from its perspective), when 
does a nuclear deterrent no longer serve as an effective deterrent for a rogue 
state?  What if Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy is to use its nuclear weapons (i.e., 
sword)?  If the intent is to use nuclear weapons either to prevent U.S. 
intervention in Korea during a major crisis82 or to credibly threaten nuclear 
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strikes on the U.S.,83 that would be a serious mistake.  By the end of May 2009, 
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared, “We will not stand idly by 
as North Korea builds the capability to wreak destruction on any target in the 
region — or on us.”84  However, Pyongyang ignored Gates’ warning by raising 
the stakes with more provocations in 2010, and when he attended the “two plus 
two” meeting in Seoul with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in mid-July 2010, 
some in the South Korean military viewed the attacks in 2010 “as a turning point 
in the history of the South’s national defense.”  The North forced Seoul to 
consider offensive deterrence, which would demonstrate its willingness to use 
deep-strike capabilities to threaten the North’s leadership in Pyongyang.85   
As a result, it is more than plausible to suggest if and when Washington 
decides to use force to eliminate the North’s nuclear ICBM threat Seoul may be 
willing to support it.  This means that the expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear 
weapons and missiles would no longer serve as a deterrent but rather elicit a 
forceful U.S. and South Korean response (i.e., double-edged sword).  In other 
words, Kim Jong-un would be taking a significant risk to his survival by 
operationalizing a nuclear ICBM capability since the U.S. cannot accept being 
held hostage to North Korean nuclear threats to the homeland.  As of January 
29, 2014, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), testified 
that North Korea’s intent for its nuclear weapons program is deterrence, 
prestige, and coercive diplomacy.  However, he admitted that “we do not know 
Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.”86  This perspective 
could change based on the U.S. IC’s assessment of Pyongyang’s 
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operationalizing of its nuclear ICBM capability.  The North Koreans may have 
played their weak hand very well to this point, but there is no guarantee the U.S. 
would concede its use of force when the North operationalizes its nuclear ICBM 
capabilities and threatens the U.S. homeland.   
Were the U.S. IC to assess with high confidence that North Korea has 
miniaturized its nuclear weapons for missile delivery,87 it would present the 
“gravest of dangers”88 to the U.S.  The same would be true of Pyongyang’s 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or related technologies to another rogue state 
or non-state actor.89  What this implies is the primacy of intelligence.  Only with 
convincing and releasable intelligence would these actions ultimately weaken 
Pyongyang’s nuclear deterrent value and justify the potential use of force 
against the Kim regime.  Paradoxically, what this reveals is that the more North 
Korea attempts to develop its nuclear ICBM capability the more vulnerable it is 
likely to become to U.S. and South Korean hard power.  North Korea seems to 
be aware of the risks despite its display of nuclear ICBM capability in April 2013. 
What is often ignored in the analysis of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons 
state declaration in April 2013 is that it also outlined the key tenets of North 
Korea’s nuclear strategy based on the principle of self-defense. (see Appendix 
D).  The SPA’s decree stated the purpose of its nuclear arsenal was to deter 
and repel “the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and 
dealing a deadly retaliatory blow at the strongholds of aggression.”  The law 
also clarified, “The nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final 
order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army to repel 
invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory 
strikes.”  It pledged not to “use nukes against the non-nuclear states nor 
threaten them with those weapons unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons 
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state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK.”  Moreover, it even claimed 
Pyongyang will “strictly observe the rules on safekeeping and management of 
nukes and ensuring the stability of nuclear tests.”  Finally, it addressed the issue 
of proliferation by stating, “The DPRK shall establish a mechanism and order for 
their safekeeping and management so that nukes and their technology, 
weapon-grade nuclear substance may not leak out illegally.”90  In spite of the 
international condemnation of its nuclear weapons and related programs, North 
Korea outlined its nuclear weapon’s strategy (e.g., first use, use against non-
nuclear weapons states, launch authority, safekeeping, and proliferation) by 
emphasizing the defensive nature of these weapons.  Next, the study examines 
the nuclear ICBM demonstration in 2013 by using the smart power framework.   
 
7.3.3 U.S.-South Korea Exercises Cited to Justify Nuclear Weapons 
First, what was the preferred outcome of the nuclear ICBM deployment?  
It is most likely that Kim’s aim was to manipulate the annual U.S.-South Korea 
exercises FOAL EAGLE and KEY RESOLVE to hype the U.S. and the South 
Korean threat in order to establish his legitimacy by formally declaring North 
Korea as a nuclear weapons state.  This probably helped him to consolidate his 
power by demonstrating that his regime was capable of building a “strong and 
prosperous nation.”  The show of force missile deployment to the east coast 
and the threatening rhetoric was intended to demonstrate that Kim was capable 
of standing up to the U.S. with his own nuclear deterrent capability that could 
now threaten the U.S. homeland.  The U.S. responded accordingly by overtly 
deploying B-52 and B-2 bombers as well as its missile defense forces.91  
Although it remains to be seen, Kim may have miscalculated because the 
incident may have forced the U.S. to consider the use of force to eliminate the 
North Korean nuclear ICBM threat.  In the meantime, Washington and Seoul 
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finalized their combined counter provocation plan to deter future provocations 
from North Korea.   
Second, which forms of power behavior did North Korea assume would 
succeed?  I argue the North’s strategists (since Kim was still inexperienced) 
may have believed this was an opportune time to use coercive power to justify 
North Korea’s position as a de-facto nuclear weapons state following the 
successful space launch in December 2012 and the February 2013 nuclear test.  
The latter is significant because Pyongyang claimed it had miniaturized a 
nuclear device during the third test, which implies it is actively pursuing a 
nuclear ICBM capability.  However, before deploying the missiles, Pyongyang 
tried to address international concerns to gain sympathy by revealing that its 
nuclear weapons policy was based on the principle of self-defense.  When the 
North sensed it had achieved its aim to demonstrate it possessed a nuclear 
ICBM capability, it chose not to launch the missile.  It used high-level diplomacy 
with China and re-opened the KIC to de-escalate the situation.   
Third, what resources were available to implement the strategy?  North 
Korea used its growing nuclear and missile capabilities to help consolidate 
Kim’s power.  The North probably never intended to launch the missiles but 
revealed the missile deployment as a demonstration of power to declare it had a 
nuclear ICBM capability to defend the country.  The escalation during the 
provocation was largely caused by the intense propaganda from the regime that 
expressed its intent to preemptively strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear 
ICBMs.  At home, the Kim regime attempted to show its benignity by 
manipulating the overt nuclear and conventional threat from the U.S. during 
military exercises to mobilize the population, the KPA, and the intelligence and 
security services.  The exit strategy was to employ high-level diplomacy and 
use the KIC as leverage to return to the status-quo.     
Fourth, how did the North Koreans view the likelihood of success?  North 
Koreans were probably convinced they could control the escalation ladder as 
long as they refrained from launching the missile.  The U.S.’s overt deployment 
of B-52 and B-2 bombers might have increased the chance of success of their 
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strategy to bolster Kim’s position as the Supreme Leader.  They became a 
visible symbol of U.S. nuclear threat to Pyongyang as Washington attempted to 
reassure Seoul with its extended nuclear deterrence.  If all else failed, Kim was 
prepared to use diplomacy with Beijing and Seoul to de-escalate.   
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors?  Kim’s strategists 
probably saw an opportunity to demonstrate his leadership by directly 
confronting the U.S. with his growing nuclear ICBM capability.  On the other 
hand, the U.S. felt threatened and it deployed its missile defense forces to 
defend itself.  At the same time, Washington decided to reassure Seoul by 
overtly deploying B-52 and B-2 bombers to Korea.  It was also a message to 
Pyongyang that it was prepared to defend South Korea.  Moreover, many in 
Washington were becoming aware it would only be a matter of several years 
before the U.S. would have to make the difficult choice about how to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear ICBM threat.  That said, the U.S. preferred to work with 
Beijing to pressure Pyongyang to change its behavior and continued to use 
unilateral and multilateral sanctions.  On the other hand, while Beijing seemed 
frustrated by Pyongyang’s nuclear provocations, it was unwilling to use coercion 
to change North Korean behavior.  Again, this incongruent policy approach 
among the key actors does not seem to be working.  The question is what tools 
does Kim Jong-un have to consolidate his power and survive?     
 
7.4 Survival Tools: Continuity and Change 
According to Terence Roehrig, “Early pronouncements have indicated 
that Kim Jong un will continue the legacies of Songun and Juche established by 
his father and grandfather.”92  As evidence has shown, it is true that in the 
spring of 2012, the North Korean propagandists used the legacies of both of his 
predecessors to establish the foundation for his rule, but some evidence 
suggests the recent adoption of Byungjin may lead to a more balanced 
approach which could institutionalize some of the positive social changes that 
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have been occurring in North Korea since the famines of the mid-1990s.  
Having said that, further examination of North Korea’s survival tools below 
reveals how important the anti-Japanese legacy and Juche are to the regime’s 
survival.  This suggests Kim probably will allow pragmatic changes to occur (like 
his father) but will continue to rely on the regime’s core ideology and 
revolutionary legacy to establish his legitimacy and survive.  The question 
remains how essential China will be to Kim’s survival and that will be examined 
further below.  The role of nuclear weapons, however, has already been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6 and above.  The North’s coercive strategy to 
extort aid and its illicit activities also will not be discussed since earlier review in 
Chapter 2 made it clear that since 2008, both are no longer effective tools of 
survival.  The post-totalitarian nature of the regime that was also discussed in 
Chapter 2 will focus primarily on marketization, penetration of external 
information, and the continuing relevance of Juche.  The reason is that Kim 
Jong-un appears to be in control of the remaining traits of totalitarianism (i.e., 
party, army, and secret police) despite indications he is relying more on the 
KWP than his father.93  Moreover, as noted above, Kim Jong-un’s sister 
appears to be overseeing the management of the regime’s security services.94   
In short, it is plausible to assume that the loyalty of the KPA, KWP, and 
the security services have been tested for four years and are assessed as loyal 
to Kim.  According to John Grisafi, during his “reign of terror” Kim has executed 
about 70 high-level officials since assuming power in December 2011, to 
include his uncle Jang Song-thaek.  During Jang’s trial in December 2013, the 
regime had to admit, whether true or not, factionalism remained and it was 
deeply rooted in North Korea’s core institutions.  The regime claimed, “When 
Kim Jong Il passed away so suddenly and untimely to our sorrow, he [Jang] 
began working in real earnest to realize his long-cherished greed for power.”  
When Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were alive, Jang was forced to stay low but, 
when Kim Jong-un was designated successor, he saw his “wild ambition.”  He 
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was accused of portraying himself, both domestically and externally, as “a 
special being” that was equivalent to Kim Jong-un.95   
Jang reportedly sought to mobilize “a group of reactionaries” to stage a 
coup by recruiting “undesirable and alien elements including those who had 
been dismissed and relieved of their posts after being severely punished for 
disobeying the instruction of Kim Jong Il.”  Jang was accused of committing 
many acts in the past to “create extreme illusion and idolization of him by 
making him appear as a special being who can overrule either issues decided 
by the party or its line.”  The regime found him guilty of working actively “to put 
all affairs of the country under his control, massively increasing the staff of his 
department and organs under it, and stretch[ing] his tentacles to ministries and 
national institutions.”  He was accused of creating a “little kingdom” that was 
perceived as untouchable as his faction attempted to wrest control of the 
North’s economy away from the Cabinet.  The regime found him guilty of selling 
its mineral resources at random and leasing the land within the Rason SEZ “to a 
foreign country for a period of five decades” to pay off his debt.96   
Jang reportedly confessed his plans for a coup to a special military 
tribunal from the MSS: 
 
I was going to stage the coup by using army officers who had 
close ties to me or by mobilizing armed forces under the control of 
my confidants.  I don’t know well about the recently appointed 
army officers but have some acquaintances with those appointed 
in the past period.  I thought the army might join the coup if the 
living of the people and service personnel further deteriorate in the 
future.  And I calculated that my confidants in my department 
including Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil would surely follow me 
and had a plan to use the one in charge of the people’s security 
organ as my confidant.  It was my calculation that I might use 
several others besides them.97 
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Jang apparently had not made up his mind about the timing of the coup 
but, once he gained more power and exercised more influence over “all 
economic organs on the Cabinet,” he would have seized power when the 
economy collapsed.  This would have legitimized his rule as he lived up to his 
reputation as a reformer and quickly gained the support of external powers.98  If 
he was in fact a reformer, Jang never got his chance, but this rationale 
highlights the importance of economic development to the Kim Jong-un regime.  
According to Lee Hong Yung, Kim used Jang to temporarily consolidate his 
power, and then purged him and his followers.99   
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the purges follow long established 
tradition of his grandfather who also purged all of his rivals during the early 
phase of his power consolidation.  However, once he became the Supreme 
Leader, Kim Il-sung relied on milder forms of punishment.  On the other hand, 
Kim Jong-il may have avoided his own reign of terror by using the Three 
Revolutionary Movement to purge the old guard100 and subsequently promote 
his own people during his long grooming period as the successor.  Having said 
that, the following highlights how Kim Jong-un is following Kim Il-sung’s lead to 
control his core elites and indicates why he may have consolidated his 
power:101 
 
In recent months, there have been numerous cases of North 
Korean elites reemerging after months of absence from public 
view.  For several of these officials, there is evidence to suggest 
they were undergoing re-education and even punishment due to 
some infraction or shortcoming.  These examples may be 
evidence of a shift in Kim Jong Un’s method of disciplining senior 
officials and exerting his supreme authority over regime elites.  
This trend itself may be a sign that Kim and the rest of the core 
leadership now feel more secure and stable as the rulers of North 
Korea.102   
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As Kim maintains continuity over the key institution of his regime, Juche 
ideology remains vulnerable to change and will be discussed below.  However, I 
will first examine the implications of significant social change in North Korea.  
 
7.4.1 Kim Jong-un: Neo-Totalitarianism or Post-Totalitarianism? 
Despite the ongoing marketization and the penetration of external 
information, it may be premature to suggest Kim Jong-un has given up on the 
totalitarian system.  As Kim consolidates his power, he may attempt to regain 
more control over the changes in North Korean society.  On the other hand, it is 
also plausible that these changes that began during the famine years of the 
1990s have gained sufficient inertia that Kim Jong-un may not be able to revive 
the totalitarian system.  In fact, one could argue the system has already 
transitioned to a post-totalitarian regime under his father’s rule.  However, the 
reality is that North Korea has yet to officially embrace economic reform and still 
attempts to control access to information.  As a result, in addition to examining 
the provocations by the Kim regime, one must understand the changes that are 
ongoing within the regime and their implications.      
First, there is little doubt that the growth and tolerance of local markets in 
North Korea is changing North Korean society, and has the potential to further 
erode central control over society.  Some have recently recognized the potential 
for the expansion of these markets to empower the average North Korean to 
become an “agent of change.”103  In fact, Park So-keel has argued that this 
Jangmadang (market) Generation (JG) of North Koreans, who were born in the 
1980s and 1990s, “presents a clear challenge to the North Korean government.”  
They consist of approximately six million young adults, ages 18 to 35.  The most 
influential among them live in large cities and border towns, and grew up during 
“an era of profound economic, information, and social change.”  Unlike the older 
generation who reminisce about the golden years under Kim Il-sung, the JG 
grew up during the Kim Jong-il years when there was little or no PDS and they 
had to fend for themselves to survive.  Thus, “They are natives to capitalism,” 
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and were active participants in “private business, market activities and de facto 
capitalism.”  The JG also had wide exposure to outside information and 
eventually got accustomed to consuming smuggled “CDs, DVDs, MP3s, USBs, 
mobile phones and laptops.”  It meant they regularly broke North Korean rules 
and laws to survive and even prosper.  Most important for the regime, “this 
disobedience is not just individual, but networked and shared to an 
unprecedented degree.”  Although the level of social change within the JG does 
not apply to all at the same level, their aspirations are rising and the regime’s 
mishandling of this group could pose significant challenges for Kim Jong-un.  
Park argued, the older generation may not have the will to resist the regime, but 
“the energy and ideas of the Jangmadang Generation seem likely to play a key 
role in the transformation and rebuilding of a better North Korea.”104   
As noted below, Kim seems to be aware of the growing expectations of 
his people and promised to improve the lives of his people.  He is actively 
experimenting with economic changes from above and some of them have the 
potential to have a positive impact on the economy.  For example, Andray 
Abrahamian’s 2014 study on North Korea’s SEZs confirmed “the priority 
Pyongyang has put on economic growth has increased.”  This was supported 
by Kim Jong-il’s on-the-spot guidance visits after his son was declared as his 
successor in 2010.  During that year, he visited 58 economic sites versus 33 
military units.  After his father’s death, Kim Jong-un celebrated the centennial 
anniversary of his grandfather’s birth (April 15, 2012) by stating that the North 
Korean people ‘will never have to tighten their belts again’.”105  Henceforth, 
Kim’s competence and leadership is likely to be associated with his ability to 
deliver positive performance in the economy will have a direct impact on the 
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stability of the regime.106  The question is can the regime deliver sustainable 
economic growth?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While Abrahamian admitted Pyongyang was not ready for serious 
economic reform, it nevertheless appears to be mimicking certain aspects of 
Chinese economic reforms.  In fact, it was experimenting with “the 
reorganization of collective farms, increased autonomy for State-owned 
Enterprises and an overhaul of investment laws.”  With respect to agriculture, as 
part of the “New Economic Management Measure” of 2013, it piloted a program 
to reduce the size of the work unit to less than six people, which probably meant 
one to two families forming agriculture work units, and that could incentivize 
them to work harder and allow them keep more of what they produce.  There 
are also some indications that this program was expanded to a larger 
population in the rural areas.107  Lankov has even argued that North Korea has 
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Figure 7.3.  Average Monthly PDS rations vs. Government Target, 2008-2013.  FAO/WFP 
Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
November 28, 2013, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and World 
Food Programme 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp261353.pdf  
357 
 
implemented agricultural reforms by empowering farming households on June 
28, 2012.  This has resulted in the best harvest in over 20 years in 2013 and the 
results exceeded expectations despite the drought in 2014.108 (see Figure 7.3). 
Obviously, the success of this pilot agricultural program would be 
significant in the regime’s efforts to alleviate its persistent food shortages, but it 
will take more than a return to family plots to ensure food security.  A 
sustainable increase in food production will require additional inputs through 
international trade and that will require “balanced economic development, 
whereby productive industrial and service sectors help produce or fund the 
inputs needed for agriculture as well as generate income for the urban 
population to purchase food.”  Moreover, the state must have sufficient funds to 
purchase food from farmers at the market rate to make the system work,109 and 
all of this will require systemic reform which the regime has resisted in the past.   
The regime also announced it would grant “greater autonomy in decision-
making for companies” as part of its new economic measure of 2013.  A pro-
North Korean newspaper in Japan highlighted, “Whereas in the past enterprises 
had just to carry out the production plans handed down from the state, the new 
measure has allowed enterprises to make production contracts with various 
clients based on their own decisions while implementing the state plan as well.”  
What this really meant was the KWP would select the managers of the State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), but authorities in Pyongyang would no longer be 
responsible “for distributing food and other provisions for workers and for setting 
quotas, targets or restrictions on production.”  It was almost as if Kim had to 
take some risks to live up to his April 2012 promise that he would improve the 
lives of his people.  This also led to allocation of resources to promote projects 
that would improve “leisure, recreational activities, and a pleasant life.”  While 
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there are many economic experiments being tried, Abrahamian argues that the 
showpiece of the effort is the expansion of North Korea’s SEZs.110   
If Abrahamian is correct, the recent revival of the SEZs in the regime’s 
economic plan could be significant because SEZs were not taken seriously 
before by outsiders.  Pyongyang first established its SEZ over a decade after 
China declared the Shenzhen SEZ in 1980.  Kim Il-sung and his large 
entourage visited successful SEZs in Shenzhen and Shanghai in the early 
1980s, and they subsequently copied and propagated China’s Joint Venture 
Law (JVL) in 1984 and established their first SEZ in the Rajin-Sonbong (i.e., 
Rason) area near the China-Russia-North Korea tri-border region in 1991.  It 
was evident at the time that North Korea was moving slowly and the SEZ 
project was mostly ignored since its economy was collapsing in the 1990s and 
there was little interest from outside investors.  Nonetheless, Pyongyang 
revised the foreign investment laws periodically throughout the 1990s.111  The 
advent of the Sunshine Policy resulted in two SEZs promoting joint ventures 
with Seoul at Kaesong (manufacturing) and Kumgang (tourism).  The Kumgang 
zone closed after a South Korean tourist was killed by a KPA soldier in the DMZ 
in 2008.  The only profitable SEZ that Kim inherited was the KIC, but the 2013 
law would significantly expand the SEZs.112   
In October 2013, the North declared it was planning to establish 13 more 
SEZs at the provincial level.  They were separated into five different sectors, 
which included “Export Processing/Trade Zones; Industrial Development Zones; 
Agricultural Development Zones; Tourism Development Zones; and Economic 
Development Zones.”  While the promotion of SEZs has been impressive, it will 
be a challenge for North Korea to attract significant foreign investment due to 
U.S. and international financial sanctions.  Another problem is that most North 
Korean officials have little understanding of what expectations potential foreign 
investors would have for doing business in North Korea, such as right to hire 
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and fire employees, access to information, remittance of earnings, etc.  With so 
much uncertainty, many investors would look for better opportunities elsewhere.  
For the SEZs to achieve their potential, the North needs more officials who have 
“greater exposure to the outside world, more education and more hands-on 
experiences with investors.”  However, the current sanctions regime makes it 
difficult to cultivate experienced economic cadres in North Korea.113   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, Abrahamian argued that four SEZs in “Wonsan [Special 
Tourist Zone], Rason [Export Processing/Trade Zone], Unjong [Technology 
Zone] and Sinuiju [International Trade Zone]... have the best prospects for 
growth in the short to medium-term.”  To achieve success, the North Koreans 
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Figure 7.4. North Korea’s Annual GDP Growth Rate from 1990 to 2013, 
http://www.nknews.org/north-korea-leading-indicators/  
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would have to overcome many challenges associated with SEZs, improve their 
foreign relations with the key players in the region, and consider broader 
economic reforms throughout the country.114  Thus, the future prospect for the 
North Korean economy looks pessimistic but it has managed to make some 
progress in recent years.  According to NK News.org, annual GDP growth for 
North Korea has increased gradually under Kim Jong-un. (see Figure 7.4).  
Lankov views the growth as quiet and cautious implementation of agricultural 
and industrial reforms through empowerment of farming households and 
industrial managers.  The results have been much improved harvests over the 
last couple of years and manufactured goods being sold legally in the 
markets.115  Moreover, since early 2010, North Korea has allowed private 
entrepreneurs to flourish and some reports indicate “local authorities have been 
advised to cooperate with the new rich, using their capital to launch some major 
projects.”116  What has all this meant for the average North Korean?   
Nearly all North Koreans, including those in the countryside, now own 
televisions.  Moreover, more than half of the North Korean households possess 
video-playing devices to watch foreign movies.  Movies from the West and 
South Korea are illegal but other foreign movies from China, India and Russia 
are apparently legal.117  In 2008, owning a refrigerator was a luxury far beyond 
most North Koreans’ reach and today almost forty percent of the people in 
Pyongyang own them.  Even the well-to-do in the periphery have them and to 
gain access to a reliable power grid they bribe the right local officials.  This 
means those with refrigerators can buy meat, which was also reserved for the 
core elites only several years ago.  That is not all.  Almost 30 percent of 
Pyongyang households own washing machines and up to 9 percent of rural 
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homes own them as well.  Other evidence suggesting life in North Korea is 
gradually improving is the sprouting of new and popular restaurants in larger 
cities across the country.  North Koreans are also more fashion conscious and 
mimic foreign fashion trends.118   
Anna Fifield has forecasted that the North’s economy is projected to 
grow by 7% in 2015 largely due to expansion of lower-level economic activity in 
northeast China.119  Her growth rate appears to be a bit too optimistic, but how 
the economy evolves as the regime’s economic policies are implemented from 
above and market forces expands from below, will largely shape the nature of 
the post-totalitarian regime.  Anecdotal evidence from a recent North Korean 
refugee survey suggest that the “first few years of Kim Jong Un’s rule have 
been marked by an exponential growth in the unofficial economy.  The 
authorities have stopped interfering with many illegal and semi-legal private 
businesses that now flourish in North Korea.”120  Although this promotes 
economic growth, it changes the way North Koreans view social status.  The 
traditional view of Songbun also matters less as “home ownership and wealth 
are increasingly being emphasized” by North Koreans.  For instance, there is a 
embryonic growth of “capitalists, petit bourgeoisie, and wage laborers.”  Hence, 
this focus on economic progress could weaken the “ideological foundation” of 
the regime.121  More importantly, a recent study of North Korean markets 
indicates they “survived or even thrived during periods of [government] 
repression” from 2009-2010.  While there are many variables for why some 
regions have larger markets than others (e.g., access to ports), one likely factor 
is the “attitudes among local government officials.”  In places like Sinuiju near 
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the Chinese border, local officials “may have greater autonomy and flexibility in 
policymaking” due to its proximity to China.122  In other words, there are 
indications that growing marketization could even influence change in the 
relationship between central and local governments in some locations.  
Second, as markets spread, North Koreans are increasingly being 
exposed to information that challenges the monopoly control of communication 
and alters their views about their own society.  As a result, it is widely 
recognized that North Korea has lost its near monopoly control of information 
and the people are now more aware of developments in the outside world.123  
According to Scott Bruce, this has led many to believe it is almost inevitable that 
the growing penetration of information will “induce a radical change in the North 
Korean state,” and he cautions against simply assuming that growing use of 
information technology and access to outside information will have a liberalizing 
effect on North Korean society.124  On the other hand, Park So-keel has argued 
that while the JG cannot openly protest against the regime, they can show low-
level expressions of disobedience “through fashions, language and behaviours.”  
For instance, these are manifested through mimicking of South Korean dramas 
and dialect.125  Nevertheless, it is likely to take some time before the JG 
becomes a revolutionary generation that can transform the North.  Moreover, 
the regime will also attempt to stifle any movement by the JG to challenge the 
regime.       
Although it is tempting to assume “increased access to information will 
undermine authoritarian governments and bolster democratic social 
movements,” it is also possible to use information technologies “to support 
authoritarian regimes through information control, surveillance, and 
propaganda.”  In other words, regimes like North Korea will not sit idly by as 
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growing penetration of information and use of information technology threaten 
the survival of the regime.  North Korea has not given up on its efforts to 
maintain strict control over its populace.  On the contrary, the regime has 
determined that use of information technology is a necessary evil if it tends to 
increase efficiency and promote foreign investments.  In order to minimize the 
risk of ideological contagions “associated with the use of cell phones, intranet, 
and internet,” Pyongyang has adopted a “mosquito net” strategy to “reap the 
positive benefits of the technology.”126   
The strategy to control information and information technology includes 
co-opting regime elites by providing access to cell phones and other information 
technology as a material incentive, and imposing severe “penalties for 
possession of forbidden technology or the misuse of approved technology.”  
Those living in the periphery, particularly non-elites, generally do not have 
access to cell phones or other information technology due to prohibitive costs of 
owning them and lack of access to reliable sources of energy to operate them.  
On the other hand, getting access to these communications tools allows North 
Koreans to “communicate in ways that are unprecedented in the history of the 
state,” even for the elites.127  More importantly, in addition to the elites, North 
Koreans living in border areas “boast an increasingly well informed and 
nuanced understanding of the outside world based on multiple sources.”  North 
Koreans are also willing to share this knowledge “with those they trust” mostly 
through word of mouth.  They do so because the security services’ enforcement 
of the rules for violating misuse of information technology and sensitive 
information is sporadic, punishment can be avoided with bribes, and “far fewer 
North Koreans appear to be reporting on each other than before.”128  In short, 
similar to the North Korean economy, there is a struggle between the top-down 
efforts by the regime to control information and the growing ability by the North 
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Korean populace to gain access to outside information and this will also have a 
significant impact on the pace of evolution of North Korean society. 
Third, due to these dramatic changes in North Korean society, even 
North Korea’s venerable Juche ideology is feeling the pressure to evolve.  
According to Armstrong, despite North Korea’s exaltation of its ideology of self-
reliance, it has come to a critical juncture where the regime must decide 
whether it will accept “substantial economic reform” or face collapse.  Thus far, 
it has relied on propaganda to promote its anachronistic ideology and uses 
coercion to keep unbelievers in line.  However, if Kim Jong-un is going to deliver 
on his promise of building a strong and prosperous nation, he has to implement 
significant measures that will improve the quality of life in North Korea.  If he 
cannot show improvement in the economy, “it will take a great deal of 
ideological work indeed to maintain a docile and satisfied citizenry.”129  The JG 
is already susceptible to outside influence130 and that could be exploited by the 
international community with programs that could promote greater opening to 
the outside world.  They include covert hacking operations to “support internal 
dissidents,” providing additional funds to NGOs educating North Koreans in the 
effective use of business practices, and supporting North Korean defectors by 
training them in “journalism, IT, and social media.”131      
     In sum, evidence confirms the post-totalitarian transition that is ongoing 
in North Korea.  They include top-down as well as bottom-up changes to the 
North Korean economy and growing penetration of information from the outside.  
More observers are now realizing that these social changes have created a 
dynamic younger generation that could challenge authority, changed the 
relationship between the central and some local governments, and altered the 
way societal hierarchy is perceived by the people.  Overtime, these 
developments could further weaken North Korea’s Juche ideology.  More 
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importantly, if Kim Jong-un fails to deliver a better life for the majority of the 
North Korean people, he will either have to find a scapegoat or use more 
coercive power to keep the people in line.  Only time will tell, but thus far, it 
appears that Kim has successfully managed the pace of social change and 
continues to consolidate his power.  Next, what does North Korea’s source of 
revenue suggest about the resiliency of the regime and what is the implication 
for the role of China in North Korea’s survival? 
 
7.4.2 Can North Korea Survive without Chinese Support? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese assistance and trade play a key role in the North Korean 
economy,132 and they have become more significant since 2010 as the 
relationship between the two Koreas worsened and foreign aid dropped 
drastically.  However, what is also important to note is that non-China trade has 
remained fairly consistent from 1994 to 2013, while trade with China was 
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Figure 7.5. Chinese-North Korean Trade vs. Total North Korean Trade 1994-2013. 
Produced by Andrew Gardner in June 2015 using data from UN Comtrade and EIU 
databases. 
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relatively low from 1994 to 2003 (see Figure 7.6).  This means that during the 
famine years Chinese trade was not a major factor in North Korea’s survival.  
However, North Korea was able to attract over $2 billion worth of foreign aid 
from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.  This included aid from the U.S., China, 
South Korea, and Japan, which provided over 80 percent of the food aid from 
1995 to 2007.133  This is not surprising because the 1994 Agreed Framework 
between the U.S. and North Korea opened the door for international aid. 
What is important to understand is that China-North Korea relations 
worsened after Beijing normalized diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992, and 
there was a corresponding drop in bilateral trade until 2003.  In fact, during most 
of the Cold War era the Soviets were the primary patron of the North Koreans.  
Even as North Korea became increasingly dependent on China, Scott Snyder 
argued, “North Korea’s leadership owes its survival to its ability [emphasis mine] 
to turn its own economic dependency into an obligation and a liability for the 
donor rather than allowing the subsidies on which Pyongyang depended to 
become a source of leverage for its erstwhile patrons.”134  This is reminiscent of 
how many observers admired Kim Il-sung’s ability to manipulate the Sino-Soviet 
split to his advantage during the Cold War and “in the process maintaining a 
steady stream of aid alternately from China and the Soviet Union.”  This allowed 
Kim to persuade and manipulate Moscow and Beijing to gain “security 
concessions, while simultaneously maneuvering to defend North Korea from 
“‘great power chauvinism’.”135  The point is North Korea has consistently been 
able to develop a strategy to survive despite its weakness, and one should not 
assume North Korea will collapse if and when China withholds its patronage.  
Nevertheless, Pyongyang seems to be aware of its over-reliance on China.  The 
question is, what are the North Koreans doing about it?   
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First, the recent growth in China-North Korea trade is not primarily driven 
by political motivations but largely influenced by commercial Chinese interests 
from “local governments and enterprises in bordering provinces.”  This suggests 
that, if and when North Korea is able to attract foreign investments for its 
economic projects and adopts more business-friendly practices for its “joint 
ventures and trade,” both could have a “significant impact on the process of 
economic integration in this region.”  The expansion of this bilateral trade with 
China also contributes to the expansion of marketization in North Korea.  
Pyongyang has also developed a 10-year economic plan in 2011 “to shift from 
an aid-dependent relationship with China to an economic partnership.”  The 
SEZs that were created near the Chinese border were intended to create this 
economic partnership and the rules governing them are more liberal than the 
one for the North’s venture with the South at Kaesong.  Surprisingly, North 
Korea has allowed its economic officials to attend some economics courses run 
by the Choson Exchange (Singapore-based NGO), and even sent some of 
them to the U.S. for an informal economic studies tour in March 2011.136  
Second, although North Korea continues to barter for food with China, it 
is obtaining rice from Myanmar by trading its military hardware.  Pyongyang has 
also acquired rice and other foodstuffs from Cambodia in exchange for 
providing its expertise in mining and hydropower.137  With respect to energy, 
Pyongyang has purchased two new oil tankers, and since 2011 six of them 
have delivered oil products to its terminals on both coasts.  Furthermore, a 
Russian tanker has also delivered oil from the Sovetskaya Gavan port in the 
RFE to Nampo on the west coast of North Korea, and in June 2015 four North 
Korean tankers visited Sovetskaya.138  According to some reports, these oil 
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shipments led to sharp declines in the price of fuel in North Korea.139  It seems 
plausible that expanding Russian oil imports could help ease Pyongyang’s 
dependence on Chinese oil,140 especially during a crisis.   
Third, another indication that Pyongyang intends to gradually wean itself 
from its dependency on China is the rising imports of other Russian products, 
“such as cooking oil, flour, powdered milk, sugar and dried fruit.”  According to 
Moon Sung-hui, Russian products are cheaper and of higher quality than 
Chinese goods and thus are more desirable.  Since late 2014, Russian goods 
have flooded North Korean markets despite the regime’s rhetoric encouraging 
its people to buy North Korean products.  North Koreans seem to know this is 
“part of a ploy by the regime to reduce its reliance on China.”  The goal is to 
“remove Chinese products and bring Russian-made goods into the country,” 
and to expand North Korea’s economic relationship with Russia.141  Although 
Chinese support remains important for North Korea, Pyongyang seems to 
realize it cannot be too dependent on the Chinese and is taking some measures 
to be more independent.   
Fourth, North Korea is also seeking more sustainable sources of income.  
According to Sheena Chestnut Greitens, the regime has developed alternative 
sources of income, especially legal sources of it.  For example, North Korea has 
increased the use of contract labor overseas to earn hard currency ($150-$230 
million/year), and what it earns at the KIC by providing cheap labor is well 
known ($80-$100 million/year).  It has made a determined effort to increase 
earnings from tourism (less than $100 million/year) and the growing North 
Korean diaspora is sending remittances, to include those from Japan ($20-$100 
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million/year) and South Korea (over $11 million/year).  The regime has also 
extracted new revenues from the domestic economy by actively participating in 
the cell phone industry ($400-$600 million as of 2013) with a 25% share of the 
Egyptian-based company’s business and charging excessive registration fees, 
and is seeking other ways to extract more revenue from the people’s growing 
reliance on markets.142  Long-term, North Korea also has at least $2 trillion 
worth of valuable minerals to attract foreign investments.143  According to Elena 
Ponomareva and Georgij Rudov, Moscow’s interests on the Korean Peninsula 
includes North Korea’s “treasure trove of natural resources,” which includes rare 
earth metals “caesium, wolfram, cerium erbium and some others.”144    
The significance of the growing sources of legal revenue is that they are 
largely immune to international sanctions and this is likely to lessen their impact, 
which is currently the preferred policy option for the U.S.  Moreover, defectors 
indicate that Kim Jong-il directed his people to “study international sanctions, 
anticipate what might be directed at North Korea in the future, and figure out 
ways to bypass the measures that were implemented.”145  The element of 
“shock and awe” of sanctions are gone, and after the BDA issue it should come 
as no surprise that John Park has recently argued that increased sanctions 
have unwittingly strengthened North Korea’s ability to conduct proliferation 
activities.  The unintended consequence of rising sanctions is that they have 
forced North Korea’s state trading companies to adapt, and they have formed 
new “procurement channels with unique Chinese middlemen [who are] 
operating in the globalizing Chinese national economy.”  They are developing 
innovative ways to navigate around the maze of sanctions, and the higher cost 
of doing business in the current sanctions environment attracts skilled Chinese 
                                            
142
 Greitens, “Illicit: North Korea’s Evolving Operations to Earn Hard Currency.” 
143
 Edward Yoon, “Status and Future of the North Korean Mineral Sector,” The Korean Journal 
of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2001, p. 193. 
144
 Elena Ponomareva and Georgij Rudov, “Russia-North Korea: state of affairs and trends,” 
Journal of Asian Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, April 2016, p. 50. 
145
 Greitens, “Illicit: North Korea’s Evolving Operations to Earn Hard Currency.” 
370 
 
businessmen who are strengthening Pyongyang’s procurement system.146  The 
regime has devised creative ways to conceal its financial activities through the 
use of cash couriers and financial institutions in China and the Middle East.147   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to a panel of experts reporting to the UNSC on North Korean 
compliance of UN sanctions, Pyongyang also uses “shell companies, foreign 
intermediaries and indirect payment methods,” to conduct prohibited activities.  
Moreover, since the first nuclear test related sanctions were levied by the UN in 
2006 (UNSCR 1718), experts found many countries were “non-reporting or late-
reporting” their implementation reports. (see Figure 7.5).  This allows the regime 
to conduct UN sanctioned activities in places like the Republic of Congo 
(refurbishing old Soviet military equipment), Eritrea (possible arms shipment), 
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Figure 7.6.  An experts’ panel reporting to the UNSC on country compliance of the 
implementation UNSC Resolution regarding UNSC sanctions on North Korea by region.  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_131.pdf  
371 
 
and Uganda (police training) to earn hard currency without international 
scrutiny.148  In short, Pyongyang remains dependent on Chinese aid but is 
expanding licit means to earn hard currency and working hard to reduce its 
economic dependency on Beijing for essential items.  Perhaps more 
importantly, North Korea is finding innovative ways to evade UN sanctions to 
acquire sensitive items necessary to expand its nuclear and missile programs 
and discovering niche markets to promote its goods and services.  Then why 
did Kim provoke South Korea in August 2015? 
 
7.5 Resumption of Provocations and Consolidation of Kim’s Power 
North Korea surprised the South again by severely wounding two South 
Korean soldiers on August 4, 2015.  The wounded soldiers triggered North 
Korean landmines in the DMZ.  After its investigation of the incident, the South 
Korean military accused the North of deliberately planting the mines near a 
South Korean army guard post, and vowed to launch “severe retaliation.”149  
The last time a landmine exploded to kill or wound a soldier in the DMZ was in 
1967,150 as Kim Il-sung attempted to intensify provocations against UNC troops 
from mid- to late 1960s.  It begs the question why North Korea used the 
landmines to raise tensions on the Korean peninsula.  The evidence reveals it 
intended to promote the North’s revolutionary credentials by discrediting 
Japanese Colonialism, Park Chung-hee’s colonial legacy, his daughter’s 
administration in Seoul, and to argue for a self-reliant path toward reunification.  
   
7.5.1 Pyongyang Draws Spotlight to Tout Its Anti-Japanese Legacy 
Kim Jong-un most likely manufactured the landmine incident in August 
2015 to legitimize his role as the Supreme Leader.  He attempted to do so by 
spotlighting both Koreas’ colonial legacy with Japan.  The day the landmine 
incident occurred, KCNA mentioned a South Korean newspaper’s claim of a 
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“sordid nexus between traitor Park Chung-hee, father of the present puppet 
chief executive of south Korea, and the Mitsubishi Group of Japan.”  It went on 
to claim that after his military coup, he received a million U.S. dollars from 
Mitsubishi as a “political fund” during the presidential election of 1963.  The 
North Koreans accused Park of giving Mitsubishi near monopoly control of 
South Korea’s economy, which made Seoul a “dependent sub-contract industry 
and a processing base” for the Japanese firm.  Park was a “pro-Japanese 
lackey” that joined hands with a Japanese firm that actively supported Japan 
during WW II and inflicted “untold pain and damage upon Koreans.”151  The 
North also accused Park of taking huge sums of money from Japanese firms 
during the 1971 presidential election, and accused his daughter of being a 
“wicked traitor as her father.”  Pyongyang took issue with Park Geun-hye 
considering normalization of relations with Japan while Tokyo refuses to issue 
“an apology and reparation for its past crimes.”152    
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Figure 7.7. Park Chung-hee as a Japanese Army Lieutenant.   
http://www.sakai.zaq.ne.jp/duehv307/img721.jpg  
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This was unacceptable to all Koreans from the North’s perspective since 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was “so arrogant as to bluster that the 
issue of comfort women can be settled by paying about three hundred million 
yen… Mitsubishi [also] refused to make reparation for the loss suffered by 
Koreans who had been forced to do slave labor during the Japanese 
imperialists' colonial rule over Korea.”153  What seemed to be most offensive to 
Pyongyang was the fact that Park was sharing intelligence about North Korea 
with Japan “at the instigation of the U.S.”  It stated Park’s “sycophancy toward 
Japan is, indeed, the most humiliating act of sycophancy and hideous act of 
treachery putting into the shade not only traitor Park Chung-hee but also the 
five traitors of 1905 [who signed away Korea’s sovereignty to Japan].”  
Pyongyang called for investigation of both of their crimes and stated they 
“should be sternly punished by the nation for kissing Japan, the sworn 
enemy.”154  In short, North Korea was reminding all Koreans it was more 
legitimate than the Park regime as the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation 
from Japanese colonial rule was looming on August 15.  
Against this background, the landmine incident brought the spotlight back 
on North Korea.  On August 6, Pyongyang announced that it would turn back 
the clock 30 minutes to reclaim its sovereignty from yet another vestige of 
Japanese imperialism.  Many observers simply discounted the time zone 
change as more “bizarre”155 behavior by the rogue regime in Pyongyang. 
However, the regime justified the time change by declaring, “The wicked 
Japanese imperialists committed such unpardonable crimes as depriving Korea 
of even its standard time while mercilessly trampling down its land with 5000 
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year-long history and culture and pursuing the unheard-of policy of obliterating 
the Korean nation.”156  The North Koreans did not spare the Americans. 
 On August 8, the North Koreans repeated their claim that the U.S. had 
deployed its “ultra-modern nuclear attack means” during exercise ULCHI 
FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG) to prepare for “a preemptive attack and all-out 
war against the DPRK.”  They also accused the U.S. of misleading the public 
that the Six Party Talks (6PT) were on hold because of North Korean 
intransigence.  The North argued the failure of the talks was a result of U.S. 
hostile policy toward North Korea, including provocative military exercises that 
are “escalating tension on the peninsula in the absence of dialogue.”  It called 
on the U.S. to accept responsibility for the growing instability in Korea and the 
region “through its ceaseless joint military drills.”  Pyongyang warned the KPA 
will respond to UFG with “tough military counteraction” to “firmly defend the 
dignity of the nation and sovereignty of the country.”157  On the same day, a 
North Korean scholar criticized Park Geun-ryong, Park Geun-hye’s younger 
sister, for making pro-Japanese remarks that enraged the “entire Korean nation.”  
Professor Kang Chol of Kim Il-sung University denounced her for embellishing 
the “issue of comfort women” and shielding the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by 
Japanese politicians, which even the U.S. deems as “wrong behavior.”  Kang 
accused her of being “a special class lackey of modern-type Japanese 
militarism.”158   
According to the Korea Times, a South Korean daily, Park Geun-ryong 
stated, “Being stricken with a victim mentality will not be good for the country's 
sake.”  She argued “Japan laid the groundwork for our country's economic 
development,” and there was no reason for South Koreans to demand an 
apology every time there is a new prime minister in Tokyo since the Emperor 
has “bowed his head and offered an apology repeatedly.”  With respect to the 
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Japanese politicians visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Park stated, “Just because 
one's ancestors did something wrong some 100 years ago, it does not mean 
their descendants just ignore and not honor them.”  These remarks came at a 
time when Seoul had informed Japan that without an apology from Tokyo over 
its crimes during the colonial period, there would be no summit between her 
older sister and Abe.  Several South Korean politicians censured her by 
claiming, “Her remarks show she is totally ignorant in understanding the Korean 
people's historical wounds.”159  As Pyongyang was waging a war of legitimacy 
between the two Koreas in anticipation of the 70th anniversary of their liberation 
from Japan, tensions continued to rise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule (August 
15, 2015), the NDC argued it was sensitive to exercise UFG because its 
purpose was to launch a “surprise preemptive attack on the DPRK,” to 
                                            
159 
Yi Whan-woo, “Park's sister draws fire for pro-Japan remarks,” Korea Times, July 31, 2015, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-korea-land-mines-broadcast-20150810-story.html 
(accessed September 29, 2015). 
 
Figure 7.8. Soviet Martyrs Cemetery in Sadong district, Pyongyang, Source, KCNA.   
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“eliminate the headquarters” and to “occupy Pyongyang.”  It called on 
Washington to “make a bold political decision of rolling back its anachronistic 
DPRK policy.”  The more the U.S. attempted to sanction and pressure North 
Korea, the “more strongly it will retaliate against the U.S. with tremendous 
muscle.”160  That said, Kim Jong-un began the day of celebration by visiting the 
Kumsusan Palace to pay homage to both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il with the 
“leading officials of the KPA.”161  Subsequently, Kim visited the Revolutionary 
Martyrs Cemetery on Mt. Taesong (i.e., cemetery for Kim Il-sung’s guerrillas)162 
and presented a wreath to the Patriotic Martyrs Cemetery (i.e., cemetery for 
Korean War veterans).163  A large delegation from the Russian Federation 
Council, its Ministry of Defense, and the local Russian Embassy also visited the 
Korean Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery,164 the Liberation Tower, and the 
Soviet Martyrs Cemetery in Pyongyang that honors the Soviet role in the 
liberation of Korea.165 (see Figure 7.8).  The day ended with a large youth and 
student celebration in Kim Il-sung Square.166 (see Figure 7.9).  In short, as the 
landmine incident began to escalate tensions in Korea, North Koreans took time 
to memorialize the Kims and celebrate their anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. 
imperialist traditions, and included their Russian allies.   
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7.5.2 Kim Jong-un Fabricates a Crisis to Demonstrate Leadership 
On August 16, a spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful 
Reunification of Korea continued to attack President Park in the South for 
staging nuclear war exercises, anti-regime leaflet operations, human rights 
allegations, and “other rows against the DPRK.”  It accused her of dampening 
“the aspiration of all Koreans and their efforts to make August 15 an important 
occasion of north-south reconciliation and national unity by conducting anti-
north psychological broadcasting and leaflet scattering operations in the wake 
of the fabrication of the ‘mine explosion,’ a poor farce.”167  On August 18, 
Rodong Sinmun stated Korea was in a state of war due to exercise UFG, and if 
the U.S. and South Korea wanted to test the power of the KPA, “they will meet 
the end more miserable than what it met in the past Korean war.”168    
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Figure 7.9. North Korean youth and students celebrate liberation day in 
Pyongyang, August 15, 2015, Source, KCNA. 
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The KPA finally responded by firing rockets across the DMZ on August 
20 and the South Korean army quickly returned counter artillery fires into North 
Korea.  The U.S. urged Pyongyang to cease its provocations as tensions 
quickly escalated on the peninsula.  North Korea chose not to return fire169 and 
the next day denied responsibility for the landmine incident and accused the 
“south Korean puppet military gangsters” of manufacturing the “doubtful” 
landmine incident in the DMZ to justify the resumption of its “anti-DPRK 
psychological warfare.”  It called the loudspeaker and “leaflet-scattering” 
operations an act of war, and announced that the General Staff of the KPA 
issued an ultimatum to the South Korean military that unless it ceased the anti-
regime loudspeaker broadcasts and “removes all psywar [psychological warfare] 
means within 48 hours,” Seoul would face “strong military action.”  The KCNA 
later claimed Seoul had fabricated the “shell fire by the north” and used it as 
pretext to fired “dozens of shells on the DPRK's inviolable territory.”  As a result, 
Kim Jong-un called an emergency “enlarged” meeting of the KWP’s CMC 
during the evening of August 20, which included senior leaders of the KPA 
General Staff, frontline commanders, senior officials of intelligence and security 
services, leading officials of the KWP, and “officials in charge of external 
affairs.”  The meeting began with a presentation by the RGB on the military 
provocations along the “central western sectors of the front” and discussed 
options for “political and military counteractions.”170 (see Figure 7.10). 
More importantly, it was also revealed Kim had “issued an order of the 
supreme commander of the Korean People's Army that the frontline large 
combined units of the KPA should enter a wartime state to be fully battle ready 
to launch surprise operations and the area along the front be put in a semi-war 
state.”  Interestingly, the readout from the meeting noted that “Commanders 
were appointed and dispatched to the relevant sectors of the front to command 
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military actions.”171  This implies that similar to provocations in 2010, key 
commanders were selected by the central authority (the Kims) to exercise 
delegated command authority along the front lines as the situation escalated.  
This may be the reason why when there are perceived failures of the plan or its 
execution, some personnel are held accountable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Korea responded by ordering its own troops to prepare for war on 
August 21, 2015.172  The U.S. and South Korea also briefly halted exercise UFG 
to coordinate a measured but strong response to North Korean provocations 
and hinted U.S. strategic assets would be deployed to Korea again.173  The 
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Figure 7.10. Kim Jong-un demonstrates his leadership by guiding the emergency 
meeting of the KWP’s Central Military Commission, Source, KCNA.   
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situation began to escalate as Seoul “vowed to hit back with overwhelming 
strength” in case of further North Korean attacks against South Korea.174  On 
August 22, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry “clarified that it did not fire even a 
single bullet or single shell at the enemy's side first nor it made any accidental 
firing.”  Then it blamed the South Koreans for “a carefully calculated 
provocation,” which it claimed was “a trite method of the successive south 
Korean rulers to cook up a shocking incident in the area along the MDL 
whenever they face a crisis in a bid to divert the attention of public at home and 
abroad elsewhere and seek a way out of it.”175  What was even more telling was 
Rodong Sinmun commentary about the South’s psychological operations.  It 
stated, “The army and people of the DPRK who value the sovereignty and 
dignity of the country as their life and soul can not allow in the least the south 
Korean puppet warmongers' desperate efforts to destroy the ideology and 
social system of the DPRK.”176  Just as the crisis appeared to escalate out of 
control, the North Koreans proposed high-level talks. 
The two sides met from August 22 to 24 at Panmunjom, and after 
Pyongyang finally expressed “regret” for the land-mine attack on August 24, 
Seoul agreed to shut down the loud speaker operations along the DMZ.  Both 
sides also agreed to resume family reunions and continue discussions to 
resolve other differences.  The U.S. State Department welcomed the agreement 
and hoped “it leads to decreasing tensions on the peninsula.”177  Some argued 
the key takeaway from this incident was the fact that the “South Korean 
propaganda broadcasts were a more powerful weapon against the North than 
firing back with substantial artillery.”  In other words, Kim Jong-un feared these 
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broadcasts so much, “he threatened to go to war over words.”  The broadcasts 
would undermine his legitimacy by describing the prosperous life in the South to 
the KPA soldiers along the DMZ, who are mostly from good families, and would 
eventually spread this “poisonous” information to the North’s elite with their cell 
phones.  Bruce Bennett argued, “While this was short of an apology, even the 
expression of regret surprised some experts, since many senior North Korean 
elites would understand this to be a quasi-apology.”178   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On August 24, Rodong Sinmun announced North Korea could not ignore 
the fact that the timing of Seoul’s provocations coincided with exercise UFG to 
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Figure 7.11. National meeting on August 25, 2015, to commemorate the 55
th
 anniversary 
of Kim Jong-il’s “Songun Revolutionary Leadership,” Source, KCNA. 
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initiate an “all-out war against the DPRK.”179  The next day, Kim Jong-un 
continued to demonstrate his leadership by calling for a national meeting to 
commemorate the 55th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s “Songun Revolutionary 
Leadership.”  At the meeting, the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, 
General Pak Yong-Sik highlighted that Kim Jong-il had led the “fierce military 
confrontation against the imperialists on the forefront for over 50 years,” and he 
“prioritized the military affairs above anything else and regarded the KPA as the 
pillar and main force of the Songun revolution to defend socialism despite 
obstacles that were laid in the way ahead of the revolution.”  The meeting 
claimed Kim Jong-il’s efforts made North Korea “an impregnable fortress for 
self-defence that no invaders dare provoke.”  Kim Jong-un has inherited the 
“Songun revolutionary idea” and is working tirelessly to develop a powerful 
revolutionary army with “various kinds of strike means of Korean style.”  The 
KPA was ready to fight any kind of war against its enemies, to include a nuclear 
war.180  The aim of the meeting to justify Kim Jong-il’s Songun politics suggests 
it is plausible that North Korea may have manufactured the landmine incident to 
celebrate the legacy of Songun as well as its anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy. 
(see Figure 7.11).   
On August 27, the North continued its harsh rhetoric against exercise 
UFG by warning that its declaration to “turn the base of aggression into the sea 
of fire and mercilessly wipe aggressors out to the last one is not an empty 
talk.”181  On the other hand, Kim Yang-gon, a member of the Political Bureau 
and secretary of the Central Committee of the KWP, appeared to send a 
positive signal to Seoul regarding the high-level meeting that occurred from 
August 22 to 24 at Panmunjom.  He noted that the meeting “reflected the will 
and stand of both sides to prevent armed conflicts, de-escalate tensions and 
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promote the development of the bilateral relations.”  Kim argued the 
negotiations resulted in restoring stability to Northeast Asia and “offered an 
opportunity of a dramatic turn in achieving peace, stability, reconciliation and 
cooperation between the north and the south.”  He claimed the lengthy meeting 
between the two sides opened up “an epochal phase for turning misfortune into 
blessings in the north-south relations.  The public at home and abroad are 
unanimously welcoming the north and the south for preventing the situation 
from plunging into an unpredictable conflict and joining hands for reconciliation.”  
Kim Yang-gon’s benignity urged both sides to learn an important lesson from 
the recent crisis by not losing “reason and temper when complicated problems 
arise in the inter-Korean relations but make efforts to prevent the recurrence of 
such incident.”  Kim Yang-gon committed to making “positive efforts to improve 
the north-south relations as desired by all the Koreans.”182  
After Kim Yong-gon provided his interpretation of the negotiations at 
Panmunjom and the way ahead, Kim Jong-un called yet another enlarged 
meeting of the CMC on August 28, 2015.  This meeting included senior 
members of the KPA, the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, all the service 
chiefs, corps-level commanders, intelligence and security services, KWP 
Central Committee, the Cabinet, Foreign Ministry officials, and Provincial Party 
officials. (see Figure 7.12).  According to KCNA, Kim Jong-un examined the 
performance of the KWP and the North Korean government during the recent 
crisis and noted the following:183    
 
He said that this time the DPRK proposed the north-south high-
level urgent contact on its own initiative and put under control the 
situation which inched close to an armed conflict, thereby clearing 
the dark clouds of war that hung over the Korean nation and 
defended peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the 
region.  Noting that peace restored under the situation that 
reached the brink of a war was by no means something achieved 
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on the negotiating table but thanks to the tremendous military 
muscle with the nuclear deterrent for self-defence built by the 
great party as a pivot and matchless ranks single-mindedly united 
around the party, he emphasized that the armed forces of Songun 
and the single-minded unity that have grown stronger amid the 
tempest of the times always serve as an essential guarantee for 
defending peace on the peninsula.184   
 
 
The outcome of the meeting suggests that the primary aim of the landmine 
incident was to clearly demonstrate Kim Jong-un’s competent leadership as well 
as reaffirming the righteous path of his father’s Songun policy and pursuit of 
nuclear weapons development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5.3 Pyongyang Warns Seoul and Washington after Negotiations 
On August 31, 2015, Pyongyang denounced exercise UFG after it ended 
on August 28.  The Kim regime reminded Koreans on both sides of the DMZ 
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Figure 7.12. Enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' 
Party of Korea led by Kim Jong-un on August 28, 2015, Source, KCNA.  
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that in spite of the claims the annual UFG exercises were defensive; their true 
intent was offensive in nature.  Pyongyang urged the South to take advantage 
of the “trend of détente” resulting from the recent high-level negotiations at 
Panmunjom.  It urged Seoul to stop the provocative exercises “with outsiders 
targeting the dialogue partner and positively respond to the joint efforts for 
defusing the danger of war and achieving peace and reunification on the 
Korean Peninsula.”185  Pyongyang claimed “there is nothing impossible when 
they settle all issues arising in the inter-Korean relations in the spirit of By Our 
Nation Itself.”  It argued that both sides had to embrace the August 24 
agreement “as a sacred commitment to the nation,” in order for it to yield “rich 
results.”186 
A couple of days later, Pyongyang took issue with the way Seoul 
characterized its expression of regret as an apology.  North Koreans refuted the 
notion that their expression of "regret" was an “‘admission’ and ‘apology’,” for 
the suspicious landmine incident in the DMZ.  The North had problems with the 
way some South Koreans were interpreting the word regret to mean an 
“apology of north Korean style,” with all the legal and political implications of an 
apology.  North Korea claimed there was a similar landmine incident along the 
DMZ on August 23 but Seoul remained silent.  It claimed that landmine blast 
occur regularly in the DMZ and clarified its position regarding the August 4 
incident.  KCNA stated, “In a word, ‘regret’ is no more than an expression that ‘I 
am sorry for the case’.”187  On the other hand, Kim Kwan-jin, the lead South 
Korean negotiator at the talks, described North Korea’s “expression of ‘regret’ 
as an apology.”188  North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of 
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Korea also berated Park Geun-hye for claiming the “constructive role” that 
Beijing played to de-escalate the situation in Korea.  Pyongyang viewed this as 
an insult and emphasized it had proposed the high-level talks “on its own 
initiative.”  The point was improving Korean relations depended on Koreans 
themselves, “not outsiders.”189   
Not surprisingly, there were reports that Beijing was massing its soldiers 
along the North Korean border during the crisis, and some observers believed 
the move was a not so veiled message for Kim to “settle down.”  It was also 
intended to reassure the international community that China was monitoring the 
situation very carefully.190  Still others claimed both Beijing and Moscow 
pressured Kim to resolve the crisis.191  While North Korea refrained from 
criticizing China, it demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea 
as the only way to achieve “peace and stability of the peninsula.”192  On 
September 8, 2015, North Korea cited the deployment of three B-2 bombers 
from Guam during exercise UFG as a prelude to a “preemptive attack on the 
DPRK.”  This was ultimately viewed as an attempt by Washington to bring 
“down the DPRK” with “a single strike.”193  North Korea responded by providing 
an update on its space and nuclear programs.   
On September 14, the North’s director of the National Aerospace 
Development Administration (NADA) announced his organization was in the 
“final phase” of developing “a new earth observation satellite for weather 
forecast,” and was also making significant progress in the development of a 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/08/24/seoul-talks-between-2-koreas-end-amid-
rising-tensions/32271971/ (accessed October 3, 2015). 
189 
KCNA, “S. Korean Authorities Denounced for Creating Complexity in North-South Relations,” 
September 3, 2015, http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/article/fdox (accessed September 27, 2015). 
190 
Paul Alexander, “North Korea's Kim Jong Un flawed, yet provides stability,” The Stars and 
Stripes, September 15, 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/analysts-north-korea-s-kim-
jong-un-flawed-yet-provides-stability-1.368202 (accessed October 3, 2015). 
191
 Rowland and Yoo, “Agreement to ease Korea tensions raises hope of better relations.” 
192 
KCNA, “Minju Joson Demands Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from S. Korea,” September 6, 
2015, http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/article/fdqo (accessed September 27, 2015). 
193 
KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Lays Bare U.S. Scenario for Invading DPRK,” September 8, 
2015, http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/article/fdua (accessed September 27, 2015). 
387 
 
“geostationary satellite.”194  His counterpart in North Korea’s Atomic Energy 
Institute of the DPRK indicated that the Institute was making progress in the 
“research and production” of “nuclear weapons with various missions in quality 
and quantity as required by the prevailing situation.”  He warned North Korea is 
fully prepared to deal with U.S. and others’ hostile policy with nuclear 
weapons.195   
This sets the stage for further provocations in the near future, but what 
does it suggest about Kim Jong-un’s developing leadership and his ability to 
wield smart power?  According to recent reports, several North Korea observers 
acknowledged Kim had demonstrated his competence by performing better 
during this crisis than anticipated.  According to David Garretson, a retired 
professor from the University of Maryland campus in Seoul, Kim “has finally got 
a feel for things,” and his “experience of juggling many balls has matured him.”  
He also demonstrated that he was “more rational” and seemed to have “good 
command and control” of the situation.  Kim Jung-bong, a former South Korean 
official, agreed by stating “Kim Jong Un is much more calculating and careful 
than we knew… We have to take him seriously.”  According to another 
professor from a Korean university in Seoul, Yoo Chan-yul, Seoul’s 
“decisiveness and refusal to back down on the propaganda broadcasts” led Kim 
to seek a face saving way out.  However, Kim “showed political savvy” by 
“backing down.”  Yoo concluded, “He’s a real tough cookie, more than we 
realized…He may be tyrannical and vicious, but maybe Kim Jong Un is realistic 
as well.”196  As a result of the incident, some observers appear to show respect 
and admiration for Kim Jong-un, but many in the U.S. seem to think he lacks 
competence and is more volatile, reckless, and unpredictable than his father.   
Others like Scott Snyder from the Council on Foreign Relations argued 
the August agreement was a “modest start” to establish a more cooperative 
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relationship between the two Koreas.  More importantly, he argued that the 
crisis demonstrated that “both Koreas are vulnerable to each other – the North 
fears the spread of propaganda from Seoul, and the South’s economy is 
vulnerable during periods of military tension with the North.”  He argued that 
whether the resolution of this incident can become a turning point for the two 
sides depends on their willingness to honor the agreement so they can 
“minimize their respective points of vulnerability.”197  This is what Nye meant 
when he raised the issue of relative costs and degree of interdependency.  In 
other words, which side is more dependent on the other for successful 
outcomes?  Is avoiding North Korean instability more important to Seoul than 
maintaining its hardline position regarding its propaganda broadcasts?  If Seoul 
values its economy and maintaining its way of life more than breaking the cycle 
of provocations, then North Korea will continue to manipulate this vulnerability 
and use this asymmetry in interdependence as a source of power.198   
According to Ken Gause, it would be premature to suggest Seoul has 
finally broken this asymmetry in the relationship.  Gause argued, “If something 
were to happen to Kim, the country would suffer severe leadership problems,” 
and the regime could suffer “a nasty collapse.”  If that occurs, “the problems of 
the Mideast would pale by comparison.”199  This suggests Seoul and others are 
still more dependent on the North Koreans in the bargaining process and Kim 
can continue to exploit this as long as he is skilled in converting this asymmetry 
into strategies that achieve desired outcomes.  Finally, what does the smart 
power framework suggest about the landmine incident? 
 
7.5.4 Kim Employs Landmines to Show Legitimacy and Leadership 
First, what was North Kora’s desired outcome for the landmine incident?  
North Korea most likely manufactured the landmine incident to attract the 
international spotlight back on the regime to continue its war of legitimacy with 
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South Korea.  In anticipation of the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from 
Japan, it touted Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese legacy and attacked former 
President Park Chung-hee’s historical ties to Japan as well as his younger 
daughter’s controversial perspectives on Japan’s colonial legacy.  These 
activities coupled with Pyongyang turning back time by 30 minutes were likely 
aimed to weaken President Park and her conservative government’s legitimacy 
by manipulating Korea’s colonial history against them.  When the landmine 
incident began to escalate tensions after the loudspeaker broadcasts and the 
subsequent exchange of artillery fire, Pyongyang called for a high-level meeting 
and offered its regret for the incident.  This persuaded Seoul to cease its 
loudspeaker broadcasts as long as Pyongyang ceased its provocations.  
However, after the negotiations had successfully de-escalated the situation, 
North Korea refused to acknowledge responsibility for the landmine incident by 
arguing that “mine explosions” occur often in the DMZ.   
The North also took time to refute Seoul’s characterization of its offer of 
regret as an apology by noting that its representatives were merely saying it 
was sorry that it happened.  Kim Jong-un seemed to use the crisis to message 
to North Koreans that he was competent and in control of the situation and 
claimed that the landmine crisis was resolved because of Kim Jong-Il’s Songun 
policy and nuclear weapons, not negotiations.  This indicates that Kim was 
attempting to highlight the achievements of both his father and grandfather to 
bolster his legitimacy.  On a positive note, Pyongyang indicated that as long as 
the South was prepared to honor the spirit of the results of the meeting, which 
included cessation of its psychological operations, it was willing to make 
progress to improve relations with Seoul.  Despite some progress at the 
negotiations, the North continued to exploit exercise UFG as provocative war 
preparations, especially the overt deployment of B-2 bombers.  It used the 
flyover to reaffirm its allegation of U.S. hostile policy and justified the expansion 
of its nuclear and space programs.   
Second, what forms of power behavior did Pyongyang employ during the 
landmine incident?  North Korea likely used special troops to emplace the 
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landmines to attack South Korean troops in the DMZ to gain international 
attention.  In the event the provocation escalated, Kim was prepared to seek 
high-level negotiations and offer an expression of regret, which had been used 
effectively to de-escalate in the past.  However, the North continued to pressure 
the U.S. and South Korea for staging their provocative “war” exercises. 
Third, what resources were available to implement the strategy?  As 
noted, Kim probably used some variant of his special forces to emplace the 
landmines and was prepared to employ his tactical artillery near the DMZ to 
heighten tensions.  Once Kim gained the international spotlight, he probably 
never intended to strike the South Korean loudspeakers after issuing the 
ultimatum.  In other words, it was a calculated tactic to heighten tensions and to 
seize the day to message North Korea’s anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy and U.S. 
presence in the South.  He also made it known that his father’s Songun politics 
was the reason why North Korea was able to maintain its sovereignty.  In the 
end, Kim’s use of diplomacy to de-escalate the situation demonstrated that he 
was perhaps more rational despite some backtracking on the expression of 
regret for the incident.  The North also used the media to roll out various senior 
officials and government entities to signal threats, desire for engagement, and 
provide the rationale for policy positions such as Juche, Songun, Byungjin, 
nuclear weapons, and the civilian space program.   
Fourth, how did North Korea view its probability of success?  The covert 
use of landmines was at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and as North 
Korea argued, mine explosions in the DMZ are not unusual in the DMZ.  Hence, 
the CMC probably assumed it could control escalation as long as it denied 
responsibility while offering expression of regret.  It was also prepared to call for 
negotiations after issuing an ultimatum because the North was not going to 
follow through knowing that South Korea was prepared to retaliate.  The 
December 2010 ultimatum against South Korea’s planned LFX in the Northwest 
Islands demonstrated the North Koreans are not foolish despite their 
threatening rhetoric.  When it decided to pursue diplomacy, it probably expected 
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difficult and lengthy negotiations, but its exit strategy was to offer an expression 
of regret.  As discussed, they had used it before to good effect.   
Fifth, what were the policy preferences of key actors?  The Kim regime 
probably intended to remind all Koreans it was more legitimate than the Park 
regime in the South as the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese 
colonial rule was looming on August 15, 2015.  As discussed, it even turned 
back the clock 30 minutes to show the world that it was reclaiming its 
sovereignty from yet another vestige of Japanese imperialism.  Even as the 
landmine incident began to escalate tensions, North Korea took time to 
memorialize Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and celebrated their anti-Japanese 
and anti-U.S. imperialist traditions with their friends and allies in Pyongyang, 
including a Russian delegation who came to memorialize their own role in the 
liberation of North Korea.  What this indicates is that sometimes North Korean 
rhetoric is not always about provocations, but more about the ongoing war of 
words with Seoul and demonstrating that the new Supreme Leader is 
competent and fully capable of protecting their sovereignty.  Most importantly, 
he is able to do so because of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s revolutionary 
achievements.       
Simultaneously, Pyongyang continued its harsh rhetoric against exercise 
UFG and the “large-scale psychological warfare” operations that resumed 
against the Kim regime after the landmine incident.  It managed to stop the 
South Korean loudspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ, but it was conditional.  
As soon as North Korea resumes provocations, Seoul is likely to resume the 
loudspeaker broadcasts.  Hence, the regime’s celebration of Kim Il-sung’s anti-
Japanese legacy and Kim Jong-il’s Songun politics might have been more 
significant to Kim Jong-un than stopping loudspeaker broadcasts along the 
DMZ.  In other words, if the loud speaker broadcasts or anti-regime leaflet 
operations are truly a survival interest for the regime as some have suggested, 
Kim would be willing to use force to deter them in the future.  What might have 
been more important for Kim during this incident was to come up with a better 
story than Seoul to gain the upper hand in the war of legitimacy to consolidate 
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his rule.  The only story that had any chance of winning was the manipulation of 
the regime’s anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy and arguably its Juche ideology of 
self-reliance as the Koreas celebrated liberation from Japan’s colonial rule.  It 
also continued its rhetoric against U.S.-South Korean combined exercises and 
called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.   
Nevertheless, what is perhaps most important is the fact that some in 
Seoul viewed Pyongyang’s willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness.  A 
former South Korean official indicated Pyongyang was “begging” to negotiate 
with Seoul because it could not “follow through on its threat of military action if 
the speakers were not turned off.”  They miscalculated by threatening to use 
force and “the only option for North Korea was to beg for a negotiated solution.”  
Some observers even concluded that “Pyongyang’s recent eagerness to hold 
talks with Seoul could be a sign of domestic vulnerability for Kim.”  Senior South 
Korean officials appear convinced that North Korea backed off and chose to 
issue an apology because it had no other option, and signaled Seoul must 
continue its hardline approach during future provocations.200   
Moreover, the dispute over South Korea’s use of psychological 
operations is also not likely to be over.  In addition to the loudspeaker 
broadcasts, Pyongyang has declared for several years that the anti-North 
Korean balloon launches were a declaration of war but has been unable to stop 
them.  This issue was highlighted in October 2014 when a South Korean NGO, 
run by a North Korean defector, announced the plan to launch balloons ten 
days in advance of the launch.  This was perceived by local residents, 
conservative and progressive politicians as self-promotion and unnecessarily 
provocative.  This diverse group of South Koreans called for the cancellation of 
the launch to avoid “unneeded conflict” along the border.201  This suggests that 
the recent agreement to halt South Korean loudspeaker broadcasts could justify 
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Pyongyang’s subsequent demands to halt future NGO balloon launches, 
especially those attempting to politicize the launches with the media.  Again, 
South Koreans cannot assume the solution to deal with North Korean 
provocations has been realized by relying only on effective self-defense.   
While the U.S. reassured South Korea by deploying the B-2 bombers 
again in 2015, there was much speculation about the worsening China-North 
Korean relations after Kim refused to attend China’s military parade celebrating 
the end of the WW II in September 2015.  When Kim sent Choe Ryong-hae in 
his place, he was “relegated to the sideline,” while Park Geun-hye was placed 
close to Xi Jinping.  Some argued this was a “loud and clear” signal that North 
Korea “exists solely because of its utility to China as buffer state.”202  However, 
their relationship appears to be improving after the landmine incident. 
 
7.5.5 Indications China-North Korea Relations Could Be Improving 
Liu Yunshan, a member of the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee, 
visited Pyongyang to observe North Korea’s military parade in mid-October 
2015.203  Liu became the senior ranking Chinese official to visit Pyongyang 
since Kim Jong-un assumed power, and reports suggest China is “now 
censoring criticism of North Korea online,” openly encouraging its netizens to 
“stop mocking” Kim. (see Figure 7.13).  On October 11, an article in Chinese 
social media touted Kim as “extremely hardworking” and criticized Chinese 
liberals for “‘frequently shoot[ing] off opinions about a cooling in China-North 
Korea relations, or Chinese abandonment of the North.’  But nothing could be 
further from the truth, it argued; Kim had simply been ‘busy’ with internal 
governance’ since ascending’” to power.  This turnabout in Beijing seems to 
suggest China is acknowledging it is better to have a “pliant neighbor” than 
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watch it collapse or being absorbed by South Korea.  In short, Beijing seems to 
be touting North Korea as “a fragile nation eager to follow China’s path.”204   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On October 25, 2015, the two countries celebrated the 65th anniversary 
of the Chinese intervention during the Korean War at the graves of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers (CPV) martyrs and the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang.205  
According to another report from Beijing, Xi Jinping sent Kim a congratulatory 
message on the anniversary of the KWP’s founding in October 2015 and 
acknowledged his role in “developing North Korea’s economy and improving the 
livelihood of its people.”  Some view this as Xi’s “endorsement of Kim.”  The 
report also indicated Kim may visit China during the first half of 2016 to meet 
with Xi and that is likely to bolster the legitimacy of Kim.  If the visit occurs, it 
would reinforce the view that Kim has consolidated his power and is more 
                                            
204 
David Wertime, “Chinese Censors Are Giving North Korea a P.R. Makeover.” 
205 
KCNA, “Wreaths Laid before Friendship Tower,” October 25, 2015, 
http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/article/fggb (accessed October 28, 2015). 
 
Figure 7.13. Kim Jong-un and Liu Yunshan share the stage during North Korea’s military 
parade celebrating the 70
th
 anniversary of the KWP in October 10. 2015. 
http://www.ibtimes.com/china-north-korea-relations-will-kim-jong-un-visit-xi-jinping-beijing-
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confident in his role as the Supreme Leader,206 and could jump start the 6PT as 
a major takeaway for the visit.   
 
7.5.6 Kim Jong-un Pays Respect to the Last Manchurian Guerrilla 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In early November 2015, Marshal Ri Ul-sol, the last of Kim Il-sung’s 
Manchurian guerrillas died at the age of 94.  On November 11, 2015, Kim Jong-
un memorialized the event with a state funeral worthy of a loyal follower of his 
grandfather.  Thousands of North Koreans reportedly lined the streets for the 
funeral procession before Ri was put to rest at the Revolutionary Martyrs 
Cemetery where the rest of his comrades are buried.  Kim Jong-un honored Ri 
at the cemetery by “laying the soil with his bare hands.”  He had served the Kim 
family as the Chief of their bodyguards before retirement.  Despite his old age, 
Ri also played a key role in facilitating Kim Jong-un’s outreach efforts with the 
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Figure 7.14. Marshal Ri Ul Sol funeral procession in Pyongyang on November, 11, 2015.  
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“other elder officials in North Korea,” and actively supported his succession by 
writing propaganda articles on his behalf.  According to Nam Seong-wook from 
Korea University, Kim’s message for the elites is “he is the legitimate heir to the 
historical legacy that Ri has lived throughout his life,” and “anyone who serves 
with loyalty until death will be awarded by the republic herself.”207    
As noted above, Kim Jong-un appears to be consolidating his power and 
is prepared to move beyond his reign of terror by using more milder forms of 
punishment.  Perhaps he also realizes that “force without legitimacy brings 
chaos; legitimacy without force will be overthrown.”208  Moreover, even after 
legitimacy has been established, the followers obey the ruler for his exceptional 
qualities and they remain loyal as long as the ruler’s charisma “is proven by 
evidence.”  In short, Kim Jong-un will have to demonstrate his “heroic strength” 
or the people could lose their faith in his ability.209  This means Kim will have to 
seek more opportunities to demonstrate his charismatic leadership.  He will 
have to show continued improvement in the North Korean economy and look for 
opportunities to demonstrate his competence as the Supreme Leader.     
 
7.5.7 North Korea Announces Its First Hydrogen Bomb Test 
 On January 6, 2016, North Korea announced that Kim Jong-un had 
“signed the final written order” to conduct its First H-bomb test on January 3, 
2016.  The announcement made a point of emphasizing that the test was 
“conducted under the strategic resolve of the Workers’ Party of Korea.”210   The 
U.S. and the international community quickly condemned the North’s fourth 
nuclear test and vowed “to punish it” for the test.  Washington also disputed 
Pyongyang’s claim it had conducted a H-bomb test.  It initially assessed that the 
test was more likely to be another atomic weapons test and its Ambassador to 
the UN indicated the UNSC committed to “impose ‘further significant’ measures” 
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to “impose real consequences” for North Korea’s threatening actions.  Others 
wondered what the international community could do short of war.211  The North 
Koreans responded on January 9 by stating the “H-bomb of justice dealt a 
heavy sledge-hammer at the U.S. and its followers keen to stifle the DPRK and 
realized the long-cherished desire of the nation to have the most powerful 
nuclear deterrent.”212    
It justified the H-bomb by arguing that no other nation has been exposed 
to U.S. nuclear threats longer than the North Korean people.  They cited 
President Truman’s threat to use the A-bomb in Korea on November 30, 1950, 
and the fact the U.S. had deployed over a thousand nuclear weapons to South 
Korea from the 1970s to the early 1990s.  It then cited numerous “nuclear war 
drills against the DPRK in South Korea for several decades under various 
codenames.”  Finally, North Korea argued, “History teaches immutable truth 
that a small country and the one exposed to the imperialist forces’ direct threat 
of aggression should exert great efforts for bolstering its military capability than 
any others.”  Since Washington has refused its call for a peace treaty, nuclear 
weapons “serves as an all-powerful treasured sword” to ensure “peace and 
security and building a thriving nation.”213  Seoul responded with loudspeaker 
broadcasts along the DMZ on 8 January and Pyongyang countered with its own 
propaganda broadcasts.214  This does not bode well for North-South relations, 
especially after the death of Kim Yang-gon on December 29, 2015.  He was in 
charge of the UFD since 2007 and was considered a “pragmatist and skilled 
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bureaucrat” who had “a great deal of influence over inter-Korean policy.”215  As 
tensions continue to rise after the nuclear test, review of Kim’s New Year’s 
speech revealed he was more confident and anxious to demonstrate his 
leadership.  He vowed to “unfold an ambitious blueprint for hastening final 
victory for our revolution” during the Seventh Party Congress216 in May 2016.            
 
7.6 Summary  
First, Kim Jong-un probably knows he cannot become the undisputed 
Supreme Leader if the only thing going for him is the pure blood inherited from 
his grandfather or terroristic police control.  As discussed, there are indications 
that after purging about seventy of his core elites, Kim may be easing up on his 
purges to build unity among the core leadership and this suggests he is more 
confident about the consolidation of his power.  After eliminating immediate 
threats to his rule, he may be varying his leadership style to co-opt the core 
elites from the KPA, KWP, and other key institutions.  Moreover, Kim must be 
able to deliver economic success to provide a better life for his people so they 
are willing to support his regime’s policies as North Korea continues its post-
totalitarian transition.  In case of failure, Kim could try to find a scapegoat but a 
better informed populace may not be willing to go on another arduous march if 
the famine returns.  As a result, despite Pyongyang’s demonstrated resilience, 
Kim has significant challenges ahead at home and abroad.   
Second, based on what has occurred during the early years of his rule, 
some North Korea observers have already decided it is a foregone conclusion 
that Kim Jong-un is an amateurish and reckless leader who will eventually 
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miscalculate and cause the end of the Kim Dynasty.  However, the evidence 
from earlier chapters has shown that this assertion may be premature just as 
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were both underestimated when they rose to power.  
As discussed, many observers assumed both lacked legitimacy and were 
incapable of consolidating their power.  Nevertheless, they obviously enjoyed a 
natural death by cultivating effective tools to survive.  Kim Jong-un has inherited 
several of their survival tools and is developing some of his own.  For example, 
he is using his grandfather’s anti-Japanese guerrilla legacy to consolidate his 
power, and his regime is also cultivating more licit sources of revenue and 
collaborating with Chinese businessmen to survive.  It took his father over 20 
years to gain the respect and trust of some U.S. policymakers and intelligence 
analysts, and that suggests it will be a while before Washington will view him as 
a legitimate negotiating partner, if at all.    
Third, the two cases of provocations under his rule suggests he wanted 
to demonstrate his competence by protecting his regime and justify the North’s 
declaration as a nuclear weapons state by overstating the threat posed by U.S.-
South Korean military exercises.  On the other hand, it is possible he may have 
overplayed his hand by deploying his nuclear ICBM and threatening the U.S. 
homeland.  The H-bomb test in January 2016 makes it even more difficult for 
the U.S. to ignore North Korea’s growing nuclear threat.  Within the next several 
years, Washington and its allies must decide how it will deal with the growing 
nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.  It remains to be seen if Kim is 
making a serious miscalculation by expanding his nuclear weapons and related 
programs, but it appears that Kim’s use of diplomacy and expression of regret 
after the landmine incident suggests he is more capable than previously 
imagined.  In the end, the evidence suggests Kim Jong-un is slowly 
demonstrating his leadership ability and is willing to assume some risk to show 
he is capable of exercising smart power strategies.  This suggests it is probably 
premature to assume North Korea’s provocations can be deterred with hard 
power alone.  Next, the study will discuss its findings and offer policy 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since its creation in 1948, North Korea has transitioned from 
pursuing a militant path toward peninsular unification under its 
own sovereignty, most notably epitomized by its attack on South 
Korea in 1950, to one of belligerent survival, characterized by 
trying to wrest economic and political concessions from other 
nations through threats and aggressive behavior. 1 
       - Jacques Fuqua 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As stated in the Introduction, this study has sought to explain how North 
Korea continues to survive.  The question posed at the start was whether Nye’s 
concept of smart power offers an alternative explanation for North Korea’s 
resilience.  Hence, the methodology of this unique study was to conduct a multi-
case study from the Korean War to August 2015 to examine over a dozen 
cases during the reigns of the three Kims and examined the relevance of their 
survival tools.  In fact, other than a few studies that have outlined the 
chronology of provocations, this is the first study that has examined North 
Korean provocations in depth from its origin to 2015.  After examining their 
survival tools, the study applied Nye’s smart power theory to consider an 
alternative and more plausible explanation for the resilience of the Kim regime.  
It is my contention that based on the analysis undertaken in the preceding 
chapters it is possible to answer the five smart power questions, and the 
findings suggest the application of smart power theory has more utility than 
other explanations of North Korean survival.  Nye’s theory accommodates not 
just the temporal context but also how limited national power resources of an 
authoritarian regime can be used effectively to achieve desired outcomes.  
While it is true North Korea’s strategic aim shifted from reunification to survival, 
coercive diplomacy was not the only way for North Korea to survive. 
                                            
1
 Prescott, East Asia in the World, p. 195.   
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As discussed in Chapter 1, observers should not assume North Korea’s 
rogue status means it is incapable of employing “a calculated employment of 
force and statecraft for a political end.”2  Moreover, one should not dismiss the 
possibility that North Korea could have exercised smart power to achieve its 
aims by arguing it has no soft power attributes.  This might result if one 
misinterprets “soft power as a synonym for culture and then go on to downgrade 
its importance.”3  The evidence suggests the North did have soft power 
attributes.  Its leaders during the early years of the regime used benignity to 
attract others but consistently have used competence and persuasion to 
exercise soft power.  It remains to be seen whether Kim Jong-un will be 
successful, but resolving the upcoming nuclear ICBM crisis with Washington 
could be his litmus test.  That being said, before I review the Kims’ use of smart 
power, I will briefly summarize the findings from my examination of the following 
questions regarding the regime’s survival tools: (1) How relevant is Kim Il-
sung’s guerrilla experience? (2) Was Kim Jong-il capable of maintaining 
totalitarianism despite relative weakness? (3) What did the Kims learn from 
North Korea’s economic failure following the Soviet collapse? (4) How critical is 
ideology to overcoming the regime’s weakness and promoting unity? (5) Will 
nuclear weapons strengthen the regime or make it more vulnerable to external 
pressure? (6) Is North Korea exploiting China to strengthen its economy or is it 
dependent on China for survival? (7) Can North Korea under Kim Jong-un 
counter calls for a “North Korean spring” with its own ideas?   
 
8.2 Analysis of North Korea’s Survival Tools      
First, the Japanese colonial legacy still looms large in Korean society, 
and Pyongyang continues to promote Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese struggle in 
Manchuria to wage its war of legitimacy with Seoul.  In order to facilitate the first 
succession, North Korea manufactured Kim Jong-il’s ties to his father’s guerrilla 
legacy to convey the message that those who fought the Japanese had the 
                                            
2 
Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 871. 
3 
Nye, The Future of Power, pp. 22-23. 
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purest nationalist credentials.  This story attempted to tie both father and son to 
the anti-Japanese guerrilla tradition of the North Korean revolution and 
reinforced the heroic bloodline of the Kim family.  When he assumed power 
during the famine years, Kim Jong-il manipulated his father’s guerrilla legacy to 
justify the arduous march, and his own son even turned back time in August 
2015 to celebrate the regime’s anti-Japanese legacy.  As Cheong Sung-hwa 
noted in Chapter 4, one of the few “common denominators of politics in postwar 
Korea” is its shared hatred of Japan, and this remains one of the most important 
tools for the Kim regime’s legitimacy, national identity, and unity.   
Second, North Korean society continues to evolve as marketization from 
below expands and outside information continues to penetrate its borders.  The 
success of Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin policy could mitigate or retard the negative 
impact of social change on the regime, but regaining near monopoly control of 
information and the economy will be difficult without risking social unrest.  
Therefore, North Korean society continues to evolve and it will be difficult for 
Kim to reverse the post-totalitarian trends in the country.  In fact, long-term 
social change could pose a significant challenge for Kim’s survival.  It could 
weaken the regime’s ideology, its social hierarchy based on Songbun, and its 
central control of the periphery.  This will be one of the survival challenges for 
Kim.   
Third, despite some indications that North Korea was considering 
economic reforms, as noted in Chapter 2, Kim Jong-il never implemented them 
because he realized from the Soviet experience that economic reforms could 
threaten the survival of the regime.  He relied on foreign aid and illicit activities 
for a while but they are no longer effective tools of survival.  The reality is that 
most aid providers are no longer willing to give aid to Pyongyang unless it 
demonstrates a willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons and halts its cycle 
of provocations.  As long as Pyongyang refuses to change its provocative 
behavior, the U.S.-led international community will continue to expand its 
sanctions regime.  It remains to be seen if Kim Jong-un will be the first to 
implement significant economic reforms to keep his promise that North Koreans 
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will no longer have to tighten their belts.  As shown in Chapter 7, there is some 
evidence that he is serious about attracting foreign investment and expanding 
foreign trade, but he has yet to officially embrace economic reforms.  How to 
deliver (slow) economic growth will be another survival challenge for Kim.   
Fourth, Juche ideology probably still resonates with many older North 
Koreans because this generation understands the regime’s call for national 
autonomy and self-determination as a former Japanese colony and a tributary 
state of China.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the younger generation 
may be less susceptible to propaganda glorifying the Juche idea due to its 
growing exposure to market forces and outside information.  In spite of these 
challenges, the regime continues to promote its ideology through education and 
propaganda, and it remains to be seen whether Juche will lose its relevance as 
the new generation continues its rise as the system evolves.  Kim’s ability to 
control the younger generation is yet another survival challenge for Kim.   
Fifth, Kim Il-sung likely learned during the Korean War that nuclear 
weapons could be used as a coercive instrument of power.  As a result, he 
probably started the nuclear program in the late 1950s with the goal of 
possessing a nuclear deterrent during his rule.  However, it was Kim Jong-il 
who succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons and related programs (e.g., 
ICBMs).  These capabilities may have arguably deterred outside intervention 
but one could also claim that North Korea’s conventional weapons and the 
costly legacy of the Korean War have been just as effective as deterrents 
against external interference.  Moreover, if Pyongyang miscalculates by fully 
operationalizing its nuclear ICBMs to threaten the U.S. homeland, that may lead 
to U.S. intervention, instead of deterring it.  In spite of this, Kim Jong-un risked 
escalation by ordering an H-bomb test in January 2016 to bolster his legitimacy.  
Sixth, it is clear that Kim Il-sung aptly played the Chinese-Soviet rivalry 
during the Cold War to gain maximum concessions from both sides.  However, 
while many observers believed North Korea was overly dependent on the 
Soviet Union, they were wrong in predicting the downfall of North Korea when 
the collapse of the Soviet Union brought Soviet aid to an end.  In recent years, 
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one cannot ignore the fact that North Korea became more reliant on China, 
especially after 2008 when a more conservative government in Seoul 
demanded reciprocity on denuclearization in exchange for economic largesse.  
Nonetheless, it may be premature to definitively conclude Pyongyang will 
collapse without Chinese support because Beijing thus far has lacked the 
political will to cut off its aid.  In fact, it is just as convincing to argue Beijing is 
held hostage to prop up the Kim regime because China is more worried about a 
mass exodus of North Korean refugees than attempting to control Pyongyang’s 
provocative behavior, including the expansion of its nuclear and missile 
programs.  In addition, Pyongyang is aware of its growing dependency on China 
and is actively seeking alternative sources for trade and investment such as 
Russia to hedge against future Chinese coercion.  Finally, under Kim Jong-un, 
North Korea has greatly expanded its ability to earn foreign currency, especially 
its licit sources of revenue.   
Finally, the growing interaction and dependence on outsiders, coupled 
with the penetration of information from the outside, could weaken the national 
narrative of the Juche idea that portrays North Korea as an “autonomous, 
independent, and self-reliant” nation.4  However, evidence suggests North 
Korea is taking some measures to reduce its dependence on China, and Kim 
has embraced Byungjin and Songun policies to legitimize his rule.  His long-
term success is likely to depend on increased foreign trade and investments 
with non-traditional partners in the international community.  Kim also has 
abundant mineral resources, a niche market in conventional weapons, the 
export of cheap labor, and a growing tourism industry that could sustain gradual 
economic growth.  More importantly, despite the spread of information from the 
outside, North Korea still maintains a police state to suppress an uprising. 
In sum, the findings from this study of North Korea’s survival tools 
suggest some of the tools have not been handed down to Kim Jong-un as the 
international and domestic situation has evolved over time, but the most 
                                            
4 
Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, p. 159. 
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enduring survival tools Kim Jong-un inherited came from both Kim Il-sung and 
Kim Jong-il.  This realization also reveals North Korea’s grand strategy.  Nye 
defined it as the country’s “leaders’ theory and story about how to provide for its 
security, welfare, and identity,” but in order for the grand strategy to work it “has 
to be adjusted for changes in context.”5  Hence, one could argue North Korea’s 
grand strategy is founded on its anti-imperialist legacy, Juche ideology, and the 
possession of nuclear weapons.  Kim Jong-il adjusted for the changes that 
occurred after his father’s death by promoting his Songun policy but contributed 
to North Korea’s grand strategy by finally producing nuclear weapons.  It 
appears that Kim Jong-un’s contribution will be to enhance the nuclear deterrent 
by acquiring nuclear ICBMs and the H-bomb, and his policy adjustment is to 
embrace his grandfather’s Byungjin policy.  The question is whether he can also 
deliver economic growth to satisfy the demands of his people.  Next, the study’s 
findings indicate Nye’s smart power framework can be used as an analytical 
tool to examine how North Korea survives.    
 
8.3 Analysis of the Kims’ Use of Smart Power      
In brief, evidence using Nye’s theory as a hypothesis suggests all three 
Kims attempted to use smart power strategies but Kim Jong-il was the most 
successful in its execution.  Kim Il-sung’s smart power attempts largely fell short 
(with the exception of the Pueblo incident) because he ultimately failed to 
achieve his goal of reunification.  Many of his failed attempts can be attributed 
to his hubris as he misread South Korean protests and popular rebellions 
against their authoritarian governments as widespread endorsement of his 
regime.  On the other hand, Kim Jong-il appears to have learned much during 
his grooming period (mostly from his mistakes) and, despite being dealt a bad 
hand in the early 1990s, he defied predictions that he would not survive very 
long after his father’s death.  Although reunification became an aspirational goal 
during his rule, Kim Jong-il aptly used smart power to survive and often 
engaged personally to achieve his aims.  Regardless of the contrast in their 
                                            
5 
Nye, The Future of Power, p. 212. 
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ability to exercise smart power, the first two Kims utilized a situational 
leadership style that was flexible enough to adapt to “the demands of different 
situations.”6  However, after Kim Jong-un purged about 70 high-level officials 
since assuming power, he has earned his reputation for a hyper-directive style 
of leadership (i.e., terroristic control).  Nevertheless, there are some indications 
he could be easing up as he completes his consolidation of power and has 
shown he is more rational than initially anticipated by many observers.  Before I 
examine the policy implications, I analyze the Kims’ use of smart power by 
presenting the answers to four of the five smart power questions in separate 
columns of the following tables, and presenting the answer to question 5 (noted 
in italics) as appropriate within the columns related to forms of power behaviors.  
The intent is not to prove scientifically the application of Nye’s smart power with 
the tables, but to demonstrate their potential as an analytical tool to support 
abductive research strategies.
                                            
6 
Northouse, Leadership, 7th ed., p. 93. 
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Table 8.1: Analyses of North Korea’s Use of Smart Power under Kim Il-sung 
      Analyses 
 
 
Cases 
(Hard Power) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
North Korea’s Power Resources 
 
 
Probability of Success (Rationality) 
 
 
Use of Soft Power 
 
 
Use of Smart Power 
 
Korean War 
 
1950 
 
By June 1950, the U.S. believed 
KPA and South Korean Army were 
roughly equal in strength.  
However, many in the KPA had 
been battle-tested before the war 
and the KPA possessed significant 
military capabilities.  Unlike the 
South, the KPA had over 210 
fighter aircraft, close to 200 tanks, 
and 180 self-propelled artillery 
guns. 
 
High probability of success.                 
Kim was convinced he could 
successfully achieve reunification 
within a month due to his combat 
power advantage and the (wrong) 
assumption that large numbers of 
Southern guerrillas would directly 
support his invasion.  He almost 
succeeded even with the U.S.-led 
UNC intervention. 
 
 
Yes.  Mao and Stalin initially 
opposed Kim’s proposal to 
invade South Korea, but 
eventually he persuaded 
them to support the 
invasion.  When Kim failed 
to reunify the country, Mao 
saved him. 
 
 
No.  U.S. won the dispute 
over non-forcible return of 
POWs.  Kim also failed to 
achieve reunification but 
used the war to consolidate 
his power and reinforced his 
revolutionary credentials. 
 
 
 
Commando 
Raid on the 
Blue House 
 
 
1968 
 
31 North Korean commandos 
infiltrated through the DMZ to 
assassinate South Korean 
President Park Chung-hee.   
Good prospect of success.               
This mission might have succeeded 
had the commandos chosen to kill the 
“four woodcutters” who ran into them 
in the woods during their infiltration.  
They let them go and the police were 
placed on alert.  There was a 
possibility that China may have 
supported Kim had he escalated. 
 
No. Kim offered an apology 
in May 1972 to Lee Hu-rak 
for the raid during a secret 
meeting in Pyongyang.  
However, it was not part of 
the initial plan to de-
escalate. 
 
No.  Kim assumed he could 
incite a pro-North Korean 
revolution in the South by 
killing Park Chung-hee.  
However, the raid failed and 
mobilized South Koreans 
behind Park Chung-hee. 
 
 
 
Capture of 
USS Pueblo 
 
 
 
 
1968 
 
 
KPA’s small contingent of air force 
and navy assets included two 
patrol craft, four fast attack torpedo 
craft, and two MIG-21 fighters. 
 
High probability of success.                 
The element of surprise and the 
apparent vulnerability of the Pueblo to 
a North Korean attack probably 
emboldened Kim.  U.S. involvement 
in the Vietnam War also was a factor.   
   
 
Yes.  Despite the failed raid 
on the Blue House, North 
Korea bridled South Korean 
desire for retaliation by 
capturing the USS Pueblo 
and manipulated the incident 
to its advantage by arguing 
the U.S. had violated its 
sovereignty.  
 
Yes.  North Korea managed 
to gain a U.S. apology and 
establish its international 
revolutionary credentials and 
improved relations with 
Beijing. 
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Ulchin-
Samchok 
Raid 
 
 
 
 
 
1968 
 
Approximately 120 Special Forces 
troops were deployed to the east 
coast of South Korea near the 
villages of Ulchin and Samchok to 
establish a base for guerrilla 
operations.  
High probability of success.               
Kim believed he had created a 
socialist paradise in the North and, if 
properly indoctrinated, South Koreans 
would choose North Korea over the 
South. The fact the commandos let 
the four woodcutters go suggests 
they viewed them as fellow Koreans, 
not the enemy. 
 
 
No. Kim misunderstood 
South Korean desire for 
democracy (e.g., protests 
against Park) as support for 
the North Korean regime. 
 
No.  North Korea failed to 
establish a base for an 
insurgency in South Korea. 
Instead, it validated a 
counter-infiltration plan of 
the U.S.-South Korea 
alliance. 
 
Panmunjom 
Ax Murders 
 
 
 
 
 
1976 
 
KPA initially had a dozen soldiers 
on-site, but when the conversation 
between the two sides became 
contentious 20 more KPA soldiers 
arrived before they assaulted the 
UNC soldiers.   
Good prospect of success.              
Zhou En-lai may have convinced 
North Korea that a U.S. loss in 
Vietnam would force it to withdraw 
from Korea.  This was probably 
intended as a low-risk affair but the 
situation quickly escalated when the 
KPA soldiers in the JSA killed two 
U.S. Army officers.  
Yes.  Kim underestimated 
U.S. resolve after the loss in 
Vietnam and did not 
interfere with U.S. tree 
clearing operation after the 
ax murders. Kim personally 
apologized to persuade the 
Commander UNC it was 
genuine and to quickly de-
escalate the situation. 
 
 
No.  Kim failed to mobilize 
support for U.S. troop 
withdrawal from South 
Korea. 
 
 
 
 
Rangoon 
Bombing 
 
 
 
 
 
1983 
 
North dispatched a three-man 
commando team to kill Chun Doo-
hwan with a powerful bomb after a 
merchant ship facilitated 
reconnaissance of the objective 
about a month before the bombing. 
Good prospect of success.            
Kim had reason to believe the 
operation would be a success due to 
its careful planning, but the mission 
failed because Chun’s motorcade 
was delayed, only by chance.  
However, the Trilateral Talks 
proposal may have been an attempt 
to hedge after the mission. 
No. Again, Kim 
misunderstood South 
Korean desire for 
democracy (protests against 
Chun before and after the 
Kwangju Massacre) as 
another opportunity for 
reunification. 
 
No.  The mission failed and 
helped to legitimize Chun’s 
rule, and North Korea began 
to garner a reputation as a 
state sponsor of terrorism. 
 
 
Bombing of 
KAL Flight 
858 
 
 
 
1987 
 
Kim Jong-il sent two covert agents 
to the Middle East to blow up a 
South Korean airliner.  They 
received support from two North 
Korean agents at the airport. 
Little or no prospect of success.                 
The experienced agent knew there 
were serious problems with mission 
planning.  It was a desperate attempt 
to destabilize the South but it took too 
long for the investigation and South 
Korea could not retaliate. 
 
No. The South was finally 
ready to become a 
legitimate democracy as 
Chun Doo-hwan was 
prepared to step down 
peacefully.   
No.  North Korea was 
designated as a state 
sponsor of terrorism after 
the bombing.  The two 
agents were ordered to kill 
over 100 innocent South 
Korean workers. 
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As shown above in Table 8.1, the review of the multi-case study under 
Kim Il-sung indicates he failed to achieve his primary aim of reunification, and 
what this implies is that survival was not in question until the early 1990s.  Kim 
was convinced that if the South Koreans had a choice they would choose his 
socialist system over the authoritarian dictatorships in the South.  As a result, 
when he observed popular protests and rebellions in South Korea from the late 
1940s to the 1980s, he always viewed them through this hubristic lens as an 
opportunity to reunify the country.  However, these were arguably rational 
choices as he attempted to use these provocations to reunify the country.  In 
most cases, he probably assessed the likelihood of success as good to high.  
The one exception was the bombing of KAL 858 when it was clear that the plan 
was likely to fail.  By 1987, Kim probably knew unification was a pipe dream as 
his son resorted to terrorism against South Korean workers before the Olympics.         
Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung attempted to use smart power during the 
Korean War, the capture of the USS Pueblo, and the ax murders at Panmunjom.  
In fact, in 1968 Kim was able to turn the failed raid on the Blue House into a 
success by arguing he had defended the North’s sovereignty by capturing the 
USS Pueblo and its crew.  Arguably, he may also have succeeded in promoting 
his revolutionary credentials by confronting the U.S. while it was at war in 
Vietnam.  In the remaining cases (i.e., Blue House raid, Ulchin-Samchok raid, 
Rangoon bombing, and KAL 858 bombing), Kim (and his son) relied only on 
hard power and they all failed to achieve desired outcomes.  Most importantly, 
the non-forcible return of POWs during the Korean War and the Panmunjom 
incident demonstrated that the U.S. could influence North Korean behavior with 
determination and willingness to risk war.  In the end, Kim’s competence and 
charismatic leadership, which brought relative security and stability to North 
Korea (in spite of provocations) after the Korean War, allowed him to bask in 
the knowledge that most of his people admired him as the Supreme Leader.  He 
also had a fallback plan to groom Kim Jong-il for over twenty years and, when 
Beijing and Moscow abandoned him in 1992, he used the nuclear card to 
ensure survival. 
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Table 8.2: Analyses of North Korea’s Use of Smart Power under Kim Jong-il 
      Analyses 
 
 
Cases 
(Hard Power) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
North Korea’s Power Resources 
 
 
Probability of Success (Rationality) 
 
 
Use of Soft Power 
 
 
Use of Smart Power 
North Korean 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Development 
1994 
Kim Jong-il and Vice Marshal Jo 
Myong-rak engaged the U.S. at the 
highest levels.  Their efforts were 
complemented by skilled 
negotiators from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs who used the 
hardline of the KPA and KWP to 
influence senior U.S. officials, 
negotiators, and some in the IC. 
 
High probability of success.         
Once President Carter intervened to 
defuse the crisis, North Koreans 
probably realized that, as long as 
they were willing to address 
Washington’s concerns about its 
nascent nuclear program, a deal 
could be made with the U.S.   
Yes.  North Korean 
negotiators manipulated and 
persuaded U.S. negotiators 
that Kim Jong-il was serious 
about nuclear negotiations 
despite KPA and KWP 
opposition.  In fact, the 
Clinton administration was 
convinced Kim could be a 
trusted partner. 
Yes.  The U.S. seriously 
considered use of force 
against the North; however, 
it eventually chose to 
negotiate. The concessions 
that Kim Jong-il received as 
a result of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework were critical in 
North Korea’s survival 
strategy during the famine 
years. 
 
Second 
Nuclear Crisis 
 
2002 
 
Kim Jong-il directly engaged with 
leaders of South Korea and Japan 
to promote his aims. At the same 
time, the North Koreans exerted 
pressure on the U.S. by conducting 
a nuclear test and missile 
launches.  They also leveraged 
select groups of U.S. interlocutors, 
both official and unofficial, to elicit 
nuclear negotiations or convey 
nuclear threats.  The North 
Koreans used their experienced 
diplomats to negotiate nuclear 
deals and monitor the course of 
their implementation to protect their 
aim of survival.  
 
 
Uncertainty of success with U.S. 
but high probability with 
Seoul/Tokyo.                                          
North Korea probably believed Bush 
sought regime change, and the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq forced Pyongyang to 
attempt various forms of coercion and 
persuasion to seek bilateral 
negotiations.  When the U.S. war in 
Iraq began to falter and Bush 
appointed Chris Hill to negotiate with 
Pyongyang, the North likely sensed 
probability of success was increasing.  
Kim sensed he had little difficulty with 
the South Koreans and the Japanese 
but misjudged the latter’s reaction to 
the abductions. 
 
 
 
Yes.  Bush preferred regime 
change; however, North 
Korea was able to 
manipulate and persuade 
some in Washington to 
pursue diplomacy.  This 
eventually convinced Bush 
to overlook Pyongyang’s 
illicit (e.g., BDA) and nuclear 
proliferation activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes.  The September 2005 
Joint Statement also helped 
Kim to resist Bush’s hardline 
policy and survive the 
growing international 
sanctions regime against 
Pyongyang. 
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North Korean 
Sinking of the 
Cheonan 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
North Korea used a submarine 
from the RGB to conduct its covert 
action to sink the Cheonan and 
deployed conventional artillery to 
conduct a limited artillery attack on 
Yeonpyeong Island. 
 
 
 
High probability of success.                 
Kim correctly assessed that using 
covert assets would improve his 
likelihood of success.  He used his 
strengths of surprise and underwater 
warfare to defeat a much more 
capable South Korean surface navy.  
The investigation also took too long 
for South Korean retaliation.     
Yes.  Kim used covert 
action, which made it difficult 
for South Korea and the 
U.S. to conclusively argue 
North Korea was 
responsible for the Cheonan 
sinking.  As a result, Beijing 
and Moscow supported him, 
and the majority of South 
Koreans were manipulated 
to believe the North was not 
responsible. 
 
 
 
Yes.  Kim Jong-il was able 
to avenge the losses from 
the November 2009 naval 
clash and successfully 
challenged Seoul’s hardline 
policy against the North. 
 
 
 
Shelling of 
Yeonpyeong 
Island 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
Three batteries of multiple rocket 
launchers fired about 170 rounds 
toward the island. 
 
High probability of success.               
KPA had the advantage of surprise 
and preparedness.  Kim argued he 
warned Seoul he would defend North 
Korea’s sovereignty.  He probably 
was ready to apologize to de-
escalate. 
 
Yes.  Kim attempted to 
manipulate the incident by 
claiming the North was 
protecting its territorial 
sovereignty but offered a 
half-hearted apology for 
those killed during the attack 
to show credibility of his 
claims. The South retaliated 
but was largely ineffective. 
 
 
 
Yes.  Kim used the artillery 
attack to bolster his son as 
his successor, defender of 
North Korea’s sovereignty, 
and a master military 
strategist.   
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When Kim Jong-il assumed power he faced a constellation of forces that 
threatened the survival of his regime.  Unlike his father, Kim became more 
pragmatic and understood that reunification was no longer a realistic aim, 
focusing instead on regime survival.  He successfully used smart power to 
resolve the nuclear issue with Presidents Clinton and Bush to deter U.S. military 
action, legitimize his rule, and obtain some of the resources he needed to 
survive from the mid-1990s to 2008.  Although many have argued Kim’s 
strategy was purely coercive, the evidence suggests he used smart power to 
convince two U.S. presidents to seek a negotiated settlement.  With the Clinton 
administration, Kim used the KPA and the KWP to threaten nuclear breakout 
and as leverage to gain the upper hand during negotiations.  He also employed 
high-level diplomacy to demonstrate his competence to build trust with Clinton.   
On the other hand, Kim reached out to the Bush administration by 
engaging both official and unofficial U.S. contacts, but they initially failed.  
However, when the Iraq War faltered, Bush was more open to negotiations.  
Having said that, the U.S. hardliners continued to apply pressure by declaring 
BDA a primary money laundering concern.  After North Korea conducted its first 
nuclear test in 2006 and launched more missiles, the BDA issue was resolved.  
Kim was successful despite crossing Bush’s redline on nuclear proliferation 
because he was pragmatic and took significant steps to dismantle his plutonium 
program.  Yet, Kim hedged by denying the existence of his HEU program. 
Kim also seized the moment to engage Seoul’s progressive governments 
from 1998 to 2008.  He used benignity to attract benefits and offered a more 
positive perception of North Korea in the South by personally engaging in the 
reconciliation process.  When North-South reconciliation was reversed after Lee 
Myung-bak assumed power in 2008, Kim resorted to carefully planned 
provocations to retaliate against Lee’s hardline policy and to support the 
leadership succession of his son.  When he attacked Yeonpyeong, Kim invoked 
defense of sovereignty claim and offered a quasi-apology.  With the exception 
of the Bush gambit, Kim probably felt the probability of success was high for the 
other cases and finally convinced Obama to negotiate a deal before his death.
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Table 8.3: Analyses of North Korea’s Use of Smart Power under Kim Jong-un 
      Analyses 
 
 
Cases 
(Hard Power) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
North Korea’s Power Resources 
 
 
Probability of Success (Rationality) 
 
 
Use of Soft Power 
 
 
Use of Smart Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Deployment 
of Long-
Range 
Missiles to 
Strike the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 
 
 
Kim reportedly ordered the missile 
deployment as a demonstration of 
power to declare he had a nuclear 
ICBM capability to defend the 
country.  The escalation during the 
provocation was largely caused by 
the intense propaganda from the 
regime that expressed its intent to 
preemptively strike the U.S. 
homeland with nuclear ICBMs.   
 
 
 
High probability of success.            
North Koreans were probably 
convinced they could control the 
escalation ladder as long as they 
refrained from launching the missile.  
If all else failed, the exit strategy was 
to employ high-level diplomacy and 
use the KIC as leverage to return to 
the status quo. 
Yes.  U.S. reassured South 
Korea by deploying bombers 
and missile defense forces, 
and called on China to 
pressure the North.  In spite 
of the rhetoric and the 
reported deployment of a 
nuclear ICBM, Kim Jong-un 
manipulated international 
sanctions and military 
exercises in South Korea to 
demonstrate his 
competence and leadership.  
He de-escalated the 
situation by sending Cho 
Ryong-hae to Beijing and 
reopening the KIC.   
 
 
Yes.  Kim Jong-un used 
Exercise KEY RESOLVE 
and the overt deployment of 
B-52 and B-2 bombers to 
justify North Korea’s status 
as a nuclear weapons state 
in April 2013.  He also 
reaffirmed his own 
adaptation of Kim Il-sung’s 
Byungjin line (simultaneous 
development of economy 
and nuclear weapons). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Landmine 
Incident in the 
DMZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 
 
KPA probably used light infantry to 
emplace the landmines and 
employed tactical artillery near the 
DMZ to heighten tensions.  Kim 
also used diplomacy to de-escalate 
the situation.  The North effectively 
used its media to signal threats, 
desire for engagement, and provide 
the rationale for policy positions 
such as Juche, Songun, Byungjin, 
nuclear weapons, and the civilian 
space program.   
 
 
High probability of success.               
The covert use of landmines was at 
the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum, and it would be difficult to 
prove conclusively North Korea was 
responsible. 
 
Yes.  South Korea 
responded to the incident by 
ordering its troops to 
prepare for war, resuming 
loudspeaker broadcasts, 
and return artillery fires. Kim 
manipulated the 70
th
 
anniversary of Korean 
liberation to demonstrate his 
leadership and quickly de-
escalated by initiating high-
level talks and offering an 
expression of regret. 
Yes.  Kim was perceived by 
some as a more rational and 
capable leader than 
previously assessed based 
on his pragmatic choices 
during the incident. The 
North also made the point its 
leadership had more 
legitimacy to rule all of 
Korea.  It also cited military 
exercises in the South to 
defend its nuclear and 
missile programs. 
 415 
 
 As Kim Jong-un began to consolidate his power in 2012, North Korea 
conducted a space launch in April even though the U.S. claimed space launches 
were in violation of the February 2012 nuclear agreement because it viewed them 
as long-range missile tests.  After claiming its sovereign right to conduct space 
launches, the North followed up in December with a successful space launch and a 
third nuclear test in February 2013.  Pyongyang then boasted it had successfully 
tested a miniature nuclear device.  In other words, North Korea claimed it 
possessed a nuclear ICBM.  The North Koreans did not have to wait long before 
they would try to demonstrate this capability.  The combined U.S.-South Korean 
military exercises in March 2013 as well as the first overt B-52 and B-2 bomber 
flights over Korea were manipulated to justify Pyongyang’s declaration as a nuclear 
weapons state in April 2013.  Subsequently, Kim ordered the deployment of a 
nuclear ICBM to the east coast.  The evidence suggests North Korea probably 
believed the likelihood of success was high because, after demonstrating it had a 
nuclear ICBM capability, it refrained from launching the missile and was prepared 
to de-escalate by sending a senior official to Beijing and re-opening the KIC.   
 The second provocation in August 2015 was more of a surprise to many 
observers.  Although some in South Korea claimed this incident was a case of 
miscalculation on Kim’s part, it appears that it was a well-planned provocation 
manufactured to manipulate North Korea’s legitimacy over the Park Geun-hye 
administration in Seoul.  As the Koreans prepared to celebrate the 70th anniversary 
of their liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Kim probably realized this was a 
unique opportunity to differentiate the backgrounds of the ruling families of the two 
Koreas and to tout the North’s nuclear weapons.  His family descended from anti-
Japanese guerrilla fighters while Park’s father was an officer in the Japanese Army 
who fought for the enemy.  For Kim, it was the perfect time to wage the war of 
legitimacy and he even turned back the clock to prove it.  Kim also used the 
opportunity to demonstrate his competent leadership, and evidence suggests some 
observers are convinced he is more capable a leader than previously imagined.  
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Moreover, the probability of success was high because there was no conclusive 
evidence the North Koreans had planted the landmines.  Like his forefathers, he 
was prepared to offer regrets to de-escalate – the issuance of a quasi-apology has 
been a regular tactic of the Kims.  The H-bomb test in January 2016 sets the tone 
for Kim Jong-un to celebrate the success of his Byungjin policy during the fifth year 
of his rule.                      
 
8.4 Conclusion and Recommendations 
As shown above, the review of the multi-case study suggests that only when 
the Kims carefully orchestrated the use of hard and soft power did they achieve 
their aims.  If Nye is correct in saying, “One has to know about a country’s skill at 
power conversion as well as its possession of power resources to predict 
outcomes correctly,”1 then the evidence suggests the North Koreans have proven 
that they are capable of converting their relatively meager power resources to 
achieve desired outcomes, especially since the early 1990s.  As shown in Chapter 
5, North Korea has been smart enough not to directly challenge the U.S. with 
conventional force since the Panmunjom ax murders (unless its sovereignty is 
violated), but as with other weak states it intends to “deter the U.S. by making it 
more costly” for Washington to use its hard power.2  From this perspective, North 
Korea has been highly successful and it bodes well for Kim Jong-un’s survival 
despite some challenges.  The question is what does the application of smart 
power theory suggest for a U.S. smart power strategy to resolve the North Korea 
problem?  Before answering this question, it is appropriate to provide additional 
context by examining a recent study forecasting the future of North Korea.    
In 2014 Kim Sung-han of Korea University conducted a survey of 135 North 
Korea experts and security specialists from the five non-North Korea 6PT countries 
                                            
1 
Nye, Bound To Lead, p. 27. 
2 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 
2004), p. 26. 
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and Europe.  According to his survey, about 48% of all respondents believed Kim 
Jong-un would be able to consolidate his power in the near future (3 to 5 years), 
instead of experiencing instability or collapse.  When looking out five to ten years 
(mid-term), slightly over 40% of the respondents from South Korea predicted that 
the Kim regime would collapse, and about 37% of all other respondents from 
outside Korea concurred with this assessment.  As the survey looked long-term (10 
to 20 years), only about a third of all respondents believed Kim could survive that 
long.3   
As for the question of how the regime would collapse, about 65% of all 
respondents believed that the main cause would be “a power struggle within the 
leadership.”  The next likely reason according to 27% of respondents was 
economic failure.  However, almost all of the respondents were cautious about 
“civil society emerging in North Korea,” as only 3% believed a popular uprising 
would end the regime.4  With respect to North Korea’s nuclear program, nearly all 
of them (95.6%) were convinced that Pyongyang would never abandon it, but 56% 
of U.S. participants in the survey believed pressure from China is the key to 
resolving the nuclear issue while about 37% of non-U.S. respondents believed that 
was the case.  Surprisingly, no Chinese respondent believed pressure from Beijing 
was the answer to solving the crisis, and 42% of the Chinese called for resumption 
of 6PT and promoted U.S.-North Korea talks.5  That said, what does the 
application of smart power suggest is the most likely future for North Korea?    
The analysis of North Korea’s use of smart power indicates Kim Jong-un’s 
regime is likely to be just as resilient and could survive over the long term as he 
consolidates power.  The study also indicates that Armstrong is correct to suggest 
that there is a stable state of permanent crisis in North Korea that promotes a siege 
                                            
3
 Kim, “The Future of North Korea.”  
4
 Kim, “The Future of North Korea.” 
5
 Kim, “The Future of North Korea.” 
 418 
 
mentality6 which justifies North Korea’s grand strategy.  Thus, from the Kims’ 
perspective, they have been mostly rational in pursuing their provocations and they 
have also been very good at controlling escalation.  As shown, Kim Jong-un has 
proven to some observers that he is more rational and savvy than before, but his 
next major foreign policy test in the near future is likely to be the U.S.-led 
international reaction to his expansion of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities.  
The findings of this study indicate Kim and his core elites are probably preparing to 
meet that challenge if and when it comes.  However, it may be more difficult for 
them to manage the long-term challenge of social change posed by the regime’s 
post-totalitarian transition.  Kim will have to demonstrate his competence and his 
leadership skills, both at home and abroad, if they are to succeed.  These 
developments offer challenges as well as opportunities if Washington were to 
consider a smart power strategy of its own to address the North Korea problem.   
First, it starts with identifying what the desired outcome is vis-à-vis North 
Korea?  Is it to force regime change or induce change in the regime’s behavior?  If 
it is the former, it is unlikely to work without risking full-scale war in Korea.  
President Bush attempted to seek regime change but in reality he pursued 
negotiations during his second term despite significant opposition from hardliners 
in his administration.  As President Eisenhower concluded during the Korean War, 
use of armed force to achieve Korean reunification (i.e., regime change) is a “pipe 
dream.”  This lesson from the Korean War continues to strike a chord with U.S. 
policymakers.  As General Gary Luck cautioned in the mid-1990s, a conflict “over 
North Korea’s nuclear program would amount to 1 million casualties and $1 trillion 
in estimated industrial damage and lost business.”7  In addition, as Nye noted, the 
Iraqi WMD failure and the perceived politicization of U.S. intelligence “will have a 
permanent damaging effect on the credibility of the American government when it 
                                            
6
 Armstrong, “Ideological Introversion and Regime Survival,” p. 225.   
7 
Moore, ed., North Korean Nuclear Operationality, p. 150. 
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approaches other countries for help on cases like Iran and North Korea.”8  It is 
plausible that this may have been a factor when the Chinese and Russians failed 
to support the multilateral findings against North Korea after the Cheonan sinking.  
That being the case, force should be used as a last resort, but what should be the 
aims to change North Korea’s behavior?   
The first priority is to stop North Korea’s development of a reliable, nuclear-
armed ICBM.  Although North Korea claims it possesses a miniaturized warhead 
already, it has yet to develop “a proven nuclear ICBM capability and a warhead 
that could survive re-entry.”
9
  The U.S. must do all it can to prevent North Korea 
from achieving this aim.  This begs the question whether North Korea’s possession 
of nuclear weapons is tolerable in the near term as long as it does not proliferate 
and is willing to cap its nuclear and related programs.  In other words, if North 
Korea agrees to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for security 
guarantees, economic benefits, or cancellation of military exercises, is it 
acceptable as the first step toward denuclearization?  If so, it is time to re-engage 
Pyongyang before it acquires a survivable nuclear deterrent.  If not, the U.S. could 
continue with even tougher sanctions, but the evidence so far suggests sanctions 
alone are unlikely to result in denuclearization.  The U.S. must find another way to 
eliminate North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.  A more realistic option is to 
cap or freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear programs as soon as possible and resume 
implementation of the September 2005 agreement.  It committed North Korea to 
abandon “all nuclear programs in return for [U.S.] security guarantees, economic 
and energy assistance, and a willingness to proceed with a peace treaty.”10 
The second priority is to ensure it stops proliferating nuclear materials, 
technology, or weapons.  Undeniably, the U.S. chose to ignore Pyongyang’s 
                                            
8 
Nye, Soft Power, p. 29. 
9
 Steve Almasy and Euan McKirdy, “North Korea claims to have nuclear warheads that can fit on 
missiles,” CNN, March 10, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/asia/north-korea-nuclear-
warheads/ (accessed March 19, 2016). 
10
 Hill, “The Elusive Vision of a Non-nuclear North Korea,” p. 12. 
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nuclear proliferation to Syria in 2007, but if it is serious about counterproliferation 
the U.S. must make it clear to Kim this is a survival issue for Washington, 
especially if Pyongyang sells its nuclear weapons to the highest bidder.  Having 
said that, Graham Allison has argued the more likely place where terrorists could 
acquire a nuclear weapon is Pakistan.  He also predicted there was a “better-than-
even” chance that there would be a nuclear attack on the U.S. by 2014, but he was 
wrong.  Michael Levi cautioned that, while some terrorist groups may have 
aspirations to “blow up Manhattan,” the likelihood of success is important to their 
calculus since failure would expose the group “and invite unwanted attention from 
the United States and other governments.”11  If and when the North sold its nuclear 
weapons to a terrorist group, it would be the end of the regime.  After the 2007 
case with Syria, there is always the possibility of miscalculation, but the evidence 
suggests the North Koreans are not suicidal and this is an unlikely outcome.     
 The third priority is to deal with local provocations.  As discussed in Chapter 
6, Seoul has taken significant steps to counter provocations near the NLL and to 
defend the Northwest Islands.  It has also worked closely with Washington to 
develop a combined operational plan to counter the North’s provocations,12 and 
has recently demonstrated its willingness to resume psychological operations 
along the DMZ.13  Nevertheless, these developments will not deter North Korean 
provocation, as we have seen in this study.  What is more likely to deter 
provocations is long-term engagement.  As Victor Cha noted, “Over three decades 
[1984-2012], there has only been one instance in which DPRK provocations took 
place during ongoing negotiations (August 31, 1998, missile test).”  While the end 
of negotiations is expected to result in more provocations, “dialogue does appear 
to help prevent crisis and escalation.”14  In other words, it is better to have patience 
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York: The Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 434-444. 
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while restoring stability and attempting to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear 
programs rather than waiting for sanctions to work as Pyongyang builds a 
survivable nuclear deterrent.   
Finally, it is a priority of the international community to address North 
Korea’s human rights violations.  As noted in Chapter 6, in late 2004 Bush 
promoted the “North Korea Human Rights Act,” which included the increase of U.S. 
radio broadcasts aimed at Pyongyang, but North Korea viewed it as more evidence 
of U.S. hostile policy and declared it possessed a nuclear weapon in early 2005.15  
The U.S. should continue to promote human rights in North Korea but it can be 
done without completely severing relations with Pyongyang over human rights.  As 
Bader noted, even when China was weak, “pressure and sanction on human rights” 
was not “successful in altering” negative Chinese behavior.16  While the U.S. 
should not ignore human rights, it needs to rely more on organizations such as the 
UN and bilateral engagement to address the issue.       
Second, what form of power behavior is likely to succeed against North 
Korea?  According to Michael Wallerstein, the time has come to consider a pre-
emptive military strike to eliminate the growing North Korean nuclear threat to the 
U.S. homeland.  He has warned that, as the U.S. pays only “limited attention” to 
Pyongyang, the latter has processed more fissile materials, and enhanced its 
nuclear ICBM capabilities, which include mobile ICBM (KN-08) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  Although Wallerstein assessed that the 
“workable ICBM capability” is “at least several years away,” North Korea is actively 
pursuing a survivable nuclear deterrent and that would change the “military 
calculus” for Washington.  The fielding of the KN-08 and SLBM capabilities signal 
Kim would have an effective nuclear deterrent.  As a result, Wallerstein argues that 
the time for diplomacy is over since it is not likely to work.  He advocates more 
sanctions and a declaratory policy to launch a pre-emptive military strike if 
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Pyongyang continues its “nuclear or missile tests” or “deploys new and threatening 
military systems.”17  This means Washington must be willing to use force even if 
Beijing and Moscow are likely to oppose it and could intervene to protect their 
interests.  In other words, is the U.S. willing to risk another war in Korea?    
Unless Washington is confident it can gain the support of its key allies to 
use force and deal with the potential fallout from it (e.g., resumption of limited war 
that threatens Seoul), it must seriously consider engagement with North Korea 
while there is still time to prevent it from acquiring a survivable nuclear deterrent.  
This will require high-level U.S. engagement with Kim.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
Erik Cornell, the former Swedish Chargé d'affaires to Pyongyang, advised, “Any 
negotiation worth its name would have to take place in Pyongyang, where those in 
power did not actually take part but were at least indirectly accessible.”18  This is 
good advice, but I would argue if the U.S. is serious about engagement a U.S. 
Cabinet-level official should lead the negotiation with North Korea (as it did with 
Iran).  If Kim is capable of using smart power as I have suggested, he is likely to 
de-escalate and try to get the best deal possible.  For this approach to work, the 
U.S. must be willing to coexist with North Korea and commit to long-term 
engagement.  The expectation should be to dismantle its nuclear and related 
programs gradually while using economic and energy assistance to influence the 
regime by enabling social change to accelerate from within the country.  According 
to Kishore Mahbubani, rather than imposing sanctions (which insulates Pyongyang 
from international norms and promotes its siege mentality), the West should 
engage North Korea to establish trade and investment networks with the regime 
and its people.  This approach is more likely to accelerate change in North Korea 
than sanctions,19 and weaken Pyongyang’s argument for U.S. hostile policy.   
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 Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “The Price of Inattention: A Survivable North Korean Nuclear Threat,” The 
Washington Quarterly, Fall 2015, pp. 22-34. 
18
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Third, what resources are available to implement the strategy?  The U.S. 
can continue to apply more sanctions or consider diplomacy and/or military strikes.  
As noted, sanctions do not seem to work as North Korea develops more innovative 
ways to counter them.  With respect to the use of force, it is commonly 
acknowledged that the U.S.-South Korea alliance has the military capability to 
defeat the North in war but the costs are assessed to be too high, especially for 
Seoul.  Moreover, “The outside world has little idea of where the actual nuclear 
material and weapons are stored or hidden,” and that means it will be difficult to 
launch even a surgical strike to eliminate the North’s nuclear arsenal.20  As a result, 
before North Korea operationalizes its nuclear ICBMs, the best option is to rely on 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to resolve the nuclear issue.  Without a serious 
diplomatic effort, China and Russia are likely to blame the U.S. for the growing 
instability on the Korean Peninsula.  Washington must also work even more closely 
with Seoul and Tokyo to build consensus for this approach.  However, if the U.S. 
ignores diplomacy, it would have to consider the use of force under much more 
difficult circumstances when North Korea will be on the threshold of acquiring a 
survival deterrent within the next several years.  The U.S. would either have to 
accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state or consider a limited military strike 
on a known nuclear facility or a missile launch pad to send a signal it is willing to 
use force.  Even this could be problematic since the U.S. will have to answer the 
question about the credibility of U.S. intelligence that would justify a pre-emptive 
strike.  Nevertheless, a recent report in January 2016 indicates the U.S.-South 
Korea Alliance is “considering a military exercise that would simulate a pre-emptive 
strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities.”21  Preparing for the 
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worst-case scenario should be expected but, without buy-in from Beijing and 
Moscow, the use of force is unlikely to resolve the issue.          
Fourth, what is the probability of success of long-term engagement and the 
use of force as a last resort?  As we have seen from the findings in Chapter 6, 
Gallucci (e.g., freeze of the North Korean nuclear program) and Hill (e.g., partial 
dismantlement of its plutonium program) both defended the outcomes of their 
nuclear deals with Pyongyang.  Although former Vice President Cheney claimed 
that both Clinton and Bush taught Pyongyang how to use a coercive strategy to 
obtain U.S. concessions while expand its nuclear arsenal,22 others have 
acknowledged the positive outcomes of Gallucci’s and Hill’s negotiation efforts.  
According to Matthew Bunn, a nuclear policy expert from Harvard University, the 
1994 Agreed Framework froze the North Korean nuclear program for almost a 
decade before Bush abolished the deal.  The North Koreans may have hedged by 
starting a uranium enrichment program, but “there was no plutonium being 
produced for nuclear weapons.”  In fact, Bunn stated, “When the US was engaged 
with trying to implement the terms of the deal… there was real progress.”  When 
the U.S. reversed course for a hardline policy of “isolation and sanctions,” the 
North Koreans withdrew from the NPT, built a nuclear bomb, and conducted a 
nuclear test in 2006.23   
Robert Gard, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and Chair of the Board 
of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, was more direct about one of 
the lessons learned from Washington’s nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang.  He 
argued that the “United States must follow through on the commitments it makes 
during the negotiating process.”  He emphasized that, as part of the 1994 nuclear 
agreement, the U.S. “committed to reduce trade and investment barriers for North 
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Korea within three months, to work a normalization of relations, and to permit the 
North Korean regime to build two light water reactors, the first to be completed in 
2003.”  Nevertheless, Washington chose not to take any substantive actions to 
meet its obligations for six years.  For instance, the foundation for the first of two 
LWRs “was not poured until August 2002, about eight years after the framework 
was agreed upon.”  One has to wonder what could have been accomplished 
through serious engagement at a time when significant social change was 
occurring in North Korea during the famine years.  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
there was significant progress under Clinton when he decided to coexist with 
Pyongyang and persuaded the Kim regime he was serious about normalization.  
The fate of the Korean Peninsula could have been different if Bush had embraced 
Clinton’s policy of engagement instead of seeking regime change.  Nevertheless, 
Gard emphasized that even during the Bush years North Korea received some 
benefits.  The U.S. also managed to convince Pyongyang to “disable its Yongbyon 
nuclear facilities, stop transferring nuclear materials or technology abroad, and 
disclose the details of its plutonium program.”24     
In short, regardless of the perception that North Koreans always cheat, 
there is evidence that some progress can be made by negotiating with Pyongyang, 
especially when Washington and Pyongyang are able to establish trust.  Although 
there is no guarantee the North Koreans will give up their nuclear weapons simply 
because the U.S. is willing to negotiate, it is still plausible to argue much more can 
be accomplished by seriously addressing some of their security concerns to build 
trust.  The U.S. must acknowledge North Korea has valid security concerns 
because it truly believes it no longer has any patron that can provide extended 
nuclear deterrence, unlike South Korea.  More importantly, Washington must 
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remember that the South Koreans also pursued their own nuclear weapons in the 
early 1970s when they sensed abandonment by the U.S., and this effort continued 
periodically until 2000.  Seoul was finally exposed in 2004 as a nuclear 
“proliferation-problem.”25  For negotiations to work, the U.S. must have some 
empathy for North Korea’s position to improve the probability of success.26  The 
key is to show long-term commitment to the diplomatic process and that may 
require a bold move such as a U.S. nonaggression treaty with North Korea.  As 
noted in Chapter 7, Bush chose not to pursue this option in October 2003 but he 
offered to consider a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization in September 
2005.  The use of a more coercive strategy can succeed only if the U.S. is willing to 
pursue peaceful coexistence through long-term negotiations to gain the support of 
Beijing and Moscow before it considers options that risk instability or war in Korea. 
Finally, what are the policy positions and preferences of the powers in the 
region?  According to Xu Beina, Beijing does not support Washington’s use of 
coercive power to influence North Korean behavior.  The Chinese view 
Washington’s “sanctions and pressure tactics… as humiliating and 
counterproductive.”27  However, the reported H-bomb test in January 2016 could 
present a short-term opportunity for the U.S. to gain the support of Beijing to 
pressure Pyongyang, especially if the U.S. shows restraint by demonstrating its 
willingness to return to negotiations.  By giving Kim Jong-un another opportunity to 
live up to his obligations to denuclearize, it will be more difficult for China and 
others to protect the Kim regime.  Without doing more to engage Pyongyang, 
Beijing is unlikely to welcome U.S. actions that could bring instability to North 
Korea.  In fact, Han Kwan-soo argues that if current estimates are correct a half-
million North Korean refugees could migrate across the China-North Korea border 
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during a period of North Korean instability.  This could start “a secessionist 
movement” in Northeast China where there are over two million ethnic Korean-
Chinese and 300,000 North Korean refugees.  It could also encourage other ethnic 
minorities in China to secede and embolden Taiwan as well.  Beijing’s other core 
interests in North Korea include U.S. military intervention across the DMZ.  No 
matter what the intent of U.S. intervention in North Korea is – humanitarian 
assistance, securing WMD, or general war – China would be threatened by a 
prospect of “a pro-American Korean Peninsula.”28  Hence, without support from 
Beijing, the use of force against North Korea may not achieve denuclearization or 
reunification. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the North has constantly called for reunification 
over the years and it has also become an important issue for South Korea.  
According to Kim Byung-yeon, the South Koreans appear to be divided on the 
issue as the ruling conservative party supports “rapid reunification while the 
opposition [progressive] party is supporting gradual reunification.”29  Perhaps this is 
why Chung Chong-wook, vice chairman of the Presidential Committee for 
Unification Preparation, had to retract his statement that “Seoul was secretly 
planning to assimilate the North by force.”  Many in South Korea were not 
convinced by Chung’s subsequent back-pedaling that “peaceful unification is the 
only choice to bring the two Koreas together.”  Paik Hak-soon of the Sejong 
Institute argued this hardline approach would only reinforce Pyongyang’s 
perception that Seoul is trying to “tear down and assimilate its regime” with its 
reunification policy.30  This suggests the ability, at least for a conservative 
government in Seoul, to rapidly induce Pyongyang to accept peaceful reunification 
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would be nearly impossible.  A confederation that promotes one country, two 
systems is a more plausible option even though it would take longer to achieve 
reunification.  This would allow U.S. troops to remain in South Korea until 
significant progress is made on denuclearization and reunification before a peace 
treaty is signed.    
According to Ponomareva and Rudov, Moscow believes Seoul and 
Washington ignore recent offers by Pyongyang to engage because both hope 
North Korea will collapse.  On the contrary, Russia interprets Pyongyang’s 
behavior as its “search for a new place and role in global politics.”  More 
importantly, Moscow empathizes with the North’s behavior by highlighting U.S. and 
South Korean hardline policy toward North Korea.  For example, the Russians 
argue combined U.S.-South Korean military exercises that simulate U.S. and South 
Korean troops “‘storming and taking over Pyongyang’” are provocative.  Moscow 
“opposes vigorously any attempt to solve the problem with the use of force, threats, 
pressure or regime change technologies, like in Georgia, Kyrgyztan, Libya, Syria or 
Ukraine.”  Hence, it claims the North Korean nuclear issue can be resolved only 
when “‘the legitimate interests of security of each and every country in the region, 
including the DPRK,” is carefully considered through bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy. Russia would even consider hosting a summit with Kim Jong-un since it 
believes “it is the direct communication of leaders that may dramatically change the 
situation over North Korea’s problem and possibly result in a breakthrough.”31  
These sentiments are not surprising since Leonid Petrov argues that Russia views 
Pyongyang as a victim of a U.S. policy “that punishes anyone who refuses to 
dance to Washington’s tune.”  Petrove claims Moscow expects no change to the 
status quo until another progressive party comes to power in Seoul and persuades 
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the U.S. “to accommodate North Korea.”32  This does not bode well for U.S. 
hardline policy toward the North, especially the use of force since Moscow has 
demonstrated it can play a spoiler role in Syria.     
On the other hand, Tokyo claimed in late October 2015 that its forces could 
conduct military operations in North Korea to address the North Korean threat 
without Seoul’s permission.33  This was a major concern for Seoul at the time but 
South Korea and Japan agreed to resolve the “comfort women” issue in early 
January 2016, and the H-bomb test re-galvanized U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
security cooperation.  Senior diplomats from the three countries met in Tokyo and 
announced on January 16, 2016, that they would work together to “draft a stronger” 
UNSC Resolution to close the “loopholes” in the existing sanctions regime.  They 
called on China to “fully cooperate and collaborate with the international 
community,” and pledged to hold regular trilateral meetings.34  Some in South 
Korea had been arguing that Park’s “Trustpolitik” has not worked and urged her to 
“lean more to engagement.”35  However, after the provocations in early 2016, it is 
clear the U.S. and its allies are unwilling to reward Pyongyang by returning to the 
6PT and will pursue tougher sanctions against the North.  Nevertheless, Beijing 
has little incentive to cooperate fully with the U.S. since it perceives that 
Washington is promoting an anti-China strategy to oppose nearly all its efforts to 
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increase China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region.36  Therefore, tougher 
sanctions most likely will not work and only give the Kim regime more time to 
develop a survivable nuclear deterrent.   
In conclusion, now is the time to test Pyongyang by committing to long-term 
engagement to change North Korea from within, but after the alleged H-bomb test 
the implementation of this approach will require Presidential leadership to deal with 
the anticipated criticisms from hardliners, to garner bureaucratic and Congressional 
support, and to reassure Seoul and Tokyo.  As former Senator (and now Secretary 
of State) John Kerry noted in 2011, “”We must get beyond the political talking point 
that engaging North Korea is somehow ‘rewarding bad behavior.’  It is not.  We will 
set the time and place and we will negotiate in good faith.  Talks will be based on 
our national security interests and those of our allies.”  Kerry also warned, “We 
don’t know what renewed diplomatic engagement can accomplish.  We do know 
this: Our silence invites a dangerous situation to get worse.”37  The North Korean 
problem has indeed gotten worse and, unless we are prepared to engage in good 
faith, North Korea will soon threaten the U.S. with nuclear ICBMs.  The use of 
diplomacy at 6PT can leverage Beijing’s and Moscow’s desire for North Korean 
denuclearization to pressure Pyongyang more effectively than sanctions.  Time has 
come to fully engage Pyongyang and that will demonstrate Washington is willing to 
show restraint and coexist.  However, time is running out on Pyongyang if it 
continues to expand its nuclear weapons and related programs.  What this means 
is that, unlike the current approach with Iran, the U.S. must address the North 
Korean nuclear issue by fundamentally changing the U.S.-North Korea relationship.  
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This realization suggests Nye’s smart power framework can also be used to 
conduct future areas of research, such as the examination of how relatively weaker 
authoritarian regimes such as Iran and Russia may be using smart power to 
achieve their aims.   
For instance, what does the application of the smart power framework 
suggest about Iran’s strategic behavior in Iraq before and after the U.S. military 
intervention in 2003?  What does smart power theory suggest about the Iran 
nuclear deal?  Was Russia’s intervention in Syria part of its smart power strategy to 
regain its influence in the Middle East?  Is Russia using smart power in the Near 
Abroad to restore its lost empire?  The results of such research could validate 
Nye’s smart power framework as an analytical tool and enhance understanding of 
Iran’s and Russia’s behavior.  This chapter has highlighted the findings of this 
unique study which attempted for the first time to apply Nye’s smart power theory 
methodically to understand a very difficult problem – North Korea.  It did so by 
using a multi-case study that for the first time examined North Korea’s provocations 
from the Korean War to August 2015.  Finally, I have also assumed Nye’s smart 
power theory can be used as a hypothesis to support abductive research strategies.  
However, this requires further research by exploring questions such as those I 
have offered for future research.  With respect to current U.S. policy toward 
Pyongyang, it is clear the status quo is not working and it is time for the U.S. to 
exercise smart power of its own to resolve the North Korea problem.   
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Appendix A 
Members of the South Korean Army Founders Association and Their Ties to the Japanese 
Military 
Number/Name  
Occupation During 
Colonial Period 
Rank Attained in the South Korean Army 
10001/Lee Hyung-gun Captain, Japanese 
Army 
One of three officers to be promoted to Four-
stars during the Korean War (along with Chung 
Il-kwon and Paik Sun-yup). 
Commanded 2
nd
 Infantry Division during the 
Korea War and Served as CJCS from 1954-
1956 and Army Chief of Staff from 1956 to 
1957 
10002/Chae Byung-
Duk 
Major, Japanese Army Army Chief of Staff during the opening days of 
the Korean War, was relived and killed in 
action on July 25, 1950. 
10003/Yu Jae-Hung Japanese Army 
service, Tokyo Security 
Command 
Served as 7
th
 Infantry Division Commander 
during the Korean War and also served as 
Corps Commander.  Later served as CJCS 
from 1957-1959.  
10004/Jang Sok-yun (Japanese) 
Manchurian Army  
Retired as Colonel. 
10005/Chung Il-Kwon Japanese Army Served as Regimental and Division 
Commander, and later became Army Chief of 
Staff from 1954-1956.  One of the three original 
four-star generals promoted during the Korean 
War. 
10006/Yang Guk-jin Captain in the 
Manchurian Army 
Served in the Korean National Police and 
became its first “Chief.”  He was the ROK Army 
G-4 (Logistics) and retired as a Lieutenant 
General. 
10007/Mun Yi-jong Unknown Discharged as 2
nd
 Lieutenant only after two 
months in the Constabulary (later became the 
Army). 
10008/Kim Hung-jun Manchurian Army Discharged as 2
nd
 Lieutenant only after six 
months in the Constabulary. 
10009/Lee Young-sun Japanese Naval Officer Discharged as a Colonel and worked as a 
translator for the U.S. military during the 
Korean War. 
10010/Choi Ju-jong Manchurian Army Served as 8
th
 Division Commander before 
retiring as Major General. 
10011/Choi Kyong-
nok 
Japanese Army Officer Served as Division Commander and later 
became Army Chief of Staff from 1960-1961. 
10012/Lee Chun-
kyung 
Senior NCO in the 
Japanese Army 
Served in the “support” field before 
commanding a division and retired as a 
brigadier general. 
10013/Jang Chang-
guk 
Japanese Army Officer Commanded the 9
th
 Infantry Regiment on Jeju 
Island in 1947.  Served as CJCS from 1965-
1967. 
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10014/Lee Byung-jo Unknown Left the Constabulary as a major in 1947 
because of his involvement with the 
Communists. 
10015/Lee Sang-Jin Unknown Left the Army as a major in 1949 because of 
his involvement with the Communists. 
 
10016/Kim Young-
hwan 
Japanese Army Officer South Korean Air Force pilot who was missing 
in action during the Korean War. 
10017/Kim Mun-bong Japanese Army Commanded Second ROK Army that control 
the rear area and retired as a Lieutenant 
General. 
10018/Min Ki-sik Served in the 
Japanese Army and 
then transferred to 
become an officer in 
the Manchurian Army 
Commanded the 25
th
 Infantry Division, the First 
ROK Army, and ROK Army Chief of Staff from 
1963-1965. 
10019/Im Sun-ha Japanese Army Officer Retired as Major General. 
10020/Pak Byung-
kwon 
Infantry Lieutenant in 
the Japanese Army 
Retired as Lieutenant General and became 
Minister of Defense from 1961-1963. 
10021/Pak Ki-Byung Japanese Military 
Police Officer 
He was unusual for a Constabulary officer 
because he could not speak English.  He 
commanded an infantry division before retiring 
as a major general. 
10022/ Shim On-bong Japanese Army Officer He retired as a Lieutenant General. 
10023/Paik In-yup Japanese Army Officer Commanded the 17
th
 Infantry Regiment that 
was cut off from the Ongjin Peninsula during 
the opening days of the Korean War.  Served 
as Division and Corps commander and retired 
as a Lieutenant General. 
10024/An Jung-hwa Unknown Left the Constabulary as a 2
nd
 Lieutenant in 
1946. 
10025/Yun Byung-ho Unknown Left the Constabulary as a Major in 1947. 
10026/Won In-sup Unknown Left the Constabulary as 2
nd
 Lieutenant in 
1946. 
10027/Won Tae-sup Japanese Army Officer Served as finance officer and retired as a 
Brigadier General. 
10028/Cho Am Unknown Killed in action as Lieutenant Colonel in August 
1950. 
10029/Lee Jong-suk Japanese Army 
Service 
Chief of Transportation and retired as brigadier 
general. 
10030/Kim Jong-kap Japanese Army Officer Served as Corps commander and retired as a 
lieutenant general.  Served as Vice Minister of 
Defense from 1956-1957. 
10031/Kim Jong-oh Japanese Army 
Service 
Served as Vice Army Chief of Staff and CJCS 
from 1960-1965 and simultaneously served as 
Army Chief of Staff from 1961-1963.  Retired 
as four star general. 
10032/Pak Dong-
Gyun 
Medical Officer in the 
Manchurian Army 
Served in the medical field and retired as a 
Major General. 
10033/Ha Jae-pal Unknown Left the Constabulary within weeks of being 
commissioned as 2
nd
 Lieutenant in 1946. 
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10034/Lee Chi-Op Japanese Army Officer Commanded Regiment During the Korean 
War, and later commanded the 27
th
 Infantry 
Division, and retired as a Brigadier General. 
10035/Kim Kye-won Japanese Army Officer Retired as four star general and served as 
head of the Korea CIA. 
10036/Yu Hae-jun Served in the 
Manchurian Army 
before defecting to the 
Chinese Army during 
WWII. 
Retired as Major General. 
10037/Lee Song-ga Served as Major in the 
Chinese Nationalist 
Army under Chiang 
Kai-shek. 
Commanded the 8
th
 Infantry Division during the 
Korean War, and retired as Major General. 
10038/Ham Byung-
son 
Japanese Army Officer Served as Corps Commander before retiring 
as a Lieutenant General. 
10039/Yu Hung-su Cavalry Officer in the 
Japanese Army 
Commanded a Division in ROK Army I Corps 
and retired as a Brigadier General. 
10040/Chung Rae-
hyuk 
Unknown Commanded the 27
th
 Infantry Division and 
retired as Lieutenant General. 
10041/Won Young-
duk 
Lieutenant Colonel in 
the Manchurian Army 
medical corps. 
Served as ROK armed forces Provost Marshal 
and retired as a lieutenant general in 1962. 
10042/Kim Dong-
young 
Born in Hawaii He left for the U.S. after serving in the Army as 
a Lieutenant Colonel and returned to serve in 
Korea as a US Army private. 
10043/Kim Byung-kil Served in Japanese 
Army 
Served as Deputy Commander, 8
th
 Infantry 
Division and retired as a Brigadier General. 
10044/Choi Hung-Hee Japanese Army Retired as a Major General. 
10045/Kim Hyong-il Japanese Army Served as both Division Commander and 
Intelligence Officer, and retired as Lieutenant 
General. 
10046/Hwang Hon-
chin 
Japanese Army Officer Served as Chief of the Adjutant General Corps 
and retired as a Brigadier General. 
10047/Kim Ik-yol Japanese Army Served in Jeju Island during the counter 
insurgency in 1948 and became a Division and 
Corps Commander before retiring as a 
Lieutenant General. 
10048/Chung Man-ki Unknown Killed in Action during the Korean War; 
posthumously promoted to Brigadier General. 
10049/An Dong-sun Japanese Army Officer Served as an Ordnance Officer and retired as 
Brigadier General. 
10050/Ham Jun-Ho Japanese Army Killed in action while serving as Regimental 
Commander in June 1950, and posthumously 
promoted to Brigadier General. 
10051/Choi Young-
hee 
Japanese Army Officer Served as Corps and Army Commander before 
serving as ROK Army Chief of Staff in 1960.  
Later served as Minister of Defense in 1968. 
10052/Mun Young-
chae 
Captain in the 
Manchurian Army 
In charge of the police on Jeju Island, and 
retired as a Brigadier General in 1959. 
 
 480 
 
10053/Choi Nam-gun Manchurian Army Discharged from the Army as a Lieutenant 
Colonel for being a Communist. 
10054/Paik Sun-yup Manchurian Army 
Officer 
Born in Pyongyang, he commanded the ROK 
Army 1
st
 Infantry Division at the start of the 
Korean War, and participated in the Armistice 
negotiations.  He was one of three original four 
star generals at the end of the Koran War.   He 
later served twice as the ROK Army Chief of 
Staff and CJCS from 1959-1960.  He retired as 
Korea’s most decorated soldier. 
10055/Kim Paik-il Manchurian Army Served as Deputy Army Chief of Staff when the 
Korean War started and commanded I Corps 
and was killed in an airplane crash in March 
1951. 
10056/Lee Han-rim Manchurian Army Served as Corps Commander and retired as a 
Lieutenant General and became the Minister of 
Transportation. 
 
10057/Chung Jin-
hwan 
Japanese Army Served as the Chief of the Signal Corps and 
retired as a Major General. 
10058/Shin Sang-chul Japanese Army Officer Chief of the Military Police before the Korean 
War and commanded the 7
th
 Infantry Division 
during the war.  He retired as a Major General 
in the ROK Air Force. 
10059/Oh Duk-jun Japanese Army Officer  Survived the atomic bombing at Hiroshima, 
and served as the commander of III Corps and 
retired as a Major General. 
10060/Kwon Sok-pil Unknown Discharged from the Constabulary as a 2
nd
 
Lieutenant after one month. 
10061/Han In-jun Unknown Discharged from the Constabulary as a 2
nd
 
Lieutenant after four month. 
10062/Kim Jong-myon Japanese Army Officer Served as the Chief of the Intelligence (G-2) 
during the Constabulary period (before it 
became an army), and retired as a Brigadier 
General. 
10063/Paik Sun-jin Japanese Army Deputy logistics officer (G-4) for the Army and 
retired as a Major General. 
10064/Suh Byung-ki Japanese Army Served as a ordnance officer before retiring as 
a Brigadier General in 1961. 
10065/Choi Chang-
mu 
Unknown Discharged from the Constabulary as a 2
nd
 
Lieutenant after 2 months. 
10066/Ui Jae-hwa Unknown Discharged from the Army as a colonel after 3 
and a half years of service. 
10067/Cho Byung-gun Unknown He defected to North Korea during the Korean 
War. 
10068/Kim Hyun-su Japanese Army Served in Psychological Operations unit and 
was killed on the third day of the Korean War, 
and posthumously promoted to Brigadier 
General. 
10069/Paik Nam-
kwon 
Japanese Army Retired as a Major General. 
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10070/Kim Jong-sok Unknown Discharged from the Constabulary as a 
Lieutenant Colonel in 1948. 
10071/Kim Wan-
young 
Japanese Army Served as Judge Advocate Corps and retired 
as a Major General. 
10072/Oh Il-gyun Unknown He defected to North Korea during the Korean 
War. 
10073/Choi Sang-min Unknown Discharged as a Major in 1948. 
10074/Kim Byung-
Hwui 
Japanese Army Retired as a Major General. 
10075/Choi Suk Japanese Army Officer Commanded 3
rd
 Infantry Division during the 
Korean War, and retired as a Lieutenant 
General. 
10076/Kim Sang-bok Japanese Army Retired as a Lieutenant General and served as 
the Minister of Home Affairs. 
10077/Kim Young-bae Japanese Army Officer Served as Assistant Division Commander 
during the Korean War and served as the Army 
Chief of Staff from 1965-1966. 
10078/Kim Ki-hung Unknown Discharged as a 2
nd
 Lieutenant after 10 months 
in the Constabulary. 
10079/Lee Hoo-rak Japanese Military Retired as a Major General and served as  
Director of the Korea CIA. 
10080/Jang Do-young Japanese Army Served as Army Chief of Staff for four months 
in 1961 and also served as the Minister of 
Defense in 1961. 
10081/Lee Sang-chul Japanese Army Retired as Major General. 
10082/Lee Hee-Kwon Japanese Army Officer Retired as Brigadier General and Immigrated 
to the U.S. 
10083/Kim Sang-kil Unknown Discharged from the Constabulary as a 
Captain in 1947. 
10084/Jang Ho-jin Japanese Army Retired as Brigadier General. 
10085/Lee Chang-il Unknown Killed during the Korean War as a Colonel. 
10086/Min Byung-
Kwun 
Japanese Army Officer Served as Army Adjutant General and retired 
as Lieutenant General. 
10087/Jang Woo-sok Unknown Discharged as 2
nd
 Lieutenant after 8 months in 
the Constabulary. 
10088/Paik In-ki Unknown Died in 1948 as a Lieutenant Colonel and 
posthumously promoted to Brigadier General. 
10089/Lee Hyun-jae Unknown Left the Constabulary as a Lieutenant Colonel. 
10090/Na Jong-ha Unknown Discharged as 2
nd
 Lieutenant after 4 months in 
the Constabulary. 
10091/Pak Jin-kyung Japanese Army 
Engineer Officer 
Commanded the 9
th
 Infantry Regiment but was 
assassinated by insurgents on Jeju Island in 
1948. 
10092/Han Chun Unknown Discharged as a 2
nd
 Lieutenant after 10 months 
in the Constabulary. 
10093/Kim Il-hwan Finance Officer in the 
Manchurian Army 
Served as Finance Officer and retired as a 
Lieutenant General. 
10094/Oh Kyu-bom Unknown Discharged from the Army as a Lieutenant 
Colonel in 1949. 
10095/Choi Chang-un Japanese Army Served as the Chief of Transportation and 
retired as Lieutenant General in 1966. 
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10096/Song Yo-chan NCO in the Japanese 
Army 
Served initially in the Korean National Police 
and commanded the Capital Division during 
the Korean War and later commanded the 1
st
 
ROK Army.  He also served as Army Chief of 
Staff from 1959-1960 and served as Minister of 
Defense in 1961. 
10097/Na Hak-son Unknown Discharged from the Army as a Major in 1949. 
10098/Lee Paik-woo Japanese Army Commanded the 26
th
 Regiment but deserted 
the unit during the Korean War.  He retired as 
a Brigadier General in 1959. 
10099/Jang Un-san Japanese Army He was discharged as a Lieutenant Colonel in 
July 1950. 
10100/Kim Ung-su Japanese Army Officer Retired as a Major General. 
10101/Kang Young-
hun 
Japanese Army Officer Served as a regimental commander during the 
Korean War and later as 6
th
 Corps 
Commander, and retired as a Lieutenant 
General. 
10102/Lee Ji-Hyung Japanese Army Served in the Judge Advocate Corps and 
retired as Brigadier General. 
10103/Lee Sun-young Manchurian Army Served in the Finance Corps and retired as a 
Brigadier General. 
10104/Kim Jong-mun Japanese Army Served in Psychological Operations and retired 
as a Major General. 
10105/Pak Hyun-su Japanese Army Retired as Major General. 
10106/Pak Kyung-
won 
Japanese Army Retired as Lieutenant General and served as 
the Minister of Home Affairs. 
10107/Shin Hak-jin Manchurian Army A medical doctor and served as the Army 
Surgeon General and retired as Major General. 
10108/Lee Myung-jae Japanese Army Served as commander of 8
th
 Infantry Division 
and retired as Major General. 
10109/Yun Su-hyun Manchurian Army Served in the Quartermaster Corps and retired 
as Brigadier General. 
10110/Lee Ung-jun Japanese Army 
Colonel 
U.S. Army leaders were hesitant to let him 
assume a publicly important role in the ROK 
Army because he had risen so high in the 
Japanese military, fearing an anti-Japanese 
backlash.  He served as Inspector General and 
3
rd
 Division Commander.  He was promoted to 
Lieutenant General and served as the first 
Army Chief of Staff from 1948-1949.  He is 
considered to be the father of the ROK Army. 
 
Source: General Lee, Chi-op, Call Me “Speedy Lee”: Memoirs of a Korean War Soldier (Seoul, 
Korea: WonMin Publishing House, 2001), pp. 215-239.   
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Appendix B 
North Korea’s 8-Point Program of National Salvation Declared on April 13, 
1971 
1. To make the US imperialist aggressor troops withdraw from south Korea and 
solve the national question by the efforts of the Korean people themselves on the 
principle of national self-determination. 
2. To reduce the armed forces in north and south Korea to 100,000 or less 
respectively and lighten the heavy burdens of military expenditure to relax the 
tension and guarantee a durable peace in our country and jointly counter the 
aggression by the US imperialists and the Japanese militarists. 
3. To abolish and declare invalid the south Korea-US “mutual defence pact”, the 
south Korea-Japan “agreements” and all other treacherous and shackling treaties 
and agreements concluded with foreign countries against the interests of the nation 
and oppose all forms of interference in the domestic affairs by foreign aggressive 
forces and attain national sovereignty. 
4. To hold free north-south general elections on the principles of universal, equal 
and direct suffrage by secret ballot in a completely democratic atmosphere in 
which the freedom of expression of the will by the people is fully guaranteed, 
without interference from any outside forces, and establish a unified democratic 
central government representing the general will of the entire Korean people. 
5. To ensure democratic rights to the people of all walks of life in south Korea, such 
as the freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, demonstration and 
strike, release all the political offenders who have been arrested and imprisoned on 
charges of having called for the peaceful unification of the fatherland and 
guarantee the conditions for freely conducting political activities in any area of the 
country to all the political parties, public organizations and individual personages of 
north and south Korea. 
6. To establish prior to complete reunification, if need be, a Confederation of north 
and south Korea as a transitional step for solving the urgent problems of common 
concern of the nation and hastening national reunification, leaving the differing 
socio-political systems in the north and the south as they are. 
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7. To promote the economic interchange and mutual cooperation in the spheres of 
science, culture, arts and sports between the north and south and realize the travel 
of personages and correspondence to alleviate the suffering of the people resulting 
from the split and restore the severed ties of the nation. 
8. To hold a north-south political consultative meeting for discussing immediate 
tasks of the nation and solving the question of the country’s reunification. 
Reunification Program of the DPRK (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1982), pp. 89-90. 
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Appendix C 
DPRK Releases Memorandum on U.S. Hostile Policy on August 31, 2012 
 
The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea released a 
memorandum Friday, terming the U.S. hostile policy towards DPRK the main 
obstacle in resolving the nuclear issue. 
Following is the full text of the memorandum: 
On July 20 last, the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced that it has reached the point of having to 
completely reexamine the nuclear issue due to the continued U.S. hostile policy 
towards the DPRK. 
The U.S. hostile policy is the root cause that has turned the Korean peninsula into 
the most dangerous hotspot in the world and it is also the main obstacle to durable 
peace and stability. 
The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is none other than the outcome of the 
U.S. hostile policy and therefore, only when the U.S. abandons its hostile policy, 
will it be possible to resolve the issue.  
The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the DPRK issues the following memorandum 
to shed light on the contrast between the U.S. claim of having no hostile intent 
towards the DPRK and its actual behavior.  
1. The hostile concept that blocks the settlement of the nuclear issue 
An important agreement was announced on February 29, 2012 as a result of the 
high-level talks between the DPRK and U.S. The U.S. reaffirmed that "it no longer 
has hostile intent towards the DPRK and that it is prepared to take steps to 
improve the bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and 
equality and agreed to provide a substantive amount of food assistance to the 
DPRK. The DPRK, considering the concerns of the U.S., agreed to a moratorium 
on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches and uranium enrichment activity 
while productive dialogues continue. 
However, when the DPRK launched the "Kwangmyongsong 3”, an artificial satellite 
for peaceful purposes, on April 13 last, the U.S. took issue with it, arguing that the 
space launch was based on the same technology with the long-range missile 
launch and went ahead with unilaterally abrogating the February 29 Agreement, 
upgrading sanctions on the DPRK. 
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It is true that both satellite carrier rocket and missile with warhead use the similar 
technology. However, when other countries conduct satellite launch, the U.S. 
neither takes an issue with any of it, calling it a missile launch, nor takes actions 
like imposing sanctions. The U.S. saw our satellite carrier rocket as a long-range 
missile that would one day reach the U.S. because it regards the DPRK as an 
enemy. 
That is the reason why the ever-first agreement reached between the DPRK and 
the U.S. since the Obama administration took office ended up with failure as other 
previous DPRK-U.S. agreements.  
At the beginning of DPRK-U.S. bilateral talks held during the Clinton administration, 
the U.S. pledged on “assurances against the threat and use of force, including 
nuclear weapons.” (DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, June 11, 1993) 
At the final stage of the bilateral talks, the U.S. agreed to “move towards full 
normalization of the political and economic relations” with the DPRK. (DPRK-U.S. 
Agreed Framework, October 21, 1994) 
The U.S. also declared that it would not have hostile intent towards the DPRK. 
(DPRK-U.S. Joint Communique, October 12, 2000) 
However, all these commitments were not honored but were broken off overnight 
with the change of each U.S. administration. 
The Bush administration turned down all the DPRK-U.S. agreements reached 
during the Clinton administration, listed the DPRK as an "axis of evil" and singled it 
out as a target of preemptive nuclear strike. (State of the Union Address, January 
30, 2002 and Nuclear Posture Review, March 2002) 
The extremely dangerous hostile policy pursued by the Bush administration forced 
the DPRK to withdraw completely from the NPT and direct its peaceful nuclear 
power industry for producing electricity to the building-up of self-defensive nuclear 
deterrent. 
At the six-party talks, the U.S. affirmed that it has "no intention to attack or invade 
the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons". (Joint Statement of the Six-Party 
Talks, September 19, 2005) 
As action steps to implement the September 19 Joint Statement, the U.S. gave 
assurances that it would improve the relations with the DPRK and move towards 
the full diplomatic relations. (Six-Party Talks Agreements, February 13 and October 
3, 2007) 
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However, four years has elapsed since the last round of the six-party talks, which 
was held in December 2008 and it is not yet resumed. During the intervening time, 
the level of U.S. hostility towards the DPRK was not lowered but further increased. 
The first step the Obama administration took towards the DPRK was taking issue 
with the DPRK's launch of peaceful satellite “Kwangmyongsong 2”. 
The U.S. extreme hostile policy aimed at depriving the DPRK of its sovereign right 
for peaceful use of the outer space, the right recognized by international law, called 
upon the DPRK's self-defensive response, namely another nuclear test. It again led 
to the repetition of the vicious cycle of mistrust and confrontation; the U.S. imposed 
ever-harsh sanctions on the DPRK and the DPRK responded by starting the 
construction of light-water reactor (LWR) on its own and the production of enriched 
uranium to meet the fuel need for the LWR.  
The reality proves that unless the long held hostile concept of the U.S. towards the 
DPRK is rooted out as a whole, nothing can be resolved but the confrontation and 
the risk of conflict would rather increase. 
In the early stages of the DPRK-U.S. talks, the DPRK maintained that the U.S. 
should first abandon its hostile policy, in order to resolve the nuclear issue, 
whereas the U.S. insisted that the DPRK should first give up its nuclear program in 
order to normalize the DPRK-U.S. relations.  
In the process, thanks to the sincerity and generosity of the DPRK, the principle of 
simultaneous action steps, known as "word for word" and "action for action", was 
agreed upon and served as the basis for the dialogue. 
The 20 year-long history of the talks between the DPRK and the U.S. has shown 
that even the principle of simultaneous action steps is not workable unless the 
hostile concept of the U.S. towards the DPRK is removed. 
2. The root of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK 
The hostile policy of the U.S. towards the DPRK has deep historical roots.  
Post-war generation in the U.S. and other countries has no proper understanding 
of the historical roots of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK; they do not 
know the fact that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula stems from the U.S. 
hostile policy towards the DPRK and even misunderstand that the U.S. is hostile to 
the DPRK because of the nuclear issue.  
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The fact is that the U.S. hostility towards the DPRK is not based on the nuclear 
issue of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK had no other choice but to develop 
nuclear weapons, because of the hostile policy and the increasing nuclear threat 
from the U.S. which is the world's biggest nuclear power. 
From the very beginning, the U.S. defined the DPRK as an enemy and refused to 
recognize its sovereignty. The U.S. continued to step up its hostile moves against 
the DPRK, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the political system of our 
people's choice.  
The institutional and legal mechanism against the DPRK has been in place long 
before the rise of the nuclear issue. Military attacks and nuclear threats aimed at 
eliminating our ideology and system have been openly committed, and economic 
sanctions and international pressure for isolating and suffocating the DPRK have 
been persistent. 
The end of World War II meant the beginning of the Cold War between the East 
and the West. 
The U.S. needed a bridgehead to contain the "southward expansion" of the then 
Soviet Union and to make an inroad into the Eurasian continent. It was out of this 
requirement that the U.S. hurriedly drew a line along the 38th parallel before the 
surrender of Japan in order to secure that bridgehead. This led to the tragic 
division of the Korean nation and its territory. 
For the U.S. engaged in the Cold War, the area south of the 38th parallel was its 
ally and that north of it was the enemy.  
It is a general international practice for the states to establish diplomatic relations 
with new independent sovereign state. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between countries does not necessarily mean specially favorable sentiment or 
close friendship; it is an indication of political stand that they regard each other as 
an equal part of the international community. 
Despite the differences in political ideology and system, the U.S. established 
diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries 
in the Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. refused even to call the DPRK by its 
official name, to say nothing of the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
The UN recognized the sovereignty of the DPRK when it joined it in 1991. The 
DPRK currently maintains diplomatic relations with 166 countries which account for 
about 86 per cent of the UN membership. The U.S., however, refuses to recognize 
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the DPRK as a sovereign state with whom it may co-exist in the international 
community. 
Out of 193 member states of the UN, only the DPRK, together with Iran and Cuba 
have no diplomatic ties with the U.S. This clearly shows that the U.S. pursues 
extremely hostile policy towards these countries unprecedented case in the history 
of contemporary international relations. 
Hostile policy of the U.S. towards the DPRK finds its most clear expression in 
military area. 
The DPRK and the U.S. have been technically at war against each other for more 
than sixty years even after the end of war; no comparable example can be found in 
the modern history. 
The Korean Armistice Agreement concluded on July 27, 1953, is by no means an 
agreement that officially ended the war. Nor is it a lasting peace treaty. The Korean 
Armistice Agreement was the transitional measure aimed at withdrawing all foreign 
troops from the Korean Peninsula and ensuring permanent peace. 
However, the U.S. deliberately chose to prolong the status of armistice. 
In November 1953, the U.S. defined as its ultimate goal on the Korean Peninsula 
to maintain the ceasefire regime, to make south Korea its "military ally" and prevent 
the spread of communism across the entire Korean Peninsula until "pro-U.S. 
unification" is achieved. (US NSC Resolution No. 170) 
Accordingly, the U.S. intentionally broke off the Geneva conference on peaceful 
resolution of the Korean issue in June 1954 and violated and nullified the key 
provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement step by step by introducing modern 
military equipment including nuclear weapons into south Korea and by stepping up 
aggressive military exercises. 
The U.S. turned down numerous peace proposals and initiatives put forward by the 
Government of the DPRK, such as the proposal for the conclusion of a peace 
treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. (1970s), tripartite talks proposal to include 
south Korea in the DPRK-U.S. talks (1980s), proposal for establishing a new peace 
mechanism (1990s).  
The DPRK, China, U.S. and south Korea sat for the four-party talks in the late 
1990s to set up a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. However, the 
talks could not produce any result, due to the absence of sincerity on the U.S. side.  
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At the beginning of the new century, the DPRK proposed that the signatories to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement sit together to discuss on declaring the end of the war 
and that the talks should be held to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace 
treaty on the occasion of the 60th year of the Korean War outbreak. (Declaration 
for the development of North-South relations and peace and prosperity, October 4, 
2007 and Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, January 11, 
2010). However, the U.S. turned a blind eye to all the above proposals. 
The U.S. remains unchanged in its dogged position as regards the peace 
proposals of the DPRK; the U.S. position is that the conclusion of peace treaty is 
premature and the ceasefire regime is to be maintained. This means that the U.S. 
would continue to regard the DPRK as its enemy and warring party. 
The U.S. has an array of different categories of war plans and scenarios targeting 
the DPRK, such as "OPLAN 5029", "OPLAN 5030", "OPLAN 5012", etc.; all these 
plans are for making the armed invasion of the DPRK and setting up its military 
rule. 
It is pursuant to these war plans that the U.S. keeps on conducting various kinds of 
joint military exercises, such as "Focus Retina", "Freedom Bolt", "Team Spirit", 
"RSOI", "Key Resolve", "Foal Eagle", "Ulji Freedom Guardian", etc. All the above 
exercises seek to achieve the same goal but are conducted in different names. 
The U.S. economic sanctions against the DPRK are an important tool for the 
pursuit of its long-standing hostile policy towards the DPRK. 
The U.S. curtails trade with the DPRK and imposes all sorts of economic sanctions 
on such accusations that DPRK threatens regional stability, does not cooperate 
with the U.S. in its anti-terrorism efforts, engage in proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and that the DPRK is communist state, nonmarket economy, etc. 
(U.S. Congressional Research Service Report, April 25, 2011) 
In particular, economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK before the rise of the 
nuclear issue have nothing to do with the nuclear issue and merely reflect the U.S. 
hostile concept towards the DPRK. 
Having defined the DPRK as a "Marxist-Leninist state with a communist 
government", the U.S. has long maintained sanctions against the DPRK. (Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) 
The U.S. began to apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to the DPRK from 
December 1950. A few days later, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued 
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Foreign Assets Control Regulations to forbid any financial transactions involving, or 
on behalf of, the DPRK. 
On June 26, 2008, more than half a century later, the then U.S. President Bush 
took measures to terminate the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
(TWEA) as regards the DPRK, pursuant to the agreement reached at the six-party 
talks. However, on the same day, Bush declared a state of emergency, saying that 
the weapons-usable fissile material in the possession of the DPRK constitutes an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the security of the U.S. and that other 
provisions of sanctions on the DPRK should remain effective under the terms of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies 
Act. It meant that all property and interests of the DPRK which had been blocked 
as of June 16, 2000, would remain to be blocked and that a U.S. national would not 
be allowed to register, own, lease, operate or insure a vessel flagged by the DPRK. 
The effectiveness of this measure has been intensified and extended annually by 
Obama who issued two Executive Orders, i.e. No. 13551 (August, 2010), and No. 
13570 (April, 2011). It means that the Trading with the Enemy Act, nominally no 
longer applicable to the DPRK? actually continues to maintain its effect under 
different name. 
The Trade Agreement Extension Act of the U.S. required the suspension of Most-
Favored-Nation trade status for all communist countries. However, this Act was 
applied to the DPRK as early as September 1, 1951, long before the establishment 
of the socialist system in the DPRK. As a result, the DPRK was denied normal 
trade relations with the U.S.  
The DPRK tops the list of countries to which the U.S. applies highest rate of tariff. It 
means that the DPRK would have to pay the highest tariff if it is to export its 
products to the U.S. The DPRK and Cuba are the only countries to which the U.S. 
applies this rule. The Trade Act of 1974 defined the DPRK as a communist state. 
Therefore, the DPRK is denied mutually preferential treatment in trade relations 
with the U.S. 
The extent of obsession with the hostile concept towards the DPRK on the part of 
the U.S. finds its clear expression in the terms and provisions of the U.S.-instigated 
United Nations Security Council resolution adopted in the wake of the DPRK's first 
nuclear test. The U.S. sneaked a provision that banned export and import of luxury 
goods as regards the DPRK? a provision that has no relevance at all to the nuclear 
issue, in the resolution and rushed it through. It was a mean and foolish plot to 
undermine the reputation of our supreme leadership and drive a wedge between 
the leadership and our people. 
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Although the U.S. nominally removed the designation of the DPRK from the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008, under the agreement reached in 
the course of the six-party talks, no sanctions on the DPRK had actually been 
eased or lifted in effect because those sanctions are overlapped by the different 
U.S. domestic laws under different pretexts. 
The sanctions listed above are only a tip of the iceberg of the economic sanctions 
which the U.S. applies to the DPRK. 
According to the 2006 statistics published by the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service, the U.S. imposes some forty different kinds of sanctions on the DPRK; 
however, only a quarter or so of these sanctions are based on the different political 
system. 
The remaining three quarters of the sanctions? sanctions under the pretext of 
"threat to the security of the U.S.", "proliferation of WMD", "sponsor of terrorism", 
"human rights", "religious freedom", "money laundering", "missile development", 
"human trafficking", etc., many of which are based on absurd allegations, are 
applied at the discretion of the U.S. President or relevant departments of the U.S. 
administration.  
It points to the unjustifiable discrepancy between the words and deeds of the U.S. 
administration that claims to having "no hostile intent". 
Since the roots remain to be there, it takes more than words to remove them, the 
hostile concept. 
3. To Renounce the Hostile Policy is a Prerequisite for the Settlement of Nuclear 
Issue 
The U.S. hostile policy pursued by the U.S. makes the prospect of denuclearizing 
the Korean peninsula all the more gloomy. 
At present stage, there is no possibility of the U.S. giving up its hostile policy 
towards the DPRK. The actions taken by the U.S. towards the DPRK gets more 
hostile day by day, despite the claims made by the U.S. authorities that they have 
"no hostile intent" towards the DPRK. 
In April this year, they flagrantly violated the sovereignty of the DPRK by unjustly 
challenging our peaceful satellite launch. In the wake of this, there occurred an 
unprecedented incident; the U.S. army stationed in south Korea fired live bullets to 
the DPRK national flag, taking it as the target.  
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This was followed by the extreme provocative action on the part of the U.S. 
intelligence institution which manipulated south Korean intelligence plot-breeding 
agency to fabricate the plot to demolish statues of the peerlessly great persons of 
Mt. Paektu. At the same time, the bilateral and tripartite aggression war exercises 
are on the increase between the U.S. and its followers in and around the Korean 
Peninsula and their offensive nature and scope are steadily expanded and 
strengthened. 
All facts show that the intensity of the U.S. hostility towards the DPRK is being 
escalated. 
This has a nexus with the U.S. new defense strategy made public by the Obama 
administration on January 5, 2012. 
This strategy envisages increasing the U.S. armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region 
to the level of 60 per cent of all its military stationed abroad by way of drawing 
down 10 percent of its armed forces stationed in Europe by 2020. 
In general, the arms build up necessitates justification of the "existence or threat of 
the enemy". The only country that the U.S. can consider as its enemy in Northeast 
Asia is the DPRK. Each of big countries normally would not describe the other as 
an enemy. It means that the U.S. will perceive the DPRK as its enemy for the 
purpose of augmenting its armed forces for such a long time so as to realize its 
new defense strategy. 
In addition, the new defense strategy does not guarantee that the U.S. will not 
occupy the whole Korean Peninsula through a direct armed invasion, in order to 
form its military encirclement around the big countries in Eurasia. 
The prevailing situation urges the DPRK to prevent the recurrence of war in the 
Korean Peninsula by all means and make up thoroughgoing preparations to wage 
a war for national reunification, in case the war is inevitably forced upon us. 
This is the motive and backdrop for us to completely reexamine our nuclear issue. 
The U.S. has two ways. 
One way is to make bold and fundamental change in its cold war mindset to 
renounce its anachronistic policy toward the DPRK, and thus contribute to the 
peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and pave the way for ensuring its own 
security. 
If the U.S. shows such courage in action, we will be willing to respond to it. 
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The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il said on August 4, 1997 that we did not 
intend to regard the U.S. as the sworn enemy but wished for the normalization of 
the DPRK-U.S. relations. 
The respected Marshal Kim Jong Un wants to open up a new chapter for the 
development of relations with the countries friendly towards us, unbound to the 
past. 
Another way is to continue down the U.S. hostile policy as of today, resulting in 
further expanding and building up of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. 
If the U.S. seeks to meet its further interests at the cost of sacrificing the DPRK's 
interests, it will be inevitably met by strong response from the DPRK.  
The DPRK has already emerged as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state, and the 
era when the U.S. threatened the DPRK with atomic bomb has gone by. We will 
not sit idle watching the increased hostile moves of the U.S. but will make every 
effort to defend the destiny of the country and the nation. 
It will be a great mistake to regard our strong position as a kind of tactics. 
We opted for building up nuclear deterrent, not because we wanted to trade it off 
for something but because we had to counter off the moves of the U.S., the biggest 
nuclear power in the world, aimed at eliminating the DPRK. 
Our nuclear deterrent for self-defense is a treasured sword that prevents war and 
ensures peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
If the U.S. does not make a right choice, the DPRK's nuclear possession will 
inevitably be prolonged, modernizing and expanding its nuclear deterrent capability 
beyond the U.S. imagination. 
KCNA, “DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in Resolving Nuclear Issue,” August 31, 
2012, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 11, 2014). 
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Appendix D 
North Korea’s Declaration as a Nuclear Weapons State on April 1, 2013 
A law on consolidating the position of nuclear weapons state for self-defence was 
adopted in the DPRK.  An ordinance of the Supreme People's Assembly of the 
DPRK in this regard was promulgated on Monday.  The ordinance said as follows: 
The DPRK is a full-fledged nuclear weapons state capable of beating back any 
aggressor troops at one strike, firmly defending the socialist system and providing 
a sure guarantee for the happy life of the people.  
Having an independent and just nuclear force, the DPRK put an end to the 
distress-torn history in which it was subject to outside forces' aggression and 
interference and could emerge a socialist power of Juche which no one dares 
provoke.  
The Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK decides to consolidate the position 
of the nuclear weapons state as follows: 
1. The nuclear weapons of the DPRK are just means for defence as it was 
compelled to have access to them to cope with the ever-escalating hostile policy of 
the U.S. and nuclear threat.  
2. They serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of 
the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the 
strongholds of aggression until the world is denuclearized.  
3. The DPRK shall take practical steps to bolster up the nuclear deterrence and 
nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity to cope with the gravity 
of the escalating danger of the hostile forces' aggression and attack.  
4. The nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of the 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army to repel invasion or attack from 
a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.  
5. The DPRK shall neither use nukes against the non-nuclear states nor threaten 
them with those weapons unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its 
invasion and attack on the DPRK.  
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6. The DPRK shall strictly observe the rules on safekeeping and management of 
nukes and ensuring the stability of nuclear tests.  
7. The DPRK shall establish a mechanism and order for their safekeeping and 
management so that nukes and their technology, weapon-grade nuclear substance 
may not leak out illegally.  
8. The DPRK shall cooperate in the international efforts for nuclear non-
proliferation and safe management of nuclear substance on the principle of mutual 
respect and equality, depending on the improvement of relations with hostile 
nuclear weapons states.  
9. The DPRK shall strive hard to defuse the danger of a nuclear war and finally 
build a world without nukes and fully support the international efforts for nuclear 
disarmament against nuclear arms race.  
10. The related institutions shall take thorough practical steps for implementing this 
ordinance. 
KCNA, “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” April 1, 2013, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed September 26, 2015). 
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Appendix E 
North Korea’s Declaration of the Byungjin Line on April 2, 2013 
The historic March 2013 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' 
Party of Korea, held on Sunday, set forth a new strategic line on carrying on the 
economic construction and the building of nuclear armed forces simultaneously 
under the prevailing situation to meet the legitimate requirement of the developing 
revolution. 
This line is aimed to beef up nuclear armed forces qualitatively and quantitatively 
with the U.S. nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being 
escalated. 
The line makes it possible for the DPRK to exert bigger efforts on economic 
construction while bolstering up the nation's defense capabilities with self-
defensive nuclear armed forces. 
It is a brilliant succession and development on a new higher stage of the unique 
line of simultaneously developing the economy and national defense, advanced 
and steadily maintained by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. 
At the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 4th WPK Central Committee in December Juche 
51 (1962), President Kim Il Sung advanced a unique and revolutionary line of 
developing the nation's economic construction and defense buildup 
simultaneously. 
The President chose the line with the belief that a country should defend itself with 
its own efforts. 
The strict implementation of the line turned the DPRK into a country, independent 
in politics, self-supporting in the economy and self-reliant in national defense, in the 
1960s. 
The country's self-reliant defense capabilities grew stronger under the Songun 
(military-first) politics pursued by leader Kim Jong Il. He had worked heart and soul 
to increase the military capability, stressing that top priority should be given to the 
military affairs and the defense industry serves as the key to building a thriving 
country. 
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The new strategic line represents the steadfast will of respected Marshal Kim Jong 
Un to build a powerful socialist nation on this land by successfully concluding the 
showdown with the U.S. by dint of the nuclear armed forces. 
KCNA, “New Strategic Line, Succession of Line of Simultaneously Developing Economy and 
Defense,” April 1, 2013, http://www.kcna.us/2013/04/02/news-27/ (accessed September 26, 2015). 
 
